Kristin Muszynski

The applicant brought an application seeking a declaration that the respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent had a history of initiating multiple unsuccessful civil actions against various professionals following the suspension of his driver's licence, and had previously been declared a vexatious litigant in Ontario and British Columbia regarding other matters.

The court applied the Fabian factors and found that the respondent persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings.

The application was granted, the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant, and all his existing proceedings in Ontario were stayed pending leave of the court.

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim brought a motion to add an independent winter maintenance contractor as a third party.

The Crown and the proposed third party opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the claim was not discoverable until the Crown finally produced patrol records and a representative for discovery, having previously failed to plead the contractor's existence or provide timely disclosure.

The court held that the defendants exercised reasonable diligence and rebutted the presumption of knowledge.

The plaintiff, Owen Lightfoot, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his Statement of Claim to proceed under Rule 76 (simplified procedure) and to strike the defendants' jury notice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding that the January 1, 2020 amendment to Rule 76 and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted substantial and unexpected changes in circumstances.

The court further granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim to limit damages to $200,000, thereby bringing the action within Rule 76.

The court held that jury trials are incompatible with the summary trial process mandated by the amended Rule 76, and that the transition provision in Rule 76.14 means pre-January 1, 2020 jury notices are preserved but require the action to proceed in ordinary procedure.

Finding that proceeding with a 3-week jury trial in ordinary procedure would be contrary to the interests of justice and proportionality compared to a 5-day non-jury summary trial under Rule 76, the court struck the defendants' jury notice.

Costs of the motion were reserved.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend its Amended Amended Statement of Claim to include new allegations of fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, and punitive damages, claiming these were recently discovered.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amendments constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act and that they would suffer non-compensable prejudice due to purged records.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend, finding that leave under Rule 48.04(1) was not required for general amendments under Rule 26.01, and that the issues of discoverability and alleged prejudice from purged records were best determined by the trial judge.

The applicant, a federal inmate, sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to challenge his reclassification from medium to maximum security and subsequent involuntary transfer.

The court found the Correctional Service of Canada's decision to be reasonable and procedurally fair, based on a holistic review of the applicant's conduct, including involvement in contraband importation and prior misconducts.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The applicant, an estate trustee, sought increased costs on a full indemnity basis for an Application to Pass Accounts.

The respondent, a beneficiary, opposed this, alleging the application was unnecessary and the trustee's compensation was generous.

The court found the applicant's actions prudent and necessary due to the respondent's baseless allegations and refusal to engage in an informal accounting process in New Brunswick.

The court awarded the applicant increased costs of $24,182.47, payable from the respondent's share of the estate, to avoid penalizing the other beneficiary.

The applicant brought a Charter challenge against s. 163(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, which gave the Parole Board 90 days to review a suspended statutory release.

For offenders with less than six months remaining on their sentence, this timeframe could result in incarceration beyond their newly calculated statutory release date.

The court granted the applicant public interest standing and found that the provision violated s. 7 of the Charter by arbitrarily and disproportionately depriving offenders of their liberty.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1.

The court remedied the violation by reading in language requiring the Parole Board to render its decision before the offender's new statutory release date.

The plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful dismissal following an asset sale of the business.

He claimed entitlement to 12 months' notice under his employment agreement due to a change in control.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages by unreasonably rejecting an offer of comparable employment from the purchasing company.

Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiff had fully mitigated his damages through earnings generated by his own corporation during the notice period.