Grace Hyunju Choi

The appellant appealed his sentence, relying solely on fresh evidence regarding his treatment needs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence would not have altered the sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record, and noted his treatment needs could potentially be met in the federal system.

The accused was found unfit to stand trial and the hearing judge issued a treatment order under s. 672.58 of the Criminal Code, directing that he be taken forthwith to a designated hospital.

The hospital appealed, arguing that it had not consented to the order as required by s. 672.62 because no bed was immediately available.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the hospital's consent is a mandatory precondition that includes having the capacity to safely admit the patient.

The Court also held that the consent requirement does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as it accords with the principles of fundamental justice by ensuring treatment orders are executed safely and balancing the needs of the accused with broader societal and medical realities.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his detention with privileges for supervised community accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence, failed to consider a conditional discharge, and erred by not ordering an independent psychiatric assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusions reasonable, noting that a conditional discharge was inappropriate given the need for supervised accommodation, and agreeing that an independent assessment was unnecessary.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that was more restrictive of his liberty than previous orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a solid evidentiary basis for the disposition and noting the Board's intention to maintain oversight while allowing for the possibility of an earlier hearing if progress was made.

The appellant was convicted of robbery of a convenience store as a party to the offence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and wrongly used his utterances to police to draw an inference of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of essential evidence and concluding the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding sexual interference, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and untainted by references to other incidents.

The court allowed the appeal regarding breach of probation, entering an acquittal because the trial judge failed to make a discrete finding concerning the date of the offences.

On consent, the court entered a stay on the sexual assault conviction.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider evidence corroborating his claim that he could not communicate in English.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge expressly referred to the evidence but accepted the police officers' evidence as equally credible, concluding the appellant had not met his burden.

The young person appealed her conviction and sentence for robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence exceeding the recommendations of both the Crown and defence.

The Court found the sentence excessive and reduced it to time served (two-and-a-half months) while maintaining the $350 restitution order.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown agreed the sentence should be reduced by 11 days for time served.

The Court of Appeal noted the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's positive steps toward rehabilitation.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the sentence was varied from six months consecutive to six months concurrent, with an 11-day reduction for time served.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible (NCR), appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention at a psychiatric hospital.

The amicus curiae argued the Board erred by failing to appoint counsel for the unrepresented appellant under s. 672.5(8) of the Criminal Code or by failing to provide adequate assistance during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly considered whether the interests of justice required appointing counsel and reasonably concluded the appellant could participate fairly.

The Court also held that the Board's decision to continue the appellant's detention was reasonable and supported by evidence of his lack of insight, substance abuse history, and risk of violence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated July 15, 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent order dated February 14, 2011, had superseded the order under appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a long-term offender.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment in addition to 31 months of pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year supervision order.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by crediting his pre-sentence custody on a 1-to-1 basis rather than an enhanced basis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, particularly given the appellant's dangerousness and the unlikelihood of early release.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with criminal negligence causing death while street racing.

The young person acted as the 'flag man' to start a street race that resulted in the death of one of the drivers.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict of acquittal, finding the young person's participation insufficient to cause death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to properly consider party liability under section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that the mens rea for an aider to criminal negligence causing death requires intentional assistance of the negligent conduct with knowledge of the principal's intentions, and objective foresight that bodily harm would result.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision to sentence him as an adult and to impose a sentence of eight years, less credit for time served, to be served in a youth facility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual assault, sexual intercourse, and luring a child using a computer.

The offences involved a 12-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly addressed inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, which was supported by confirmatory emails and letters.

The court also held that the facts supported the luring conviction and that the global sentence of 21 months was fit.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of possessing and accessing child pornography after the trial judge excluded his statement to police due to voluntariness concerns and found the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control of the files found on his computer.

The summary conviction appeal court judge overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's mother's evidence regarding his cognitive limitations and in failing to infer guilty knowledge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the summary conviction appeal court judge failed to accord proper deference to the trial judge's factual findings and misapprehended the trial judge's permissible use of the mother's evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: failure to consider exculpatory portions of out-of-court statements, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and improperly admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the statements, noting they were only probative of the appellant lying to police.

The court also found the trial judge properly cautioned himself against uneven scrutiny and reasonably admitted the similar fact evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of driving over 80.

At trial, he raised a Carter defence, calling a toxicologist and a friend to testify about his alcohol consumption.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and convicted the appellant, noting the rigorous circumstances of the breath testing.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge violated the Boucher principle by using the breath test circumstances to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the Crown called the Intoxilyzer technician to testify rather than relying solely on the certificate of analysis, the presumption of accuracy was not engaged, and the trial judge was entitled to consider all evidence, including the test results.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the proposed appeal was essentially fact-driven, raised no issue of law of general importance, and lacked sufficiently strong grounds to warrant leave.