Grace Hyunju Choi

The appellant appealed his sentence for flight from police and driving while disqualified.

The sentencing judge imposed a two-year sentence with credit for 283 days of presentence custody on a one-for-one basis, refusing enhanced credit at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating violations of federal statutory release with provincial institutional misconduct.

The court held that the loss of early release eligibility alone generally justifies enhanced credit at 1.5:1.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced by 142 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and failure to comply with probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to consider his specific circumstances when assessing his credibility and intent, and that the trial judge improperly relied on his after-the-fact conduct of fleeing the daycare as evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was aware of the appellant's personal circumstances and made credible findings that were not subject to appellate interference.

The court also found that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's after-the-fact conduct as circumstantial evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a pastor, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his 14-year-old step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge placed undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly analyzed the substance of the evidence and did not overemphasize demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance (x2), and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence.

The appellant pled guilty to all offences except pointing a firearm, which proceeded to trial.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the evidence.

The appellant raised concerns regarding territorial jurisdiction, misuse of his criminal record, and the trial judge's assessment of the victim's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the trial judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal from conviction.

The appellant also sought a one-month sentence reduction to complete his remaining time in a provincial institution, which the Court of Appeal declined to grant.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction entered on January 25, 2011 and his sentence imposed on July 11, 2012.

The appellant's submissions consisted solely of attacks on the factual findings of the trial judge, including allegations that key witnesses were liars and challenges to the professional integrity of the police and prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for driving a taxi from which a youth shot and killed the deceased.

The Crown's case relied on evidence from two witnesses: the front-seat passenger who testified that the appellant knew of the plan to kill the deceased, and the shooter himself who testified that the appellant had no knowledge of his plan.

The trial judge made numerous interventions during the shooter's testimony, expressing disparaging views about his credibility and reliability.

The trial judge also gave a Vetrovec instruction regarding the shooter's evidence, permitted re-examination of the passenger on prior consistent statements, and instructed the jury on the standard of proof.

The appellant appealed on five grounds.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board regarding Bartosz Gajewski, raising two grounds: (1) that a condition allowing indirectly supervised or unaccompanied entry into the community for up to seven days was unreasonable and did not protect public safety, and (2) that the Board's failure to include the victim's father (J.N.) in a 500-metre boundary condition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground, finding the Board's disposition reasonably supported by the evidence and noting that the Crown had not opposed the condition at the hearing.

The Court allowed the second ground in part, ordering that J.N. be included in the 500-metre boundary condition.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Karina Neff.

He did not deny killing the deceased but claimed he lacked the mens rea for murder and was therefore guilty of manslaughter.

The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in admitting a video-recorded statement of a witness with a disability under section 715.2 of the Criminal Code when the witness could not confirm the truth of the statement from present recollection; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for mistrial after the Crown made prejudicial remarks in closing address regarding the defence's expert evidence and the issue of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adoption test under section 715.2 is the same as under section 715.1 and does not require present recollection, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing a mistrial and addressing any prejudice through corrective jury instructions.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for state-funded counsel for his conviction appeal after being denied Legal Aid.

The court assessed whether it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel.

Finding that the proposed grounds of appeal lacked arguable merit and that the applicant was capable of self-representation with the assistance of duty counsel, the court dismissed the application.

The applicant sought leave to appeal her convictions and sentences for driving without insurance and surrendering false evidence of insurance.

She had been convicted at an ex parte trial and fined $12,500, which she argued she could not afford.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the convictions, finding no viable due diligence defence.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, noting the appeal judge failed to inquire into the applicant's financial circumstances or consider relief from the mandatory minimum fines under s. 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in the General Forensic Unit at CAMH.

The appellant challenged the finding that she was mentally ill and posed a significant threat, and argued for a conditional discharge or a Community Treatment Order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was firmly grounded in the evidence and not unreasonable, and noting the Community Treatment Order alternative was not advanced before the Board.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death after striking a 13-year-old pedestrian while driving 152 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider evidence regarding his speed and erred in assessing legal causation, specifically whether the victim running onto the road was an intervening act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the speed evidence lacked probative force and the appellant's dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause of the death.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after shooting a man during a drug transaction.

At trial, the judge charged the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code but not under s. 35.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the unlawful assault requirement of s. 34(2) and erred by failing to leave s. 35 with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions on s. 34(2) when read as a whole, and concluding there was no air of reality to a s. 35 defence because the appellant, as the initial aggressor drawing a loaded handgun, could not claim he commenced the assault without intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm.

The appellant, who claimed to have a spiritual healing gift from God, was convicted of sexual assault and breaching recognizance conditions after touching a client's breast without consent during healing sessions.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias, and erred in finding he breached his recognizance and committed sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge managed the trial fairly, the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted, and the convictions were supported by credible evidence.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The parties had made a joint submission requesting a transfer to a secure unit and an early six-month review hearing.

The Board accepted the transfer but rejected the early review.

The appellant argued this breached procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not impose a more restrictive disposition than requested, the parties had a full opportunity to argue the merits of the early review, and the Board's decision was reasonable based on the evidence of the appellant's recent behaviour.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board dismissing his Charter application.

He alleged that a delay in holding his annual disposition review hearing violated his rights under s. 7 of the Charter and sought costs, damages, and declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the minor delay did not significantly deprive the appellant of his liberty or security of the person.

The Court also held that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to grant costs, damages, or declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and is not required to adopt an inquisitorial approach when hearing Charter applications.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

Following a deterioration in his mental state, he was readmitted to a secure forensic assessment unit.

The Ontario Review Board held a restriction of liberty hearing and found that his continued detention without usual privileges violated his s. 7 Charter rights, ordering the hospital to pay costs under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal, holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the detention met the least onerous and least restrictive standard, and the Board lacked jurisdiction to award costs as a Charter remedy.

The appellant appealed convictions for three counts of dangerous driving causing death arising from a highway collision after attempting to pass three vehicles on a wet two-lane road while cresting a hill in heavy traffic.

The court held that the trial judge gave careful and thorough reasons and committed no reviewable error in finding that the passing manoeuvre was dangerous and a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable driver.

The court rejected appellate calculations advanced to challenge the factual findings, noting they had not been tested through the trial process and did not undermine the trial judge's reasoning.

The court also upheld the finding that evasive action and loss of control by the oncoming vehicle were foreseeable consequences of the appellant's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.