Autumn v. Attorney General of Canada et al., 2026 ONSC 101

CITATION: Autumn v Attorney General of Canada et al, 2026 ONSC 101

COURT FILE NO.: CR-25-00000185-MO

DATE: January 6, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MICHELLE AUTUMN

Applicant

– and –

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, AND GRAND VALLEY INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN (WARDEN), AND MILLHAVEN INSTITUTION (WARDEN) Respondents

A. Bonney, for the Applicant

T. Andreas, for the Respondents

HEARD: September 10, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

(HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATION)

muszynski J.

1This application for habeas corpus with certiorari in aid is brought by a federal inmate, Michelle Autumn, a transgender woman. The Applicant challenges her involuntary transfer from Grand Valley Institution for Women (GVIW) to Millhaven Institution, a male institution.

2There was no security level reclassification associated with the institutional transfer. The Applicant was a maximum-security inmate at both GVIW and Millhaven. Rather, the Applicant takes the position that the involuntary transfer from a female institution to a male institution resulted in a deprivation of her residual liberty which was unlawful.

3The Respondents, the Attorney General of Canada and Wardens of GVIW and Millhaven, oppose the relief sought by the Applicant. The Respondents submit that the Applicant’s transfer from GVIW to Millhaven does not constitute a deprivation of liberty. Regardless, the Respondents submit that, if the transfer is held to be a deprivation of liberty, it was lawful in the circumstances. The Respondents request that the application be dismissed with costs.

Issues

4The issues in this application are:

• Has the Applicant shown that there has been a deprivation of her residual liberty as a result of her involuntary transfer from GVIW to Millhaven?
• If so, have the Respondents established the lawfulness of that deprivation of liberty?
• How should the court deal with the allegations of Charter breaches?

Result

5Given the facts in this case, I am able to render a decision on this application without answering the threshold question of whether the involuntary transfer of the Applicant, a transgender female, from a female institution to a male institution constitutes a deprivation of her residual liberty. This is a complicated question that would, in my view, benefit from the submissions of intervenors.

6Even if I had concluded the Applicant’s involuntary transfer resulted in a loss of her residual liberty, given the evidentiary record before the court I am satisfied that decision to transfer the Applicant was reasonable and therefore lawful. The application is dismissed.

7The Applicant’s claims relating to alleged breaches of the Charter are not appropriately addressed within a habeas corpus application and, in any event, were not fully advanced. Accordingly, they are dismissed.

Background Facts

8The 37-year-old Applicant commenced a life sentence for first degree murder in 2007. The offence has been described as excessively violent and included targeting the young victim at the West Edmonton Mall, luring her to a golf course, and sexually assaulting her before committing a violent assault that caused her death. The Applicant was 17 years old at the time of the offence and was sentenced as an adult.

9The Applicant has served the vast majority of her sentence to date in male institutions with a maximum-security classification. Over the years, the Applicant has been transferred between institutions on a number of occasions, usually due to the Applicant’s extremely problematic behaviour which Correctional Service Canada (CSC) reports has been difficult to manage in any population.

10In 2014, the Applicant was diagnosed with gender dysphoria. She served approximately six months in a women’s institution in late 2017 before formally requesting to be transferred back to a male institution.

11In the fall of 2024, the Applicant was incarcerated at Millhaven in the Voluntary Limited Access Range (VLAR). The VLAR houses inmates who do not want to integrate into mainstream populations but are still considered to be subject to similar conditions of confinement to inmates in the general population. The VLAR is distinct from a Structured Intervention Unit (SIU), which the Applicant has described as having segregation-type conditions. The Applicant has spent time in SIUs while incarcerated.

12Regardless of the institution, gender-based accommodations are in place for the Applicant, including that non-emergency medical escorts, frisks, strip searches, and security camera monitoring be carried out by women staff members. Further, the Applicant has a private toilet in her cell and access to a private shower every day.

13It was while she was in the VLAR at Millhaven that the Applicant requested an institutional transfer to GVIW. The Wardens of GVIW and Millhaven were not supportive of the request. However, on November 25, 2024, CSC’s Deputy Commissioner for Women approved the Applicant’s voluntary transfer to GVIW.

14Before the transfer took place, CSC officials at both institutions undertook extensive planning. The Applicant was involved in the preparation, attending at case conferences where she was introduced to GVIW staff, and the dynamics of the institution were explained. Specifically, at one of these case conferences, GVIW staff emphasized to the Applicant that since GVIW is a small site, the Applicant would have to work to get along with everyone in her assigned Pod or it may not be possible to accommodate her at GVIW.

15It took some time for the Applicant’s transfer to GVIW to occur. This is due to the preparation for the Applicant’s arrival and occupancy issues. Several inmates had to be transferred from GVIW to other institutions to accommodate the Applicant’s arrival.

16On March 6, 2025, the Applicant was transferred from the VLAR at Millhaven to the secure unit at GVIW. The secure unit is comprised of three Pods which can house nine inmates each. The Applicant was subject to the most restrictive level of supervision in a women’s institution.

17Upon arriving at GVIW, the Applicant consented to a routine strip search. The Applicant’s pre-existing protocol required strip searches to be conducted by female staff members. The strip search at GVIW was conducted in accordance with the protocol, but staff reported that the Applicant’s behaviour was highly inappropriate, including playing with her penis and buttocks in a sexually suggestive manner.

18Following the strip search, the Applicant was placed on Pod 1 in the secure unit. Another inmate in that Pod expressed that she was uncomfortable with the Applicant’s presence on the Pod. GVIW staff were able to manage the concerns of this other inmate, but the Applicant’s response was to threaten to assault or kill the other inmate if confronted again. The Applicant was then placed in a double occupancy cell in Pod 3. As the Applicant’s protocol requires her placement in a single occupancy cell, the Applicant was placed alone in the double occupancy cell.

19On March 10, 2025, GVIW planned to move the Applicant into a single occupancy cell on Pod 2. The Applicant was reported as being verbally resistant to the move. She barricaded herself into a shared common room with a broken television remote control that the Applicant appeared to be attempting to use as a weapon. This incident lasted approximately eight hours. During this time, GVIW staff reportedly could not de-escalate the Applicant. The Applicant covered all security cameras in the common room. She threatened self-harm and violence against other inmates and CSC staff. Every attempt to speak with the Applicant, even to offer her food, was met with verbal assaults by the Applicant. The incident finally resolved when the Institutional Emergency Response Team deployed a chemical irritant grenade into the common room and then restrained and extracted the Applicant. There is no real dispute that this long, drawn out incident took place. The Applicant justifies her reaction by alleging that she was fearful of being exposed to transphobia if she was moved to another Pod.

20Reports from several GVIW staff members state that, during this incident, the Applicant stated that she was a man and wanted to return to Millhaven. One staff member reports having provided her with transfer forms. The Applicant denies that she expressed identifying as a man and denies having requested to return to Millhaven.

21It was following this March 10^th^ incident that the Applicant was transferred back to Millhaven on an emergency, involuntary basis. During the three-hour drive to Millhaven, the Applicant was reported as being highly agitated, refusing to sit down, screaming verbal abuse at staff and urinating in the vehicle.

22A detailed Assessment for Decision (A4D) was completed by CSC staff in support of the emergency, involuntary transfer to Millhaven on March 12, 2025. In the A4D it is noted that the Applicant demonstrated a pattern of threatening staff to manipulate the outcome of a situation. It is further noted that the Applicant attributes most of her “behavioural problems and conflict as the result of gender identity or policies not being adhered to”, which made managing the Applicant difficult to manage in any population. A recent psychological risk assessment was referred to which states “that risk factors for future violence are high and the ongoing behavioural issues in the institution support this assessment.” The Applicant’s Indigenous background is taken into account in the A4D. It is recommended that she re-engage with Indigenous Services to begin a healing journey to assist in reducing risk factors.

23The A4D concludes:

Autumn has demonstrated a requirement for a highly structured environment in which individual or group interaction is subject to constant and direct supervision. Returning to Millhaven Institution, a maximum-security men’s institution, will allow for close observation of Autumn’s behaviour and provide the CSC the opportunity to monitor their conduct and motivation.

Autum demonstrated negative behaviours towards themselves and staff, proved to be of great concern when attempting to have them integrate to the more open environment of a women’s institution.

An Emergency Intra-regional transfer is deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the institution. Autumn has been returned to an environment to which they are familiar with the resources and interventions, including access to culturally based services for support.

24Assisted by counsel, the Applicant provided a rebuttal to transfer on March 26, 2025. The issues raised in the rebuttal by the Applicant include:

• She never told GVIW staff she identified as a male and did not request a transfer to a male institution, and any suggestion that she made these comments to CSC staff is false.
• She was not given enough time to integrate into GVIW before the emergency transfer back to Millhaven.
• She does not understand why she had to be moved into a new Pod at GVIW as opposed to other inmates being moved.
• GVIW was transphobic and did not support her placement within the institution.

25On April 14, 2025, the Applicant’s emergency, involuntary transfer back to Millhaven received final approval by CSC. The Referral Decision Sheet contains significant detail about the rationale for the transfer and considers the issues raised in the Applicant’s rebuttal, including but not limited to:

• It being difficult to reconcile the Applicant’s denial of reporting she was a male and wanting to be transferred back to a male institution when numerous CSC staff reported hearing her make these comments.
• Contrary to the concerns expressed by the Applicant, she was not the only offender that had to move into a new Pod at GVIW to accommodate the Applicant’s placement there. It was noted “there were several significant moves which occurred within the institution, in addition to external to another institution (3 involuntary transfers) prior to Mrs. Autumn’s transfer to GVIW specifically in order to reserve a cell for her.”
• With respect to supporting the Applicant at GVIW, it was noted that, leading up to the transfer to GVIW, there were case conferences with the Applicant as well as numerous meetings amongst CSC staff on how she could be accommodated. Further, additional funding was obtained in order to increase staffing at the institution to accommodate the Applicant. The Applicant was introduced to the various supports available to her at GVIW in advance and was offered supportive services during the March 10^th^ incident. Discussions with the Applicant took place to ensure that the Applicant understood expectations while at GVIW.
• GVIW is not transphobic and worked diligently to support the Applicant, but given her risk factors, it is difficult to integrate her within any population.

Legislative / Regulatory / Procedural Framework

26Sections 4(c) and 28 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (CCRA), provides that CSC must take all reasonable steps to ensure that inmates are placed in a penitentiary and at the security classification which, among other things, provides that inmate with the least restrictive environment taking into account the safety of the public, the institution, other inmates and staff.

27CSC has established policies involving gender diverse offenders. Some relevant policies can be found in “Commissioner’s Directive 100: Gender diverse offenders”, which provides:

40. Throughout their sentence, offenders may apply for a voluntary transfer to a men’s or women’s institution according to their gender identity or expression.

41. All transfer requests to a different institution type (i.e., men’s to women’s or vice versa) are assessed on a case-by-case basis and require an Assessment for Decision that includes a security classification review and a transfer recommendation. The Assessment for Decision will also document the results of the Security Reclassification Scale (SRS)/Security Reclassification Scale for Women (SRSW) and identify any health or safety concerns (including mitigation strategies and accommodation measures considered at both sites, and why these measures were accepted or rejected and deemed sufficient or insufficient).

28Importantly, and contrary to assertions made by the Applicant, there is no statutory right for an inmate to be placed in an institution that reflects a gender they identify with most.

Law and Analysis

General principles

29In Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, at para. 30, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the test to succeed on a habeas corpus application: “First, the applicant must establish that he or she has been deprived of liberty. Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate ground upon which to question its legality. If the applicant has raised such a ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation of liberty was lawful” (citations omitted).

30As noted, I decline to make a finding as to whether the involuntary transfer of the Applicant from GVIW to Millhaven constitutes a deprivation of the Applicant’s residual liberty. Had I done so and determined that the transfer did deprive the applicant of her residual liberty, it would fall to the respondents to show that the deprivation of liberty was not unlawful.

Have the Respondents shown that the decision to involuntary transfer the Applicant from GVIW to Millhaven was lawful?

31A decision of correctional authorities that deprives an inmate of their residual liberty will be unlawful if it is unreasonable or if it is made in a manner that is procedurally unfair. In this case, the Applicant does not allege that there was any procedural unfairness associated with the decision to transfer the applicant from GVIW to Millhaven.¹ Rather, the Applicant alleges that the decision is unlawful because it was unreasonable.

32In Khela, the Supreme Court states: “[A] decision will be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, if an inmate’s liberty interests are sacrificed absent any evidence or on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence, or evidence that cannot support the conclusion”: at para. 74.

33At para. 75, the Supreme Court expressed that this reasonableness standard of review acknowledges the deference to be afforded to decision makers in the corrections context:

An involuntary transfer decision is nonetheless an administrative decision made by a decision maker with expertise in the environment of a particular penitentiary. To apply any standard other than reasonableness in reviewing such a decision could well lead to the micromanagement of prisons by the courts.

34There is no obligation on CSC to prove their case against an inmate beyond a reasonable doubt before a transfer decision is made. In Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Correctional Service Canada), 1989 9463 (FCA), [1989] 3 F.C. 329, leave to appeal refused, [1989] S.C.C.A. No. 215, Marceau J.A. confirmed that all that is required is the existence of information “sufficient to raise a valid concern and warrant the transfer”: at p. 343; see also Bryant v. Attorney General of Canada, 2023 ONSC 1519, at para. 48.

35The Applicant submits that she should have been given more time to integrate into GVIW and that she should not be penalized for trying to protect herself after she was exposed to a transphobic inmate. It appears that the only placement within GVIW that was satisfactory to the Applicant was within Pod 3 where she had formed positive relationships and was housed alone in a double occupancy cell. The Applicant’s reaction when she was informed that she had to be moved to another Pod to a single occupancy cell resulted in an eight-hour stand off where the Applicant made threats, fashioned a weapon, and damaged CSC property. The Applicant admits to having grabbed her penis and spread her buttocks when she was strip searched and justified her behaviour by claiming that she was frustrated because of how long it was taking.

36CSC has provided evidence as to the efforts that were made to accommodate the Applicant within GVIW. The efforts were significant. CSC transferred other inmates to other institutions to accommodate the Applicant. CSC successfully de-escalated an inmate that initially expressed concern about living with a “man”, but the Applicant could not be de-escalated and continued to make threats against the other inmate.

37The A4D and Referral Decision Sheet set out in significant details the many reasons why the Applicant could not be managed at GVIW given her pattern of conduct over the four-day period. The Referral Decision Sheet appropriately responded to the issues raised in the Applicant’s rebuttal.

38Wardens have a unique appreciation for the security environment within their institutions. The Wardens of both GVIW and Millhaven concluded that the Applicant was not manageable within GVIW given the totality of the Applicant’s behaviour between March 6, 2025 – March 10, 2025. Deference is owed to this conclusion.

39The Applicant was provided with advanced notice with respect to expectation of inmates of GVIW. The Applicant’s actions during the short time that she was at GVIW did not meet expectations.

40The evidentiary record on this application provides information that I find to be sufficient to raise a valid concern to warrant the transfer from GVIW to Millhaven.² The Respondents have demonstrated that the decision was reasonable.

Relief under the Charter / Human Rights Legislation

41In the notice of application, the Applicant seeks a declaration that her placement in a male institution is unlawful and contrary to ss. 7, 12 and 15 of the Charter. Further, the Applicant advanced, but later abandoned, a claim under the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6.

42At the hearing of the application, the Applicant confirmed that she was not seeking to challenge any legislation, regulation, or policy. Other than general allegations of Charter breaches, there was no meaningful submissions in relation to the alleged violations and no discussion of remedy.

43The Respondents rely on several cases to support the submission that, generally, a habeas corpus application should not proceed at the same time as a claim seeking relief under the Charter: Brown v. Canada (Public Safety), 2018 ONCA 14, 420 D.L.R. (4th) 124, at para. 19-22, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 74; Newman v. Attorney General of Canada, 2019 ONSC 7254, at para. 27.

44The Charter arguments raised by the Applicant were not fully developed. Given the authorities above and the lack of comprehensive legal submissions or argument on these issues, this aspect of the application is dismissed.

Conclusion and Costs

45Regardless of whether the decision to involuntarily transfer the Applicant from GVIW to Milhaven constituted a deprivation of the Applicant’s residual liberty, I find it to have been reasonable and therefore lawful.

46The application is dismissed.

47I heard submissions on costs at the time of the application. The Respondents advised that, if successful, they are seeking a modest cost award in the amount of $1,000.

48In Little v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 ONSC 3239, aff’d 2022 ONCA 457, MacLeod-Beliveau J. confirmed that costs can be awarded in habeas corpus applications of a civil nature subject to the discretion of the application judge.

49The Applicant submits that if the application is dismissed, no costs should be awarded given the limited opportunity for the Applicant to earn an income while incarcerated and due to the novelty of the issue before the court. The issue of whether transfer of a transgender inmate from a female institution to a male institution (or vice versa) constitutes a deprivation of residual liberty has not been considered to any significant degree in this country.³ However, the Respondents successfully demonstrated that the applicant’s involuntary transfer was lawful and were thus the successful party. On this basis, I am satisfied that a cost award should issue.

50Having regard to the Applicant’s limited opportunity to earn an income while incarcerated, I find an appropriate costs award is $500, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

51An order shall issue that the Applicant shall pay costs fixed in the amount of $500, all inclusive, to the Attorney General of Canada, made payable to the Receiver General of Canada.

Muszynski J.

Released: January 6, 2026

CITATION: Autumn v Attorney General of Canada et al, 2026 ONSC 101

Footnotes

1. 1While the Applicant’s written submissions allege procedural unfairness, in oral argument the Applicant advised that she was not pursuing this argument.
2. 2There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the Applicant told CSC staff that she was a man and wanted to return to a male institution during the March 10^th^ incident. It is not necessary to resolve this conflict. Even had the Applicant not made these statements, the A4D and Referral Decision Sheet contain ample justification to transfer the Applicant back to Millhaven on an involuntary basis.
3. 3It is acknowledged that in the case of Boulachanis v. Thibodeau, 2020 QCCS 1020, the court considered a habeas corpus application by a transgender inmate who claimed that her placement in a male institution constituted a deprivation of her residual liberty. The application judge found that the inmate established a deprivation of her residual liberty based on the particular facts in that case. The application judge clearly stated that the decision should not be considered a global, universal, or exhaustive judgment on the incarceration of transgender persons. Ultimately, the application judge held that the decision to place the inmate in a male institution was reasonable and the habeas corpus application was dismissed.