Holden Stanley Agnew-Pople

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order for the child's residence to be returned to Petawawa, Ontario, and for disclosure of Family and Children’s Services records.

The respondent mother opposed, having unilaterally relocated the child to Grafton, Ontario, citing safety concerns and alleged abuse by the father.

The court found the respondent failed to provide proper notice of relocation as required by the Divorce Act and that her allegations of abuse were not sufficiently corroborated to excuse this requirement.

Applying the best interests of the child framework under the Divorce Act and principles from Plumley v. Plumley, the court ordered the child's residence to be returned to Petawawa, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the child's accustomed routine and relationship with both parents.

Disclosure of FCSRC records was also ordered.

The respondent brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss the applicant's claim for spousal support, arguing she had grossly repudiated their 50-year common law relationship by placing him in a long-term care facility.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and utilized its fact-finding powers under Rule 16 to determine the spousal support claim on a final basis.

The court rejected the respondent's argument that the applicant's conduct was unconscionable under s. 33(10) of the Family Law Act.

Finding the applicant entitled to support, the court ordered the respondent to pay $722 per month in accordance with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines to equalize the parties' net disposable incomes.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside the registration of an Australian child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The moving party failed to serve the Ontario Interjurisdictional Support Orders Unit (the designated authority) as required by section 20(3) of the Act and Rule 37(20)(c) of the Family Law Rules.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, allowing the moving party 20 days to recommence the motion and properly serve the designated authority, while extending a temporary stay of enforcement.

The moving parties sought summary judgment to validate Joan Cavanagh's 2014 will and dismiss Carolynn Sutherland's objection, which alleged the will was invalid due to a material mistake of fact regarding a $65,000 payment.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the testator was not mistaken about the payment, which was consideration for relinquishing an interest in a cottage, not repayment of a loan.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, validating the 2014 and 2011 wills and dismissing the objection.

The applicant sought an order declaring entitlement to a $20,000 deposit held in trust by Royal LePage Your Community Realty following a failed real estate transaction.

The purchasers defaulted on the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The court applied established principles regarding deposit forfeiture in real estate transactions, finding that the vendor is entitled to the deposit without proving actual damages when the purchaser defaults.

The vendor's damages exceeded the deposit amount.

The court ordered the deposit to be paid to the vendor.