Audra Bennett

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order granting custody to the mother with supervised access for the father.

The father opposed the motion, arguing he should be allowed to defend a pending criminal trial first and that there were genuine issues of credibility requiring a trial.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the father failed to provide sufficient evidence to counter the Society's case.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the children in need of protection due to exposure to parental conflict, and ordered custody to the mother with supervised access for the father.

Following a 15-day family law trial where the respondent mother was entirely successful, she sought costs of $80,000 on a full indemnity basis.

The court found the self-represented applicant father's conduct protracted the trial, his positions were unreasonable, and he failed to accept offers to settle that were less favourable than the trial outcome.

The court awarded the requested $80,000 in full indemnity costs.

The court also exercised its discretion to order that $20,000 of the costs award be treated as a 'support order' enforceable under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, reflecting the portion of the trial dedicated to child support issues.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order granting joint custody to the father and maternal grandmother, with supervised access to the mother.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child to her care.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the need for protection, citing the mother's emotional dysregulation, conflictual relationships, and lack of cooperation with the applicant.

The court also found no genuine issue regarding the disposition, granting joint custody to the father and maternal grandmother with primary residence to the father.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the extent and supervision of the mother's access, ordering a mini-trial to resolve that issue.

The court determined costs following a motion to change involving custody, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The father was awarded $2,500 for an earlier motion where he successfully sought the return of the child.

No costs were awarded for a consent order reached at a case conference.

On the main motion, the mother was the more successful party, having been granted sole custody and retroactive child support.

The court fixed the mother's costs at $11,300.

After offsetting the awards, the father was ordered to pay the mother a net amount of $8,800.

This supplementary endorsement clarifies and corrects a previous decision regarding Section 7 expenses.

The court confirmed that volleyball expenses are to be included as Section 7 expenses, resolving an inconsistency.

It also agreed to exclude Manotick Massage expenses, resulting in a reduction of the total amount owing by the applicant to $3,036.49.

The applicant sought an annulment of his marriage, sole custody, and child support.

The respondent opposed the annulment, seeking a divorce, sole custody, and retroactive/ongoing child support.

The court dismissed the annulment request, finding the respondent's prior marriage void *ab initio* due to her minor status and lack of parental consent.

The court granted the respondent sole custody, finding it in the children's best interests given the parents' communication difficulties and the applicant's historical conduct and lack of insight.

Retroactive and ongoing child support were ordered based on imputed income for the applicant, along with a proportional sharing of Section 7 expenses.

The applicant's request for a restraining order was dismissed due to lack of substantiation.

The mother brought a motion to change a final order, seeking sole custody of the child, child support from the father, and reimbursement of child support previously paid.

The father sought to maintain sole custody or joint custody, shared parenting, and retention of funds paid into an RESP.

The court granted the mother sole custody, ordered the father to pay retroactive child support and section 7 expenses, and to return the child's personal funds and belongings.

The court emphasized the child's wishes and the father's unhelpful conduct in determining the child's best interests.

The applicant children’s aid society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding concerning a young child.

The society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection due to risks of physical and emotional harm arising from the father’s long history of aggressive, threatening, and unstable behaviour, including threats against the mother, authorities, and others.

Expert psychiatric evidence raised concerns regarding personality disorders and the father’s inability to comply with authority or accept limits.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring trial and that summary judgment was appropriate under the Family Law Rules, applying the principles from Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The child was found to be in need of protection, sole custody was granted to the mother, and the father’s access was terminated.

In a family law motion involving parenting issues, support, and the matrimonial home, the respondent sought several forms of relief including appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, severance of the divorce, variation of access, and an order for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court declined to sever the divorce and refused to alter the existing temporary access arrangement due to insufficient evidence of a material change affecting the children’s best interests.

However, the court ordered the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home and required the responding party to vacate the property, citing financial realities and the risk of eroding equity.

The court also ordered the payment of ongoing child support and appointed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to obtain the children’s views and preferences.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of the County of Renfrew to transfer child protection proceedings involving two children from Renfrew County to Ottawa, where the children currently reside with their father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish a preponderance of convenience favouring transfer.

The court considered the statutory test under section 48(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, the best interests of the children, the location of witnesses, the children's connections to both jurisdictions, and the availability of court resources.

The court also addressed a related summary judgment motion regarding a third child, which resulted in a consent order placing the child with the mother subject to supervision.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to make a four-year-old child a permanent ward of the Crown.

The child's mother and father did not oppose the motion or present viable plans of care.

The paternal grandmother opposed the motion and presented a plan of care.

The court found that the grandmother had a long history of child protection involvement, lacked a relationship with the child, and failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the child's needs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered that the child be made a permanent Crown ward.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order for Crown wardship of a newborn child.

The parents had a history of child protection involvement, with two previous children made Crown wards due to the father's untreated sexual offender history and both parents' substance abuse and neglect issues.

The court applied the summary judgment rules and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded the child was in need of protection and that Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption was in the child's best interests.

In a child protection proceeding seeking Crown wardship, both parents brought motions to adjourn the scheduled trial until after the completion of related criminal proceedings against them.

The court held that the parents could testify in the child protection proceeding without prejudicing their criminal trial rights and that the statutory timelines under the Child and Family Services Act and Family Law Rules required timely resolution.

The court found no sufficient evidentiary basis to delay the matter beyond the statutory limits and dismissed the parents’ adjournment motions.

However, the court granted an adjournment to allow the father to retain new counsel after his lawyer withdrew for health reasons, and removed counsel of record.

The trial dates were vacated and rescheduled to a fixed date.

On a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the moving child protection agency sought permanent Crown wardship of two children who had been in foster care for an extended period.

The mother consented to the wardship, while the father sought custody or access and argued that factual disputes regarding his past involvement with the children required a trial.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the father had been largely absent from the children’s lives for several years and had not advanced a viable plan of care.

Considering the statutory time limits, the children’s need for permanency, and the father’s lack of meaningful involvement, the court determined the children were in need of protection and that Crown wardship was in their best interests.

Summary judgment was granted.

A child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act sought temporary care and custody of three children following their apprehension from the maternal grandmother’s home.

The society relied on concerns regarding unsafe home conditions, the continued presence of the grandmother’s adult son contrary to prior warnings, and developmental progress observed while the children were in foster care.

The court found the society met the statutory burden under s. 64(8) of the CFSA only in relation to the youngest child, whose health and developmental improvements and attachment in foster care demonstrated that remaining in care was in her best interests.

The evidence did not establish that the two older children’s best interests required continued placement in care, particularly given their lengthy residence with the grandmother and improvements to the home environment.

The court therefore ordered temporary care and custody of the youngest child to the society, while placing the two older children with the grandmother subject to supervision and conditions.

On a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act, the child protection authority sought Crown wardship without access for three young children with significant behavioural and developmental needs.

The parents proposed that the children be returned to the father under a supervision order.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of long‑standing child protection involvement, unstable housing, chronic household disorder, parental conflict, substance use, and the parents’ inability to consistently meet the children’s complex needs despite significant community support.

While acknowledging the father’s commitment and efforts, the court concluded he lacked the capacity, resources, and organization required to safely parent the children long term.

The court determined that permanency through adoption best served the children’s interests and ordered Crown wardship without parental access.