Scott Reid

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The defence brought an application to preclude the Crown from bringing a hearsay application to admit the prior statements of a missing witness.

The defence argued the Crown failed to provide the required 30 days' notice under Rule 30.04 of the Superior Court Criminal Proceedings Rules and failed to promptly disclose that the witness could not be found.

The court found that while the police efforts to locate the witness were lacking and the Crown failed to comply with the notice rules, there was no improper motive.

The court concluded it was in the interests of justice to dispense with compliance with the rules, as the defence suffered no prejudice.

The defence applied to preclude the Crown from bringing a hearsay application to admit the prior videotaped statement and preliminary inquiry testimony of a missing victim in an attempted murder trial.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to comply with notice requirements under the Superior Court Criminal Proceedings Rules and that police efforts to locate the witness were insufficient.

The court found that while police efforts were inadequate and Crown disclosure of the witness's unavailability was late, there was no improper motive by the Crown.

The court dismissed the defence's application, concluding that it was in the interests of justice to permit non-compliance with the notice rules, as the defence was not prejudiced by the timing of the application itself, and the issues raised were relevant to the merits of the hearsay application.

The offender was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation after fleeing from police during a traffic stop.

He was found with 2.5 ounces of cocaine and had a significant criminal record including three prior convictions for the same offence.

The court emphasized specific and general deterrence, sentencing the offender to 30 months in custody for the drug offence and 90 days concurrent for the breach of probation.

The accused brought a pretrial application to exclude evidence of crack cocaine seized from a vehicle he was driving, alleging breaches of his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

After being pulled over for speeding, the accused fled the scene on foot and was later arrested.

The police towed the vehicle as abandoned under the Highway Traffic Act and discovered drugs during an inventory search.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle by fleeing, and that the police lawfully impounded and searched the vehicle.

The accused, a bank employee, was charged with fraud over $5,000 after allegedly providing customer identifying information to non-employees who used it to defraud customers.

The Crown sought to admit a statement the accused made to bank investigators during a workplace interview.

The Crown conceded the investigators were persons in authority.

The court found that the accused's statement was voluntary, as there were no threats, promises, or quid pro quo offers, and the accused spoke out of a desire to mitigate his obvious guilt rather than statutory or employer compulsion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

During a trial for attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, specifically his alleged membership in a street gang called the 'Clean Up Crew'.

The Crown argued this evidence was necessary to establish motive and animus, as the shooting was allegedly ordered by a gang leader.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the evidence was highly probative of motive, its prejudicial effect—the risk that the jury would convict based on gang membership alone—outweighed its probative value.

The Crown was permitted to lead evidence of the relationship between the parties without referencing gang affiliations.

During a jury trial for multiple robbery-related offences, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict on a count alleging use of an imitation firearm while committing a robbery under s. 85(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the directed verdict test and considered whether there was sufficient admissible evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that an imitation firearm was used in the robbery of the particular complainant.

While evidence supported that an imitation firearm was used in robberies against other victims during the same incident, there was no evidence that such a weapon was used in the robbery of the specific complainant named in Count 2.

The court held that party liability or common purpose principles could not substitute for proof that an imitation firearm was actually used in the commission of that robbery.

The motion for a directed verdict was granted and the count was dismissed.

The applicants, dissident shareholders of Oremex Silver Inc., requisitioned a shareholders' meeting.

The directors called a meeting for November but later postponed it to December, setting a new record date.

Just before the new record date, the directors issued 34.5 million shares to a third party in escrow, significantly diluting the applicants' voting power.

The applicants sought to confirm a meeting they held in November or, alternatively, to change the record date for the December meeting.

The court found the directors validly postponed the November meeting but improperly issued shares to manipulate the voting process for the December meeting.

The court ordered a new record date prior to the share issuance and appointed an independent chair for the December meeting.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on multiple firearm and weapons offences following a search warrant execution at the accused's residence.

The accused was charged with possession of prohibited firearms, unauthorized possession, careless storage, and related offences.

The Crown conceded insufficient evidence on one count of pointing a firearm.

The court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to commit on charges relating to "obtained by crime" and on charges relating to items found in a common basement area.

The court discharged the accused on counts relating to knowledge that firearms were obtained by crime due to lack of evidence of acquisition.

The court committed the accused to trial on counts relating to possession of items found in the basement based on circumstantial evidence of knowledge and control.

The court discharged the accused on a threatening death charge due to lack of evidence of communication of the threat.

Five police officers were convicted of attempting to obstruct justice, and three of them were also convicted of perjury, arising from a warrantless search of a drug suspect's apartment and subsequent false memo book entries and testimony to conceal the timing of the search.

The Crown sought penitentiary sentences of three to four years, while the defence sought non-custodial sentences.

The court considered the serious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence, but also weighed significant mitigating factors, including the catastrophic impact of the prolonged 14-year investigation and proceedings on the officers' lives, careers, and health.

The court concluded that a penitentiary term was not warranted and imposed a 45-day conditional sentence (house arrest) for each offender.

In Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings, the applicant sought an extension of the stay period, an increase to debtor-in-possession financing, authorization to honour pre-filing prepayments made by merchant customers for loyalty program points, and a variation of the initial order to defer statutory notice to certain creditors.

The court granted the stay extension and approved the increased DIP facility, finding the debtor had acted in good faith and required additional financing to continue operations during the sale and investor solicitation process.

The court also authorized the debtor to honour prepayments for loyalty points where doing so would preserve customer relationships and enhance prospects for a going‑concern sale, applying a cost‑benefit approach consistent with earlier CCAA jurisprudence permitting payment of certain pre‑filing obligations.

However, the court refused to vary the statutory notice requirements under s. 23 of the CCAA, emphasizing that transparency and creditor notification are foundational principles of CCAA proceedings.

The applicant corporation sought an Initial Order under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act to obtain protection from creditors and pursue restructuring options.

The evidence showed the corporation owed more than $11 million to creditors, had a significant working capital deficit, and faced termination of a key commercial agreement that generated most of its revenue.

The court found the statutory requirements of the CCAA were met, including insolvency and claims exceeding $5 million.

The court granted a 30‑day stay of proceedings, appointed a monitor, and approved administrative, directors’, and DIP lender charges to facilitate restructuring efforts.

The accused was charged with four criminal offences (driving while disqualified twice and failing to comply with probation twice) and two Highway Traffic Act offences (failing to remain at the scene of an accident and failing to report the accident).

At a judicial interim release hearing, the Crown sought detention on the secondary ground (public safety).

The accused's mother offered to act as surety with a $5,000 pledge and proposed a house arrest plan with parental supervision.

The court found the accused had an extensive criminal record with 32 convictions in six years, including 11 convictions in the eight months preceding the hearing.

Despite the proposed release plan appearing adequate on paper, the court was not satisfied it would be effective given the accused's pattern of non-compliance with court orders and disregard for conditions.

The court ordered detention on the secondary ground.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a pre‑trial application, the Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence against one accused in a prosecution for aggravated sexual assault involving alleged non‑disclosure of HIV‑positive status during sexual encounters.

The proposed evidence included testimony from other individuals alleging similar encounters, statements from a roommate suggesting non‑disclosure practices, and chat log communications from the accused’s computer.

Applying the governing framework for similar fact evidence articulated in R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence inconsistent, partially related to outstanding charges in another jurisdiction, and largely directed to propensity reasoning.

Concluding that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value, the court ruled the evidence inadmissible, while noting the ruling could be revisited depending on the evidence at trial.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

The defendants, charged with aggravated sexual assault for allegedly failing to disclose their HIV-positive status before engaging in consensual sexual acts with the complainants, brought a pre-trial application under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

They sought to cross-examine the complainants on their prior sexual activity, including casual and group sex, to challenge their credibility and their assertion that they would not have consented had they known of the defendants' HIV status.

The court granted the application, finding the proposed evidence highly relevant to the issue of whether consent was vitiated by fraud, and concluded its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice to the administration of justice.

In a pre-trial motion for charges of aggravated sexual assault related to HIV non-disclosure, the court assessed the admissibility of the accused's police statement.

The court found several issues with the police conduct, including a missing minute of video recording, improper communication between officers, and failure to provide sufficient information regarding outstanding warrants before the accused waived his right to counsel.

Crucially, police breached a remand warrant by returning the accused to the police station instead of a detention centre.

The court ruled the statement inadmissible, finding the Crown failed to prove voluntariness.