C.A. Morrow

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The United States of America sought the extradition of the respondent to face charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana and MDMA.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for an order committing the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on surrender.

The court found that the respondent was the person sought and that the Record of the Case contained sufficient admissible evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial on the corresponding Canadian offence of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The committal order was granted.

The applicant sought an order for the committal of the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on extradition to the United Kingdom.

The respondent had been convicted in the UK of conspiracy to evade duty on imported tobacco products and of absconding during his trial.

The court found that the conduct underlying the UK convictions corresponded to Canadian offences, specifically evading duty under the Excise Act, and that the evidence provided by the UK was sufficient to justify committal for trial had the conduct occurred in Canada.

A warrant for committal was issued.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term supervision order by consuming cocaine on June 2, 2016.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while defence counsel sought six months with immediate release given time served.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months incarceration with a 1.3:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in one day's custody remaining.

The decision emphasizes the principles established in R. v. Ipeelee regarding sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders, with particular attention to Gladue factors and the offender's Aboriginal background.

The court found that while the breach was serious given the offender's history of violence linked to cocaine use, the context of the relapse, his significant rehabilitation progress over eight years, strong community support, and diminished moral culpability warranted a substantially lower sentence than the Crown sought.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code for a 60-day remand of the respondent for a psychological assessment at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The respondent had been found guilty of two counts of robbery and two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, which are designated serious personal injury offences.

The Crown sought the assessment on the grounds that there were reasonable grounds to believe the respondent might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, citing a pattern of repetitive behaviour based on his extensive criminal record, including prior robberies and a home invasion.

The court found that the threshold of "reasonable possibility" was met, given the respondent's history of criminal activity and the similarities in his past and current offences, which involved planning, co-accused, and threats of violence.

The application for the assessment was granted.

The offenders pleaded guilty to manslaughter and indecent interference with human remains following a joint submission.

Originally charged with first-degree murder, the Crown accepted lesser pleas due to evidentiary frailties.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a 10-year sentence for manslaughter and 3 years concurrent for indecent interference, with credit for pre-trial custody and Gladue factors for Aboriginal offenders.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential racial bias and pretrial publicity.

The defence proposed multiple-choice versions of the traditional Parks question and an additional question regarding stereotypes about Black men.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on challenges for cause, including the requirement to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality.

The court declined to permit the multiple-choice format and rejected the stereotype question due to insufficient evidentiary basis.

Instead, the court approved modified questions addressing racial bias and exposure to publicity, requiring jurors to answer in their own words.