Michelle Bryant v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2023 ONSC 1519

COURT FILE NO.: CNJ MISC 22-101522 DATE: 2023-03-06

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Michelle Bryant, Applicant – and – The Attorney General of Canada, Respondent

COUNSEL: Sarah M. Cheshire, for the Applicant Adrian Zita-Bennett, for the Respondent

HEARD: January 13, 2023

BEFORE: The Honourable Justice M.J. Valente

Decision on Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus

[1] This is an application for writ of Habeas Corpus brought by the applicant, Michelle Bryant (the ‘applicant’), a federal inmate currently incarcerated at Nova Institution for Women (‘Nova”). The application challenges her security reclassification from medium to maximum and her involuntary transfer from Grand Valley Institution for Women (‘GVI’) in Kitchener, Ontario to Nova in Turo, Nova Scotia.

[2] The respondent opposes the relief sought by the applicant and seeks an order dismissing her application with costs.

Issues

[3] There are two main issues in this application. They are:

i. Has the applicant shown that there has been a deprivation of her liberty as a result of her reclassification and transfer?

ii. If so, has the respondent established the lawfulness of that deprivation of liberty?

Background Facts

[4] The applicant is a 51-year-old female federal inmate currently serving a 3-year, 10 month, and 4-day sentence at Nova for one count of possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000 and two counts of possession of a Schedule I/II Substance for the purpose of trafficking. The applicant is a federal recidivist. The applicant served her first federal sentence at GVI for robbery, possession for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine) and theft.

[5] The applicant began serving her second federal sentence at GVI on January 5, 2022. On December 5, 2021, prior to the commencement of her second federal sentence, the applicant received from her parole officer a custody rating scale (‘CRS’) score of a medium security risk. The CRS is a tool that helps assess an offender’s security placement and is one factor that contributes to the security classification decision. In other words, the CRS score is a preliminary security assessment. The final security assessment is made by the institution’s head after a consideration of all of the issues and circumstances.

[6] After spending 14 days in medical isolation in accordance with COVID-19 protocols, the applicant was moved to GVI’s medium security compound pending final security classification.

[7] Shortly after her release to the medium security compound, the GVI authority received information from a confidential source that the applicant was involved in a scheme to introduce drugs into GVI. Given the assessed reliability of the confidential source, the applicant’s history of drug use and her 2014 penitentiary conviction of attempting to bring contraband into GVI, officials authorized the interception of the applicant’s phone conversations from January 21, 2022 to February 19, 2022 (the ‘First Intercept’). Based on these intercepted phone conversations, GVI officials concluded that the applicant was planning to introduce drugs into the institution with the assistance of her brother, Mike Bryant, friend, Yvonne Hamilton, and mother, Beth Bryant.

[8] On January 28, 2022, because of the risk of the applicant introducing contraband into GVI, and pending finalization of her security classification, she was placed on a temporary basis into the secure unit. On that same day, the applicant was provided with the “gist” of the information that in the opinion of the GVI authority required her interim placement in the secure unit. Specifically, the applicant was advised that GVI officials had information to believe that she was attempting to introduce drugs into GVI.

[9] The applicant submitted a rebuttal to the interim placement. The rebuttal was heard on January 31, 2022, at which time the applicant stated she had not had conversations with anyone about the introduction of contraband into GVI. The interim placement was ultimately confirmed at the hearing.

[10] On February 17, 2022, GVI officials recommended to the deputy warden that the applicant be classified as a maximum-security inmate. In response to the recommendation, the applicant asserted that she was being penalized for her 2014 institutional conviction of attempting to bring contraband into GVI. On February 28, 2022, the GVI deputy warden confirmed the applicant’s maximum-security classification on the basis that she had attempted to bring contraband into GVI shortly upon arrival and the future risk of any such attempts.

[11] On February 24, 2022, GVI officials received confidential information of another attempt by the applicant to introduce drugs into the penitentiary. As a result, a second interception of the applicant’s telephone conversations was authorized from February 25, 2022, to March 7, 2022 (the ‘Second Intercept’).

[12] During the time of the Second Intercept, the respondent received new information regarding the applicant’s involvement to introduce drugs into GVI by means of a new scheme without the assistance of her family and Yvonne Hamilton.

[13] On March 8, 2022, GVI officials gave the applicant notice of the First Intercept and advised her of the following information:

a) The intercepted calls revealed that she was planning to bring contraband into the institution with the assistance of her community contacts including her brother, Mike Bryant, and friends, Yvonne Hamilton and Cassie Dawson;

b) The applicant was provided with samples of conversations taken from the intercepted calls. Specifically, (i) on January 3, 2022, during the applicant’s conversation with Beth Bryant, Beth Bryant read a text from Mike Bryant to the applicant that stated “Casey, Yvonne, and Mitch having to get things ready to go fishing”; and (ii) on January 24, 2022, the following conversation was recorded between the applicant and Mike Bryant (identified as ‘MB’ and ‘Mike’ respectively for the purpose of the recorded call):

MIKE: Yeah she hasn’t done shit MB: Who? MIKE: Yvonne MB: Really? MIKE: No no fishing gear’s ready, no nothing…said she really needs to talk to you real bad MB: What the fuck ok I gotta call her right now MIKE: Yeah call her right now man because I told her I’d do it tonight I got a ride there tonight MB: tonight would be perfect too you know where right? MIKE: Yeah I got some of the drugs [inaudible] so we can go out fishing tonight, she won’t answer none of my calls nothing like I don’t think she’s doing anything Michelle

[14] In response, while the applicant denied attempting to introduce drugs into GVI, she did admit to discussing drug dealing in some of the recorded conversations and being actively involved in drug dealing in the community. The applicant refused, however, to provide any details because, according to the interviewing officer, the applicant stated: “I’m a drug dealer, not a rat”.

[15] In the same March 8, 2022, meeting the applicant was also advised that the intercepted conversations revealed that her mother, Beth Bryant, facilitated prohibited three-way calls to a number of individuals, including the applicant’s daughter, who was incarcerated in the GVI medium security compound. The applicant was further advised that she would no longer be permitted to have telephone contact with her mother, brother, and friend, Yvonne Hamilton, for a period for 90 days and should she disagree with this decision, she was entitled to dispute the decision in writing. Based on the record before me, there is no evidence of a dispute having been filed by the applicant.

[16] The Second Intercept revealed, in the opinion of GVI officials, that the applicant was continuing to co-ordinate, with the help of her family and friends, the introduction of drugs into GVI. The Second Intercept in conjunction with the CCTV footage and information received from Waterloo Regional Police also caused GVI officials to conclude that the applicant was involved in a separate and distinct scheme to introduce drugs to GVI. This conclusion was the basis for the decision that the applicant could not be managed in the GVI maximum security unit. To eliminate access to the applicant’s drug contact network and reduce the safety and security risks associated with the introduction of drugs into the institute, GVI officials recommended that the applicant be moved to Nova.

[17] On April 8, 2022, the applicant’s involuntary transfer to Nova was approved and on April 19, 2022, the applicant was provided notice of the transfer. The applicant subsequently confirmed in writing that she waived her right to rebut the transfer decision.

[18] On May 5, 2022, the applicant was provided notice of the Second Intercept, but she refused to meet with GVI officials.

[19] On June 14, 2022, the applicant arrived at Nova.

[20] On October 6, 2022, Nova officials reclassified the applicant as a medium security inmate.

[21] The applicant has no family or friends in Nova Scotia. All of her family, friends, and community are in Ontario.

[22] The warrant expiry date for the applicant’s sentence is September 9, 2025. She will soon be eligible for parole.

[23] The applicant prefers individual rather than group programs in preparation of her parole application given what she describes as her anxiety, depression, and trust issues.

[24] In the applicant’s affidavit, sworn the date of the hearing (which the Respondent originally objected to being allowed into evidence but ultimately did not oppose), the applicant states that she is currently statutorily eligible to apply for both unescorted and escorted temporary absence passes and has submitted applications for such passes but to date has not been granted any passes. The applicant further states that as of January 13, 2023, she has not received “any meaningful assistance” from Nova staff in putting together a parole release plan.

Position of the Parties

[25] The applicant originally took the position that her liberty was deprived by virtue of a security reclassification from medium to maximum.

[26] For its part, firstly the respondent submits that the applicant was never assessed at a medium security level. Albeit that she may have been initially assessed at this lower level, the preliminary assessment was never confirmed, and therefore, the initial medium risk assessment is of no relevance (see: Bennett v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] OJ NO. 3367 (‘Bennett’)). Secondly, the respondent’s position is that because the applicant’s security risk level was reclassified in October 2022 from maximum to medium, the matter is moot, and this court should not exercise its discretion to entertain the matter. In particular, the respondent relies on the decision of this court in Charley v. The Queen, 2018 ONSC 1163 (“Charley”). In Charley, the court confirmed that habeas corpus is “a remedy for here and now” (at para 31) because the relief “is concerned only with the lawfulness of a person’s current detention” (at para 33). It is for this reason that a “change in circumstance which renders the petitioner’s allegedly unlawful situation lawful has the effect of making a habeas corpus application moot” (at para 34).

[27] Without conceding that she was never classified as a medium security risk inmate, the applicant does concede that because she has been reclassified at the medium security level, there is no live issue between the parties, and in the interest of judicial economy, this court need not address the security classification matter.

[28] Otherwise, the applicant submits that her out of province transfer to Nova amounts to a significant reduction in her residual liberty. It is the applicant’s position that because her only community supports are located in Ontario, she will be disadvantaged in working toward and successfully applying for parole if required to remain in Nova Scotia. The applicant also asserts that her disadvantage in reintegrating into the community is compounded by her lack of familiarity with the local Turo halfway houses. It is also the applicant’s position that Nova does not offer her the services that are available at GVI.

[29] The applicant further submits that her deprivation of liberty cannot be considered lawful for the twofold reason that her involuntary transfer to Turo was unreasonable and made in a procedurally unfair manner.

[30] Specifically, the applicant asserts that the Nova involuntary transfer was based on unreliable evidence to the extent that the applicant disputes it. Secondly, the applicant submits that she was precluded from providing a comprehensive rebuttal to the transfer decision because the decision-making process was less than transparent. While the applicant acknowledges that section 27(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20 (‘CCRA’) authorizes Correctional Services of Canada (‘CSC’) to withhold information from an offender where disclosing that information may jeopardize the safety of any person, the security of the penitentiary, or the conduct of a lawful investigation, the information provided to her to rationalize the transfer was insufficient. In particular, at the relevant time no information was provided to suggest the means by which the GVI authorities acquired the evidence as the basis of its transfer decision. This lack of transparency resulted in the applicant’s inability to fully participate in the process, and therefore, was procedurally unfair.

[31] The respondent submits that because the applicant’s official classification was that of a maximum-security inmate and she was transferred from one maximum security facility to another, the transfer was lateral in nature and not a transfer to a “more restrictive” institution as the applicant purports. The respondent relies on the line of decided cases that state that lateral transfers, whether they are inter provincial or extra provincial in nature, do not constitute a deprivation of liberty warranting relief in the nature of habeas corpus. The respondent also argues because Ontario has only one maximum security penitentiary for women (i.e., GVI) to find that all extra provincial transfers amount to a deprivation of liberty would unnecessarily restrict CSC’s discretion in its management of security issues.

[32] It is also the respondent’s position that the decision to transfer the applicant to Nova from GVI was reasonable and procedurally fair. The First Intercept confirmed information received from a confidential source that the applicant was working with others to introduce drugs into GVI. While in the maximum-security compound, GVI officials received additional confidential source information that the applicant was still working to introduce contraband into the institution. The Second Intercept confirmed the applicant’s efforts and caused GVI officials to reasonably conclude that the applicant’s maximum-security classification at GVI would not deter her from future attempts to introduce drugs into the institution. Accordingly, it was reasonable for GVI officials to decide that GVI could no longer manage the applicant and recommend her transfer to Nova.

[33] The respondent also submits its decision-making process was procedurally fair. Firstly, because certain of its gathered information was intelligence information protected under section 27(3) of the CCRA, it provided the applicant with the “gist” of the information upon which GVI officials relied to place her on an interim basis in the secure unit pending review of her preliminary medium security classification. The information conveyed the essence of the information considered and provided the applicant with sufficient detail to permit her to know what the information was about. Later, the respondent provided the applicant with specific examples of conversations recorded during the First Intercept.

Analysis

[34] The habeas corpus application is a two-stage process. The first stage requires the applicant to establish that she has suffered a deprivation of liberty. The threshold required in the first stage of the analysis is based on “reasonable and probable grounds” (see Dodd v. Warden of Isabel McNeill House (‘Dodd’) at para 41). Should the applicant meet the first stage of the test, the onus shifts to the respondent to justify the lawfulness of the deprivation (see Dodd at para 42). For purposes of this analysis, the lawfulness of the deprivation is defined in terms of whether the decision was reasonable and the decision process was procedurally fair (see Stubbs v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2021 ONSC 4819, (‘Stubbs’) at para 6).

(a) Deprivation of Liberty

As to what constitutes a deprivation of liberty, the Supreme Court of Canada in Dumas v. Leclerc Institute, at para 11, held:

In the context of correctional law, there are three different types of liberty: the initial deprivation of liberty, a substantial change in conditions amounting to a further deprivation of liberty, and a continuation of the deprivation of liberty.

[35] The applicant claims that her involuntary transfer from GVI to Nova amounts to a restriction in liberty sufficient to give rise to the habeas corpus remedy. The applicant relies in part on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Miller, for the principle that the scope of the habeas corpus remedy includes making the writ available to free inmates from restrictive forms of custody within an institution without releasing the inmate. The applicant also relies on the more recent 2005 decision of the Supreme Court in May v. Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, for the principle that an involuntary transfer to a more restrictive institution, or a denial of an inmate request to transfer to a less restrictive institution, constitutes a deprivation of an inmate’s residual liberty.

[36] This court has consistently held that a transfer of an inmate between maximum security institutions is a lateral transfer which does not amount to a deprivation of liberty (see Barriera v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 6123: Thompson v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 6484). This principle was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mission Institute v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24.

[37] In following the decision of Justice Gilmore in Bennett, I find that the applicant’s initial medium risk assessment is of no relevance to the issues before this court and that her involuntary transfer was from one maximum security institution to another. Nonetheless the applicant urges me to find that she has suffered a deprivation of liberty by the extra provincial transfer because she has access to less services at Nova than would otherwise be available at GVI and her future prospects of parole have been reduced because she is cut off from her community who live thousands of kilometers away in Ontario.

[38] The applicant advances this position notwithstanding this court having previously found that extra provincial transfers from the same security level institution to another do not engage the court’s habeas corpus remedy. See for example, Barriera where the applicant was involuntarily transferred from Ontario to New Brunswick and Thompson where the applicant’s transfer was from New Brunswick to Saskatchewan.

[39] In considering the applicant’s submission, I am reminded of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Miller, upon which the applicant relies. In that decision, at para 35, the court stated as follows:

Confinement in a special handling unit or in administrative segregation…is a form of detention that is distinct and separate from that imposed on the general inmate population. It involves a significant reduction in the residual liberty of the inmate. It is in fact a new detention of the inmate, purporting to rest on its own foundation of legal authority. It is that particular form of detention of deprivation of liberty which is the object of the challenge of habeas corpus … I do not say that habeas corpus should lie to challenge any and all conditions of confinement in a penitentiary of prison, including the loss of any privilege enjoyed by the general inmate population. But it should lie in my opinion to challenge the validity of a distinct form of confinement or detention in which the actual physical constraint or deprivation of liberty, as distinct from mere loss of certain privileges, is more restrictive or severe than the normal one in an institution.

[40] In Miller, the Supreme Court speaks of a distinct form of detention in which the actual physical constraint or deprivation of liberty is more restrictive than the normal form of confinement in the institution as opposed to the mere loss of privileges. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Dodd v. Warden of Isabel McNeill, [2007] OJ No. 4821, stated that any applicant who is lawfully in custody and seeks the benefit of the habeas corpus remedy as a result of an involuntary transfer must demonstrate that the transfer amounts to a substantial change in the applicant’s conditions of incarceration, thereby resulting in a deprivation of the inmate’s residual liberty.

[41] For this reason, the psychological impact from added perimeter security and subjective concerns arising from restriction of movements, in and of themselves, do not affect any residual liberty interests in the relevant sense (see Star v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 ONSC 2534 at para 50). Likewise, conditions of detention, including access to justice, without more, do not constitute a deprivation of liberty (see Thompson at para 9).

[42] The applicant asserts that Nova has failed to offer her the same services that are otherwise available at GVI. It is the respondent’s evidence, however, that Nova offers the same treatment and programming as GVI. Based on the record, I am not satisfied that Nova offers less accommodations to the applicant than are available at GVI. Were I so satisfied, however, based on the above articulated principles, I would nonetheless find that the applicant’s residual liberty has not been adversely affected. By virtue of the transfer to Nova, the applicant has not experienced an adverse substantial change in her conditions of incarceration; the applicant’s physical confinement at Nova is no more restrictive than that which she experienced at GVI.

[43] I am also not satisfied on the applicant’s evidence that she will be disadvantaged in securing parole from Nova Scotia as opposed to Ontario. On the contrary, based on the information from the First Intercept and the Second Intercept, I have no confidence that her Ontario family and friends would facilitate the applicant’s application for parole. The applicant’s brother, Mike Bryant, is a recidivist and her friend, Yvonne Hamilton is well-known to the Hamilton police for involvement in criminal activity. Additionally, based on the evidence which I discuss later in this Decision, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the applicant’s brother, friend, mother, and other members of her Ontario community co-operated with the applicant to introduce drugs into GVI, or in other words, the applicant’s Ontario community was a significant reason for her involuntary transfer to Nova. Having said that, even if I were satisfied that the applicant’s family and friends would otherwise advance her parole application were they local to Turo, Nova Scotia, I do not find that the distance separating the applicant and her Ontario community amounts to a deprivation of liberty. That circumstance is a condition of her incarceration, but it does not constitute a more restrictive form of physical constraint than the applicant had experienced at GVI. Put differently, the applicant’s loss of close and immediate contact with her family and friends in Ontario is a loss of a privilege. A loss of privilege is not equivalent to a deprivation of the applicant’s residual liberty.

[44] If I am incorrect in my determination that the applicant’s involuntary transfer to Nova fails to constitute a deprivation of her liberty, it is necessary to determine if the decision to transfer the applicant was both reasonable and procedural fair.

b) Reasonableness of Decision

[45] In Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24 (‘Khela’), the Supreme Court of Canada stated that a decision to transfer an inmate “will be unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, if an inmate’s liberty interests are sacrificed absent any evidence or on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence, or evidence that cannot support the conclusion…” (at para 74).

[46] The importance of deference is emphasized by the court in Khela:

An involuntary transfer decision is nonetheless an administrative decision made by a decision maker with expertise in the environment of a particular penitentiary. To apply any standard other than reasonableness in reviewing such a decision could well lead to the micromanagement of prisons by the courts (at para 75).

[47] In the 2019 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavliov, 2019 SCC 65, the process for reviewing an administrative decision is described in the following terms:

Developing an understanding of the reasoning that led to the administrative decision enables a reviewing court to address whether the decision as a whole is reasonable… a reasonable decision is one that is based on internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and the law that constrain the decision maker (at para 85).

[48] It is not necessary for the respondent to prove the applicant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the transfer from GVI to Nova. The Federal Court of Appeal in Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Corrections Service, [1989] 3FC 329, confirmed that all that is required is the existence of information “sufficient to raise valid concern and warrant the transfer” (at para 28).

[49] Based on my review of both the public and sealed record of the respondent, it is my opinion that the First Intercept confirms on the balance of probabilities the information received from the confidential source that the applicant, with the assistance of her family and friends, was attempting to import drugs into GVI. It is also my view, after considering both of the respondent’s records, that the Second Intercept together with GVI’s further investigations confirm on the balance of probabilities that the applicant was continuing in her attempts to introduce drugs into the institution despite her being placed in the GVI maximum security compound.

[50] It is not to be forgotten that when the applicant was provided with excerpts of certain conversations with her mother and brother from the First Intercept, she admitted to discussing drug dealing and being involved in the sale of drugs in the community. For this reason and based on the evidence contained in the respondent’s sealed record, I reject as entirely unreliable Michael Bryant’s sworn statement that “[n]one of the conversations I had with Michelle while she was at GVI had anything to do with drugs, contraband, or bringing anything into the prison”. Likewise, I cannot accept as credible Beth Bryant’s evidence that “it is possible during our conversations, we discussed drug use, but only in the context of her struggling with her own past addiction”.

[51] I conclude that the information available to the GVI officials was sufficient to raise valid concerns that the applicant’s maximum-security classification would not deter her from further attempts to introduce contraband into the prison. Because of this valid concern that GVI could no longer manage the applicant, I am also of the opinion that it was reasonable for prison officials to have decided to transfer the applicant to Nova to mitigate the risk she posed to the safety of GVI by eliminating the applicant’s access to her local drug contacts. For these reasons, I reject the applicant’s argument that the basis of her transfer to Nova was her 2014 penitentiary conviction of attempting to bring contraband into GVI. The applicant is not being “punished” twice for the same conduct as she asserts.

c) Procedural Fairness

[52] Following a security reclassification and transfer of an inmate, s.27 of CCRA provides that “all of the information” or a “summary of that information” that was put to the warden (or acting warden as in the case of the applicant) and was ultimately used by the warden in reaching a decision, must be disclosed to the inmate.

[53] As acknowledged by the applicant, however, s. 27(3) of the CCRA authorizes the authorities to withhold information if its disclosure would jeopardize the safety or security of any person, the institution, or the conduct of an investigation. In the case of the applicant, CSC did invoke s. 27(3) to justify withholding information from the applicant.

[54] The objective of the CCRA disclosure requirements is to ensure that the inmate has the information required to make an effective rebuttal to the allegations made against him or her.

[55] The standard of review for whether a decision was lawful on the basis of procedural fairness is correctness (see: Stubbs v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2021 ONSC 4819 at para 31).

[56] In my opinion, GVI officials properly invoked the provisions of s. 27(3) of the CCRA to protect the identity of the confidential informants to its investigation as well as the conduct of its investigation, the legal nature of which is not being challenged by the applicant.

[57] Given the authority provided by s. 27(3) of the CCRA, GVI officials did not provide the applicant with a summary of the information it relied upon in placing her in the secure unit on an interim basis as it would otherwise be required but rather provided the applicant with the “gist” of that information. In my opinion, the gist of the information given to the applicant conveyed the essence of the information considered by GVI officials and provided her with sufficient detail to know what the information was about. It is my view that at this stage of the investigation it was unnecessary for CSC to have advised the applicant the means by which it acquired its information to permit her to make a rebuttal. Indeed, without this detail, the applicant submitted a rebuttal to the interim placement in which she claimed not to have had conversations with anyone about the introduction of drugs into GVI during her initial 9 days in the institution.

[58] Later, but before the decision was made to transfer the applicant to Nova, CSC disclosed to the applicant details of the First Intercept along with excerpts of the transcripts of intercepted calls with her mother and brother. In response to this information, the applicant admitted to being involved in drug dealing but denied any intention to import contraband into GVI. In my opinion, the nature and content of this subsequent disclosure to the applicant more than satisfied CSC’s obligation under s. 27 of the CCRA considering the protective limitations imposed by s. 27(3).

[59] Furthermore, I am of the view that the GVI officials cannot be criticized for not disclosing information obtained from the Second Intercept when the applicant both waived her right to rebut the transfer decision to Nova and refused to meet with GVI officials to discuss the findings of the Second Intercept.

[60] Nonetheless, after considering the affidavit evidence of the applicant, her mother, Beth Bryant, and her brother, Michael Bryant, all of which were sworn prior to the applicant’s receipt of the respondent’s record, I am satisfied that the applicant had sufficient information to make an effective rebuttal to the allegations should she have chosen to do so.

Conclusion

[61] Because I find that the applicant has not suffered a deprivation of her residual liberty and the decision to transfer her to Nova was both reasonable and procedurally fair, the habeas corpus application is dismissed.

[62] I have resealed the respondent’s confidential record and I order it to remain sealed unless otherwise ordered by this court or such other court of competent jurisdiction.

[63] Finally, after considering counsel’s cost submissions, I exercise my discretion and order that the applicant pay the respondent its costs fixed in the all-inclusive sum of $500. In exercising my discretion, I have considered that this application is in the nature of a civil proceeding, the lack of evidence of the applicant’s ability to pay, and the respondent’s offer to settle.

M.J. Valente J.

Released: March 9, 2023