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The court held that failing to wear a seatbelt under the Highway Traffic Act is a strict liability offence.
The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to properly wear a seatbelt contrary to section 106(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.
The trial justice found the offence to be one of absolute liability and convicted the appellant.
On appeal, the court considered two issues: whether a reasonable apprehension of bias arose from the trial judge's premature pronouncement of guilt, and whether section 106(2) creates a strict liability or absolute liability offence.
The court dismissed the bias argument but found that section 106(2) is a strict liability offence, not absolute liability.
The Crown consented to a stay of proceedings rather than proceed with a new trial.
The defendant was convicted of failing to stop at a red light after the court rejected his testimony regarding traffic signal mechanics and following distances as illogical.
The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red light under s. 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.
A police officer testified that he observed the defendant's transport truck proceed through a red light at the intersection of Ontario Street south and Derry Road in Milton.
The defendant testified that the first truck ahead of him triggered a green light and that he proceeded through on the amber.
The court found the defendant's testimony internally inconsistent and illogical, particularly regarding the timing of the light cycle, the distance he maintained behind the lead truck, and his changing estimates of distances.
The court accepted the officer's evidence and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
A fine of $260.00 was imposed with 90 days to pay.
The defendant was convicted of failing to stop for a school bus after the court rejected his testimony as illogical and self-serving.
The defendant was charged with failing to stop for a school bus contrary to section 175(11) of the Highway Traffic Act.
A constable positioned himself at a specific location to monitor complaints of drivers failing to stop for a school bus at a particular intersection.
The officer observed the defendant's vehicle traveling westbound at approximately 80 kilometers per hour, pass a stopped school bus with activated overhead flashing lights and stop arm extended, while a child was exiting the bus.
The defendant testified that he did not see the flashing lights before the bus stopped and was too close to stop.
The court found the officer's evidence credible, detailed, and consistent, while finding the defendant's evidence unclear, confusing, illogical, and self-serving.
The court rejected the defendant's various assertions and speculative responses, finding them insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.
A conviction was entered and a fine of $400.00 was imposed with 30 days to pay.
The defendant was acquitted of careless driving after momentarily taking her eyes off the road to grab her purse.
The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after a motor vehicle collision on the Queen Elizabeth Way.
The defendant struck the rear of another vehicle while momentarily taking her eyes off the road to grab her purse, which contained a sentimental glass object that was slipping out.
The court found that while the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of a prudent driver, it constituted only inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving was either reckless or indicative of indifference to the safety of others.
The defendant was acquitted.
The court denied a stay of proceedings for careless driving, finding the institutional delay reasonable.
The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.
The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.
The charge was laid on May 17, 2010, and the trial was not completed until September 17, 2012, a period of 28 months.
The court applied the four-factor test from Regina v. Morin to assess whether the delay was unreasonable.
After allocating various periods of delay to different categories (inherent time requirements, actions of the accused, and institutional delay), the court determined that the institutional delay of approximately 9 months and 23 days fell within the constitutionally tolerable range of 8 to 10 months established in Morin.
The court found no evidence of prejudice to the defendant's liberty, security, or fair trial interests.
The application was denied.
The defendant was convicted of speeding based on reliable radar evidence.
The defendant was charged with speeding—98 kilometres per hour in a posted 60 kilometres per hour zone, contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.
The trial proceeded over three dates.
The Crown presented evidence from Police Officer Mike Hunchak, who used a Decatur Genesis II Select radar device to measure the defendant's speed.
The defendant testified that he was driving cautiously due to heavy cargo and was travelling at less than 60 kilometres per hour when stopped.
The court found that the radar device was properly tested and operated, and that the Crown had established a prima facie case.
The court concluded that the defendant's evidence, while credible, did not raise a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt.
The defendant was found guilty as charged.