Kristin Muszynski

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their remaining claims for damages arising from the respondent municipality's enactment of a fill permit by-law and its unsuccessful prosecution of the appellants for breach of that by-law.

The appellants claimed malicious prosecution, misfeasance and abuse of public office, and damages from the invalid fee provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issues requiring trial on any of the claims.

The respondent had reasonable and probable cause to initiate and continue the prosecution, and there was no evidence of bad faith or unlawful conduct in enacting the by-law.

The applicants, minority shareholders in a family-owned wholesale grocery business, brought an oppression application against the majority shareholders and the company.

The dispute arose over succession planning, with the majority seeking to sell the company's assets to a third-generation family member, which the applicants opposed.

The court found that while the applicants did not have a reasonable expectation of passing their shares to their sons, the proposed asset sale and certain workplace actions were oppressive.

The court ordered the sale of the applicants' shares at fair market value to the proposed purchaser or the company.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office on a motion for summary judgment, the defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were public interest litigants.

Finding that the plaintiffs' unsubstantiated claims impugned the professional integrity of the defendant and its employees, the court awarded the defendant costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $65,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiffs brought an action against the municipality, which included claims of malicious prosecution, misfeasance/abuse of public office, and damages related to the municipality's Fill By-Law.

The municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss all remaining claims.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial for any of the plaintiffs' claims.

Specifically, the court found that the municipality had reasonable and probable cause to initiate and continue Provincial Offences Act proceedings, did not act with malice, and did not act in bad faith in enacting or enforcing the Fill By-Law, including its fee provisions (which were previously found ultra vires but did not give rise to damages due to the plaintiffs' failure to complete permit applications).

Following a successful motion for leave to appeal, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs agreed the amounts were reasonable but argued payment would create a tremendous financial burden due to their impecuniosity.

The court fixed the costs as requested but, exercising its discretion under Rule 57.03(1), ordered that the costs be payable following the final resolution of the matter by the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding a profit-sharing agreement for construction projects.

The trial judge found no negligence on one project and that both parties were responsible for the failure to earn a profit on the other, declining to apportion liability or award compensation.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in excluding its expert witness for lacking impartiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on liability and holding that the exclusion of the expert was a discretionary decision open to the trial judge.

The defendants, Kingston General Hospital and Paladin Security Group Ltd., moved for summary judgment to dismiss an action alleging excessive force by security staff.

The plaintiff, an adult male with schizophrenia, sustained an elbow fracture while being restrained by security staff at the hospital.

The court reviewed contemporaneous security notes and discovery evidence, finding that the security staff acted in accordance with their training and that the force used was reasonable given the plaintiff's aggressive and non-compliant behaviour.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action against all defendants.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs alleged that the application of biosolids on the defendants' adjacent farm caused noxious odours, seepage onto their property, and resulting illnesses and economic loss.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' strict liability claim under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, finding that spreading biosolids is not a non-natural use of land.

However, the court dismissed the defendants' summary judgment motions regarding the claims of trespass, negligence, and nuisance, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial based on evidence of potential pooling, seepage, and prolonged offensive odours.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that a municipal by-law imposing permit fees for the importation of fill material constituted an indirect tax and was therefore ultra vires under s. 142 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the evidentiary record filed by the municipality was insufficient to determine whether a nexus existed between the fee charged and the cost of the regulatory scheme.

Without evidence demonstrating the methodology, cost analysis, or calculations supporting the fee structure, the court could not determine whether the charge was a valid regulatory fee or an impermissible tax.

Invoking the fact‑finding powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court ordered the municipality to file further supplemental materials addressing the nexus between the fees and administrative costs.

The motion was not finally determined and further evidence was required before adjudicating the legality of the by‑law.

The appellant claimed she suffered pregnancy complications after a police officer wrongfully confiscated her car in August 2009.

She pursued a police complaint and was informed of the outcome in November 2012.

She commenced a negligence action in October 2013.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period began to run on the date of the incident, as the appellant knew the material facts giving rise to her claim at that time.

The plaintiff's vehicle was impounded by police in August 2009.

She filed a public complaint and later commenced a civil action in October 2013.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff moved to strike the defendants' motion, alleging the supporting affidavit was based on hearsay and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the affidavit proper and the documentary evidence sufficient.

The court granted summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known she had a cause of action by August 2009, making her 2013 claim out of time.

Police defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a civil action alleging wrongful apprehension, unlawful detention, negligence, and Charter breaches arising from a psychiatric assessment and involuntary detention under the Mental Health Act.

The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy and misconduct by police and medical personnel but provided only a self‑serving affidavit and no expert evidence regarding the applicable standard of care.

The court held that the police had reasonable grounds under s. 17 of the Mental Health Act to take the plaintiff for psychiatric assessment and that the subsequent 72‑hour detention was a decision of hospital staff.

The court found no evidence supporting the alleged conspiracy or Charter violations and concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted and the action against the police defendants was dismissed.

The defendant municipality sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its summary judgment motion in a slip-and-fall action involving alleged failure to comply with the ten‑day notice requirement under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act.

The motion judge had previously ordered a trial on whether the municipality suffered prejudice from the late notice and whether the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse under s. 44(12).

The court held that the authorities cited by the municipality did not create conflicting jurisprudence and that the prior decision merely determined that the issues required viva voce evidence at trial.

The court further found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and concluded the matter was not of general importance warranting appellate review.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The defendant municipality moved for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a winter slip-and-fall on a sidewalk, arguing the claim was statute-barred because the plaintiff failed to provide notice within the ten-day period required by s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The plaintiff argued that the municipality suffered no prejudice because weather conditions changed shortly after the accident and any evidence of snow or ice would have dissipated even with timely notice.

The court considered the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory saving provision in s. 44(12) permitting late notice where there is a reasonable excuse and no prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge held that the issues of prejudice and reasonable excuse could not be determined on the motion record and required a trial.

Summary judgment was therefore refused and a trial ordered to determine whether the municipality was prejudiced and whether the mistaken belief about ownership of the sidewalk constituted a reasonable excuse for late notice.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim for contribution and indemnity arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a pedestrian.

The plaintiffs alleged that an off-duty police officer who observed the pedestrian before the accident owed a duty to intervene or provide assistance and that the police services board was vicariously liable.

The court held that an off-duty officer in the circumstances owed no heightened duty beyond that of a reasonable citizen and that the pedestrian’s conduct did not trigger any obligation under common law policing duties or statutory provisions.

The court found no breach of duty of care and concluded that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.