Bradley Reitz

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to sign the warrant of surrender.

The appellant conceded that the facts underlying the American charges involved a licensed distributor and would have been illegal in Canada, abandoning the first issue.

The appellant also conceded that the court was bound by the precedent in Ferris for the remaining issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellants were investigated by Revenue Canada for claiming fraudulent limited partnership losses related to software valuation.

Search warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on an outside consultant's opinion, which the deponent incorrectly described as a 'valuation report'.

The appellants applied to quash the warrants, arguing the ITO was deceptive and improperly relied on hearsay.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no deliberate deception and that the remaining information was sufficient to issue the warrants.

The appellants appealed.

The Crown moved to quash the appeal as moot because the seized items had been returned and no charges laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the mischaracterization was not deliberate and that the deponent was entitled to rely on hearsay from other Revenue Canada employees and hired consultants.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition, arguing that sections 32(1) and 34 of the Extradition Act are unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the constitutional issue had already been decided against the appellant's position in a previous decision.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him to the United States.

He argued that the Minister's letter ordering surrender did not give adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while the reasons were perfunctory, they were adequate.

The Minister considered the applicant's section 6 Charter rights, health concerns, and the Cotroni factors, which overwhelmingly pointed to prosecution in the United States.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on narcotics charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision.

He argued that the new Extradition Act's evidentiary provisions were unconstitutional, that time limits for the authority to proceed were breached, and that the extradition judge erred in his assessment of the conduct and evidence.

He also challenged the Minister's surrender decision on Charter grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding the legislation constitutional, the time limits functionally met, the committal justified by the evidence, and the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conspiracy convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the affiant and sub-affiants during an application to exclude wiretap evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied too strict a test, requiring a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, rather than the correct standard of showing a basis that cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit a pre-condition to the authorization, such as investigative necessity.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Justice refusing a request for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister carefully considered the matters raised and that his reasons amply justified the refusal on any test for reconsideration.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and possession of a restricted weapon.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the evidence seized from her residence under a general warrant violated her section 8 Charter rights and should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal found that the general warrant was invalid because the police could have obtained a conventional warrant, rendering the search warrantless and a breach of section 8.

However, the Court admitted the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that the police acted in good faith and the exclusion of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than its admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Crown conceded that the summary conviction appeal court acted upon the wrong set of rules in dismissing the appellant's appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the summary conviction appeal court to be determined on its merits.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen, was ordered surrendered for extradition to the United States.

After his appeals were exhausted, he requested the Minister of Justice amend the surrender order to require assurances that he would receive enhanced credit for his five years of pre-trial custody in Canada.

The Minister refused.

The applicant sought judicial review of this refusal.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to review the Minister's refusal to amend the order.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding that because Canadian law does not guarantee enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, the absence of such a guarantee in the United States does not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The applicant was committed for extradition to Trinidad on charges of murder and accessory after the fact to murder, where he faced a mandatory death penalty.

He applied for bail pending his appeal of the committal order and pending the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Court of Appeal granted bail pending the surrender decision, finding that the mandatory death penalty raised a non-frivolous issue for the Minister, the applicant established he would surrender despite the flight risk, and public interest favoured his release given the 14-month delay.

The application for bail pending appeal was adjourned until after the Minister's decision.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a search warrant and declare s. 487 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional regarding law office searches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 487 is constitutional in respect of law offices provided the guidelines set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Lavallee are followed.

The court also found no evidentiary basis to support the appellant's alternative argument that the Lavallee principles were not complied with in this case.

The appellant applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order and appealed an order under s. 69 of the Extradition Act.

The appellant argued that the Minister's decision constituted an abuse of process, violated s. 6(1) of the Charter, and failed to adequately consider his claims of ill health.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application and the appeal, finding no air of reality to the abuse of process claim, that the Minister's decision was reasonable under the Charter, and that the medical claims were unsubstantiated.

The appellant was charged with drug offences in Canada and subsequently indicted in the United States.

The Canadian charges were stayed to allow extradition proceedings to the United States to proceed.

The appellant appealed the refusal to set aside the stay of the Canadian charges and the order committing him for extradition, arguing the proceedings were an abuse of process and violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no basis to interfere with the Crown's discretion to stay the domestic charges and concluding that the appellant's abuse of process claims regarding the extradition had no realistic possibility of success.

A related motion for production of documents was also largely dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a jury trial.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate instructions to the triers during the challenge for cause process and erred in dismissing his Corbett application to exclude a prior narcotics conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the triers on the nature of their task and the procedure to follow.

The Court also held the trial judge erred in dismissing the Corbett application, as the prior conviction was highly prejudicial and not a crime of dishonesty.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a restricted handgun, receiving a six-year sentence.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude evidence obtained through a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights when police unlawfully knocked on his motel room door.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis, the curative proviso applied because the trial judge explicitly accepted the appellant's wife's testimony as sufficient, standing alone, to justify the convictions.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, arrested for extradition to the United States on charges relating to a fraudulent loan scheme, appealed multiple rulings including habeas corpus dismissals, a committal order, and the dismissal of a release application under s. 69 of the Extradition Act.

He also sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and the application for judicial review, finding that the Minister's surrender order was valid, the superseding indictment did not invalidate the proceedings, and there was no abuse of process or procedural unfairness.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for drug offences involving 2.575 kilograms of marijuana.

They argued the Crown failed to disclose an informant's identity and that police lacked reasonable grounds for arrest and search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no substance to the non-disclosure complaint as the defence could have called the suspected informant, and concluding police had reasonable grounds based on their observations.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed, and the sentences were reduced to 27 months, as the original sentences were deemed excessive despite the appellants' serious criminal records.

The appellant was convicted of drug and weapons offences following an undercover narcotics investigation.

Police forcibly entered an apartment, arrested the appellant without a warrant, and seized firearms.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the firearms, allowing improper cross-examination, and inadequately answering jury questions.

The Court of Appeal held the firearms were admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

However, the trial judge erred by allowing hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's brother's affidavit and by failing to instruct the jury that a mere bystander cannot be convicted as a party under s. 21 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the drug and restricted weapons charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a street-level police encounter initiated on mere suspicion.

The court held that the police unlawfully detained the appellant, used immigration questioning as a pretext to create grounds for arrest, and then conducted an illegal search incident to that arrest.

The court found breaches of ss. 8, 9 and 10(b) of the Charter and concluded that the seized crack cocaine would not have been obtained absent those violations.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2), the conviction was quashed, and an acquittal was entered.