Matthew R. Gourlay

The appellant appealed his conviction for discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence of 7 years 4 months imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding the jury's use of evidence that the appellant possessed a handgun at the time of arrest, three days after the shooting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the evidence of the handgun was highly relevant as it could connect the appellant to the shooting and corroborate witness testimony, and that there was no realistic possibility the jury engaged in improper propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction, challenging the trial judge's decision not to formally self-instruct in accordance with the Vetrovec warning regarding the credibility of a co-accused who testified.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to conclude the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion.

The trial judge had properly considered the co-accused's status and motivation to fabricate, found her evidence honest and supported by corroborating evidence, and provided ample reasons for rejecting the defence theory of evidence planting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to set aside the trial judge's credibility findings.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence failed to reflect the appellant's peripheral role in the offence given the amount of marijuana involved.

The sentence was reduced to time served, with all ancillary orders remaining in place.

The appellant brought a motion to reinstate his appeal from conviction and to seek an extension of time to seek leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant's former counsel had filed a Notice of Abandonment of the appeal based on instructions allegedly from the appellant's brother, not the appellant himself.

The Crown did not oppose the motion.

The court found that the appellant intended to pursue his appeal and was unaware that a separate notice was required for leave to appeal sentence.

The conviction appeal was reinstated to include leave to appeal sentence, and the matter was adjourned for further proceedings.

Two appellants were convicted following a jury trial for their roles in an armed robbery of a drug dealer's residence in Barrhaven.

During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed the resident.

The first appellant was convicted of first degree murder; the second appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, the first appellant's conviction was upheld.

However, the second appellant's conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered due to errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mens rea requirement for party liability to murder under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant's motion to set aside a previous Divisional Court order under Rule 59.06 was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The successful respondents and intervenors sought costs.

The applicant argued against a costs award, citing impecuniosity and public interest.

The court rejected the public interest argument but considered impecuniosity in determining the quantum.

The Attorney General and the Justices of the Peace Review Council were awarded $7,500 each on a partial indemnity basis.

The intervenors, the applicant's former counsel, were awarded $23,000 on a substantial indemnity basis due to the applicant's reprehensible conduct in making unfounded allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAJ had found that the trial judge improperly interfered with the respondent's right to make full answer and defence by preventing cross-examination on 45 photographs.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCAJ erred in interfering with the trial judge's discretion to control the trial process.

The trial judge had properly vetted the photographs to prevent redundant and repetitive evidence.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions on five counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of assault causing bodily harm, and one count of theft under $5,000.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after a head-on collision on Highway 17 that killed the other driver.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstruction officer, arguing the evidence was tainted by bias and that the Crown failed to disclose draft reports.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while there were concerns about the expert's independence, the trial judge properly circumscribed the scope of admissible evidence and that any disclosure violation did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace removed from office for misconduct, brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous Divisional Court order that had dismissed his judicial review application.

The applicant argued he was denied a fair hearing and alleged ineffective assistance by his former counsel.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and finding that the applicant's complaints did not fit within the narrow exceptions of Rule 59.06 for fraud or newly discovered facts.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a conviction entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the case met the criteria for granting leave to appeal under the second category established in R. v. R(R.).

The court found that the appellant had not established sufficient grounds for leave to appeal and refused the application.

The appellant appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault of a minor victim, as well as his six-year sentence.

The victim alleged that the appellant sexually and physically assaulted her over a two-year period when she was 14-15 years old and he was 44.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault after finding the victim's evidence credible and rejecting the appellant's denials.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal on conviction: misapplication of the burden of proof, misapprehension of the significance of the victim's diary, and erroneous assessment of the victim's testimony according to standards applicable to young persons.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge relied on inadmissible evidence and failed to apply the principle of parity.

The appellate court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault on August 27, 2010, and sexual assault on October 31, 2010.

He was acquitted on one count.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months for the August 27 assault causing bodily harm (concurrent with three months for sexual assault) and six months consecutive for the October 31 sexual assault, for a global sentence of 15 months.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the August 27 conviction but found the trial judge's reasons inadequate regarding the October 31 sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial on that count.

On sentence, the Court adjusted the sentences to account for immigration consequences not considered by the trial judge, reducing the assault causing bodily harm sentence to six months less ten days and converting the sexual assault sentence to consecutive rather than concurrent, maintaining the overall nine-month sentence for the August 27 incident.

The appellant sought to vary a trial judgment that had been set aside by the Court of Appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on jurisdictional grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a judgment that had already been set aside by the appellate court.

The court also found no evidence of fraud or accidental slip that would justify relief under the applicable rules.

The proposed intervenors, former appellate counsel for the applicant, brought a motion to be added as parties to the applicant's Rule 59.06 motion, which sought to set aside a previous Divisional Court order based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The applicant consented to the intervention but sought to restrict the intervenors from seeking costs or making submissions on underlying legal issues.

The court granted the intervention with full party rights, declined to impose the requested restrictions, and awarded costs of the motion to the intervenors.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision denying bail pending appeal of his conviction for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault against his minor daughters.

The applicant argued the bail judge erred in applying the public confidence test from R. v. Oland and that her decision was clearly unwarranted.

The Chief Justice dismissed the application, finding no material errors of fact or law and that the bail judge's assessment of the seriousness of the offences, the merits of the appeal, and the likelihood of parole were all reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement entered after a jury trial.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for sexual assault as part of similar fact evidence, and also challenged the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the use of such evidence on the issue of consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the prior conviction was properly admitted as part of a package of similar fact evidence and that the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

Appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, and possession of child pornography.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the convictions for attempted kidnapping and attempted aggravated sexual assault arising from an August 29, 2005 incident, as well as the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the appellant's actions constituted attempts beyond mere preparation and that all criteria for dangerous offender designation were satisfied.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct an alleged accidental slip in a trial judgment, to vary the decision based on fraud and fresh evidence, and to stay the execution of costs orders made by the Court of Appeal.

The trial judgment in question had previously been vacated by the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the plaintiff's action and granted the defendant's counterclaim for defamation.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to vary a vacated judgment.

In the alternative, the court held that the fresh evidence regarding a non-testifying expert was irrelevant, the accidental slip argument was groundless, and the test for a stay of execution was not met.

Walter Creglia appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and that his Charter rights were violated due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for both dismissing the Charter motion and convicting on impaired driving were convoluted, difficult to understand, and failed to demonstrate a clear path to conviction by linking the evidence, law, and conclusions.

The court also noted the trial judge's irrelevant discussion of "care and control." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as meaningful appellate review was not possible, and the curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for multiple counts of assault and theft arising from an intimate relationship.

At trial, the judge engaged in a vetting procedure that excluded approximately 45 photographs the defence intended to use during cross-examination of the complainant to challenge her credibility and narrative of the relationship.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the vetting process was flawed, applied the wrong legal test for excluding defence evidence, and improperly curtailed the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

Because the case turned almost entirely on the complainant's credibility, the error was deemed serious and the curative proviso was not applied.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.