Erin Nicole Elizabeth Rivers

Following a successful Crown application to review the accused's release on bail under s. 680 of the Criminal Code, the Court of Appeal posted its reasons online.

Both the Crown and the accused raised concerns that the reasons should be withheld or edited due to a publication ban under s. 517.

The Court held a hearing and determined that the reasons must be published in full.

The Court found no express statutory authority applying s. 517 to s. 680 reviews, noted that the original bail judge's reasons were already widely available online, and concluded that publishing edited reasons would be unintelligible and contrary to the open court principle.

The Crown applied for a review of a second bail judge's decision to release the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy.

The second bail judge had found a material change in circumstances based on new evidence regarding the identity of a purchaser of GPS trackers and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's application, finding that the second bail judge made a palpable and overriding error in assessing the strength of the Crown's case and erred in law by treating the pandemic as an automatic material change without considering it in the context of the first bail judge's findings.

The accused was ordered detained pending trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available, arguing that the search of his rooming house and electronic devices violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal held that the warrant was not overbroad, was executed reasonably, and explicitly authorized the search of the seized electronic devices.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, A.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his wife, alleging the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by misapprehending J.R.'s testimony regarding leg bruises, which was central to the conviction's corroboration finding.

Furthermore, the trial judge improperly relied on a prior consistent statement as corroboration.

This misapprehension of evidence constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his cellmate at a detention centre by forcing him to engage in oral sex on three occasions.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's credibility assessments were properly reasoned and entitled to substantial deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the four-year sentence was fit and properly reflected the principles of sentencing.

The victim surcharge imposed at trial was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a firearm obtained by crime, possession of property obtained by crime, break and enter to steal a firearm, and break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and incorrectly applied the rules of circumstantial evidence in finding that the appellant was the perpetrator of the break-in and that the rifle was a firearm within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-grounded in the evidence and that there was no reasonable alternative inference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for repeatedly communicating by way of telecommunication with intent to harass contrary to section 372(4) of the Criminal Code, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

The sole issue on appeal was identification: whether the appellant was the person who met the complainant at a bar and subsequently sent her harassing messages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly analyzed the identification evidence as recognition evidence based on the complainant's prior acquaintance with the appellant during several hours of close contact on the night in question.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a detention order rather than granting a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued that the Board made a palpable and overriding factual error regarding his propensity to decompensate and that the Board failed to adequately consider alternative mechanisms for readmission to hospital.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and that the detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available given the appellant's risk to public safety.