R. v. Vongsuttachit, 2026 ONSC 3694

R. v. Vongsuttachit, 2026 ONSC 3694

CITATION: R. v. Vongsuttachit, 2026 ONSC 3694

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-40-00

DATE: 2026-06-24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

KRITTANAI VONGSUTTACHIT

Applicant

Jordan Tekenos-Levy, for the Crown

Nikolas Lust, for the Applicant

HEARD: April 17, 2026 in person and May 27, 2026 by video in Kingston

REASONS FOR DECISION ON CHARTER APPLICATION

MUSZYNSKI J.

1On August 18, 2021, Kingston Police officers obtained a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act¹ search warrant in relation to 58 Wellington Street in Kingston on the grounds that it was believed to be a stash house for illegal drugs. The dwelling was separated into multiple apartments, but the warrant did not specify which unit police were authorized to search.

2Police used a dynamic, forced entry to gain access to Unit #3 but quickly realized that it was the wrong apartment. They then used a dynamic, forced entry to gain access to Unit #4 where the Applicant, Krittanai Vongsuttachit, was located.

3The Applicant was arrested. The Applicant was advised of his right to counsel, in some form, and cautioned. He advised police that he wanted to speak with duty counsel. No attempt was made to put the Applicant in touch with a lawyer until two hours later. In the interim, the Applicant made a spontaneous, inculpatory statement and complied with a police request to unlock a safe in which a significant amount of cocaine and MDMA were located.

4The Applicant brings this application pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms² to exclude the seized evidence and the inculpatory statement on the basis that the search was unlawful and constituted a breach of s. 8, and that his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed.³

5The parties agreed that this application could proceed on a written record, including transcripts from the preliminary hearing and police notes.

ISSUES

6The issues to be determined on this application include:

I. Is the search warrant valid?

a) Does the Information to Obtain (ITO) disclose reasonable and probable grounds to believe that controlled substances would be found at 58 Wellington?

b) Does the failure of the warrant to specify a particular unit number render it invalid?

II. Was the execution of the search reasonable?

III. Was the Applicant arbitrarily detained contrary to s. 9 of the Charter?

IV. Was the Applicant’s s. 10(b) right to counsel without delay infringed?

V. If Charter breaches are found, what is the appropriate remedy under s. 24(2)?

POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

7The Applicant takes the position that the warrant was invalid, rendering the search illegal. The Applicant further submits the execution of the search was unreasonable, consequently his detention and arrest was illegal, and that the delay in accessing counsel infringed his s. 10(b) rights. The Applicant submits that, particularly when viewed cumulatively, the appropriate remedy under s. 24(2) of the Charter is to exclude the items seized in the search and any inculpatory statements made by the Applicant before he was given the opportunity to speak with a lawyer.

8The Crown denies that there were any Charter breaches. Alternatively, if there were breaches, they were minor and administrative in nature when compared to the significant public interest in adjudicating the case on the merits.

9It is agreed that the outcome of this application will be determinative of the case.

I. IS THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID?

10The Applicant’s position is that the search warrant is invalid for two reasons: (a) because the ITO does not disclose sufficient grounds to believe that illegal drugs would be found at 58 Wellington; and (b) because the warrant fails to specify the precise location (unit number) to be searched.

General Principles - Search Warrant Review

11The starting point of the analysis is that a warrant is presumed to be valid unless proven otherwise. The onus is on the applicant to prove invalidity.⁴

12The test for reviewing the validity of a search warrant is set out in R. v. Garofoli: “[t]he reviewing judge does not substitute his or her view for that of the authorizing judge. If, based on the record which was before the authorizing judge as amplified on the review, the reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted the authorization, then he or she should not interfere.”⁵

13In R. v. Morelli, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that: “[t]he question is not whether the reviewing court would itself have issued the warrant, but whether there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.”⁶

14Mere suspicion or hypothesis cannot establish reasonable grounds, but reasonable grounds should not be equated with a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even on a balance of probabilities.⁷

15The drafter of a search warrant application has an obligation to put forward full and frank disclosure of material facts for the authorizing judicial officer.⁸ When it has been shown that the ITO contains erroneous information, the remedy is to excise any misstatements and then consider whether the warrant could have issued when considering the remaining portions.⁹

16In Sanchez, Hill J. summarized judicial guidelines for assessing the validity of search warrants:

a) “The specificity and legal precision of drafting expected of pleadings at the trial stage is not the measure of quality required in a search warrant information.”

b) “The appropriate approach for judicial review of a search warrant information is scrutiny of the whole of the document, not a limited focus upon an isolated passage or paragraph.”

c) “An issuing justice is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from stated facts and an informant is not obliged to underline the obvious.”¹⁰

17When information from confidential informants is used as grounds to believe, the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Debot confirms that the strength of a confidential source should be assessed by considering whether they have provided information that is: (i) credible, (ii) compelling, and (iii) corroborated.¹¹ An evaluation is then required on the totality of the circumstances.

18With respect to corroboration, there is no rule that states that witnesses of suspect trustworthiness cannot provide support for one another.¹² Further, otherwise “innocent” biographical facts considered upon the totality of the record can nevertheless be supportive or confirmatory of an informant’s overall account.¹³

a) Does the ITO disclose reasonable and probable grounds to believe that controlled substances would be found at 58 Wellington?

19First, the Applicant submits that there are misstatements in the ITO that should be excised, including: i) the Applicant was observed conducting multiple drug transactions; ii) the assertion that 58 Wellington is a stash house; iii) the conclusion that the Applicant was the “Sunny” referred to by the confidential informants; iv) the assertion that there was a “pattern” involving 58 Wellington; and v) the statement that the Applicant resides at 58 Wellington.

20Second, the Applicant submits that the information from the confidential informants is neither reliable nor corroborated. After the erroneous statements are excised, and given the frailties with respect to the remaining information, the Applicant takes the position that the warrant to search 58 Wellington could not have issued.

21The Crown denies that there were misstatements in the ITO and takes the position that when the totality of the record placed before the issuing justice is reviewed, it is clear that the warrant could have issued.

The ITO

22The affiant of the ITO in this case was Detective Constable Josh Conner. At the material time, Det. Cst. Conner was working in the Street Crime Unit of the Kingston Police.

23The ITO explained that the initial targets of the drug investigation were Matthew Campbell and Matthew Wildsmith, who had been suspects after a police raid that took place earlier in 2021 at another Kingston residence where large amounts of illegal drugs were seized. No arrests occurred in the earlier raid. The application for the subject warrant sought authorization to search two residences: Unit 101 of an apartment building located at 64 Ontario Street in Kingston and 58 Wellington Street. It was believed that Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith were living at 64 Ontario and that 58 Wellington was being operated as a stash house by the Applicant.

24The grounds to believe that illegal drugs would be found at the two locations includes information from three confidential informants, results of a Transmission Data Recorder (TDR) warrant for Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith’s cell phones, police surveillance, and the search of various databases.

Alleged misstatements / erroneous information in the ITO

25The Applicant advances a sub-facial challenge to the warrant on the basis that the affiant of the ITO overstated or misstated observations during police surveillance. Specifically, the Applicant references observations of the Applicant conducting drug deals “a number of times”, observations of the Applicant “conducting what police believe to be drug-related transactions”, and observations of “having suspected customers acquire illegal drugs from him at his residence of 58 Wellington”.

26Police surveillance was focused on Mr. Campbell, Mr. Wildsmith and 64 Ontario. Incidental observations were made of 58 Wellington and the Applicant. The relevant information from police surveillance that relates to the Applicant’s involvement in drug transactions is as follows:

a) On July 14, 2021, police observed Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith walk from 64 Ontario to 58 Wellington. Shortly after they entered 58 Wellington, an Asian male believed to be the Applicant exited the residence, got picked up by a male in a black pickup truck and is dropped back off by the truck one minute later.

b) On July 21, 2021, police observed a known user of illegal drugs exit 58 Wellington and leave in a motor vehicle. The Applicant is not observed by police on this day.

c) On August 10, 2021, police observed a known cocaine user visit 58 Wellington for two minutes before leaving again. Police observe the Applicant inside the door of the residence.

27The impugned statements by Det. Cst. Conner, in my view, do not overstate or misstate police observations during surveillance, but rather summarize observations of the Applicant that circumstantially raise suspicion or cause police to believe the Applicant is associated with drug trafficking. Accordingly, I would not excise these statements.

28The Applicant submits that, in the ITO, Det. Cst. Conner erroneously asserts that 58 Wellington is a stash house with insufficient corroboration for the assertion. I reject this submission. Police received information from a confidential source that Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith had a stash house within a short walking distance of 64 Ontario. The same source reported that an Asian male was running the stash house. Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith were observed walking from 64 Ontario to 58 Wellington three times where they were seen speaking with an Asian male on one of those occasions.

29The Applicant further submits that the ITO jumps to the conclusion that the “Sunny” referenced by two confidential sources is the Applicant. I also reject this submission. The Applicant points to the inherent dangers associated with cross-racial identification and confirmation bias. The authorities relied upon by the Applicant are largely trial decisions addressing frailties in the eyewitness identification. This is an ITO based on the affiant’s reasonable belief. The information provided by Det. Cst. Conner regarding the identity of the Asian male supports the reasonable belief that it is the Applicant, including:

a) Two confidential sources report that Mr. Campbell is working with an Asian male in his twenties named “Sunny”.

b) One of the confidential sources reported that Sunny goes by the name “Sunny Vongsuttachit” on Facebook. The profile for “Sunny Vongsuttachit” was retrieved and shown to the confidential source who confirmed it was the same person.

c) During police surveillance, observations were made of Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith entering 58 Wellington and speaking with an Asian male in his twenties who police reported looking “very similar” to Facebook profile photograph for “Krittani ‘Sunny’ Vongsuttachit”.

d) On a separate surveillance date, police took a photograph of the man believed to be “Sunny” and “confirmed” it to be the Applicant.

e) Police conducted an RMS search which confirmed Krittanai Vonsuttachit had a criminal record. There was a mugshot. The ITO states: “[u]pon reviewing the photograph of this male and comparing the RMS record against the human source information, I was satisfied that Sunny was Krittani Vongsuttachit”.

30The Applicant challenges the integrity of the assertion in the ITO that there was a “pattern” involving 58 Wellington. Specifically, the ITO states that Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith appear to walk from 64 Ontario to 58 Wellington and are observed thereafter conducting numerous drug deals. The Applicant points out that Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith are observed attending 58 Wellington three times and on only two of those occasions are they later observed to conduct suspected drug deals, and only after they first return to 64 Ontario.

31While the characterization of Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith’s attendance at 58 Wellington as establishing a “pattern” may not be an ideal descriptor, as opposed to a course of conduct, I am mindful that courts have repeatedly confirmed that authors of ITOs “are not wordsmiths and the ITO is not to be parsed as though produced by a meticulous solicitor.”¹⁴ I do not find the reference to a pattern to be misleading, accordingly, I would not excise this statement.

32Finally, the Applicant submits that the statement in the ITO that the Applicant “resides” at 58 Wellington is misleading as the Applicant was only observed at the address on two occasions. The Applicant notes that this misstatement is particularly concerning as the police record search results revealed a different home address for the Applicant. The ITO also refers to the stash house as being “occupied and operated” by the Applicant.

33In my view, the assertion in the ITO that the Applicant resides at 58 Wellington is not particularly material, except perhaps that a residence would afford a greater expectation of privacy to the occupant. The ITO discloses the results of the police record search that states the Applicant’s registered home address was elsewhere and characterizes the Applicant’s involvement as occupier and operator of the stash house. Police observed the Applicant at 58 Wellington twice and received information that the Applicant was living in the area and working with Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith. I am not offended by the characterization of the Applicant’s relationship with 58 Wellington. Accordingly, I would not excise this statement from the ITO.

Information from confidential sources

34The Applicant also maintains a facial attack on the warrant, submitting that the warrant could not have issued based on the record before the issuing justice. In particular, the Applicant submits that that the information provided by confidential sources was not sufficiently credible, compelling, nor corroborated to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe that he was connected to drug trafficking or that drugs would be found at 58 Wellington.

35The information contained in the ITO regarding the three confidential sources can be summarized as follows:

a) Confidential Source A:

i. Was used in the execution of prior warrants which has led to the seizure of a firearm, large quantities of drugs, and evidence of other crimes. None of the matters for which this source provided information have gone to court.

ii. No convictions for fraud, perjury, or obstruction of justice.

iii. Motivation is moral reasons and financial reward.

iv. Is a known drug user and is familiar with illegal drugs such as crack, cocaine, crystal meth, molly (MDMA) and fentanyl.

v. Reports that “MC” is selling MDMA, mushrooms, acid, cocaine and marijuana. [notation in ITO confirms that MC is Matt Campbell].

vi. Reports that they purchase daily from “MC”.

vii. Provides information about prior police raid and connection to “MC” and other known drug dealers.

viii. Reports being with another individual when they purchased cocaine from a male named Sunny who works with MC.

ix. Reports belief that Sunny is below MC in the “food chain” and is from Thailand or another Asian country.

x. Reports that Sunny lives “down near King St or Barrie St, but unsure of the exact address” and provides police with Sunny’s phone number and advises that Sunny has a profile of “Sunny Vongsuttachit” on Facebook. [notation in ITO: “I located this account on Facebook and Source A confirmed this was the Sunny they were talking about”].

xi. Provides information about the quality of cocaine purchased from MC, details about the supply and price. [notations in ITO reference corroborating phone activity obtained through TDR warrant].

b) Confidential Source B:

i. Previously provided information in other investigations that has been corroborated through surveillance and information from other sources but not yet received enforcement action.

ii. No convictions for fraud, perjury, or obstruction of justice.

iii. Motivated for charge consideration.

iv. Is a known drug user and low-level drug trafficker and is familiar with illegal drugs such as crack, cocaine, crystal meth, molly (MDMA) and fentanyl.

v. Reports that Matthew Campbell is trafficking a large quantity of cocaine.

vi. Reports that Campbell lives with Mattthew Wildsmith and works with him to traffic drugs.

vii. Reports that Campbell is the leader of the operation and Wildsmith does the hand-to-hand deals.

viii. Campbell and Wildsmith live in the corner unit, closest to the pool at 64 Ontario where they conduct some drug trafficking, but reports that Wildsmith leaves the unit to do most deals by foot. [notation in ITO: corroborated through surveillance].

ix. Provides information regarding Campbell’s supplier, the price of drugs, and details about the re-upping the supply. [notation in ITO that certain details are “corroborated with TDR”].

x. Reports that there is a stash house that Campbell can walk to and back in under 10 minutes from his house at 64 Ontario. [notation in ITO to be “corroborated through surveillance”].

xi. Reports the stash house is being run by a “Chinese or Korean male named Sunny” who is in his twenties and has a criminal record.

xii. Reports that most of the cocaine is kept at Sunny’s stash house.

xiii. Reports purchasing cocaine from Campbell.

c) Confidential Source C:

i. Has not previously been used to obtain any judicial authorizations but has been referenced for several investigations and is motivated by moral reasons.

ii. Provides a phone number [name and number redacted].

36The Applicant submits that Source B lacks credibility. I acknowledge that Source B has a criminal record, is motivated by charge consideration and does not have a track record for providing information that has attached enforcement action or been tested in court. That said, the information provided is compelling and, in certain respects, corroborated by Source A, police surveillance, and information from the TDR. Weaknesses in one of the three Debot factors can be compensated by strengths in the others.¹⁵

37The Applicant submits that the information regarding the existence of a “stash house” is neither compelling nor sufficiently corroborated. I disagree. While it is correct that Source B was the origin of information about a stash house, I would not describe the information provided as lacking in detail. Source B provided police with information that the stash house was a ten-minute roundtrip walk from 64 Ontario and that it was being operated by an Asian male identified as Sunny. Police observed Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith walking from 64 Ontario to 58 Wellington on three occasions and conducting drug deals thereafter on two of those occasions. Police also observe the Applicant (an Asian male) at 58 Wellington, interacting with Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith, and conducting a suspected drug transaction from this address. In my view, the information provided by Source B is sufficiently compelling and corroborated.

38The Applicant takes the position that from reviewing the ITO, it is unclear as to where Source B has obtained information about a stash house. Again, this potential frailty is ameliorated by corroboration through police surveillance and, to some extent, information received by Source A as to the Applicant’s involvement with Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith and the connection to 58 Wellington.

Conclusion – Reasonable and probable grounds

39The Applicant’s essential argument is that while the ITO may contain credible, compelling and corroborated information to connect Mr. Campbell, Mr. Wildsmith, and 64 Ontario to a drug trafficking operation, the information is lacking when it comes to establishing such a direct connection to him and 58 Wellington. In my view, the Applicant is requesting that the court unreasonably analyze the contents of the ITO related to him and 58 Wellington in isolation from the remaining information about Mr. Campbell, Mr. Wildsmith and 64 Ontario.

40Adopting a piecemeal dissection of the information before the issuing justice is inappropriate. It is the “cumulative effect” of all the information before the issuing justice that results in reasonable grounds having been met.¹⁶

41The facial attack on the warrant must fail. When the totality of the record before the issuing justice is considered, I find that it was sufficient to be satisfied that reasonable grounds to believe existed that illegal drugs would be found at 58 Wellington. Accordingly, the warrant could have issued.

B. Does the failure of the warrant to specify a particular apartment number render it invalid?

42The adequacy of the description of the place to be searched in the warrant requires a separate analysis.

43At the material time, 58 Wellington, formerly a single-family home, had been converted into four separate units. The Applicant occupied Unit #4, one of the two units located on the second floor of the two-storey residence.

44The search warrant issued on August 18, 2021, by Justice of the Peace Chapelle, authorized the search of “101-64 Ontario Street” and “58 Wellington Street”. There was no unit number specified with respect to 58 Wellington in the search warrant. The ITO did not contain any information to alert the issuing justice that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling.

45The Applicant takes the position that the warrant is invalid because it does not authorize the search of Unit #4.

General Principles – Specificity of place to be searched

46In R. v. Ting, the Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the issue of searches in multi-unit dwellings and the requirement that a warrant particularize the unit authorized to be searched. Writing for the Court, Miller J.A. stated:

…what constitutes an adequate description will vary with the location to be searched and the circumstances of each case. With respect to a multi-unit, multi-use building, as seen in this case, it is not enough to simply provide a street address that distinguishes the building from others. The description must adequately differentiate the units within the building, as those in a multi-unit dwelling have the same expectation of privacy as those in a single-unit dwelling.¹⁷

47A similar conclusion regarding the validity of a search warrant that referenced an incorrect address was reached in R. v. Pampena.¹⁸

48The Crown relies on a Manitoba case to suggest that a warrant should not be invalidated by a technical flaw. In R. v. Rautenberg, the search warrant was “specific as to location and items to be searched and seized, but did not on its face contain or indicate an expiry date.”¹⁹

Analysis

49It is important to keep in mind the distinction between facial and sub-facial validity. A warrant is facially valid if it could have issued based on the information contained in the record before the issuing justice. On facial review, the record is “fixed” and is based strictly on the ITO, not an “amplified or enlarged record.”²⁰

50For the reasons already noted above, I have found the warrant could have issued as the ITO disclosed reasonable and probable grounds to believe that illegal drugs would be found at 58 Wellington. The warrant is thus facially valid. However, that does not end the inquiry.

51A sub-facial attack on a warrant involves the credibility and reliability of the information put before the issuing justice and permits a reviewing court to look beyond the four corners of the search documents to consider relevant evidence.²¹

52In this case, the sub-facial attack centres on the Applicant’s submission that Kingston Police knew or ought to have known that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling and failed to disclose this information to the issuing justice, thus undermining the existence of reasonable grounds to search the entire residence.

53At the preliminary inquiry, Det. Cst. Conner was questioned about the information he had about 58 Wellington at the time the ITO was sworn. Detective Constable Conner testified that:

a. 58 Wellington appeared to be a house.

b. In the vicinity of 58 Wellington, there are a mix of single-family homes and rental accommodations for students attending Queen’s University.

c. He knows from having attended Queen’s University, that sometimes groups of students will rent out an entire house and that sometimes houses are split up into separate apartments and rented out individually.

d. An officer was sent to do a perimeter check of 58 Wellington and, in doing so, went up to the front door “lobby” area of the residence.

e. There were no other steps taken to ascertain whether 58 Wellington was a single-family home or a multi-unit dwelling.

54Photographs of the exterior of 58 Wellington were downloaded from Google Earth and included in the evidentiary record before this court. The photographs obviously show five utility meters attached to the exterior of 58 Wellington.

55At the preliminary inquiry, when questioned about 58 Wellington, the officer in charge, Detective Sergeant Jonas Bonham, confirmed that from the outside of the house you could observe “multiple mailboxes and a bit of a lobby”.

56Taking a common sense, objective view, there were obvious indicia that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling, including the prevalence of multi-unit dwellings in this part of the city due to the large student population in this area; the five exterior utility meters that would have been obvious during a perimeter check of the residence; the presence of a “lobby”; and multiple mailboxes. These were red flags that would clearly cause a reasonable officer in the circumstances to question the conclusion that 58 Wellington was a single-family dwelling.

57These facts were material. They were not disclosed to the issuing justice. They should have been. This is not a mere technical flaw. Apprised of these facts, any judicial officer would inevitably have inquired into the reasonableness of issuing a search warrant directed simply to the residential street number (as opposed to a specific unit) and would not have issued a warrant in that form.

58At the very least, the red flags should have prompted further inquiry by police.²² There is no evidence that police searched registry or municipal records nor were any hydro electric utility subscriber inquiries made.²³ Accordingly, I find that Kingston Police ought to have known of the strong potential that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling.

59The Applicant’s sub-facial challenge to the overly broad warrant must succeed. I find that the search warrant was legally invalid.

II. WAS THE EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH REASONABLE?

60Two issues arise related to the execution of the search. First, after the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) entered 58 Wellington, it was clear and obvious that there were separate units within the residence, yet a decision was made to continue with the search. The Applicant submits that this was unreasonable. Second, the Applicant takes the position that the police decision to perform a dynamic, forced entry into the Applicant’s unit was not justified.

Continuation of Search

61Regardless of what police ought to have known at the time the ITO was drafted, certainly by the time the ERU entered 58 Wellington to execute the search warrant, they were aware that they were dealing with a multi-unit dwelling.

62The continuation of the search at this point was illegal. It amounted to guesswork by police. As observed in Suggs: “[a]gents may not conduct a roving search of all units in a building ‘until they find the one they are looking for.’” ²⁴

63It was inappropriate for police to rely on the assistance from Mr. Wildsmith to narrow down the search to one of the two upper floor units. Oral information received from police officers at another location is no different than the impugned practice of resorting to facts contained in an ITO to determine the precise place to be searched.²⁵

64Further, there is no evidence of any legally valid, informed consent to the search, nor of exigent circumstances as contemplated in s. 11(7) of the CDSA and, of course, police are not permitted to rely on exigent circumstances of their own making.²⁶

65Finally, police could have, but did not, obtain a valid successive warrant bearing a correct description of the precise apartment to be searched. A second warrant was the type of approach undertaken by the police in Ting.

66In conclusion, the continuation of the police search of 58 Wellington, with only the authority of an invalid and overbroad warrant, was a violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

Manner of Entry

67The ERU performed a dynamic entry to gain access to Unit 101 of 64 Ontario and Units # 3 and 4 of 58 Wellington. There is no additional information contained in the evidentiary record beyond the fact that the ERU “breached” the doors of each unit.

68The Applicant takes the position that the execution of the search was illegal as there was no justification to depart from the presumptive “knock and announce” rule, rendering the search unreasonable. The Crown submits that the record supports the use of a dynamic entry for the protection of the public, officer safety, and to preserve evidence.

69The investigative plan set out in the ITO by Det. Cst. Conner was to execute the search warrant for the two residences in close proximity to one another. The ITO further states:

These warrants are being requested on residences in a densely populated residential area, and as such will need a coordinated effort to execute the warrants safely. Further, precautions must be made by the entry team to ensure that evidence is not lost at the time of entry as illegal drugs such as cocaine and MDMA are easy to dispose of.

70The ITO summarizes a search of police records related to Messrs. Campbell, Wildsmith and the Applicant. In February of 2021, police executed a CDSA search warrant at a residence on Joyce Street in Kingston, where it was suspected that Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith were doing business. Police seized brass knuckles and bear spray along with illegal drugs. Neither Mr. Campbell nor Mr. Wildsmith were at the residence when the warrant was executed. The results of a criminal record check confirmed that Messrs. Campell and Wildsmith did not have records and that the Applicant had a prior conviction for impaired driving.

71The August 18, 2021, search warrant itself is silent with respect to the search execution.

72The requirement that police officers executing a search warrant at residential premises knock and announce their presence before entering is a common law rule that has been “part of our law for over 400 years.” ²⁷ As noted in R. v. Cornell, there is a requirement for the police executing a warrant at a dwelling to give notice of their presence, notice of their authority, and notice of purpose for demanding entry.²⁸ There is a presumption that the police will comply with this rule absent exigent circumstances, having regard to the safety of the police or others, and to avoid destruction of evidence.²⁹

73Cornell confirms that where police depart from their common law duty to knock and announce, with reference to the record, they have the onus to explain why they believed it was necessary to do so to justify their actions.³⁰ The Crown must lay an evidentiary framework to support their decision to depart from the knock and announce rule.³¹

74None of the ERU officers that performed the dynamic entry on the Applicant’s unit testified at the preliminary hearing. None of the officers that testified at the preliminary hearing were questioned with respect to the decision to perform a dynamic entry. There was no evidence that the dynamic entry in this case was a reflection of a general or blanket policy by Kingston Police.

75Aside from the more general reasons for conducting dynamic entries when executing a CDSA warrant, there is specific evidence in the record to justify departure from the knock and announce rule in this case, including:

a) there were two search warrants to be executed in two separate residences;

b) the searches took place in densely populated areas;

c) police seized brass knuckles and bear spray at a prior location where Messrs. Campbell and Wildsmith had been suspected of doing business, indicating the potential for weapons to be used in relation to a trafficking operation by involved parties; and

d) the ease with which the drugs suspected to be in the specific locations to be searched in this case (MDMA and cocaine) could be destroyed.

76I am also mindful that Cornell provides that police should be judged on what was reasonably known to them at the time, not by the result, and afforded a certain latitude with respect to how they enter a premises.³²

77Given the court’s finding that police were illegally present at 58 Wellington, the inquiry into the legality of the manner of entry into Unit #4 is largely academic. However, as there is no evidence of a blanket policy, and there are case specific justifications to depart from the knock and announce rule, I find that the Crown has established a minimum evidentiary framework in the record to justify a dynamic entry.

III. WAS THE APPLICANT ARBITRARILY DETAINED CONTRARY TO s. 9?

78Kingston Police purport to have arrested the Applicant “on the strength of the [search] warrant”. There was no Feeney warrant to arrest the Applicant in his dwelling.³³

79The legality of the Applicant’s detention and arrest was not raised in the original Charter application. After I questioned the parties about the status of the Applicant’s arrest if I found police were in the residence illegally, an agreed statement of facts was filed to address the issue.

80The parties agree that if the search is found to be illegal, the Applicant’s subsequent detention and arrest amounts to a s. 9 Charter breach.

81Given my finding that the police search of Unit #4 of 58 Wellington was illegal, I consequently find that the Applicant’s detention and arrest violate s. 9 of the Charter.

IV. WAS THE APPLICANT’S s. 10(b) RIGHT TO COUNSEL WITHOUT DELAY INFRINGED?

82Multiple ERU officers entered Unit #4 followed by detectives from Kingston Police’s Street Crimes Unit. By all accounts, Unit #4 was described as a very small, studio apartment. Detective Constable Scott MacNeish was working with the Street Crimes Unit at the material time and was involved in the search of 58 Wellington. He testified that at 1:33 p.m., immediately upon entering Unit #4, he arrested the Applicant and provided the Applicant his right to counsel and a caution.

83According to both Det. Cst. MacNeish and Det. Sgt. Bonham, the Applicant appeared to be confused, hysterical, like he was having a panic attack and did not understand why police were there. Detective Constable MacNeish testified that “it was almost like he wasn’t comprehending what I was telling him”.

84Detective Constable MacNeish did not have his notebook with him while in Unit #4. He testified that his notes were made “shortly after the event took place”. He later confirmed that he could not recall if his notes were made the same day or the following morning. Detective Constable MacNeish was unable to recall what he said to the Applicant to ensure that he understood why he was being arrested. He testified that he gave the Applicant “his rights to counsel” and that the Applicant stated he did not have a lawyer. When offered duty counsel, the Applicant responded that he would like to speak with duty counsel. With respect to the caution, Det. Cst. MacNeish testified that he would have told the Applicant that he did not have to say anything but did not mention that he told the Applicant the potential consequences of speaking. There is no reference to a secondary caution having been provided. Detective Constable MacNeish testified that shortly after the Applicant’s right to counsel was given, the Applicant spontaneously made an inculpatory utterance, namely, that he was holding the drugs for “Matt”. Detective Constable MacNeish purported to record this statement at some point in his notebook.

85Detective Sergeant Bonham testified that when he arrived at 58 Wellington, the Street Crimes Unit detectives were already searching the premises. After observing a safe in the closet, he asked the Applicant “if he could open it rather than us smash it open”, leading to the Applicant agreeing to open the safe. When questioned whether the Applicant was informed that he did not have to cooperate, Det. Sgt. Bonham testified that he made the following statement to the Applicant: “if you could do us a favour and use the combination, that would be best but one way or the other we are opening the safe”. At this point in time, Det. Sgt. Bonham “assumed” that the Applicant had been provided his right to counsel but was unaware if he had asserted that right.

86The Applicant was taken outside after about ten minutes to await transport to the police station. There was a delay in transporting the Applicant to the police station. The delay was unexplained. At 3:29 p.m. the Applicant finally arrived at the station. A call was placed to duty counsel at 3:35 p.m. The Applicant did not speak with duty counsel until 4:03 p.m.

General Principles – Right to Counsel

87On arrest, everyone has a right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.³⁴ There are three duties imposed on police by s. 10(b) of the Charter:

(i) The “informational” duty: to inform the detainee of his or her right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and of the existence and availability of legal aid and duty counsel;

(ii) The “implementational” duty: if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise this right, to provide the detainee with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the right (except in urgent and dangerous circumstances); and

(iii) The “holding-off” obligation: to refrain from eliciting evidence from the detainee until he or she has had that reasonable opportunity (again, except in cases of urgency or danger).³⁵

88The purpose of the right to counsel is to provide a detainee with the opportunity to obtain legal advice relevant to his legal situation including how to protect himself against self-incrimination.³⁶

Analysis

89Although the Applicant has not raised the issue of police compliance with the s. 10(b) informational duty, there are clearly issues with the discharge of this police obligation. It is unknown precisely what Det. Cst. MacNeish said to the Applicant. Because no contemporaneous notes were made – nor even notes made shortly after relevant events – Det. Cst. MacNeish was unable to provide a verbatim, or even reliable, account of what was said to the Applicant or what the Applicant said in response. While some exchange apparently occurred, resulting in the Applicant’s request to speak with duty counsel, neither Det. Cst. MacNeish’s notes nor the broader record establishes what the Applicant understood about his entitlement to exercise the right “without delay”, including when, where, or how the right could be exercised, the existence of a 24-7 free access to duty counsel, or that a toll-free phone number would be provided.³⁷

90Further, given his emotional condition and reported difficulty in comprehending what he was being told, it is unclear whether the Applicant clearly understood his right to counsel. When a detainee is in such a state, the police are obliged to carefully and positively ensure that the right is clearly understood.³⁸

91With respect to implementation, a detained person who exercises their right to speak with counsel must be given an opportunity to do so immediately unless specific circumstances exist to justify the delay.³⁹ Some delay in providing access to counsel can be acceptable when there are concerns about public safety, police safety, preservation of evidence, or certain circumstances relating to the execution of search warrants.⁴⁰ However, to justify a delay in providing access to counsel, there must be evidence that police turned their mind to the specific circumstances of the case and had reasonable grounds for the delay.⁴¹ The burden is on the Crown to prove the circumstances that make the delay reasonable.⁴² It is difficult for the Crown to prove that administrative or logistical factors justified delay of the constitutional right to consult counsel without delay.⁴³

92The Applicant exercised his right to speak to counsel immediately following his arrest at 1:33 p.m. There was no attempt to contact duty counsel until two hours later. I find the general explanation of “transport delay” to be insufficient to justify not providing the Applicant with access to counsel. First, police should have been prepared for the possibility of having to transport detainees to the police station for processing after the execution of two search warrants. Second, this was not an incident of two officers executing a search warrant in a rural location. There were numerous officers on scene. Access to counsel without delay could have been expedited in this instance. Finally, there was no explanation provided by police as to why the Applicant was not put in contact with a lawyer while at the residence when there was a phone readily available.⁴⁴

93In the present case, police conducted a planned search of 58 Wellington that involved a coordinated effort among several officers. It would be no surprise that the Applicant was present when the search warrant was executed. The Applicant was arrested and invoked his right to counsel before any incriminating evidence was located. Nothing in the record suggests the police gave pre-search consideration to the potential for timely transport. The arrest occurred in a municipal location with close access to a police facility. Assuming that immediate access to counsel could not be provided on account of safety and/or privacy concerns, there was a duty on police to then efficiently, expeditiously and sensibly turn the existing right to counsel into access to counsel. This did not happen.

94Claims that “transport” was not available for two hours despite the presence of multiple officers at the scene amounts to prioritizing other tasks over compliance with the Applicant’s right to counsel without delay. The delay was not reasonable and violated the Applicant’s s. 10(b) right to counsel.

95Delay is only one issue. Timely access to counsel assures that a decision of a detainee to cooperate in an investigation, or decline to do so, is both voluntary and informed by legal advice.⁴⁵

96Police have an obligation to hold off eliciting evidence from a detainee who has exercised their right to counsel but has not yet had an opportunity to consult with counsel.⁴⁶ Specifically, “police cannot in any way compel him or her to make a decision or participate in a process which could ultimately have an adverse effect in the conduct of an eventual trial until that person has had a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right.”⁴⁷

97When Det. Sgt. Bonham solicited the assistance of the Applicant to open the safe, when the Applicant had not been provided access to counsel, the officer further breached the Applicant’s s. 10(b) Charter right by effectively conscripting the Applicant to incriminate himself.⁴⁸

V. GIVEN THE CHARTER VIOLATIONS, WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER s. 24(2)?

98Police were in Unit #4 without a valid warrant, arrested the Applicant illegally, and elicited inculpatory information from the Applicant after he asserted his right to counsel but before he was provided timely access to counsel.

99All evidence required to secure a conviction was “obtained in a manner” that violates the Applicant’s Charter rights. This includes the Applicant’s spontaneous utterance that he was holding the drugs for someone else, which I find was contextually and temporally connected to the ss. 8 and 9 breaches, as well as his self-incrimination in opening the safe and the discovery of its contents, which I find are contextually, temporally, and causally related to all of the Charter breaches.⁴⁹

100I must now determine whether this evidence should be excluded by considering whether its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.⁵⁰

101The onus is on the Applicant to establish on a balance of probabilities that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. To determine whether evidence should be excluded following a Charter breach, as set out in R. v. Grant, the following factors must be considered: (i) the seriousness of the conduct; (ii) the impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter protected interests; and (iii) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.⁵¹

102When there are multiple Charter breaches, a breach that is entirely consequential on an earlier breach is unlikely to significantly increase the overall seriousness of the state conduct but may be relevant to the impact on an accused person.⁵²

Analysis

(i) Seriousness of the conduct

103The chief consideration when analyzing this factor is the gravity of the police conduct. There are different degrees of seriousness of Charter infringing state conduct. As noted in Grant:

At one end of the spectrum, admission of evidence obtained through inadvertent or minor violations of the Charter may minimally undermine public confidence in the rule of law. At the other end of the spectrum, admitting evidence obtained through a wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights will inevitably have a negative effect on the public confidence in the rule of law, and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.⁵³

104I have found that the warrant was invalid as it could not have issued since material facts related to the potential for 58 Wellington to be a multi-unit dwelling were not included in the ITO. While police obtained a warrant and had reasonable grounds to believe that drugs would be present at the Applicant’s dwelling, at a minimum, they remained willfully blind as to red flags about the nature of the dwelling and were beyond careless in disclosing material facts to the issuing justice. Given the obligation of an ITO affiant to make full and frank disclosure, the omission of material facts from an ITO is conduct that should not be endorsed by the court.

105Further, there is some indication that the failure to include these material facts was not an oversight and that police had actual knowledge that there were multiple units in the residence. The record demonstrates that the search warrant for 101-64 Ontario was executed first, followed by 58 Wellington. Detective Sergeant Bonham testified that during the execution of the search warrant at 64 Ontario, he received information from Mr. Wildsmith that the Applicant was in one of the upstairs units of 58 Wellington. The Applicant submits that the court should draw the inference that this information was provided in response to a police inquiry into which unit the Applicant lived in. This would imply that police were aware that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling. The evidentiary record is limited with respect to how Mr. Wildsmith came to divulge the whereabouts of the Applicant. I am not prepared to make a definitive finding that police had actual knowledge that 58 Wellington was a multi-unit dwelling at the time the ITO was drafted, rather I conclude they ought to have known given the constellation of factors already identified in these reasons.

106With respect to the execution of the warrant, police unreasonably continued to search the premises after it was obvious that there were multiple units, entering another residential apartment incorrectly before ultimately entering the Applicant’s unit. I cannot accept that police could have honestly believed that the search warrant permitted entry into every unit in the dwelling. In the circumstances of this case, with no exigent circumstances noted, I find that the police decision to continue the search and to enter individual units without express authorization on the face of the warrant constitutes a serious Charter violation.

107The s. 9 violation – the illegal detention and warrantless arrest – are consequential to the illegal search and does not increase the seriousness of the Charter violation for the purpose of the s. 24(2) analysis.

108However, the s. 10(b) violation was an entirely separate breach. The Applicant was deprived of timely access to counsel without a reasonable explanation. The s. 10(b) breach was aggravated when police elicited inculpatory information from the Applicant after he asserted his right to counsel but before he was provided with access to counsel. Detective Sergeant Bonham’s evidence was that when he asked the Applicant to unlock the safe, he was unaware as to whether the Applicant was advised of his right to counsel or provided access to counsel. In my view, the police actions demonstrate a disregard for the Applicant’s Chater protected right to counsel, which I find to be serious.

109When viewed collectively, given the serious nature of the numerous breaches of the Applicant’s Charter rights, this factor strongly favours exclusion of the evidence.

(ii) Impact on [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html) protected interests of the accused

110The second element of the Grant test requires a court to examine the extent to which the breach undermines the Charter right itself.

111An “unconstitutional search of a residence strikes at the heart of the privacy and security of the person interests protected by s. 8 of the Charter.”⁵⁴ For this reason alone, this factor favours exclusion of the evidence.

112With respect to the s. 10(b) breach, the Applicant was not given a timely opportunity to get advice to make an informed decision as to whether to cooperate with the police request to unlock the safe. The breach was more than just incidental. This factor strongly favours exclusion of the evidence.

(iii) Society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits

113The evidence seized from the search is highly reliable, real evidence, without which the Crown’s case would be gutted. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that the exclusion of relevant and reliable evidence “may undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and render the trial unfair from the public perspective, thus bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.”⁵⁵

114The illegal search coupled with the inculpatory evidence obtained from the Applicant in a non-Charter compliant manner resulted in the seizure of over 2 kg of illegal drugs. If the evidence is excluded, the Applicant will go free. Because of the seriousness of the charges and the critical importance of this evidence to the Crown’s case, I find that this final factor favours admission.

Conclusion: Balancing Grant factors

115I have found the Charter breaches to be serious and the impact on the Applicant to have been significant.

116If the first two factors strongly favour exclusion, it is rare that high societal interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits will tip the balance in favour of admissibility.⁵⁶

117I reject the Crown’s submission that the breaches, if any, are only minor or technical in nature. Police actions in this case demonstrate there was a complete disregard for several of the Applicant’s constitutionally protected rights.

Conclusion

118The Charter application is granted. All evidence obtained in the illegal search, following the illegal arrest, and as a consequence of eliciting information from the Applicant before he had access to legal advice, is therefore excluded.

Muszynski J.

Footnotes

1. 1S.C. 1996, c. 19 [CDSA].
2. 2Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
3. 3The application alleged ss. 8 and 10(b) violations. The court invited submission with respect to s. 9 and the parties filed an agreed statement of facts in this regard.
4. 4R. v. Crevier, 2015 ONCA 619, 330 C.C.C. (3d) 305, at para. 66.
5. 51990 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, at p. 1452 [Garofoli].
6. 62010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 40 [Morelli].
7. 7R. v. Sanchez (1994), 1994 CanLII 5271 (ON CTGD), 20 O.R. (3d) 468 (Gen. Div.), at p. 479 [Sanchez]; R. v. Okezie, 2025 ONCA 77, at para. 6; and R. v. Barton, 2024 ABCA 34, 433 C.C.C. (3d) 196, at para. 85, leave to appeal refused, [2024] S.C.C.A. No. 66.
8. 8R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 992, at para. 46 [Araujo].
9. 9Garofoli, at p. 1421; Araujo, at para. 57; and Morelli, at para. 44.
10. 10Sanchez, at pp. 476-477.
11. 111989 CanLII 13 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at p. 1168.
12. 12R. v. Winmill (1999), 1999 CanLII 1353 (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 582 (C.A.), at p. 609; R. v. Linklater, 2009 ONCA 172, 246 O.A.C. 303, at para. 11.
13. 13R. v. Ifesimeshone, 2024 ONCA 834, 174 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 27-32; R. v. Brown, 2021 ONCA 119, 403 C.C.C. (3d) 457, at paras. 52-55 [Brown]; and United States v. Francis, No. 24-1386 (1st Cir. 2025), at pp. 11-13.
14. 14R. v. Green, 2015 ONCA 579, 337 O.A.C. 72, at para. 18.
15. 15Brown, at para. 32; R. v. Jones, 2023 ONCA 106, at para. 13; and R. v. Lye, 2026 ONCA 188, at para. 38.
16. 16R. v. Abdoulkader, 2022 ONCA 354, at paras. 21-22.
17. 17R. v. Ting, 2016 ONCA 57, 333 C.C.C. (3d) 516, at para. 51 [Ting].
18. 182022 ONCA 668, at paras. 24-25, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 2.
19. 192025 MBKB 132, at para. 18.
20. 20R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at paras. 37-38 [Sadikov]; R. v. Shivrattan, 2017 ONCA 23, 346 C.C.C. (3d) 299, at para. 26, leave to appeal refused, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 93.
21. 21Sadikov, at para. 38.
22. 22In the context of search warrant challenges, American authorities have addressed whether police ought to have known of the multi-unit character of a residence. Determining what police ought to have known in this scenario is determined “objectively, based on the totality the circumstances, considering only the information available” at the time the warrant was issued: USA v. Suggs, No. 24-2892 (7th Cir. 2026), at p. 7 [Suggs].
23. 23An example can be found in Ting, at para. 14, where it was noted that police conducted a “check with Toronto Hydro”.
24. 24Suggs, at p. 9.
25. 25Ting, at para. 59: “[i]t is not enough, however, for the ITO to accurately describe the premises to be searched. For a search warrant to fulfill its functions, those who are relying on it – including police officers who are executing it and third parties whose cooperation is sought – must not be required to look past the warrant to the ITO. The warrant itself must be clear and limited on face with respect to the location to be searched.”
26. 26See R. v. Silveira, 1995 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, at para. 53; R. v. Thompson, 2025 ONCA 500, 450 C.C.C. (3d) 383, at para. 24.
27. 27R. v. Pan, 2012 ONCA 581, 292 C.C.C. (3d) 440, at para. 35.
28. 282010 SCC 31, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 142, at para. 18 [Cornell].
29. 29Cornell, at para. 20.
30. 30Cornell, at paras. 20, 29.
31. 31See R. v. Genest, 1989 CanLII 109 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, at p. 89; R. v. Collins, 2023 ONCA 2, at para. 11.
32. 32Cornell, at paras. 23-24.
33. 33R. v. Feeney, 1997 CanLII 342 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at para. 45.
34. 34Charter, s. 10(b).
35. 35R. v. Bartle, 1994 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173, at p. 192 [Bartle].
36. 36R. v. Dussault, 2022 SCC 16, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 306, at para. 30; R. v. Hamouth, 2023 ONCA 518, 167 O.R. (3d) 682, at para. 44, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 387.
37. 37R. v. Brydges, 1990 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at p. 215; Bartle, at p. 201; and R. v. Pozniak, 1994 CanLII 66 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 310, at p. 319.
38. 38R. v. Willier, 2010 SCC 37, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 429, at para. 31.
39. 39R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745, 143 O.R. (3d) 135, at paras. 25-26 [Rover]; R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, at paras. 38, 42; and Bartle, at pp. 191-192.
40. 40Rover, at para. 26.
41. 41Rover, at para. 33.
42. 42R. v. Brunelle, 2024 SCC 3, at para. 83; R. v. Samuels, 2025 ONCA 736, at para. 65 [Samuels].
43. 43See e.g., Samuels, at para. 66.
44. 44See R. v. Jonat, 2023 ONCA 162, at para. 15; R. v. Fan, 2017 BCCA 99, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 280, at paras. 63-65.
45. 45R. v. Sanclemente, 2021 ONCA 906, 408 C.C.C. (3d) 429, at para. 132.
46. 46R. v. Prosper, 1994 CanLII 65 (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236, at p. 269 [Prosper].
47. 47Prosper, at p. 269.
48. 48R. v. O’Brien, 2023 ONCA 197, 166 O.R. (3d) 114, at para. 50.
49. 49R. v. Fox, 2026 SCC 4, at para. 90 [Fox].
50. 50Charter, s. 24(2); Fox, at para. 91.
51. 512009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 71 [Grant].
52. 52R. v. Zacharias, 2023 SCC 30, at para. 2.
53. 53Grant, at para. 74.
54. 54R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 525, at para. 133.
55. 55Grant, at para. 81.
56. 56R. v. McGuffie, 2016 ONCA 365, 131 O.R. (3d) 643, at para. 63.