David H. Lauder

The plaintiff in a personal injury action moved to strike the jury notice because pandemic-related public health restrictions made it unlikely a civil jury trial could proceed as scheduled in June 2021.

The defendant opposed, preferring to adjourn the trial until a jury was available.

The court noted that local conditions in Kingston meant no civil jury trials would be held in 2021, and an adjournment would delay the trial until at least April 2022, causing prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court conditionally struck the jury notice, ordering that if the case is called during the June 2021 sittings, it will proceed without a jury, but if it must be adjourned due to lack of judicial resources, the jury notice may be restored if a jury trial is available at the rescheduled date.

Following a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident where liability had been admitted, the plaintiff recovered damages of $280,525.60.

The parties disputed entitlement to costs in light of competing offers to settle under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the defendant’s offer to settle for $375,000 complied with Rule 49 and triggered the usual cost consequences because the plaintiff obtained a judgment lower than the offer.

The plaintiff was therefore entitled to partial indemnity costs only up to the date of the defendant’s offer, while the defendant was entitled to partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court reduced both parties’ claimed fees and disbursements as excessive and fixed costs at equivalent amounts, resulting in a full set‑off.

During a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to qualify a chiropractor as an expert to testify about an in‑home functional assessment.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the proposed testimony satisfied the admissibility criteria for expert evidence under R. v. Mohan.

The judge found the proposed opinion exceeded the witness’s professional expertise, overlapped with evidence already provided by more qualified medical experts, and largely repeated the plaintiff’s own testimony.

Because the proposed evidence lacked necessity and probative value, the witness was not qualified as an expert.

The ruling emphasizes the trial judge’s gatekeeping role in scrutinizing expert evidence and preventing unnecessary or duplicative expert testimony.

The defendant employer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action, arguing that an employment agreement limiting termination compensation was enforceable.

The employee resisted the motion relying on the changed substratum doctrine, asserting that promotions and increased responsibilities had fundamentally altered the employment relationship and nullified the contractual notice limitation.

The court held that, although the doctrine had not been expressly pleaded, the pleadings and affidavit evidence raised the issue sufficiently for the purposes of the motion.

Applying the summary judgment framework, the court found that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding whether the employee’s responsibilities and status had materially changed.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the action was permitted to proceed to trial.

The appellant slipped and fell on a grape in the produce department of a grocery store owned by the respondent.

A jury found the respondent had taken reasonable care and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the standard of care and causation, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the standard of reasonableness under the Occupiers' Liability Act, and that there was sufficient evidence of the respondent's floor maintenance program to support the jury's verdict.

The applicant was injured as a pedestrian in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits from multiple insurers, including the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

A dispute arose regarding which insurer was responsible for paying the benefits and whether Ontario Regulation 283/95 applied.

The arbitrator determined that because the applications for benefits and the dispute arose after March 27, 1995, Ontario Regulation 283/95 applied.

Consequently, the Commission lacked jurisdiction to decide the priority dispute, and the issue of which insurer is required to pay benefits must be resolved through private arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 1991.