Ian Carter

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, and administering a noxious thing after intentionally attempting to infect multiple sexual partners with HIV.

The court found that the offender acted deliberately and maliciously, lying about his HIV status and seeking out vulnerable young men.

The court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody.

The court also designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 5-year supervision order, finding a substantial risk of reoffending based on his pattern of reckless and predatory conduct.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, finding police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the passenger in the respondent's car.

On appeal, the Crown argued the police had grounds for an investigative detention, a position not advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be unfair to allow the Crown to rely on a new factual scenario and legal theory not raised before the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The arrest followed a routine traffic stop where an officer smelled fresh marijuana and found over three kilograms of marijuana and cash.

The appellant argued the search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge had concerns about the arresting officer's credibility but accepted the evidence of a second officer, concluding there were reasonable and probable grounds for the stop.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding his failure to negotiate a curve and the testimony of witnesses in a trailing vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interpretation of the expert data was open to him and that he provided detailed, accurate reasons for rejecting the witness testimony as unreliable.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a man was seen peering into a women's washroom stall.

The Crown's case rested on circumstantial evidence, primarily the appellant's DNA found on a partially consumed pop bottle left in the stall.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because the DNA evidence alone could not prove he was the perpetrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the totality of the evidence, including the DNA on the bottle and the lack of any other rational explanation for its presence, reasonably supported the conviction.

The applicants brought a motion to reconsider a previous decision denying production of CSIS source documents and sought leave to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on a Garofoli voir dire.

The court found that newly disclosed information revealed an apparent contradiction in the CSIS affidavit regarding whether a target was actively seeking a gun.

This contradiction met the threshold to show the affiant may have failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court ordered the CSIS source documents to be produced for judicial review to determine their relevance to the Garofoli application.

In a terrorism prosecution, the applicants sought further disclosure from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service relating to payments made to a human source relied upon in a CSIS affidavit supporting investigative warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that records detailing remuneration and reimbursements paid to the source were likely relevant to a pending Garofoli voir dire because financial incentives may affect credibility and the affiant’s assessment of reliability.

Production of records relating to payments to the source was therefore ordered.

However, the request for disclosure of any CSIS reliability assessments concerning a target of the investigation was refused, as the target was not a traditional informant whose reliability required evaluation.

The respondent was acquitted at trial of several driving offences causing death and bodily harm, with the trial judge finding reasonable doubt as to whether the respondent or his passenger was driving at the time of the fatal collision.

The Crown appealed the acquittals, arguing the trial judge made errors of law in his treatment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended key eyewitness testimony and failed to consider the totality of the evidence, instead applying the reasonable doubt standard in a piecemeal fashion to individual pieces of evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, particularly stopped timepieces, to establish the appellant had the exclusive opportunity to commit the offence before leaving for work.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence in his jury instructions, instead merely reading the parties' positions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to relate the evidence to the key issues and improperly instructed the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard to a specific piece of evidence (the timepieces).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The statement had previously been ruled inadmissible in a separate proceeding before a different judge.

The court held that issue estoppel did not apply to voluntariness rulings and permitted the voir dire.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of video recording, an unrecorded interaction in the holding cells, and a failure to transport him directly to the remand centre after bail court.

The court found the police explanations reasonable, no evidence of improper conduct, and concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused applied under s. 591(3)(a) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to one complainant from a multi-count indictment involving seven complainants alleging sexual offences and attempted murder arising from nondisclosure of HIV-positive status.

The accused argued he intended to testify regarding the severed complainant’s allegations, which included disputed non-consensual conduct, but not regarding the other complainants whose sexual encounters were admitted to be consensual at the time.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting a strong factual nexus among the counts and a viable similar fact evidence application based on an alleged pattern of behaviour and extensive chat log evidence demonstrating intent.

The court held that the accused established an objectively justifiable basis for testifying on the severed counts but not the others, and that forcing a joint trial would prejudice the accused’s right to choose whether to testify.

Severance of the counts relating to the particular complainant was therefore granted in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime prohibition order under s. 161(1)(a) of the Criminal Code following convictions for serious sexual offences against young persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order appropriate given the appellant's history, psychological reports, and failure to obey court orders.

The Court noted the appellant could apply to vary the order in the future under s. 161(3) if his circumstances changed.

The appellant appealed an order directing that electronic images of the hard drives of two computers seized from her be sent to France pursuant to warrants issued under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The appellant argued the warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the issuing judge's conclusion that the appellant's common-law spouse was likely communicating with other members of a terrorist plot using the seized computers.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and advised of her right to counsel at the roadside, including the right to free legal advice 'right now'.

She declined to call a lawyer and was not re-advised of her rights upon arriving at the police station.

The trial judge convicted her, but the summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal, finding the roadside caution misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the use of the word 'now' properly conveys the immediacy of the right to counsel and does not require the officer to specify that the call will be made from the police station.