Kenneth W. Dechert

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer observed the defendant holding what he identified as a cell phone while driving through an intersection.

The defendant's representative challenged whether the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was a cell phone.

The court found the officer's lay opinion evidence credible and reliable, despite a discrepancy in the officer's notes regarding his direction of travel.

The defendant was found guilty of the offence.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act: operating a motor vehicle without insurance and knowingly using a false insurance card.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle on Highway 403 in Oakville on November 7, 2011, and that she was the registered owner of the vehicle.

The defendant's insurance policy had been cancelled on October 8, 2011, due to non-payment of premiums.

The defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the vehicle was insured at the time of the offence.

The defendant also failed to establish the defence of reasonable care.

The Crown stayed the second count, and the defendant was convicted on the first count.

The defendant was charged with obstructing a public health inspector lawfully carrying out her duties under the Health Protection and Promotion Act.

The inspector attended the defendant's barber shop to conduct a routine annual inspection.

After the inspector made comments about the cleanliness of the Barbicide solution, the defendant lost his temper, left the shop, and subsequently prevented the inspector from completing the inspection by swearing at her, making obscene gestures, and directing her to leave the area.

The court found the offence to be one of strict liability and determined that the prosecution proved all elements of the prohibited act beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant failed to establish the defence of reasonable care or honest and reasonable mistake of fact.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with speeding 82 kilometres per hour in a posted 60 kilometres per hour zone on Tremaine Road in Milton, Ontario on January 24, 2014.

The prosecution relied on radar speed measurement evidence obtained by a qualified police officer using a Genesis II Select radar device.

The defendant challenged the accuracy of the radar reading, arguing that adverse winter weather conditions with blowing snow caused a false reading.

The court found that the prosecution established all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence of the posted speed limit and the defendant's speed as measured by radar.

The defendant's theory regarding weather-induced radar error was found to be speculative and unsupported by expert evidence or effective cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police constable observed the defendant holding a dark object in his right hand while driving a van on Speers Road in Oakville.

The constable identified the object as a cell phone based on his specialized experience in distracted driving enforcement.

The defendant's counsel challenged whether the object was definitively a cell phone, given the observation distance of 12 feet, light rain conditions, and lack of detailed description.

The court found the constable's lay opinion credible and reliable, considering his vantage point, specialized experience, and the subsequent observation of a matching cell phone on the vehicle's console.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red traffic light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the defendant entered an intersection while facing a red light or a green light.

The prosecution presented four witnesses who testified that the defendant ran a red light, while the defendant testified that he faced a green light.

The court applied the credibility assessment principles from R. v. W.(D.) and found the prosecution witnesses credible and reliable, particularly an independent witness who had an optimal vantage point to observe both traffic signals.

The defendant's testimony was found to be unreliable and inconsistent with the preponderance of prosecution evidence.

The court convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged that the defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a complete stop at a marked stop line at the intersection of Scott Boulevard and Pringle Avenue in Milton on September 11, 2012.

The defendant denied the allegation and testified that he did stop his vehicle before the stop line.

The court found that while the prosecution established the actus reus on a balance of probabilities, it failed to meet the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's testimony, when considered in the context of the totality of evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding (76 km/h in a posted 50 km/h community safety zone) contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a Charter application under section 7 and subsection 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the prosecution failed to provide adequate disclosure.

Specifically, the defendant contended that the investigating officer's notes, prepared on a pre-typed template containing pre-written assertions about the radar device functioning properly and the vehicle appearing to exceed the speed limit, constituted "canned evidence" and inadequate disclosure.

The defendant sought a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the defendant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his section 7 Charter rights had been violated.

The court concluded that the template notes, including pre-printed portions, constituted adequate disclosure of the officer's anticipated evidence, particularly given the officer's testimony about his standard practices and the reliability of the pre-determined statements.

The defendant was charged with two offences: speeding at 88 km/h in a posted 50 km/h community safety zone, and failing to surrender a motor vehicle permit upon demand by a police officer.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates with conflicting evidence from the defendant and the investigating officer regarding both the speed of the vehicle and whether the permit was actually surrendered.

The court found the defendant guilty of both charges.

The speeding charge was classified as an absolute liability offence, requiring only proof of the prohibited act.

The permit charge was classified as a strict liability offence, allowing for a due diligence defence, which the defendant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a stop sign contrary to section 136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution presented evidence from a police officer who observed the defendant's vehicle pass through a stop sign at approximately 5-7 km/h without coming to a complete stop.

The defendant testified that he stopped his vehicle behind the marked stop line before proceeding through the intersection.

The court found that while the offence is one of absolute liability requiring only proof of the actus reus, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant uncertainty regarding the officer's vantage point (possibly 50 metres or more from the intersection rather than the stated 10 metres) and the credible, consistent testimony of the defendant.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after a motor vehicle collision on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The defendant struck the rear of another vehicle while momentarily taking her eyes off the road to grab her purse, which contained a sentimental glass object that was slipping out.

The court found that while the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of a prudent driver, it constituted only inadvertent negligence rather than conduct deserving of punishment.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving was either reckless or indicative of indifference to the safety of others.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with failing to remain at or immediately return to the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant backed her vehicle out of a driveway and struck a parked vehicle.

She did not remain at the scene.

The Crown alleged she knew or ought to have known of the collision.

The defendant testified she believed she had struck the curb, not another vehicle, due to a "bump stop" sensation, loud radio volume, and her positioning in the vehicle.

The court found the defendant's explanation plausible and credible, leaving a reasonable doubt as to whether she was aware of the accident.

The court held that her failure to remain was therefore an involuntary act, and the actus reus of the offence was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant, a convenience store clerk in her second day of training, was charged with selling tobacco to a person under 19 years of age, contrary to the Smoke-Free Ontario Act.

A test shopper, aged 17, successfully purchased cigarettes from the defendant without being asked for identification.

The defendant claimed she honestly believed the purchaser was of legal age and that she exercised due diligence given the high volume of customers and stressful circumstances.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that while her belief may have been honest, it was not objectively reasonable, and she failed to meet the required standard of being "scrupulously vigilant" in preventing sales to minors.

The defendant was charged with speeding (134 km/hr in a 100 km/hr zone) under the Highway Traffic Act.

He brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The overall delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated trial completion was 20 months and 18 days.

The court found that while 11 months and 22 days of this delay was attributable to institutional or systemic factors, the defendant failed to establish that he suffered actual or inferred prejudice as a result of the delay.

The application was denied.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under subsections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge was laid on May 17, 2010, and the trial was not completed until September 17, 2012, a period of 28 months.

The court applied the four-factor test from Regina v. Morin to assess whether the delay was unreasonable.

After allocating various periods of delay to different categories (inherent time requirements, actions of the accused, and institutional delay), the court determined that the institutional delay of approximately 9 months and 23 days fell within the constitutionally tolerable range of 8 to 10 months established in Morin.

The court found no evidence of prejudice to the defendant's liberty, security, or fair trial interests.

The application was denied.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while operating a handheld communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution relied solely on the testimony of Police Constable Norman Deneault, who observed the defendant holding a black device to his ear while driving and appearing to talk into it.

The court classified the offence as one of strict liability and determined that the prosecution must prove all elements of the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that based on circumstantial evidence—the defendant holding a black device to his ear, appearing to talk, with an electrical cord visible, and being the sole occupant of the vehicle—the only rational inference was that the device was a cell phone.

The court took judicial notice that a cell phone is a hand-held wireless communication device and found that the prosecution need not prove the device was capable of receiving or transmitting communications.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant corporation was charged with unlawfully disposing of oil field fluids in violation of the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act and related regulations.

The Crown sought to admit a Certificate of Analysis from Maxxam Analytics containing chemical analysis results of soil and vegetation samples collected from the defendant's well site.

The defendant objected to admission of the document as hearsay.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the business records exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of the Ontario Evidence Act.

The court found that the Certificate of Analysis met all requirements for admission as a business record and admitted it into evidence.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign by failing to stop at the intersection of Leighland Avenue and Kent Avenue in Oakville on February 9, 2011.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of Police Officer Ross Amore, who observed the defendant's vehicle entering the intersection at approximately 15 kilometres per hour without stopping.

The defendant testified that he stopped properly at the stop sign, and his passenger corroborated this account.

The court found that while the officer's testimony was genuine, it lacked significant reliability due to equivocal responses regarding other vehicles at the intersection and a lack of detail regarding the defendant's vehicle's approach to the marked stop line.

The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to stop at the marked stop line as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was acquitted.

The Crown charged Timur Leckebusch with two counts of unlawfully undertaking development without a permit in a Development Control area under the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act: construction of an earthen berm and construction of a retaining wall.

The Crown also charged 819743 Ontario Inc. with unlawfully undertaking development without a permit for construction of an armour stone wall.

The defendants argued that the structures were exempt from the permit requirement as accessory structures to general agricultural development under Ontario Regulation 828.

The court found that the Crown proved the actus reus of all three offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the court found that Leckebusch successfully established the exemption for both the berm and retaining wall on a balance of probabilities, resulting in acquittals on both counts.

The court found that 819743 Ontario Inc. failed to establish the exemption for the armour stone wall and was convicted.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's licence was suspended contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant drove on May 14, 2011, while his licence was suspended effective April 14, 2008, for unpaid fines.

The defendant raised the due diligence defence, arguing he held an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief that his licence was not suspended.

The court found that although the defendant may have honestly believed his licence was valid, his belief was not objectively reasonable.

The defendant failed to take reasonable steps to verify the status of his licence despite knowing of the 2008 suspension, failing to pay the outstanding fine, and failing to notify the Ministry of Transportation of address changes.

The court found the defendant guilty.