C.A. Morrow

The United States of America sought the extradition of the respondent to face charges of conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana and MDMA.

The Attorney General of Canada applied for an order committing the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on surrender.

The court found that the respondent was the person sought and that the Record of the Case contained sufficient admissible evidence of conduct that, had it occurred in Canada, would justify committal for trial on the corresponding Canadian offence of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The committal order was granted.

The applicant sought an order for the committal of the respondent into custody to await the Minister's decision on extradition to the United Kingdom.

The respondent had been convicted in the UK of conspiracy to evade duty on imported tobacco products and of absconding during his trial.

The court found that the conduct underlying the UK convictions corresponded to Canadian offences, specifically evading duty under the Excise Act, and that the evidence provided by the UK was sufficient to justify committal for trial had the conduct occurred in Canada.

A warrant for committal was issued.

The accused pleaded guilty to breaching a long-term supervision order by consuming cocaine on June 2, 2016.

The Crown sought a 12-month sentence, while defence counsel sought six months with immediate release given time served.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months incarceration with a 1.3:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in one day's custody remaining.

The decision emphasizes the principles established in R. v. Ipeelee regarding sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders, with particular attention to Gladue factors and the offender's Aboriginal background.

The court found that while the breach was serious given the offender's history of violence linked to cocaine use, the context of the relapse, his significant rehabilitation progress over eight years, strong community support, and diminished moral culpability warranted a substantially lower sentence than the Crown sought.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a dangerous offender following his convictions for two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, discharging a firearm with intent to wound, and failing to comply with a prohibition order.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal record, institutional misconduct, gang affiliation, and psychiatric assessments.

Finding that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender due to a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and a substantial degree of indifference to the consequences of his actions, the court declared him a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The offenders pleaded guilty to manslaughter and indecent interference with human remains following a joint submission.

Originally charged with first-degree murder, the Crown accepted lesser pleas due to evidentiary frailties.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a 10-year sentence for manslaughter and 3 years concurrent for indecent interference, with credit for pre-trial custody and Gladue factors for Aboriginal offenders.

The applicant, who was convicted of attempted murder and other firearm offences, challenged the constitutionality of the dangerous offender provisions in sections 753(1) and 753.01 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the 2008 amendments impermissibly curtailed judicial discretion and were overbroad, violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court reviewed the legislative history and jurisprudence, concluding that the provisions operate as part of a carefully calibrated scheme to protect the public while maintaining judicial discretion at the penalty phase.

The court found that the provisions are not overbroad and do not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The application was dismissed.