Kristin Muszynski

The accused, Abu Mandal, was charged under s. 7.1(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for selling items intending they be used in the unlawful production of a Schedule I substance (methamphetamine).

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence that Mandal sold chemicals and equipment to an individual operating a clandestine methamphetamine lab.

The central issue was whether Mandal possessed the requisite intent.

The court found that Mandal had knowledge of the unlawful end-use of the chemicals, which was sufficient to establish intent, rejecting the defence's argument that a desire for the outcome was required.

The court relied on principles from aiding and abetting cases under the Criminal Code.

Mandal was found guilty.

The applicant shareholder brought an application under the Business Corporations Act to compel the respondent corporation to produce audited financial statements and appoint an auditor.

The respondents agreed to the appointment but argued the audits should only cover 2020 to present, claiming earlier years were barred by estoppel and the Limitations Act.

The court held that the right to audited financial statements is a mandatory statutory right not subject to the Limitations Act, as it is not a 'claim' for injury or loss.

The court ordered the production of audited financial statements from 2013 to present.

The applicant property owner sought leave to appeal several decisions of the Assessment Review Board regarding an increase in the assessed value of its property.

The Board had previously increased the property's value based on minutes of settlement filed by the respondents, without the applicant's participation, relying on a rule that deemed non-responsive parties to not oppose settlements.

The court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the Board erred in disposing of the proceeding without a hearing in the absence of the consent of all statutory parties, finding a potential conflict between the Board's rules and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The applicant property owner sought leave to appeal decisions of the Assessment Review Board that increased the assessed value of its property.

The Board had disposed of the matter based on minutes of settlement filed by the respondents, relying on ARB Rule 39 which deemed the non-participating applicant to have consented.

The court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether ARB Rule 39 conflicts with s. 4.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, which requires the consent of all parties to dispose of a proceeding without a hearing.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused of sexual assault arising from a Tinder-arranged meeting in a university residence.

The central issue was consent and credibility.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's account as untruthful, accepted the complainant's evidence that initially consensual sexual activity became non-consensual and violent, and relied in part on photographic evidence of injuries.

A mid-trial s. 276 application was allowed on a narrow basis to permit cross-examination on an alleged inconsistency regarding prior sexual history.

The person sought in an extradition proceeding brought an application for disclosure of records from the Requesting State (United States), including police interviews and polygraph test results, to support a potential abuse of process claim.

He alleged that he had cooperated with US authorities and passed a polygraph test, which was not mentioned in the Record of the Case.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the person sought failed to meet the first stage of the Larosa test because his affidavit did not provide an evidentiary foundation for an agreement or deal with US authorities that would support a stay for abuse of process.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident for which the defendants admitted liability.

The trial proceeded by judge alone to determine whether the plaintiff's injuries met the statutory threshold and to assess damages.

The court found that the plaintiff sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function, specifically chronic widespread pain, mild neurocognitive disorder, and psychological symptoms.

The court dismissed the defendants' threshold motion and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in general damages, $38,371 for past income loss, $201,294.72 for housekeeping, and various amounts for future care costs and out-of-pocket expenses, with future income loss to be calculated based on a projected retirement date.

The defendant freight forwarder brought a motion for partial summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid invoices.

The plaintiff had contracted the defendant to transport machinery from Brazil to Ontario, which was delayed and invoiced at a significantly higher amount than quoted.

The plaintiff sued for damages and the defendant counterclaimed for the unpaid invoice balance, relying on a clause in its Standard Trading Conditions requiring payment without set-off.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the disputed invoice amounts were deeply connected to the plaintiff's underlying claim and that granting partial summary judgment would not reduce the complexity or duration of the upcoming trial, risking inconsistent findings of fact.

The applicant, N.R., sought to set aside a guilty verdict for sexual assault and incest, requesting a mistrial due to alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, or alternatively, to reopen the trial to admit fresh DNA evidence.

The court dismissed both applications.

The claim of ineffective assistance was rejected as the court found N.R. failed to prove his counsel prevented him from testifying, accepting counsel's evidence that the decision was N.R.'s.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed because the new DNA reports lacked credibility, were inadmissible, and would not have affected the trial outcome, as the conviction was primarily based on the complainant's testimony.

The plaintiff, Mary Ann Lalonde, brought a motion to strike portions of the defendant Canadian Blood Services' statement of defence, specifically references to the 'plaintiff’s husband’s law firm,' arguing they were irrelevant, scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The defendant argued these facts were material to the issue of repudiation of the employment contract.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding the references immaterial to the claim or defence and serving no legitimate purpose other than to diminish the plaintiff's claim and cast her and her counsel in a negative light.

The court also ordered the removal of gratuitous underlining from the statement of defence by consent.

Following the dismissal of an application for a declaration of a duty to defend, the successful respondent insurer sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no malicious or unreasonable conduct and noting ambiguity in the respondent's offer to settle.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale but reduced the award by 25% due to divided success, as the applicants had to unnecessarily address an exclusion that the respondent had implicitly abandoned.

Costs were fixed at $7,482.62.

The defendants' solicitor of record brought a motion to be removed due to a complete breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The defendant, acting in person, agreed with the removal and orally requested an adjournment of the upcoming trial to retain new counsel.

The 90-year-old plaintiff opposed the adjournment due to prejudice from delay.

The court granted the motion to remove the solicitor and adjourned the trial, but ordered an interim distribution of $90,000 from the estate to the plaintiff to mitigate prejudice.

The plaintiff suffered a wrist fracture and attended the emergency room, where she was assessed by the defendant physician.

The physician discharged the plaintiff to follow up with her family health clinic but failed to provide adequate verbal instructions regarding the need to see an orthopedic surgeon within 7-10 days, nor did he document this timeframe in his chart.

The plaintiff experienced a delayed referral to an orthopedic surgeon, resulting in the fracture healing in a malposition that required surgery.

The court found that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to provide and document adequate discharge instructions, and that this breach caused the plaintiff's poor outcome.

Judgment was issued in favour of the plaintiffs for an agreed-upon amount of damages.

The applicants, R.C. and J.M., sought a declaration that their insurer, Western Assurance Company, had a duty to defend them in an underlying action.

They were sued for alleged negligence in failing to prevent their son's schoolyard assault on a classmate.

Western denied coverage, citing policy exclusions for intentional acts and failure to prevent abuse.

The court found that while the intentional act exclusion did not apply to the parents' negligence claims (as per Unifund and Durham), the "failure to prevent abuse" exclusion did apply.

The court determined that "assault" was synonymous with "physical abuse" in the context of the policy, and the substance of the allegations fell within this exclusion.

Consequently, the application for a duty to defend was dismissed.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation claim arising from negative online reviews they posted about the plaintiffs' construction businesses.

The court found that while the reviews related to a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the defamation claim had substantial merit and the defences of justification and fair comment would fail, partly due to evidence of malice.

The court concluded the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression, which appeared motivated by an attempt to force a deposit refund.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary a consent order that established a wait-and-see deadline for striking their jury notice due to COVID-19 court capacity limits.

The defendants argued that recent communication from defence counsel in a conflicting criminal jury trial constituted new facts justifying an extension of the deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the communication did not amount to new facts that could not have been known earlier, and emphasized that courts should rarely vary voluntary consent orders.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Assessment Review Board that denied its request to withdraw its property tax appeals.

After the applicant appealed its 2017 and 2018 assessments, it sold the property for significantly more than the assessed value.

The respondents subsequently gave notice of their intention to seek a higher assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision that the applicant could not withdraw its appeal as of right once notice of a higher assessment was provided.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his security reclassification from medium to maximum and his involuntary transfer to Millhaven Institution.

The transfer was triggered by his alleged involvement in a drone drop of contraband.

The court found the Correctional Service of Canada's decisions to be unreasonable due to a lack of connection between the applicant's behaviour and the drone drop, and procedurally unfair due to deficient information sharing and insufficient reasons.

The application was granted and the Warden's decisions were quashed.

The plaintiff brought an action for unpaid commissions owed by the defendant for the sale of medical equipment in India and Nepal.

The defendant raised three defences: that part of the claim was statute-barred, that it was entitled to a set-off for breach of contract, and that paying the debt risked prosecution under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act due to unproven charges in India.

The court rejected all defences, finding that the defendant had acknowledged the debt via email, that no liquidated sums were owed for a set-off, and that the foreign criminal charges were irrelevant.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

The applicant, a federal inmate, brought a habeas corpus application challenging his security reclassification from medium to maximum and his involuntary transfer to Millhaven Institution.

The transfer was prompted by an incident where the applicant made a threatening remark to a correctional officer.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair due to inadequate information sharing and insufficient reasons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Correctional Service of Canada's decision was reasonable given the applicant's behaviour and risk factors, and that the process was procedurally fair.