Cedric Yaacov Laurent Nahum

Application by defendant Jasmyn Jarrett to join a trial already in progress after she failed to appear on the first day.

The defendant had been arrested on a bench warrant and sought retroactive permission to participate in the trial, having missed the first five days of evidence.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that the trial had effectively been severed when the Crown proceeded against the three remaining defendants.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown has discretion to proceed with co-accused and that allowing the defendant to join retroactively would prejudice the other defendants' right to a timely trial and would require the Crown to have led evidence differently.

The accused, Albert Tremblay and Amanda Ruddy, applied for directed verdicts of not guilty on multiple counts, arguing the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court granted directed verdicts for counts related to possession of stolen property (chainsaws) due to lack of recent possession evidence, and for fraud counts due to absence of economic deprivation to the pharmacies.

However, the court denied directed verdicts for a count of possession of property obtained by crime (cash), and for counts of illegal possession of narcotics (fentanyl and oxycodone), finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to proceed to a jury.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find the child in need of protection and to place her in extended Society care for the purpose of adoption.

The mother consented to the order, while the father opposed it.

The court found that the parents had a history of domestic violence and the father had not presented a viable plan of care.

Applying the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court concluded there was no genuine issue for trial, found the child in need of protection, and ordered her placed in extended care for adoption.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order to place one child, B.L., in the temporary care of kin pending trial.

The parents brought a cross-motion to return all five children to their temporary care under a supervision order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the kin placement approval for B.L. and the parents' recent housing and service engagement for the other children.

The court granted the Society's motion for B.L., placing him with kin, finding it in his best interests and that he could not be returned to parents.

The parents' cross-motion for the four youngest children was adjourned to allow them more time to demonstrate sustained progress in addressing mental health, addiction, and parenting concerns.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, for an order excluding evidence due to alleged Charter violations.

The application concerned two main issues: lost police photographs from a search and unlawfully obtained/undisclosed medical prescription records.

The court found that the loss of photographs did not constitute unacceptable negligence or prejudice the defence, thus denying their exclusion.

However, the court determined that two specific prescription documents (Exhibits #26 and #27) were unlawfully seized without a production order, infringing the accused's privacy rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and were not disclosed in a timely fashion.

Applying the Grant factors, these two exhibits were deemed inadmissible.

A stay of proceedings was not warranted as the Charter-infringing conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton brought a motion for summary judgment seeking extended society care for two children, F.M.-C. and L.M., and findings of need of protection.

The mother, supported by the father and maternal grandparents, opposed the motion, arguing that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including her progress in addressing Society concerns and the improper admission of evidence as business records.

The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial for both children, particularly regarding the mother's progress in addressing homelessness, substance use, and mental health, and the admissibility of the Society's evidentiary record.

The court emphasized the cautious approach required for summary judgment in child protection cases due to the high stakes and Charter rights involved.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a protection application concerning two children, S.B. and A.O.H., alleging physical harm and a pattern of neglect by their mother.

The mother failed to attend trial, and her counsel was removed.

The fathers of the children agreed with the Society's protection findings and sought custody.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the mother's inappropriate physical discipline, inadequate supervision, lack of provision for necessities, and threats.

Custody of S.B. was granted to her father, and joint legal custody of A.O.H. was granted to her paternal grandmother and father, with primary residence with the grandmother.

Access to the mother was made discretionary for the custodial parents, considering the children's views and best interests.

Orders were also made to facilitate obtaining passports for the children without the mother's consent.

The offenders were found guilty of recruiting two minors for the purpose of exploitation and advertising sexual services.

At sentencing, they challenged the constitutionality of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 279.011 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the s. 7 overbreadth challenge but found that the mandatory minimum violated s. 12 as it was grossly disproportionate to the offenders' lower level of moral blameworthiness, and it could not be saved under s. 1.

The mandatory minimum was struck down, and the offenders were sentenced to 18 months and 11 months respectively.

Four co-accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on all charges, alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges included numerous break and enter offences and drug offences.

The court found that the total delay from October 18, 2017 (date charges laid) to the anticipated completion of trial in April 2020 was 30 months.

After deducting defence-caused delay (7 months and 25 days), waiver (1 day), discrete events (5 days), and case complexity (3 months), the net delay was 19 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay through exceptional circumstances.

Key issues included late and disorganized disclosure from police and Crown, inadequate trial time allocation, and the departure of the case manager from the police investigation without replacement.

The Respondent Mother, J.K., sought an order for costs against the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa for alleged delays in returning her child, X.K., to her temporary care and custody.

The Society opposed this request and brought its own motion for costs.

The court dismissed the Mother's motion for costs, finding that the evidentiary record did not support the conclusion that the Society acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner, despite some initial delays in worker assignment.

The court emphasized the special considerations for First Nations, Inuit, and Métis children under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, but concluded that the Mother had not demonstrated sufficient stability for an earlier return of the child.

The Society's motion for costs was adjourned.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that the child, H., was in need of protection and for a disposition of extended society care for purposes of adoption, with no parental access.

The respondent mother could not be located, and the respondent father filed a plan of care lacking detail and did not participate further.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the child in need of protection due to parental neglect, severe drug abuse by the mother, and the father's violent criminal history.

The court also determined that extended society care was in the child's best interests and denied parental access, citing the lack of parental contact, the child's young age, and the potential impairment to adoption opportunities.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended society care for two Indigenous children, S.L. and L.E.L., due to ongoing exposure to domestic violence and the parents' non-compliance with court orders.

The parents, E.L. (mother) and I.O. (father), opposed this, seeking the children's return.

The court found the children remained in need of protection, citing the high risk of domestic violence and the parents' inability to adhere to supervision orders.

Despite acknowledging the importance of Indigenous heritage and the historical harms of assimilation, the court prioritized the children's safety and stability.

Extended society care was granted, with the court retaining jurisdiction over access to ensure meaningful contact with birth parents and cultural preservation.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two purported prescriptions during a criminal trial.

The documents, introduced by defence counsel during cross-examination of a doctor's secretary, were questioned for authenticity by co-accused's counsel.

The court found that the witness's testimony, which appeared to accept the documents' representation, coupled with the difficulty of assessing her evidence without the documents, warranted their admission as numbered exhibits for a limited purpose, rejecting defence arguments for non-admission or identification-only marking.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender, R.M.P., for a dangerous offender/long-term offender assessment following his conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The court found that R.M.P. had been convicted of a serious personal injury offence.

The primary issues were whether there were reasonable grounds to believe R.M.P. might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, and if so, who should perform the assessment.

The court reviewed R.M.P.'s extensive criminal record, including multiple convictions for sexual assault, assault, assault with a weapon, robbery, uttering threats, and breaches of court orders, noting a pattern of escalating violent and aggressive behaviour and failure to control sexual impulses.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds for the assessment.

The defence objected to the Crown's proposed assessor, Dr. Jonathan Gray, but the court found no cogent reason to reject him, noting his qualifications and availability.

The application was granted, and R.M.P. was remanded for a psychiatric assessment by Dr. Gray.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking extended society care for the child D.M. without access for purposes of adoption.

The motion also sought to strike the father's Answer and Plan of Care.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the caution required in child protection cases, but granted summary judgment.

The child was found in need of protection due to a history of parental substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of engagement, and was placed in extended society care without access for adoption.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of pharmacy records as business records under section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The documents in question included fax copies of prescriptions and computer-generated "prescription hard copies" some with handwritten notes.

The court found that these documents met the five prerequisite conditions for admissibility as business records: they were original entries, made contemporaneously, in the course of normal business routine, by persons under a duty to record, and without a motive to misrepresent.

The court also addressed the notice requirement under subsection 30(7), finding that sufficient notice was given or, alternatively, dispensing with the formal notice requirement.

The records were admitted into evidence.

R.M.P. was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault.

During the sentencing phase, specifically concerning a Crown application under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for a dangerous or long-term offender assessment, defence counsel raised concerns about R.M.P.'s fitness to continue participating.

A fitness hearing was held, considering psychiatric reports and testimony.

The court applied the "limited cognitive capacity" test, which requires a rudimentary understanding of the judicial process, its consequences, and the ability to communicate with counsel.

Despite R.M.P. suffering from schizophrenia and exhibiting delusions, the court found that he met the fitness criteria, being able to follow proceedings, understand roles, and be redirected.

The defence failed to establish unfitness on a balance of probabilities, and their request for a finding of unfitness and a treatment order was dismissed.

The applicant, having been found guilty of two counts of sexual assault, was subject to a fitness hearing during a dangerous offender assessment application.

The applicant brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging actual bias and a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge based on various evidentiary and scheduling rulings made during the hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the rulings were made in accordance with the law and trial management principles, and did not demonstrate any bias or predisposition.

The applicant, M.R.M., pleaded guilty to sexual contact and incest.

He sought a conditional stay of proceedings for the sexual contact charge based on the Kienapple principle and challenged the constitutionality of the five-year minimum sentence for incest under s. 155(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court granted the stay for the sexual contact charge, finding a legal nexus with the incest charge.

However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the minimum sentence for incest, determining it was not grossly disproportionate, even when considering hypothetical less severe cases.

The final sentence imposed was five years imprisonment for incest.

The accused, an Indigenous person, was found guilty after trial of driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and breaching a bail condition prohibiting him from driving.

The Crown sought six months consecutive on both counts.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of six months less one day followed by three years of probation, applying Gladue principles.

The court found that despite the accused's significant criminal record, he was at a unique point in his life with a supportive partner, a newborn daughter, and engagement with Indigenous community resources, presenting a genuine opportunity for rehabilitation through a restorative approach rather than incarceration.