Grace Hyunju Choi

The appellant appealed her conviction for counselling to commit murder, arguing for a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

At trial, her defence of duress was rejected, and the trial judge found she had fabricated some journal entries.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from her trial counsel to show the continuity of her journal entries and the post-sentence criminal conduct of her former boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion and the appeal, concluding that the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result, as her behaviour with undercover officers was inconsistent with acting under duress.

The appellant appealed a lengthy jail sentence imposed for offences involving violence and a specific victim.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had a very lengthy record for similar offences, including previous convictions relating to the same victim.

The court held that protection of the public and the victim was paramount, and while the sentence was at the high end of the range, it was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had imposed conditional discharges.

The Court of Appeal held that a discharge is not legally available for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional discharges were set aside, and suspended sentences with probation were substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault by a jury, arguing the verdict was compromised because the jury was not informed of sequestration until five hours into deliberations, and because they returned mixed verdicts on related charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility of coercion from the delayed sequestration notice and concluding the verdicts were not irreconcilable.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's instruction on the burden of proof.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence of 8 months, combined with credit for pre-trial custody and pre-trial bail equivalent to house arrest, amounted to the equivalent of a penitentiary term.

Although the sentence was lenient and at the low end of the range, the Court admitted fresh evidence showing the offender had resumed caring for his son and found employment.

The Court concluded the sentence was not so inadequate as to warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge applied the wrong test and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the evidence of impairment, including the appellant's high rate of speed, abrupt stop, and slurred speech, and that the verdict was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed the 18-month conditional sentence imposed on the 18-year-old respondent, who had no prior criminal record and a horrific childhood.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit and adequately reflected deterrence and denunciation.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to issue a mandatory DNA order, which the trial judge had erred in omitting.

The appellant was convicted of making harassing telephone calls contrary to s. 372(3) of the Criminal Code.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed, and he sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant argued that the prosecution was barred by the limitation period, that the calls were not 'repeated', that they were not received by the intended victims, and that he had a lawful excuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the offence was a continuing course of conduct within the limitation period, and that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the nature, receipt, and purpose of the calls were supported by the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his intimate partner and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give him the benefit of the doubt regarding the jury's verdict, improperly relied on an excluded statement, and failed to consider mitigating factors and pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons lacked clarity on the use of the excluded statement and failed to apply the benefit of the doubt principle.

The Court allowed the appeal, factored in mitigating circumstances and pre-trial custody, and reduced the sentence to 7 years' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed the disposition imposed on a young person.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge gave the matter careful consideration and his assessment was worthy of considerable deference.

The Court also noted that the sentencing principles in the new youth justice legislation must inform their consideration.

The Court concluded that the sentence was not unfit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of assault following an altercation with the complainant, during which the appellant claimed she acted in self-defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by restricting cross-examination of the complainant regarding pending assault charges, misapprehending a witness's evidence, and improperly applying the doctrine of reasonable doubt to credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the restricted cross-examination prejudiced the appellant's self-defence claim and that the trial judge improperly resolved credibility before considering reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence following a conviction for aggravated assault causing catastrophic and permanent brain injury to the victim.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge did not err by placing significant weight on the brutal nature of the attack, the callous abandonment of the victim without medical assistance, and the devastating consequences of the assault.

The court found that the sentencing judge also properly considered mitigating background factors, remorse, prospects of rehabilitation, and pre-trial custody.

A 9-year penitentiary sentence was held to be within the appropriate range and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two sexual assaults involving two sisters, one consisting of repeated abuse of a child over several years and the other a later sexual touching of the adult sister.

The Court of Appeal held the sentence was demonstrably unfit because the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to denunciation and deterrence, mischaracterized the conduct as out of character, and relied on unsupported hearsay opinions about risk.

A custodial disposition was required notwithstanding the historical nature of the principal offence, particularly given the later assault showing the misconduct was not isolated.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional sentence was set aside, a sentence of 14 months in the reformatory was imposed after accounting for time served on the conditional sentence, and a DNA order was directed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence demonstrating that trial counsel failed to call evidence that could have explained inaccuracies in the appellant's police statement.

The trial judge had used the statement to undermine the appellant's credibility.

The Court found that the ineffective assistance occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the defence of intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the intoxication defence as the appellant's conduct was clearly purposeful.

The court also held that the trial judge properly found the appellant's actions amounted to threats of violence under s. 343(a) of the Criminal Code, as they caused a reasonable apprehension of physical harm.

The respondent pled guilty to seven counts of robbery, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and possession of a stolen vehicle, receiving a total concurrent sentence of four years.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the total sentence manifestly inadequate given the respondent's extensive record, the number of offences, and the fact that he was on parole.

The Court varied the sentences for dangerous driving and failing to stop to be consecutive to the robbery sentences, resulting in a total sentence of six years, and imposed a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence of three and one-half years' imprisonment.

He argued that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning regarding an accomplice's testimony was deficient, that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, and that the defence of intoxication should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Vetrovec warning adequate, no prejudice from the hearsay evidence, and no air of reality to the intoxication defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly applied the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm and the sentence was not excessive.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault and argued, among other grounds, that the trial judge failed to properly investigate allegations that jurors had communicated with the officer-in-charge during trial.

The Court of Appeal held that both actual fairness and the appearance of fairness required a fuller inquiry into the allegation.

Because the witness was not permitted to explain an inconsistency and the officer should at least have been called to testify, the inquiry was incomplete and inconclusive.

The resulting appearance of unfairness required that the conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a speeding conviction based on a laser speed detection reading, arguing the Crown failed to prove the scientific reliability of the device absent expert evidence.

The court reviewed authorities concerning radar, speedometers, and newer laser technology, and held that although judicial notice of laser reliability had not yet been established, the Crown had adduced sufficient prima facie evidence of the particular unit's trustworthiness.

The combination of manufacturer-recommended testing on the date of the offence and an earlier comparison against an accurate radar unit by a qualified operator provided a sufficient circumstantial guarantee of reliability.

In the absence of contrary evidence, the conviction was upheld.