Scott Reid

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, unauthorized possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, wearing a disguise with intent, and occupying a vehicle with a firearm after shooting the victim in an apartment parking lot.

The court weighed the extreme gravity of the planned shooting and the offender's prior criminal record involving firearms against his youth, difficult background, and rehabilitative potential.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 125.25 months, which was reduced to 102 months after applying Summers and Duncan credits for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and related offences after a woman was shot multiple times by a masked man.

The Crown relied on the victim's recognition evidence, a photo line-up identification by the person who rented the getaway vehicle, and circumstantial evidence including DNA and GPS data.

The trial judge gave no weight to the victim's recognition evidence and little weight to the photo line-up due to reliability concerns.

However, the court found that the remaining circumstantial evidence, including the accused's DNA in the rented vehicle and his presence near where it was parked after the shooting, led to the only reasonable inference that he was the shooter.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The offender, a youthful first offender, was convicted of manslaughter following a trial for the stabbing death of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 11 years' imprisonment, while amicus curiae sought time served (69 months).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the use of a concealed knife and the vulnerability of the victim, against mitigating factors such as the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years' imprisonment, less 69 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months to serve.

The accused stabbed a stranger in a hospital and advanced on a police officer with a knife, resulting in the accused being shot.

He had a long history of schizophrenia and substance abuse.

The central issue was whether his psychosis at the time of the offences was a disease of the mind or a self-induced state caused by voluntary drug consumption (Concerta).

The court applied the Bouchard-Lebrun framework and found that the accused's underlying mental health issues and substance abuse were inextricably linked.

The court concluded the accused was suffering from a mental disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his acts were wrong, and found him not criminally responsible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault of his stepdaughter, alleging errors by the trial judge regarding the admission of post-incident evidence, the Crown's closing submission, and the exclusion of photographs under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, upholding the trial judge's decisions on the high probative value of the post-incident evidence, the acceptable latitude of the Crown's closing given no objection, and the s. 8 ruling that the daughter was an independent actor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Tyrelle Lee and Steven MacIsaac, were charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing at a park party.

A verbal altercation escalated into a physical melee, during which the deceased was chased to a hill and stabbed once in the chest by Lee.

MacIsaac was present, armed with a knife, and assisted in preventing the deceased from escaping.

The court found that while Lee caused the unlawful death, the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were found guilty of manslaughter, with MacIsaac convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The proceedings spanned over 19 years, involving three trials, an appeal, and a dangerous offender application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling after deducting significant periods of defence delay—including the accused absconding and repeatedly changing counsel—and exceptional circumstances such as a mistrial.

The court also found the post-verdict delay reasonable, as it was justified by the complexity of the dangerous offender application, further defence delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

During a dangerous offender hearing, the Crown sought to abandon reliance on a court-ordered psychiatrist whose evidence was challenged in cross-examination, and instead tender the evidence of a new psychiatrist.

The defence brought an abuse of process motion under s. 7 of the Charter, arguing the Crown was seeking an improper litigation advantage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Crown was attempting to provide the court with as much information as possible to assess the offender's risk, rather than acting for an oblique motive.

The accused brought a Charter application to stay firearm charges or exclude a seized firearm, alleging excessive force during his arrest and breaches of his right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not use excessive force when arresting the fleeing accused.

The court also found no s. 7 breach regarding an officer commanding a witness to stop recording the arrest, as there was no actual prejudice to the accused's defence.

However, the Crown conceded that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were violated when an officer denigrated duty counsel's advice and threatened to charge the accused's family members if he did not confess.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct warranted the exclusion of the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter to maintain the long-term repute of the justice system.

This is an application by the accused, Jermaine Chapman, under s.520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order.

The accused sought release based on a new bail plan with strong sureties and electronic monitoring, public interest concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential trial delays.

The court found no error in the original justice's decision to detain and determined that the health emergency did not outweigh other considerations for detention.

The court also noted that while trial delays might occur, detention remained necessary and could be reviewed in the future.

The application for review was dismissed.

The Crown applied under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness, S.B., on a prior inconsistent statement.

The accused opposed, arguing the statement's reliability was compromised due to the circumstances of its taking, including S.B.'s detention without Charter or Youth Criminal Justice Act rights being provided, and aggressive police questioning.

The court found S.B. was detained, not informed of her rights to counsel or to remain silent, and was a young person whose YCJA rights were breached.

The court also noted the unrecorded initial questioning and the coercive nature of the police interview.

Concluding that the statement's reliability was questionable and that granting the application would not serve the ends of justice, the court dismissed the Crown's application.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the court considered whether the two accused should be committed to stand trial for first-degree murder in a stabbing death.

The Crown argued the murder was planned and deliberate or occurred during a forcible confinement.

The court found no evidence of planning or deliberation, and concluded any confinement was inherent in the act of killing rather than a distinct act.

The accused were committed to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged Tingle was a party to the planned and deliberate murder of Neeko Mitchell, having lured him from a community centre at the direction of Jermaine Dunkley, where Reshane Hayles-Wilson then shot him.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty.

The ruling reiterated the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the trial judge's role is limited to determining if any evidence could support a conviction, taking the Crown's case at its highest, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

The court also noted that a prior Court of Appeal decision had affirmed the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial, applying the same legal standard.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit the accused to stand trial on charges of first degree murder of a seven-year-old step-son and attempted murder of a bank loans officer.

The defence conceded evidence supported committal on second degree murder and aggravated assault but contested first degree murder and attempted murder.

The court found evidence of planning and deliberation for the murder charge based on the accused's journal entries demonstrating prior animus toward the victim and brooding about the need to protect his biological son.

For attempted murder, the court found the accused's actions—stabbing the victim twice in the neck area and attempting a third strike—demonstrated intent to kill, particularly in context of the murderous rampage and threats recorded in the journal.

The accused was committed to stand trial on both charges.

The accused, O’Neil Harriott, was convicted by a jury of weapons trafficking (offer to transfer a handgun) and cocaine trafficking (offer to sell 2 ounces of cocaine), but acquitted on three counts of actual cocaine trafficking based on a duress defence.

The defence brought a constitutional challenge to the three-year mandatory minimum sentence for weapons trafficking under section 99(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated section 12 of the Charter.

The court found the mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate, both in the accused's specific circumstances (a hollow offer to sell a gun with no intent or ability to provide it, under duress) and in reasonable hypothetical scenarios (e.g., licensing infractions).

The mandatory minimum was declared of no force or effect.

The court then sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence on the cocaine trafficking charge and 6 months less a day consecutive on the weapons trafficking charge, along with three years' probation and a lifetime weapons prohibition, considering mitigating factors such as duress, limited record, and pre-sentence custody.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Crown had obtained a direct indictment, moving the trial to the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicants argued the 18-month presumptive ceiling from Jordan should apply because they were denied a preliminary inquiry.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases tried in the Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs.

As the anticipated delay was 28 months, falling below the 30-month ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death, failing to stop at the scene of an accident, failing to stop for police, refusing to provide a breath sample, and driving while disqualified.

The victim, a 44-year-old cyclist, was struck and killed by the accused who was driving at approximately 110 km/h in a 60 km/h zone while impaired.

The accused had a prior drinking and driving conviction from one month earlier and fled the scene at high speed, eventually reaching 200 km/h while evading police.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years less pre-trial custody credit, resulting in 4½ years additional custody, plus a 10-year driving prohibition.