A non-publication and non-broadcast order in this proceeding has been issued under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code. This subsection and subsection 486.6(1) of the Criminal Code, which is concerned with the consequence of failure to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), read as follows:
486.4 Order restricting publication — sexual offences.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of
(a) any of the following offences:
(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 172, 172.1, 173, 210, 211, 212, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.02, 279.03, 346 or 347,
(ii) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983, or
(iii) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or (2) (sexual intercourse with a female between 14 and 16) or section 151 (seduction of a female between 16 and 18), 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or
(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in any of subparagraphs (a)(i) to (iii).
(2) Mandatory order on application.— In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall
(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the complainant of the right to make an application for the order; and
(b) on application made by the complainant, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.
486.6 Offence.—(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE# 24 50000408
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
C.L.
Judgment
Before Justice Brock Jones
Heard on April 27, 28, and July 7, 2026
Written Reasons for Judgment released on July 17, 2026
A. Weafer counsel for the Crown
L. Wilhelm counsel for C.L.
Jones J.:
Introduction
1C.L. is charged with one count of sexual assault, one count of sexual assault with choking, and one count of common assault.
2The events underlying this trial occurred on three dates. First, on October 11, 2022, he is alleged to have sexually assaulted N.L. in her residence. Second, on January 17, 2023, he is alleged to have sexually assaulted her again in her residence, this time using zip ties to restrain her. And third, a simple assault is alleged to have occurred on April 26, 2023, when he was in the midst of an argument with N.L. and grabbed her arm.
3The trial progressed over three days. N.L. testified for the Crown. C.L. testified in his own defence. After hearing from the parties at the conclusion of the trial, I reserved my judgment.
4In these written reasons, I explain why I have acquitted C.L. of all the charges.
Overview Of Ms. N. L.’s Testimony
5N.L. and C.L. were in an intimate partner relationship for several years. On Monday, October 10, 2022, she was at her condominium in downtown Toronto. She lived alone, except when C.L. stayed over.
6C.L. had been visiting family in Ottawa over the Thanksgiving weekend. He returned home late in the evening. N.L. was doing schoolwork. She believed he had cheated on her, as she had been tracking his location through an iPad he brought with him to Ottawa. She was able to track its location. She noticed that he had travelled to Quebec. In her mind, this suggested he was seeing another woman.
7When he arrived at her residence, they spoke. He pressured her to sleep with him. She refused. Eventually, it became physical. He placed his hands on her. He moved her from the kitchen to the bedroom. He removed her clothes. She was resisting and asked him to stop. He tried to have anal sex with her on her bed, but he did not succeed. After about 20 or 30 minutes, he finally relented.
8On January 17, 2023, N.L. was at her condominium. C.L. was no longer staying with her regularly. They broke up after the first incident. However, he came over that day, as their relationship remained in flux. They decided to talk. From N.L.’s perspective, however, they were no longer together.
9When he arrived, he wanted to have sex. She ultimately “gave in” and agreed. It was “easier than trying to fight him off.” In the bedroom, they undressed. N.L. expected a normal sexual experience. Then everything changed.
10C.L. told N.L. to wait. He left the bedroom and returned with zip ties. He tied her wrists together behind her back. She told him it was too tight and she did not consent to them being used. He ignored her and continued. He had vaginal sex with her while covering her mouth. She had trouble breathing. When she could, she told him that she “didn’t want this.”
11He desired to have anal sex with her. He tried to force that act upon her. He put his arm around her neck in a chokehold. She told him she could not breathe. She feared that she might die because he was being so violent.
12Eventually, he stopped and cut the zip ties to free her. N.L. was terrified. She saw the used zip ties. One was white, and the other was black. He went to shower. When he was out of the bedroom, she grabbed the zip ties and put them in a bag. She took a picture of her wrists. She debated reporting the incident to the police but decided against it. She was afraid of what C.L. might do in response.
13N.L. had a sore neck and throat for two or three weeks following the assault.
14On April 16, 2023, N.L. and C.L. were living together at a new address in Toronto. They had attempted to work on their relationship since the January 17, 2023, incident. On this date, they argued about him talking to other women. The argument escalated into a discussion about N.L. being pregnant with his child. He told her he didn’t want to continue their relationship and that he wanted her to have an abortion. N.L. was crying. She was already under considerable stress and now had to face the prospect of being a single parent.
15She told him that she would continue with the pregnancy. She reached for her phone, and he grabbed her forearm. He used considerable force. She told him to leave her alone. He continued packing his belongings as if to leave, but eventually decided to stay with her, as she was quite upset. He remained with her until the next day.
16N.L. was challenged on whether any of the assaults occurred during cross-examination. Ms. Wilhelm suggested a very different relationship between the parties than the one N.L. described in her testimony in chief: one in which N.L. constantly begged C.L. to be a faithful partner while he made it clear that he wanted to pursue other women. Ms. Wilhelm directed N.L. to prior police statements she had provided to demonstrate dramatic inconsistencies in her evidence. Ms. Wilhelm then spent considerable time in cross-examination asking N.L. about many text messages exchanged between her and C.L., which appeared to support the defence theory of the case. Finally, Ms. Wilhelm challenged N.L. with her true motivation for making the allegations. She suggested that N.L. learned that C.L. was seeking access to his son through the family courts, prompting her to file a false report with the police to thwart his efforts.
17N.L. denied the vast majority of Ms. Wilhelm’s suggestions and maintained she had been assaulted on all three dates. I will review the details of N.L.’s cross-examination during my analysis of her testimony.
Testimony of C.L.
18C.L. testified that he and N.L. were in a relationship for six years. From his perspective, the relationship ended in November 2022. They tried to get back together after that, with mixed results. He concluded that the relationship was unsalvageable on April 26, 2023.
19On October 10, 2022, he arrived at N.L.’s condominium. He had been in Ottawa over the preceding weekend to visit his family. He admitted he had also seen another woman behind N.L.’s back. He realized she was aware of his infidelity because she stopped texting him that weekend. That was unusual and would only happen if she was upset.
20That evening, when he saw N.L., he asked why she had not responded to his messages. She asked where he had been the previous night. He initially claimed he had been with his family, but she told him she had viewed his location data on the iPad he had brought and therefore knew he’d been in Quebec. At that point, he knew he could not continue lying.
21N.L. was very upset. She “lost it” and accused him of cheating. C.L. could not calm her down, went to the bathroom, and closed the door. He remained there for an hour.
22There was no physical or sexual contact between them that night.
23On November 1, 2022, he signed a lease for a new apartment. N.L. wanted him to continue living with her, but he wanted his freedom. Their relationship remained cordial. By the end of November 2022, they had resumed intimacy. They spent Christmas together. The relationship was going well again.
24However, he was still seeing other women in addition to N.L. She knew that and said she was comfortable with their open relationship.
25On January 17, 2023, they planned to watch a movie together. He went to her condo. As the evening progressed, they had sex. It was a normal experience. There were no restraints or zip ties. He did not force her to do anything against her will, and he did not use violence against her.
26Afterwards, they lay in bed, and N.L. asked him about the other women he was seeing. N.L. wanted a monogamous relationship. He slept over. The next day, N.L. was very affectionate towards him. Ms. Wilhelm reviewed the same series of text messages with him that she had put to N.L. in cross-examination. The messages were exchanged between the parties and included sexually suggestive content. I will comment on the significance of these messages later in this judgment.
27On February 7, 2023, C.L. and N.L. got matching tattoos. The tattoos depicted lovebirds. He believed that they were genuinely in love. N.L. had even discussed getting married. They spent more time together.
28On March 21, 2023, C.L. learned that N.L. was pregnant. He was initially very excited. By April 26, however, his mindset had changed. N.L. was barely working. He was paying rent on his own apartment. He was concerned that they would not be able to financially support a child. He suggested she have an abortion.
29She became quite upset. She took out her phone and began recording C.L.. She demanded that he “say it again.” She would not let him leave the condo. C.L. grabbed her phone to stop her from recording him. In the process, he inadvertently touched her arm. It was only for a second.
30After that occurred, N.L. suggested he leave. He agreed. He was no longer interested in reconciling with her and concluded she could not move past his past infidelity. He did not want to see her again.
31On April 28, 2023, N.L. sent him a very long text message. That message was N.L.’s final plea for them to be together, but it did not change his mind.
32On November 22, 2023, his son was born. He has never met his son because N.L. refuses to allow it. C.L. contacted a family lawyer, who arranged a DNA test confirming that C.L. was the father. He has not yet initiated further family proceedings because he cannot afford both a criminal lawyer and a family lawyer at the same time.
Positions of the Parties
I. Defence
33Ms. Wilhelm submits that her client should be acquitted of all charges. His testimony was logical, largely unchallenged, and had “the ring of truth.” He testified in a straightforward manner. He admitted to his faults and did not minimize any mistakes in his relationship with N.L. But he denied committing either of the alleged sexual assaults and explained that he did not intentionally assault N.L. when he was moving out of her condo. There is no principled basis for rejecting his testimony. At a minimum, it should raise a reasonable doubt.
34In the alternative, N.L.’s testimony was internally inconsistent, unsupported by much of the external evidence presented by the Crown, and, at times, simply illogical. She was evasive and unfocused during her testimony. She was neither a credible nor a reliable witness. During submissions, Ms. Wilhelm reviewed many alleged inconsistencies in N.L.’s testimony and her police statement. None of the photographs or physical evidence entered into evidence can overcome the problems with N.L.’s testimony.
35Ms. Wilhelm also directed me to the absence of evidence in the case as another possible source of reasonable doubt. For example, had N.L. been the victim of the violent assault she described on January 17, 2023, she would have experienced far more serious injuries. There was no evidence presented to support her claims. Even the zip ties were never tested for DNA to confirm whether they had been used by her client and placed around N.L.’s wrists.
36The content of the text messages exchanged between her client and N.L. is entirely at odds with N.L.’s description of their relationship. In particular, the messages sent after January 17, 2023, contradict her claims about what happened with C.L., her declared fear of him, and her claims that she was attempting to distance herself from him. On the contrary, they demonstrated that she was ramping up her efforts to keep their relationship alive. Her explanations for these messages and why they appeared to flat-out contradict her allegations of being sexually assaulted were nothing short of “nonsense.”
37Ms. Wilhelm submitted that there was also evidence of a motive to lie. N.L. contacted the police only after she became aware that C.L. had begun to pursue his interests regarding his son in family court. When, how, and why N.L. made her complaint to the police can be considered, lawfully, when assessing her credibility.
II. Crown
38Mr. Weafer submits that the Crown has proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. He asks me to reject C.L.’s evidence on the two counts of sexual assault and to accept N.L.’s evidence. For the assault count, Mr. Weafer submits that, on either version of what occurred, the offence has been proved.
39Mr. Weafer acknowledged that N.L.’s testimony was far from perfect. She was confused about some details and had difficulty answering some questions. But the specific details of the sexual assaults themselves stood out in her mind. Any memory gaps she experienced are understandable given the “horrific” sexual assaults she endured. Employing a trauma-informed approach to assessing her testimony and appreciating the passage of time, these frailties are understandable.
40Furthermore, Mr. Weafer submits that the photographs of N.L.’s injuries and the evidence regarding the zip ties corroborate N.L.’s testimony. There is no reason for her to have taken photographs in the early morning hours following this sexual assault if it did not occur. The photographs depict injuries to her wrists that are unexplained by C.L.’s testimony. While he bears no burden to prove anything, I can reject his evidence about this event when it does not align with other reliable sources of evidence.
41I should approach any suggestion that the absence of injuries depicted in these photographs undermines N.L.’s credibility with caution. No other source of evidence – such as from an expert witness – was presented about what injuries would be expected if the assault occurred as N.L. described it. I cannot assume what degree of injury “should” have been documented.
42Regarding the count of assault, C.L. accepted that he chose to try to take N.L.’s phone without her consent and reached out to her to achieve that goal. He touched her in the process, with enough force to leave a noticeable mark on her arm. That is an assault, even if he is believed about what happened.
43Nothing should turn on the timing of N.L.’s complaint to the police. It is not surprising that N.L., who loved C.L., may have struggled with making the difficult choice to report the assaults.
Presumption of Innocence
44C.L. is presumed innocent. The Crown bears the onus of proving each element of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. In R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), at para. 39, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “[a] reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous doubt. It must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence.”
Assessing Credibility and Reliability
45I must consider both the credibility and reliability of N.L.’s evidence. Credibility relates to the veracity, or the truthfulness, of a witness’s evidence. Reliability relates to the accuracy of the witness’s testimony, including their ability to accurately observe, recall and recount the events in question: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, at para. 41.
46When determining what weight should be afforded to a witness’ testimony, especially where there are inconsistencies on important features of that testimony, the court should review all other sources of independent, reliable evidence and determine whether or not that evidence supports or contradicts the witness’ testimony: see R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, at paras. 127-8. The plausibility, coherence and logic of a witness’ testimony will also be of crucial importance: see R. v. Goldfinch, 2019 SCC 38, at para. 123.
47In R. v. A.M., 2014 ONCA 769, at paras. 12-14, the Court of Appeal outlined certain principles that a judge should consider when evaluating the credibility and reliability of a witness’s evidence. They include the following (with the citations removed from the original):
- One of the most valuable means of assessing witness credibility is to examine the consistency between what the witness said in the witness box and what she has said on other occasions, whether or not under oath... Inconsistencies may emerge in a witness' testimony at trial, or between their trial testimony and statements previously given. Inconsistencies may also emerge from things said differently at different times, or from omitting to refer to certain events at one time while referring to them on other occasions.
- Inconsistencies vary in their nature and importance. Some are minor, others are not. Some concern material issues, others peripheral subjects. Where an inconsistency involves something material about which an honest witness is unlikely to be mistaken, the inconsistency may demonstrate a carelessness with the truth about which the trier of fact should be concerned…
- A trial judge giving reasons for judgment is neither under the obligation to review and resolve every inconsistency in a witness' evidence, nor respond to every argument advanced by counsel… That said, a trial judge should address and explain how she or he has resolved major inconsistencies in the evidence of material witnesses…
48In sexually based offence trials, there are specific cautions to keep in mind before assessing witnesses' evidence. The first is that there is an important distinction between assessing evidence in light of “human experience and common sense” and relying on stereotypical myths. The latter, clearly, is a form of impermissible reasoning: see R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, at paras. 31-43, and 71-3; R. v. P.F.J., 2018 ABCA 322, at para. 13.
49Sexual assaults are often committed in private, leaving only the complainant and the alleged perpetrator as witnesses to the assault. In this context, findings on credibility or reliability will often be difficult to make and articulate. Nevertheless, they remain crucial to a court’s fact-finding function: R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20, at para. 81. It is furthermore well-settled that a trial judge may convict based on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness, even where there is a significant delay in reporting the sexual assault: see R. v. A.G., 2000 SCC 17, at para. 30.
50I caution myself against presuming that I will know how a victim of sexual assault will act in any given circumstance. There is no inviolable rule governing how a victim of sexual abuse, or of intimate partner violence more broadly, will behave in response to that abuse: see R. v. Lavallee, 1990 CanLII 95; R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, at para. 65.
51In any criminal trial where the Crown’s case turns almost exclusively on the testimony of a single witness, that testimony must be carefully and critically reviewed in the context of all the evidence presented at trial. Any inconsistencies or discrepancies in the witness’s evidence must be addressed, especially considering the position of the defence and the legal arguments advanced in support of that position: R. v. Parr, 2020 NUCA 2, at para. 42; R. v. Wanihadie, 2019 ABCA 402, at para. 38; R. v. Williams, 2018 ONCA 138, at paras. 33-40. Where the defence raises a motive to lie, that too must be considered “to give full effect to the presumption of innocence”: R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, at para. 65.
52Of great importance, a criminal trial is not a “credibility contest where the trier of fact must choose whether to believe one side or another”: R. v. I.W.S., 2017 ONCA 409, at para. 14. Rather, I must be guided by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. W.D. 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC) and approach the evidence with the following framework:
- If I accept the testimony of the accused he must be acquitted.
- Even if I do not believe the testimony of the accused, if I find I am nevertheless left with a reasonable doubt, I must acquit the accused.
- Even if the defence evidence does not leave me with a reasonable doubt, I must consider all of the evidence I accept, including that adduced by the Crown, when determining whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offences against the accused.
Analysis
I. Assessment of N.L.’s Testimony
(i) Trauma-Informed Perspective
53At the outset of my review of N.L.’s evidence, I acknowledge that she testified about very intimate details of her private life. She and C.L. had a long-term relationship that ended amid difficult and tumultuous circumstances. The trial was distressing for her. N.L. often displayed emotional reactions to the questions she was asked. That is understandable. Testifying is an unusual and challenging experience for anyone, and it can be nothing short of traumatizing for complainants in sexual assault trials: see R. v. R.V., 2019 SCC 49, at para. 33.
54N.L. described experiencing two sexual assaults that would have unquestionably had a devastating impact on her. And while the assaults themselves were disputed as a factual matter, by the completion of N.L.’s testimony, I had no difficulty concluding she had been emotionally hurt by C.L.’s infidelity and the lack of trust that existed between them even as they tried to reconcile. A trauma-informed approach to assessing her evidence is required. In R. v. G.M.C., 2022 ONCA 2, the Ontario Court of Appeal held at para. 38 that “observations made by witnesses in the course of traumatic events can be difficult to recall and to describe accurately at a later date”, and a “witness cannot be expected to have a faithful memory of minor incidents that occurred during a traumatic event and the inability to recall a minor or insignificant event does not detract from the witness’s overall reliability or credibility.”
55Even with those considerations in mind, I did not find N.L. to be a trustworthy or forthright witness. She refused to answer questions directly, regularly veering into tangents and long-winded responses that seemed intended to offer explanations she wanted to provide or statements she wanted to make. Oftentimes, simple questions that invited a yes-or-no answer were met with meandering, directionless outbursts.
56N.L. expressed difficulty remembering details about many aspects of the specific assaults she alleged and, more broadly, her relationship with C.L.. She stated she wasn’t sure about many details that one would expect to stand out in her mind. I will review some examples. The reliability of her testimony was often inherently suspect. In addition to those concerns, there were startling issues with her credibility that called into question her commitment to truth-telling during the trial and that cannot be easily dismissed.
(ii) October 11, 2022, Sexual Assault
57One example that arose early in her testimony concerned C.L.’s whereabouts during the Thanksgiving Weekend of October 2022. Infidelity was a major concern for N.L. in her relationship with C.L.. He travelled to Ottawa to visit his family. She tracked his exact location using the “Find My Devices” feature common on Apple products. She suspected he was not being truthful with her about his intentions and concluded he was likely cheating. This conclusion was driven in large part by her ability to track the location of one of his devices (an iPad), which she could tell had entered Quebec. There was no other explanation in her mind for why he would travel there.
58When he returned to visit her in Toronto on October 11, 2022, she testified that there was no discussion about him having cheated on her. She could also not recall whether she had asked him where he had been during his trip, despite an intense fear that he had been unfaithful. Indeed, she was “not sure” whether she had even asked him a single question about his whereabouts, despite her previous efforts to monitor his location meticulously through the location-tracking app on his iPad.
59I did not find her answers to these questions convincing. She was clearly very hurt that he had betrayed their relationship. She had been intentionally monitoring him and had “evidence” in her mind that he had gone to Quebec without any explanation from him for that detour. Ms. Wilhelm pursued this line of questioning for some time. N.L.’s answers were evasive and illogical. She would have had an understandable basis to confront him about her belief that he’d been unfaithful. I did not find these answers believable. Understandably, she was hurt that he was seeing another woman and believed she had “proof” that he had cheated. Yet she continued to claim memory loss about whether she had questioned him about this upon his return to Toronto.
60I conclude that she was feigning her memory loss. Ms. Wilhelm told her that, in cases where she had evidence that C.L. had cheated on her in the past, she would confront C.L. with that evidence. She agreed with that suggestion. There was no convincing explanation for why this time would be any different.
61There were also significant inconsistencies between N.L.’s testimony and her prior police statements. N.L. was questioned extensively about her prior statements to the police. She agreed that she first contacted the OPP on November 11, 2024. She knew that it was vital that she provide truthful, accurate and detailed information to the investigating officers.
62She was then referred to the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”). On November 16, 2024, she met with Det. Ward. Again, she testified that she knew the allegations she was making were very serious and that she had to ensure she was accurate and did not mislead Det. Ward. She took a solemn affirmation before providing this statement. She understood she had to tell the detective “Absolutely everything”.
63Ms. Wilhelm brought to my attention many inconsistencies between N.L.’s courtroom testimony and her statement to Det. Ward during the trial and throughout her closing submissions. I have chosen to focus on those I have found most revealing.
64During her testimony in chief, N.L. was quite certain about the details of the October 11, 2022, sexual assault. She testified that she remembered standing in the kitchen, C.L. grabbing her wrist, and him placing his hands around her lower back. He then pulled her into the bedroom. Those details about how their interactions began stood out for her.
65In cross-examination, Ms. Wilhelm took N.L. to portions of her statement to Det. Ward. In that statement, she stated that she could not remember how she arrived in the bedroom and that she “just ended up” there. That was the “best answer” she could provide at the time. The added details in her testimony in court were startling. She was clearly asked by Det. Ward to explain everything that happened and the chain of events that placed her in the bedroom. The descriptions of being assaulted in the kitchen before being sexually assaulted in the bedroom had not been mentioned before. Ms. Wilhelm suggested to N.L. that when testifying, she had a memory of “very specific allegations”, but in 2024, she had “no idea how [the assault] even happened.” N.L. responded, “I want to say no; I don’t know.”
66I do not accept that N.L. was able to remember more details about this event, honestly, when testifying in 2026, as opposed to when she provided her police statement in 2024. That was much closer in time to the events in question.
67Another example concerned the removal of the parties’ clothing prior to the sexual assault occurring. During her testimony in chief, N.L. stated that C.L. took off some of his clothes in the bedroom. That was the “first thing” he did. During cross-examination, when pressed on this topic, she testified that “I know he took off his clothes. I don’t know the order of everything.” Ms. Wilhelm followed up by asking, “Today, in chief, you identified this as the first thing that happened?” Before answering, N.L. paused, then said, “Honestly… maybe. Yes. I don’t know.”
68Again, I found this answer intentionally evasive and not an honest attempt to answer. So too was her answer to the subsequent question:
Q: “You don’t have a distinct memory of him taking his clothes off?”
A: “It happened quickly and it was dark. I have a vague memory of it happening.”
69This was another example of what I would characterize as convenient memory lapses that repeatedly emerged during N.L.’s testimony. She was able to provide details when she wished, but when challenged on her recollection of the events or presented with inconsistencies between her testimony and her police statement to Det. Ward, N.L. attempted to deflect. She would often pause, fail to answer a direct question from Ms. Wilhelm, and then meander into a statement she thought would distract from the problems with her testimony. I do not find that N.L. was trying to answer these questions honestly and accurately, but rather was attempting to avoid the obvious contradictions or frailties in her testimony that Ms. Wilhelm was pointing out.
70To the extent that some of her memory loss was genuine, it raises concerns about the reliability of her testimony. An illustrative example of an inconsistency explained by purportedly frail memory involved whether she attempted to pull her clothing back up during the October 11 assault. The following exchange was illustrative:
Q: “You testified as well that you were pulling your clothes back up to try and keep them on?”
A: “Yes.”
Q: “You never mentioned that to the police in November, 2024? That’s part of the whole struggle. Where do you give that detail?”
A: “I don’t think I did. Some details that come back later.”
71If N.L. was resisting C.L. during this assault and was trying to pull her clothing back up as he was forcibly removing it, that is a detail I would expect her to have provided to the police during her November 16, 2024, interview. I do not accept her testimony that “some details came back later.”
72N.L. testified that after this assault, C.L. turned over and stopped speaking to her. In her words, “He was silent.” Ms. Wilhelm asked her to clarify that she meant he rolled over in bed, and N.L. agreed. But this, too, was very different from what she told the police. Ms. Wilhelm took her to page 43 of her police statement transcript:
Q: “How did it end?”
A: “He just like stopped. I don’t have a good explanation. He was blank, silent and it just stopped… He got dressed, left, and left me there.”
73This appeared to be an inconsistency, as there was no mention during N.L.’s testimony that C.L. got dressed after the assault and left her on the bed. N.L. agreed she had been asked that question and given that answer. She tried to explain this away by stating that the answers on page 43 of the transcript were actually about her conduct, not C.L.’s. She testified that she meant “I got dressed. This is not worded properly [meaning what appeared in the transcript]. He left me, as in he stopped. He moved over. I was the one who got dressed and I left.”1
74Ms. Wilhelm then took her to page 45 of the transcript of her police statement. Det. Ward stated to her the following:
Q: “Ok, ok, he got dressed, he got off, he’s doing whatever he’s doing… What do you do”
A: “My schoolwork again”
75At this point in the interview, Det. Ward was parroting N.L.’s prior answer that “He [meaning C.L.]” got dressed. Yet at no point in the police statement, unlike in cross-examination, did she attempt to clarify that she meant “I got dressed.” I do not accept her explanation of this discrepancy. It was manufactured during her testimony to try and explain away this inconsistency.
(iii) January 17, 2023, Sexual Assault
76N.L. described, during her testimony in chief, a terrifying sexual assault in which C.L. overpowered her, used zip ties to restrain her wrists, applied force to her neck and upper body, and attempted to penetrate her without consent. The assault lasted up to 20 minutes.
77Yet N.L. could not answer questions about whether C.L. pulled both of her arms back at the same time before applying the zip ties, or pulled one arm first and then the other; how or if her arms were manipulated; whether her wrists were placed on top of each other or side by side; and how much, if at all, she could reposition her hands and wrists once she was bound.
78Her answers generally consisted of “I don’t remember” and “It happened quickly”. These responses were repeated when Ms. Wilhem asked for clarification on the order of events, how C.L. assaulted her specifically, and how much her physical movements were restrained. At a minimum, this raises more concerns about the reliability of N.L.’s testimony. But it raises other concerns as well, specifically about her credibility, as I will explain.
79I appreciate that N.L. should not be expected to have a flawless memory. At the same time, it is not impermissible to take memory gaps or the absence of detail into account in a credibility assessment: see R. v. Patel, 2024 NSCA 40, at para. 76. The inability of N.L. to answer nearly any of Ms. Wilhelm’s questions about how this assault occurred is troubling.
80N.L. testified about an extremely violent struggle. On her version of events, she was restrained with zip ties around her wrists. In photographs introduced by the Crown, N.L. identified the zip ties and injuries to her body. Some indentations are slightly visible in the photos around her wrists. But in the absence of any other testimony, it is difficult for me to determine whether these minor marks are truly suggestive of the assault she described. Given the level of violence described, the absence of more serious injuries raises concerns in my mind.
81The defence's position on this evidence was clear. Ms. Wilhelm submitted that the description of the assault and of how she was purportedly zip-tied does not appear to align with the photographs of the injuries.
82I recognize that I must approach this argument with caution, given the absence of other evidence and my own limitations as the trier of fact. Neither party called a medical witness to assess or provide an opinion about this evidence. However, in my view, the photographs of the purported injuries sustained during this incident do not assist the Crown in overcoming the frailties in N.L.’s evidence. They are, at best, inconclusive. Ultimately, determining whether this assault occurred turns on my assessment of N.L.’s credibility and reliability. And my assessment of N.L.’s credibility has led me to a different conclusion about this incident.
83Confirmatory evidence can take many forms. The weight to be attached to it is for the trier of fact to determine, and it “need not directly confirm key allegations in order to be considered in assessing credibility”: see R. v. R.K., 2023 ONCA 653, at para. 43. Yet a word of caution is required. Corroborative evidence and confirmatory evidence are not the same. Evidence is not “corroborative” simply because it confirms some of a witness's testimony. Evidence is only corroborative if it is independent proof that confirms a material feature of the criminal allegation. If all a piece of evidence does is provide some support for the credibility of a witness, and it emanates from the same source (that is, the witness herself), it should not be described as “corroborative”. Doing so risks giving the impact of that evidence exaggerated importance: R. v. Casarsa, 2023 ONCA 826, at para. 12.
84In R. v. Issa, 2022 ONCA 167, the Ontario Court of Appeal described what constitutes corroborative evidence at para. 28:
Second, this case illustrates the potential risks associated with conflating independent corroboration with confirmatory evidence, which is yet another instance where the trial judge might have been a bit clearer. What I mean is, while he used the term “corroborated” when describing the photographs, it would have been better, and far more accurate, to refer to them as confirmatory or “evidence in support”. For evidence to be corroborative, it must be independent. Here, of course, the photographs were not independent in that A.B. herself took them.
85The same warning must be applied in this case. The photographs and zip ties were provided by N.L. to Det. Ward. One possibility is that they are evidence of the assault she described. Another possibility is that the assault did not occur and that N.L. provided the photographs and zip ties to the police to make her version of events seem more believable. While the photographs have dates and times associated with them, I received no independent evidence that the date and time information was accurate.
86In addition, I note that Ms. Wilhelm asked N.L. twice if she failed to take additional photographs of injuries because no such injuries existed.
Q: “You would have taken photographs of other injuries?”
Q: “You didn’t take photos because there was nothing to take photos of?”
87N.L.’s answers to these questions were highly evasive. I noticed a pause before she answered each time, as if she were thinking about how to respond rather than answering honestly and immediately. Then, when she responded to the suggestion that she didn’t take photos because there was nothing to photograph (i.e., no injury occurred), she was unable to confirm whether other injuries existed.
88N.L. was also asked to explain how the zip ties in the bag align with her account of the events in the bedroom. In particular, she agreed with Ms. Wilhelm’s suggestion that two of the zip ties appeared to have been “unused.” In response, N.L. stated, “I just don’t know how all of this was done” [referring to how the zip ties were used during the assault]. She then speculated that C.L. might have wanted to tie up her ankles as well. That detail emerged during cross-examination but was not mentioned during her testimony in chief.
89N.L. explained that she had not really looked at the zip ties since the incident, despite purportedly having had them in her possession since January 17, 2023. That delay in examining them was somehow presented as an explanation for her difficulty answering Ms. Wilhelm’s questions. However, it was inconsistent with the video of her interview with Det. Ward, in which she shows him the zip ties via Zoom on November 16, 2024.
90I did not find these answers convincing. If there were other injuries resulting from this violent and prolonged assault, she would have taken photographs of them. This would have included her arms and wrists, as well as her neck, where she said C.L. applied force to prevent her from breathing, from which she took nearly three weeks to recover. She would have viewed the zip ties well before she had to see them in court, and I find, as a fact, that she did so in her statement to Det. Ward. That two of them were “unused” is furthermore entirely at odds with what she described in the assault and is highly damaging to her credibility and reliability.
(iv) Text Messages Exchanged Between The Parties
91A theme that emerged in N.L.’s testimony was that, due to the breakdown in their relationship, C.L. became a nuisance to her. She repeatedly stated that she wanted to avoid him. She maintained this position after cross-examination on April 28, 2026. Ms. Wilhelm questioned her about what happened after the assault she experienced on January 17, 2023. N.L. explained that she did not want to pursue C.L. and wanted to avoid him. She adamantly rejected Ms. Wilhelm’s suggestion that, far from wanting to avoid him, she wanted to pursue C.L. again romantically as early as January 18, 2023.
92The text messages exchanged between the parties that day and the days that followed completely belie her testimony.
93On January 18, 2023, at 6:17 am, N.L. sent a text to C.L. that read, “Miss me yet?!” N.L. confirmed she wrote the text and that C.L. had been out of the house for no more than half an hour after she sent it. She did not have to text him, but she went “out of her way” to send the message.
94N.L. agreed that she sent other messages that referred to “my booty” and “[my booty] can be in your head.” She was conveying that she wanted to see him again that very day for intimacy. She also agreed that she had explained she would be free after a 6:30 pm appointment, thus suggesting a time to C.L. for them to meet.
95N.L. sent links with pictures to lingerie available for purchase to C.L. via text messaging on January 19, 2023, beginning at 6:05 p.m. She also insisted that he not engage in intimate behaviour with another woman, referred to by the nickname “The Giant.” At 11:27 p.m., she sent additional messages with new links to lingerie outfits. She sent those messages because she had not heard from him in a few hours and wondered whether he was with that other woman.
96On January 21, 2023, N.L. sent text messages in which she told C.L. to bring lube for sex. She sent more images of lingerie available for purchase online. Ms. Wilhelm suggested that N.L. sent these messages because they had a good night together on January 17, 2023, and she wanted to see him again and work on their relationship in the days that followed. In other words, N.L. continued to desire intimacy between them. Ms. Wilhelm suggested that the messages were not intended to create distance between the parties, as N.L. had previously testified.
97N.L. mostly disagreed with these suggestions. She explained that she would send these messages to find peace for herself and to placate C.L.; otherwise, he would stalk or harass her. Providing him with a little romantic or intimate content, apparently to satisfy whatever desires he had, might prevent an escalation of his behaviour. She resisted accepting the suggestion that she was sending him messages of this nature to demonstrate her sexual desire for him. N.L. stated that if further sexual activity occurred between her and C.L. during the week that followed January 17, 2023, it was only done to “appease” him, and she did not really want to be intimate with him.
98One revealing exchange on this topic during cross-examination resulted in N.L. stating, “I guess so,” in response to a suggestion that she was asking C.L. to come over to have sex. Ms. Wilhelm had presented N.L. with the message in which she suggested that C.L. bring lube with him.
99I do not accept N.L.’s denials or explanations about these messages. No “guessing” is required to understand them. The messages have a clear and obvious interpretation – that N.L. wanted to pursue a romantic or intimate relationship with C.L., in an exclusive capacity. Her denials of the nature of these messages undermine her credibility. Furthermore, every answer she provided was a half-answer at best, followed by a series of equivocations and verbal contortions. She made a considerable effort to concoct answers to avoid answering Ms. Wilhelm directly and to avoid providing truthful testimony.
100After the final assault on April 26, 2023, Ms. Wilhelm asked N.L. why she wouldn’t just let C.L. go if he had repeatedly been violent with her. N.L. gave a very long answer that did not truly address the question. N.L. was then asked questions of this nature multiple times. She responded throughout this line of questioning that the relationship was “over in my mind”, or words to that effect.
101Ms. Wilhelm showed N.L. a long message she had written to C.L. on April 28, 2023. The message is best described as a declaration of love to him, and a final attempt to keep them together. She wrote that she was afraid of “losing you” (meaning C.L.) and that “all I really want is to make life happen with you”, among other similar statements. It flatly contradicted her testimony that she had already moved on from C.L. and did not wish to continue seeing him.
102Indeed, despite reviewing this message in court, N.L. maintained in her testimony that she had decided to end the relationship, rather than C.L. having taken that step first. According to her, Ms. Wilhelm misinterpreted this text message. The divergence between N.L.’s in-court explanation of this message and its actual content was stark. I do not accept her explanations about the content of the message or why she sent it. The relationship was very much not “over in her mind”, and she was doing everything she thought she could at the time to salvage it.
103Of course, it is entirely understandable that N.L. felt hurt and betrayed, and that she continued to grapple with her feelings for C.L.. She wanted to have his child and for them to be a family, but he told her he preferred that she have an abortion. That would be very difficult for anyone to process emotionally.
104I appreciate that victims of abuse may respond to their abusers in complex ways, and there is no “right” way for a victim to feel or act. Further contact with an alleged abuser, even affectionate contact, does not necessarily mean the abuse did not happen. There may be many reasons why a victim would continue to seek the approval or love of someone who had harmed them.
105Each case must be decided on its own facts. I do not find N.L.’s answers to these questions credible. She attempted to mischaracterize the messages and their context. Her refusal to admit what was truly occurring, even years later, is concerning. These are not the hallmarks of an honest witness.
(v) April 26, 2023, Assault
106With respect to this incident, in court N.L. described pushing on the day it happened, but during cross-examination she acknowledged that she had not mentioned “pushing” in her police statement. I find this inconsistency significant. It goes to the core of her allegation. She also agreed that she was unsure what caused the red mark on her arm, which was depicted in a picture introduced during her testimony in chief and meant to buttress her description of the assault.
(vi) Family Court Proceedings
107Ms. Wilhelm concluded her cross-examination by asking about the possibility of future family court proceedings between the parties. She suggested to N.L. that she wanted to deny C.L. access to their son, which explained why she had made false allegations of physical and sexual violence to the police. N.L. agreed there were family court proceedings and that she had safety concerns for herself and her son, but that her decision to go to the police was not “solely” based on those proceedings. She would “not be doing this” (meaning engaging with the criminal case) but for her belief that she needed to protect herself and her son from C.L..
108She agreed that a month before she went to the police, C.L. had filed an application for DNA testing regarding the paternity of their child and that she knew litigation would follow. N.L. further accepted that, after speaking with a family lawyer, she chose to file criminal complaints against C.L..
109Ms. Wilhelm submits that this is evidence of a motive to lie. Before assessing this argument, I caution myself that trial courts must always guard against myth-based reasoning. Generally, no adverse inference should be drawn against a witness due to her failure to disclose incidents of domestic violence or sexual assault to the police until many years after they occurred. In R. v. A.D.G., 2015 ABCA 149, the Alberta Court of Appeal explained the law in this area at para. 32:
The law is clear that no presumptive adverse inference may be drawn against a complainant who does not disclose sexual abuse immediately. Yet this does not mean that no consideration whatsoever can be given to the timing of the disclosure of abuse: R v TEM, 1996 ABCA 312 at paras 9-11, 187 AR 273, leave to appeal to SCC refused [1997] 2 SCR xv. The importance of delayed disclosure will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular complainant: TEM at para 11. Victims of sexual assault will have different reasons for reporting abuse at different points in time. It is up to finders of fact to evaluate the testimony of complainants and determine their credibility on the basis of all the evidence, including the timing of their disclosure.
110Furthermore, in Kruk, the Supreme Court of Canada held at para. 43 that:
This Court has repeatedly held that “myths and stereotypes have no place in a rational and just system of law, as they jeopardize the courts’ truth-finding function” (A.G., at para. 2). A trial is a truth-seeking process, and reliance on myths and stereotypes distorts the truth…
111Yet delayed disclosure coupled with evidence of a motive to lie is far from irrelevant, and not all arguments that could be construed as relying on a myth or stereotype in general are necessarily inappropriate in every case. Later in its decision, the Supreme Court stated at para. 65 (my emphasis added):
For example, just because the evidence happens to align with a myth or stereotype does not necessarily mean that any inferences that can be drawn from that evidence will be prejudicial. While it is a myth that women regularly fabricate allegations of sexual assault, it is not an error to consider whether the circumstances of a particular case support the existence of a motive to fabricate (see, e.g., R. v. Esquivel-Benitez, 2020 ONCA 160, 61 C.R. (7th) 326, at paras. 9-15) — indeed, where the defence adduces evidence on this point, a trial judge is obliged to consider it to give full effect to the presumption of innocence, and a failure to do so constitutes reversible error.
112In this case, I find reliable evidence of a very strong motive to lie. When N.L. made her allegations to the police, she believed it would be advantageous to her position in family court. She repeated several times during cross-examination that she thought C.L. posed a threat to her safety and her child’s and that the impending family litigation was one reason she made her police complaint. She maintained that she was still concerned about C.L. having visitation rights to see their son. Her motivation clearly continues to the present day.
113This is another reason to seriously question N.L.’s credibility. If she were successful with her criminal court allegations and C.L. were convicted of sexual assault or intimate partner violence, it would almost certainly harm his position to have access to his son in any future family litigation. I find that the timing of her complaint to the police is no coincidence.
114I recognize that any communications between N.L. and her family lawyer are privileged and therefore inadmissible: see Descôteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, 1982 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1982] 1 SCR 860 at 872-3; Solosky v. The Queen, 1979 CanLII 9 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 82 at 833-6. However, not all information related to the solicitor-client relationship is privileged. The “timing of when legal advice was obtained relative to a complaint to the police does not intrude upon the communications themselves and is therefore not privileged”: see Gourlay et al, Modern Criminal Evidence (2022), Toronto: Emond Publishing, at p. 490. Counsel agreed that the timing of N.L.'s obtaining legal advice could be considered, but nothing more, and Ms. Wilhelm did not ask any questions that might have intruded upon privileged communication between N.L. and her family lawyer.2
115Of great importance, in KMN v. SZM, 2024 BCCA 70, the British Columbia Court of Appeal cautioned trial courts against relying upon myths or stereotypes in cases of intimate partner violence, including that women commonly raise allegations of violence post-separation “for the specific purpose of gaining an upper hand” in family court proceedings: see paras. 84 and 122; see also Jamal J.’s dissenting opinion in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, at para. 361. However, when there is an evidentiary foundation to support such a conclusion, it is not wrong to consider that claims of intimate partner violence can be made for strategic reasons: see KMN para. 126.
II. Conclusion About N.L.’s Testimony
116I reject N.L.’s evidence. She was neither a credible nor a reliable witness.
III. Assessment of C.L.’s Testimony
117I found C.L.’s testimony logical, coherent, and detailed. He answered questions in chief and on cross-examination directly and concisely. He had a clear memory of the events at the centre of this trial and never struggled to answer questions. He was a credible and reliable witness.
118He testified that he and N.L. had been in a relationship since 2017. He admitted that he betrayed her trust by cheating on her over the Thanksgiving weekend in 2022. On October 10, 2022, when he returned home, she confronted him about his actions. He tried to deceive her, but he quickly realized she knew the truth. That led to a longer verbal argument.
119He left her apartment later that month and found his own place to live. Their relationship effectively ended for a few weeks. Later in November 2022, they began to communicate intimately again. Their relationship was rekindled for a few months.
120On January 17, 2023, he described a normal, positive interaction with N.L. While there was intimacy, there was no bondage, violence, or the use of restraints such as zip ties. In his account, the text messages that day and in the days following made perfect sense. They had a good evening together and were trying to keep their relationship going. Both sides wanted more intimacy.
121He explained that their relationship remained strong for two months. N.L. became pregnant, and he learned of this on or about March 21, 2023. At first, this made him happy. But as he thought about it more, he grew concerned about whether they could financially support a child together. On April 26, 2023, he suggested to her that it might be advisable for her to obtain an abortion. This left N.L. very upset. She took out her phone and wanted to film him as he asked her for an abortion. She chased him around the apartment. He tried to avoid her. At one point, he reached out and touched her arm, but he insisted it was unintentional. He was only trying to get the phone to prevent her from recording him, and he did not mean to grab her arm. The redness depicted in N.L.’s injury photos is equally consistent with an accident as it is with an intentional assault.
122There were no internal inconsistencies in his testimony, and I find that he was not undermined during cross-examination. His testimony is corroborated by the text messages exchanged between the parties, which align with his version of events and are logically consistent. His interpretation of those messages was plausible.
123He denied having knowledge of the zip ties presented during the Crown’s case. While he occasionally uses zip ties for his job, they were not the same kind depicted in the photographs identified by N.L. He has been working in his industry since 2017, and I have no reason to believe he would have any difficulty distinguishing between the different types of zip ties.
124The timeline he provided, which detailed how their relationship was damaged by his cheating in October 2022 and the ups and downs that followed, was logical. He admitted his faults and acknowledged that N.L. would have been hurt by his actions.
125He ultimately retained a family lawyer after his son was born on November 22, 2023. That lawyer informed N.L. that he wanted to see his son, but she resisted. A DNA test later determined that he was the child’s father. After that test result was obtained, N.L. contacted the police.
126I want to be clear that I am not condoning any of C.L.’s disrespectful conduct as an intimate partner during his relationship with N.L. On his own admission, C.L. engaged in morally reprehensible behaviour. He betrayed N.L.’s trust more than once and, at times, in my assessment, strung her along despite knowing how strongly she felt for him. When a real dilemma arose regarding their future plans – her pregnancy and the associated costs – he chose to abandon her after their first fight over this issue.
127But my role is to determine whether the offences have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. I found C.L.’s denials of the first two incidents entirely credible and have no reason to reject his testimony. His memory was excellent. He was a reliable witness. With respect to the final count of simple assault, C.L. testified that he was reaching for N.L.’s phone and, by mistake, grabbed her arm for a second. An unintentional application of force is not an assault.
IV. Conclusion About C.L.’s Testimony
128I accept C.L.’s testimony.
Dispositions
129For all of the reasons previously given, I find C.L. not guilty of all the charges. Having accepted C.L.’s testimony, the court must find that he is acquitted on the first prong of the W.D. test. In addition, I do not accept N.L.’s testimony. The Crown has not proven the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.
V. Released: July 17, 2026
Signed: Justice Brock Jones
Footnotes
- But for this one example, N.L. never disputed the accuracy of the transcriptions of her prior police statements. While a transcript is not evidence, the parties agreed to rely on the transcripts rather than play the video statements themselves in court whenever possible to avoid delay.
- N.L. volunteered additional information she received from her family lawyer during her testimony and arguably waived any privilege that might attach to those communications. However, I have chosen to disregard the additional information provided by N.L. beyond what I have referenced in this judgment.