Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CR-23-80-0000
Date: 2025-01-10

Parties

Between:
His Majesty the King
Applicant Counsel: A. Khoorshed

And:
DD
Respondent Counsel: H. Saini

Heard: September 13, 2024, October 17, 2024, and December 16, 2024

Judge: C. Chang

Reasons for Sentence

Introduction

Following a trial by judge and jury, DD was found guilty of the following offences: two counts of sexual assault (s. 271 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46), two counts of sexual interference (s. 151 of the Criminal Code), and one count of forcible confinement (s. 279(2) of the Criminal Code). Those offences relate to incidents involving his stepdaughter, L, during two timeframes: January 1, 2019 to July 31, 2021, and July 31, 2021 to March 12, 2022.

During the sentencing hearing, I received into evidence the September 9, 2024 Presentence Report of Probation and Parole Officer, Dwayne Culbard, the September 4, 2024 Victim Impact Statement of L, and the August 29, 2024 Victim Impact Statement of L’s mother, C. No viva voce evidence was proffered. DD made no statements other than through his counsel.

The Crown requests that I conditionally stay the two counts of sexual assault pursuant to R. v. Kienapple, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 and proceed to sentencing on the remaining two counts of sexual interference and one count of forcible confinement. The Crown submits that the appropriate sanction on the latter three counts is a global sentence of eight years’ incarceration. The Crown suggests however that an eight-year sentence is on “the low end” and, based on R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, the appropriate sentence “could even be higher”. Although its written submissions argued for consecutive sentences for the sexual interference and forcible confinement counts, they set out no applicable particulars and, in any event, the Crown did not pursue that argument during the sentencing hearing.

The defence takes no issue with the Crown’s request that the sexual assault counts be conditionally stayed, but submits that the Crown’s proposed sentence on the remaining counts is excessive. It submits that the appropriate range of sentence is three to four years, and a global sentence of four years’ incarceration is “where the court should ultimately land”. The defence also requests 1.5:1 credit for DD’s 39 days in pretrial detention. The Crown takes issue with neither the accuracy of the number of pretrial detention days nor the requested credit for them. By my calculation, the requested credit totals 58.5 days.

For the reasons set out below, I find that the two counts of sexual assault should be conditionally stayed and that the appropriate sanction on the remaining counts is a global sentence of eleven years’ imprisonment.

Issues

Given the Supreme Court of Canada’s clear guidance in R. v. Kienapple, I accept the Crown’s submission, not opposed by the defence, that the two sexual assault counts should be stayed. Therefore, the sole remaining issue for determination is the appropriate sentence for the two sexual interference counts and the forcible confinement count.

In setting out my reasons for sentencing DD to eleven years’ imprisonment, I will:

1. review the legal principles applicable to the circumstances in the case-at-bar;
2. set out the factual basis upon which I have decided DD’s sentence; and
3. explain that decision.

Analysis

Legal Principles Applicable to Sentencing

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society (see: Criminal Code, s. 718). This purpose is achieved by the imposition of just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: denunciation, specific and general deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation of offenders, reparation of victims or the community, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of harm done to victims or the community (see: Criminal Code, ss. 718(a)-(f)). Where the offence involves the abuse of a person under eighteen years of age or a vulnerable person, the sentencing court must give primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence of the relevant conduct (see: Criminal Code, ss. 718.01 and 718.04).

A sentencing court must also consider any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, parity (like sentences in like cases), and the appropriateness of all available sanctions (including non-custodial sentences) in the circumstances (see: Criminal Code, s. 718.2).

The goal in every case is to determine a fair, fit, and principled sentence, with the proportionality of the sentence to the gravity of the offence and the degree of the offender’s responsibility being the organizing principle in achieving that goal (see: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, para. 10).

The principle of parity is not at odds with proportionality, as courts must “calibrate the demands of proportionality by reference to the sentences imposed in other cases” (see: Parranto, at para. 11). Individualization of the sentence to reflect the unique circumstances of each case is central to the proportionality assessment, as each offence “is committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile” (see: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 58).

Sexual violence against children should be punished more severely (see: Friesen, at para. 116). Sentences must recognize and reflect both the harm caused and the wrongfulness of sexual violence, and should fully reflect the life-altering consequences that can and often do flow from them (see: Friesen, at para. 74). Sentencing courts must weigh these harms in a manner that reflects society’s deepening and evolving understanding of their severity and must impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children (see: Friesen, at paras. 74 and 76).

The intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of a child increases the offender’s blameworthiness because “the use of a vulnerable child for the sexual gratification of an adult cannot be viewed as anything but a crime demonstrating the worst of intentions” (see: Friesen, at para. 90). Moreover, given the disproportionate victimization and impact of sexual offences on adolescent girls by adult men, a particularly careful approach to sentencing is required (see: Friesen, at para. 136).

Where an offender is found guilty after a trial by judge and jury, the sentencing court must accept as proven all express or implied facts that are essential to the jury’s finding of guilt, and may find to be proven any other relevant fact disclosed by the evidence or hear evidence presented respecting that fact (see: Criminal Code, s. 724(2)). The court is not required to take a view of the evidence most favourable to the offender (see: R. v. S.P., 2024 ONCA 211, para. 38).

Factual Foundation for DD’s Sentence

Factual Disputes Raised at Sentencing Hearing

During the trial, the defence’s theory of the case was that none of the incidents described by L ever happened and that DD’s admissions during his video recorded interview by police were all untrue. Those admissions included DD touching L’s breasts and vagina manually and with his mouth and tongue, his use of lubrication, his digital penetration of her vagina, and his attempted penile penetration of her vagina.

During the sentencing hearing, the only factual disputes that I was asked to resolve were:

1. whether DD touched or penetrated L’s vagina with his penis; and
2. the level of trust in L’s relationship with DD.

I resolve those disputes in accordance with the following reasons and incorporate the resultant fact finding into my recitation of the factual foundation for DD’s sentence set out below.

Respecting the dispute about penetration, in her evidence at trial, L described two incidents during which DD inserted his penis into her vagina. At the sentencing hearing, DD denied that there was any penile-vaginal contact of any kind.

The defence submits that L’s evidence that there was penetration is “a little ambiguous” and neither credible nor reliable, while DD’s evidence that there wasn’t penetration should be believed. The Crown submits that the jury accepted L’s evidence respecting the forcible confinement incident, which included DD’s penetration of L’s vagina with his penis. Therefore, the Crown submits, I am bound by the factual implications of the jury’s verdict on the forcible confinement count, including that there was penile penetration.

I accept the Crown’s argument. In my view, the factual implications of the jury’s finding of guilt on the forcible confinement count is that, over the course of DD’s sexual abuse of L, including the penetration of her vagina with his penis, he intentionally and without lawful authority confined her. Furthermore, the Crown’s evidence at trial included DD’s statement to the police that, although not in relation to a specific incident, he attempted to penetrate L’s vagina with his penis. In my view, that admission and the jury’s findings of guilt are not reconcilable with the defence’s position that there was no penile-vaginal contact of any kind.

Respecting L’s relationship with DD, the defence concedes that, as stepfather and stepdaughter, theirs was a relationship of trust, but submits that it was at the “lower end of the spectrum”. The defence argues that L had limited interaction with DD and she wasn’t reliant on him “from a trust perspective” because any reliance was infrequent and limited to specific and trifling requests. The Crown submits that the only evidence about the nature of L’s and DD’s relationship came from L and DD, who both agreed that he was like a father to her and that she loved him like a father. That was the nature of their relationship.

I agree with the Crown. The only evidence about the nature of L’s and DD’s relationship came from them and is entirely consistent: DD was like a father to L and she loved him as a father. In my view, L’s relationship with DD was one of trust between a daughter and a father.

Basis for Factual Findings

As set out above, the only evidence adduced during the sentencing hearing was the presentence report and the victim impact statements of L and C. I therefore find the following facts based on the evidence adduced at trial, my resolution of the two factual disputes raised during the sentencing hearing as set out above, the presentence report, and the two victim impact statements.

Offences

DD was married to C and they lived together with L, both before and during the marriage. The family lived at two residences in Milton: the first between January 2019 and July 2021 (the “First Residence”); and the second between July 2021 and March 2022 (the “Second Residence”).

DD was L’s stepfather. He was like a father to her and she loved him like a father.

When L was twelve years old, the family was living at the First Residence and, one day when C had gone grocery shopping, L and DD were in the living room of the home. DD was working on a puzzle when L asked him to help her access a tablet computer by imputing the password, which he did. While L was using the tablet computer, DD touched her leg and said that he wanted to try something different, to show her something, and to help her. L was sitting on the couch and DD knelt in front of her. He tried to take off her pants, touched the area of her vagina, applied lubrication, and repeatedly inserted his finger into her vagina. L was confused about what was happening. She didn’t like it. Her insides hurt when DD inserted his finger into her vagina. He asked L, “Did you finish?”. She didn’t understand what he meant by that. DD eventually took off L’s pants and continued to touch her until C returned home approximately twenty minutes after leaving. After the incident, L wrote a letter to DD telling him to stop touching her because it made her uncomfortable. DD received the letter and told her that “it would stop soon”.

Approximately one week later, L was seated in a chair in the laundry room when DD came to her, knelt down below her, and used his mouth and tongue to touch her vagina. He then lifted her onto the dryer and continued to touch her vagina. The incident lasted approximately ten minutes. L doesn’t remember saying anything or anything being said. It was a blur, she felt “really light-headed” and like she was not there. DD told the police that he had never licked a vagina before and he licked L’s vagina because he wanted to “try something fresh” and not with “somebody that been having sex and been, you know, different dicks and this and that”.

During a subsequent incident at the First Residence, DD pulled out his penis, pulled down L’s pants, and inserted his penis into her vagina. He was not wearing a condom. DD was unable to fully penetrate L’s vagina and said, “you’re so tight”. It made her insides hurt and she started to cry, so he stopped.

In total, there were twelve to thirteen incidents at the First Residence.

The family moved to the Second Residence in July 2021.

DD told L that “things would change” after the move and, indeed, they got worse for her. DD touched L more. He sexually abused her everyday or almost everyday, including multiple times per day, except for a time one summer when she stayed with her biological father.

DD used his hands, mouth, and tongue to touch her breasts and vagina and inserted his finger into her vagina. As she grew older and her breasts developed more, DD touched her more on her breasts and left “hickey” marks after sucking on them. During a number of incidents, DD tried to put his penis in L’s mouth and was briefly successful once. DD made sexual comments about L and said that he wished she were older.

L tried to stop DD from touching her by, among other things, telling him to stop, telling him that she didn’t like it, and tightening up her pants to prevent him from pulling them down or removing them. DD told L to be quiet or someone might hear. He told her to relax and just go along with it, that she would learn to grow to like it, and that she will “never get anywhere with guys if you’re gonna be a pussy”. DD was physically much stronger than L, so she could not prevent his sexual abuse of her. DD referred to the times he would sexually abuse L as “time to squeeze it up”; referencing her unsuccessful attempts to prevent his sexual abuse by tightening up her pants.

The situation with DD made L feel disgusting and she hated herself and the clothes that she wore. She stopped wearing clothes that he had commented on.

In late December 2021 or early January 2022, DD picked L up by the waist and put her on the bed in the bedroom that he shared with C. L told DD to let go of her and that she “[didn’t] want to do this”. He told her to just relax and go along with it. DD pulled L’s pants down, applied lubrication to her vaginal area, manually touched her vagina, and retrieved a condom from a side table. L tried to leave, but DD put her back on the bed and inserted his penis into her vagina. He was wearing a condom. She told him to stop and that she didn’t like it. He told her that she would grow to like it. During this incident, DD inserted his penis deeper into L’s vagina than during the previous penile penetration incident. It caused her pain and, afterward, it hurt to walk.

On March 9, 2022, L was on a FaceTime cellphone videocall with her friend, O. Sometime during that videocall, O temporarily stepped away, but the videocall remained active and L put her cellphone into her pocket. DD called L to him and took her to the bedroom that he shared with C. L didn’t want to go, but went with DD because of his previous threats. She told him that she had to be on a call soon. He undid her pants, pulled up her top, and touched her breasts. L didn’t know what to do. O returned to the videocall and said, “Hi, I’m back”. DD backed away from L and L returned to her room, where she did up her pants and pulled down her top.

L reported DD’s sexual abuse to the police the following day.

Presentence Report

DD was born in St. Thomas Parish, Jamaica on July 25, 1977. He has six siblings: four brothers and two sisters. His family background presented with some socio-economic challenges during his upbringing in Jamaica. DD attended high school in Jamaica, but did not graduate. DD was employed part-time in Jamaica since the age of fifteen by cutting hair, fixing bicycles, and working at a supermarket. DD is the father of four children from two different partners, both of whom reside in Jamaica. DD’s eldest son lives with him in Toronto.

DD started coming to Canada in 2010 as a seasonal farm worker. On his third visit to Canada as a seasonal farm worker, he left the farm and overstayed in Canada, resulting in a minister’s delegate review of his immigration status, the making of a removal order in absentia, and the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. DD made a spousal sponsorship application in 2018 with C as his sponsor, and that application was approved in 2020. In August 2020, DD complied with an Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada order to surrender himself to Canadian Border Services Agency due to the outstanding warrant and was released on conditions. DD was landed as a permanent resident of Canada on August 19, 2021. He was employed in construction and then started his own construction and renovation business, which he continues to operate.

DD has no history of alcohol abuse or the use of banned substances, but admits to recreational use of marijuana.

DD’s former common law partner in Jamaica called him a caring person, who cares a lot about other people and is a good father. That former partner expressed a hope that DD would sponsor her and/or their children’s move to Canada. DD’s current partner has known him for approximately one year and said that he has “been very kind and honest with me”, as well as upfront about the criminal charges in this matter. She thinks that a dispute about DD’s immigration status “may have been an issue” in the criminal charges against him. DD’s eldest son said that DD “never did anything to hurt anyone in our family, he never hurt anyone in the neighbourhood”. DD’s son said that he was “so surprised” when DD was arrested and expressed DD’s importance to “our family”.

When interviewed for the presentence report, DD reported that he is in good physical health and has no history of mental health crisis or diagnosis. DD didn’t deny the offences and was reluctant to make any comment other than to say, “I don’t have the words, I wish healing for her, her daughter, and all of their family”. DD provided two letters to Officer Culbard, in which: 1) a Justice of the Peace in St. Thomas, Jamaica stated that she has “never known him to be involved in any misdemeanor or felony”; and 2) a religious minister in St. Thomas, Jamaica stated that DD was “very interactive” with his church and no complaints were raised against DD’s character.

The Canadian Police Information Centre reported that DD does not have a prior criminal record in Canada.

L’s Victim Impact Statement

In her victim impact statement, L says that she has nightmares and is otherwise unable to sleep due to the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of DD. She remembers that, when he was sexually abusing her, she felt dirty all the time and scrubbed her skin in the shower “to try and get the feeling of his touch off my skin”.

Even with trauma counselling, L relives the trauma of that abuse. She has lived, and continues to live, in fear that DD will come to hurt her. He told her that if she ever told anyone about the sexual abuse, he would kill her, and she believed him. She panics when she smells the brand of cologne that DD wore. When she gets out of the shower, she still checks the corners of the bathroom “just to make sure he isn’t there”.

The trauma of the sexual abuse and the criminal process, as well as her resultant inability to sleep, have caused L to fall behind in school and be delayed in properly preparing for college.

As a result of DD’s sexual abuse of her, L is scared to even begin getting intimate with someone. L also fears for her bodily integrity and is concerned about her future, as she has read about young sexual abuse victims experiencing fertility problems. She has great difficulty with anyone – even her own mother – touching her.

C’s Victim Impact Statement

C cannot adequately express her concerns for L and L’s mental health. C is adversely impacted by witnessing L’s struggles. She sees L’s inability to sleep well or at all, her difficulties in school, and when she gets triggered by “even simple things like knocking on her bedroom door” and has a panic attack.

C feels deep sadness and guilt “for having a relationship with [DD]”, about what he did to L, and “not knowing this was happening to stop it sooner”. C is unable to date because she is “afraid to trust any man again in my home and around [L] or with me”. C no longer trusts her own judgment of people’s character.

C’s and L’s everyday lives have been forever altered. C has had to drastically limit her in-person work and social engagements because she fears leaving L alone. C doesn’t want anyone to know where she and L live because she is fearful and anxious that DD will do something to hurt her and/or L. As a result, she can’t have people over to their home and, when she and L are at home and the doorbell rings, they pretend that no one is at home.

C doesn’t feel that she can ever trust anyone enough for them to join her and L in a domestic or family relationship.

Explanation of Decision on Sentence

As set out above, I find that the appropriate sentence is eleven years’ imprisonment. In my view, it is a just and proportional sanction that achieves the primary objectives of denunciation and deterrence, as well as the objectives of reparation of victims, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of harm done to victims. I note that neither the Crown nor the defence recommended any type of non-custodial sentence. Indeed, both suggested a federal penitentiary sentence (although for different durations) to be appropriate sanction in the case-at-bar.

As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Friesen, sexual offences against children are violent crimes “that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities” (see: Friesen, at para. 5). Sentences for these crimes “must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large” (see: Friesen, at para. 5).

In my view, applying, primarily, the principle of proportionality and, secondarily, the principles of individualization and parity, an eleven-year penitentiary sentence is a fair, fit, and principled one.

In the case-at-bar, L was twelve years old when DD began sexually abusing her and that abuse continued until she reported the abuse to police more than three years later. As someone whom she treated and loved as a father, L understandably reposed in DD a trust that was sacrosanct. She should have been safe in his presence. DD selfishly and savagely exploited and violated that trust for his own sexual gratification and to satisfy his sexual urge to “try something fresh”. He committed his acts of sexual abuse and exploitation of L over the course of more than three years when she was at an exceedingly vulnerable age. Over that time, DD not only savagely violated L’s person and sexual integrity, but he did so in the one place where L should have been the safest: the family home. At the Second Residence, DD subjected L to that savage violation daily or almost daily and, in some cases, multiple times per day.

Borrowing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s dicta in Friesen, at para. 90, DD’s conduct toward L cannot be viewed as anything but a crime that demonstrates the worst of intentions. The need to denounce that conduct and to deter DD and others from conducting themselves similarly cannot be overstated. In my view, that need cannot reasonably be met by either the eight-year sentence proposed by the Crown or the four-year sentence proposed by the defence. The appropriate sanction is an eleven-year penitentiary sentence.

In reaching this conclusion, I have considered the following mitigating factors:

a. DD’s lack of a criminal record in Canada and, possibly, in Jamaica;
b. DD’s employment history in Canada and his progression from temporary farm worker to construction trade employee to construction business owner;
c. DD’s generally positive standing in the community, as evidenced by the contents of the presentence report, including what people who were and are in DD’s life have said about him; and
d. DD’s expressions of concern about the adverse impacts of his sexual abuse against L on her, himself, and his eldest son, D, and his wish that L and C can “heal”.

However, given that prosocial conduct has only limited significance in the sentencing of sexual offences (see: R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, para. 69), I give limited weight to DD’s employment history and his standing in the community. I also give limited weight to DD’s expressions of concern about the adverse impacts of his actions, as they fail to demonstrate that he is remorseful for his crimes or has taken responsibility for them.

I have also considered the following aggravating factors:

a. L was twelve years old when DD’s sexual abuse and exploitation of her began and that abuse continued for more than three years;
b. DD’s exploitation and violation of his significant position of trust over L and of her inherent vulnerability for the purposes of gratifying his sexual desire;
c. the frequency and regularity of DD’s sexual abuse and exploitation of L, which increased to daily or almost daily, including multiple times per day, following the family’s move to the Second Residence;
d. DD’s admission that he knew that sexually touching a child is wrong, but his decision to sexually abuse L anyway;
e. DD’s statement that he sexually abused L because he wanted to “try something fresh” with someone who hasn’t “been having sex…different dicks and this and that”;
f. DD’s derisive reference to the incidents of his sexual abuse of L as “time to squeeze it up”, referring to L’s unsuccessful attempts to prevent that abuse by tightening up her pants;
g. DD’s non-compliance with Canadian immigration law by overstaying in 2013 and having an arrest warrant issued against him by CBSA, which he only addressed when he applied for permanent residency;
h. the enduring trauma and harm that L has suffered and continues to suffer as a result of DD’s sexual abuse of her, including, without limitation, her constant fear of DD, the adverse psychological impacts on her, the adverse impact on her education, and her intolerance of human touch; and
i. the enduring harm that C has suffered and continues to suffer as a result of DD’s sexual abuse of L, including, without limitation, her deep sadness and guilt for bringing DD into her and L’s lives and her failure to discover his sexual abuse sooner, her need to fundamentally alter her and L’s life out of fear and anxiety for her and L’s safety, and C’s inability to trust her own judgment of people’s character.

For the following reasons, I consider to be particularly aggravating DD’s statements about his desire to “try something fresh” and his reference to the incidents of his sexual abuse of L as “time to squeeze it up”.

In my view, DD giving effect to his desire to “try something fresh” by sexually abusing L represents a higher degree of moral blameworthiness and culpability. DD could have given effect to that desire with a consenting adult. Instead, he chose to sexually exploit and violate a child: his twelve-year-old stepdaughter.

Furthermore, DD’s choice to coin and use the phrase “time to squeeze it up” when referring to his sexual abuse of L also represents his higher degree of moral blameworthiness and culpability. He viewed L’s attempts to protect herself from his sexual abuses as humorous and referred to them in a mocking and degrading way. L clearly and repeatedly communicated to DD that she didn’t want him to sexually touch her, and did her best to prevent it. However, DD ignored those clear messages and viewed them as irrelevant, physically overpowered L’s attempts to protect herself, continued to sexual abuse her, and mockingly used the phrase “time to squeeze it up” in reference to his sexual abuse of her.

Both of these factors are particularly concerning given DD’s admission that he knew that sexually touching a child is wrong.

In determining the appropriateness of an eleven-year penitentiary sentence, I have also considered sentences given in cases similar to the case-at-bar.

In R. v. M.C., 2024 ONSC 4503, the offender was found guilty of various historical sexual offences involving his two daughters, who were both under the age of eighteen at the time of the offences. The court sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. While there are some distinguishable facts in M.C. from the case-at-bar (e.g., there were two victims, and one of them had a disability and was also anally penetrated), in my view, the court’s analysis of the nature of the offences and the impact on the victims is similar to that applicable to the case-at-bar.

In R. v. J.W., 2022 ONSC 6491, the offender was found guilty of various sexual offences against two children (one of whom was his stepdaughter) aged eleven and fifteen, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. The offences occurred over multiple incidents over a period of two years. Again, in my view, while there are some distinguishable facts in J.W. from the case-at-bar (e.g., there were two victims), the court’s analysis of the nature of the offences and their impact on the victims is similar to that applicable to the case-at-bar. Furthermore, in J.W., the offender (like DD) didn’t graduate from high school, but (unlike DD) there were additional mitigating factors, including the offender’s reports of his parents’ alcoholism, and their physical and emotional abuse of him during his upbringing.

In R. v. B.C.M., 2022 ONSC 3511, the offender was found guilty of various sexual offences against his biological daughter and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The offences occurred over multiple incidents during the time between when the victim was fifteen and seventeen years old. Once again, although there are some distinguishable facts in B.C.M., there are sufficient parallels in the applicable analyses in B.C.M. and the case-at-bar.

In R. v. N.M., 2022 MBPC 13, the offender was found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching, and was sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment on the sexual interference count. The offences involved his wife’s cousin and occurred over more than four years when the victim was between the ages of twelve and seventeen. Again, despite the presence of some distinguishable facts in N.M., I am of the view that there are sufficient parallels between that case and the case-at-bar.

As noted above, there are some facts in M.C., J.W., B.C.M., and N.M. that could be distinguished from the case-at-bar, but there are sufficient similarities and parallels in the courts’ analyses in those cases that render them assistive in my determination of an appropriate sentence in the case-at-bar.

Conclusion

For the reasons set out above and upon careful consideration of the nature and gravity of DD’s offences, their impacts on L and C, the applicable mitigating and aggravating factors, and the sentences rendered in similar cases, I find a fair, just, and principled sentence in the circumstances of the case-at-bar to be eleven years’ imprisonment.

Disposition

I therefore make the following orders:

a. counts 1 and 5 (sexual assault) are conditionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple;
b. DD is convicted on counts 3 and 6 (sexual interference) and count 8 (forcible confinement);
c. on counts 3 and 6 (sexual interference) and count 8 (forcible confinement), DD is sentenced to a global term of imprisonment of eleven years minus fifty-nine days’ credit for pretrial detention; and
d. I also grant the ancillary orders requested by the Crown respecting:
i. DD’s provision of a DNA sample,
ii. s. 109 weapons prohibition for ten years,
iii. s. 743.21 non-communication orders, and
iv. s. 490.012 SOIRA registration for twenty years.

C. Chang
Released: January 10, 2025

Addendum

1I delivered these reasons orally in court on January 9, 2025. During that oral delivery, I omitted headings, citations, and endnotes, and reserved the right to subsequently edit these reasons for, among other things, structure, grammar, and style. I also advised that, to the extent of any difference between the orally delivered and written versions of these reasons, the written version shall govern.

2The defence advised that the Presentence Report incorrectly stated that DD completed two years of high school when, in fact, he completed four. The Crown took no position on the proposed correction. Whether DD completed two or four years of high school, it is undisputed that he did not graduate.