Abby Lauren Jordana Woolf

The defendant, R.D., was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference involving his step-granddaughter.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant, her mother, and step-father.

The defence argued that the complainant's delayed disclosure was influenced by her mother's reprimand and personal history, and that the defendant lacked opportunity.

The court found the defendant and his wife untruthful about the opportunity to commit the offences.

However, the court expressed concerns about the reliability of the complainant's statement due to potential influence from her mother's well-intentioned inquiries and instructions.

Ultimately, the court found that the Crown did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charges were dismissed.

The applicant sought to delay setting trial dates scheduled for December 2020 to allow time to prepare a motion to stay proceedings based on unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant had only recently obtained Legal Aid approval for the motion.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had failed to act diligently in bringing the motion earlier despite the judge raising the issue of delay on multiple occasions throughout the proceedings.

The court emphasized that all participants in the justice system must strive to prevent delay rather than react to it, as directed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody.

The accused was convicted after trial of assault, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and threatening death arising from a violent incident with his former common law partner.

The Crown sought a maximum reformatory sentence with ancillary orders.

The defence sought an intermittent sentence on the sexual assault count and a conditional sentence on the remaining counts.

The court imposed consecutive sentences totalling 16 months in a provincial reformatory, followed by three years of probation, while considering Gladue principles applicable to the Indigenous accused and his prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault of Daniel Shaver and assault with a weapon against Tim Brozeau following an incident on June 17, 2016.

The complainants attended the accused's residence to confront him about allegedly slashed tires on a vehicle.

After an initial heated discussion at the apartment door, the parties moved outside where the accused produced a machete.

The accused initially waved the machete at the unarmed complainants, then dropped it.

A struggle ensued over the weapon, during which Mr. Brozeau struck the accused with a shovel.

The accused subsequently chased the retreating complainants and struck Mr. Shaver with the machete while he was on the ground, causing a partial amputation of his hand.

The central issue was whether the accused's actions were justified as self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a minor collision at a coffee shop.

The Crown proceeded on the excess alcohol charge.

The court addressed two key issues: whether the first breath test was taken within two hours of the incident to satisfy the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and whether the defendant's Charter rights to counsel were breached.

On the first issue, the court found that based on the totality of evidence and applying common sense, the collision occurred approximately 1.5 hours before the breath test, satisfying the two-hour requirement.

On the second issue, the court rejected the defendant's claim that his rights to counsel were violated, finding that the police provided adequate information regarding his right to counsel and that the defendant failed to communicate any desire to speak with a lawyer other than duty counsel.

The defendant was found guilty.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish sufficient evidence to commit the accused to stand trial on charges of first degree murder of a seven-year-old step-son and attempted murder of a bank loans officer.

The defence conceded evidence supported committal on second degree murder and aggravated assault but contested first degree murder and attempted murder.

The court found evidence of planning and deliberation for the murder charge based on the accused's journal entries demonstrating prior animus toward the victim and brooding about the need to protect his biological son.

For attempted murder, the court found the accused's actions—stabbing the victim twice in the neck area and attempting a third strike—demonstrated intent to kill, particularly in context of the murderous rampage and threats recorded in the journal.

The accused was committed to stand trial on both charges.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand contrary to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court found that the accused unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample after six feigned attempts and multiple warnings that he would be arrested for failing to provide a suitable sample.

The accused's claim that he requested another opportunity to blow after his arrest was rejected.

The court held that even if such a request had been made, the police are not obliged to provide post-arrest opportunities to provide a sample.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act and fail to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded ex parte after the defendant failed to appear.

The Crown proved that the defendant lost control of his vehicle while driving at 70-80 km/h in a 60 km/h zone on a curve, causing it to leave the roadway and roll down an embankment.

The defendant admitted to leaving the scene immediately and not returning until police contacted him.

The court acquitted on the careless driving charge, finding the speed excess of 10-20 km/h constituted inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The court convicted on the fail to remain charge, finding all elements of the strict liability offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with three offences arising from an incident on November 18, 2013: speeding (120 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone), stunt driving (excessive speed), and failing to have an insurance card.

The defendant did not appear at trial.

The Crown presented evidence from a police officer who used a Lidar laser speed measuring device to record the defendant's speed.

The court found the defendant guilty of all three charges but applied the rule against multiple convictions, entering a conviction for the more serious stunt driving charge and staying the speeding charge.

The insurance card charge conviction stood.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought Charter applications under sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), alleging that statements made at the accident scene were statutorily compelled and that his rights were violated.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the accused did not provide a compelled report, that the officers were acting for public safety purposes, and that the brief delay in reading the ASD demand was justified by safety concerns.

At trial, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle with a BAC over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood during the relevant time period.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice convicted the appellant after he pled not guilty to the charge.

The appeal court found multiple serious errors: the trial justice effectively directed the appellant to testify, improperly intervened during examination, made inappropriate comments suggesting bias, and provided reasons for judgment that failed to demonstrate application of the proper legal test for credibility assessment.

The trial justice relied on inadmissible expert evidence from a witness not qualified to express the opinions given.

The court found the appellant did not receive a fair trial and that the reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed her sentence for careless driving resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The trial judge imposed a 20-day intermittent jail sentence and a 24-month driving suspension.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing the appellant based on facts not admitted or proven, specifically that she was using a hand-held device at the time of the collision.

The appellant had only admitted to holding the device, not using it.

The appeal court allowed the appeal and substituted a $2,000 fine and 18-month driving suspension.