Cedric Yaacov Laurent Nahum

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order of Crown wardship for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over two years.

The mother opposed the motion but filed no responding materials, while the father was noted in default.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing struggles with alcohol addiction and failure to complete recommended treatment programs.

The motion was granted, and Crown wardship was ordered with access provided to the mother on a regular basis, including attendance at cultural events.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order to allow a witness to testify via videoconference at an upcoming trial.

The witness suffered from severe back pain and had limited ability to travel or remain seated for long periods.

The court granted the motion, finding that the balance of convenience favoured videoconference testimony and that any concerns regarding cross-examination or assessing credibility could be addressed by the court's directions.

The court determined the burden of proof regarding consent in a sexual interference prosecution under section 151 of the Criminal Code where section 150.1(2.1) applies.

The accused, a 16-year-old, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The defence argued that the Crown bears the burden of disproving consent beyond a reasonable doubt, despite section 150.1 referring to consent as a "defence." The court held that section 150.1(2-2.2) operates to add consent as an element the Crown must prove, rather than imposing a burden on the accused to prove consent.

Therefore, the Crown must prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a child protection proceeding, the society sought continuation of an interim order placing three children in its temporary care and custody following apprehension.

The motion focused on the mental health condition of one parent, including psychiatric diagnoses, medication compliance concerns, and recent warnings from the treating psychiatrist indicating potential risk if the children were returned home.

The court emphasized the absence of the ordered family court clinic assessment and the uncertainty surrounding the parent's mental health stability.

Given recent concerns about medication non‑compliance and potential substance use, the court concluded that the risk to the children had not been adequately resolved.

The interim order continuing society care was granted pending the forthcoming assessment.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary court order placing the two-year-old child with the paternal grandmother.

The child had previously been residing with the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order, which included a condition that the mother not reside in their home.

The maternal grandparents breached this condition when the mother arrived in distress, leading to the child's apprehension.

The court found that the maternal grandparents had provided good care for two years and now understood the necessity of complying with the order.

The court ordered the child returned to the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order with conditions.

In a child protection proceeding, the child protection agency brought a motion to terminate the respondent mother's supervised access to a young child pending trial.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary a temporary access order under the Child and Family Services Act.

Evidence included psychological assessments, reports of problematic behaviour during supervised visits, and a lengthy period without contact between the mother and child.

The court found that the mother had engaged in conduct during access visits that posed emotional and developmental risks to the child and demonstrated an inability to comply with the conditions of supervised access.

Concluding that continued access would not be in the child’s best interests pending trial, the court suspended the mother’s access.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for an interim supervision order placing two children in the care of the respondent mother, subject to conditions.

The mother opposed a condition requiring her to consent to psychological and educational assessments for her child, who exhibited severe language delays, and opposed releasing school records.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of emotional harm due to delayed development from the mother's failure to act.

The court granted the interim supervision order and found the assessment condition reasonable and appropriate, though it removed the requirement that the mother follow all recommendations before knowing what they are.

In a child protection status review, the Society sought summary judgment for Crown wardship with access in its discretion, while the mother sought a further Society wardship order.

Applying the Hryniak summary judgment framework and the best-interests analysis under the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no issue requiring a trial on continuing need of protection, but there was a genuine issue requiring a trial on whether Crown wardship versus Society wardship was in the child's best interests.

The court emphasized the statutory permanency timeline in s. 70, but found it was still too early to foreclose rehabilitation given the parent's longstanding relationship with the child, cultural connection, and some evidence of commitment to treatment.

The request for summary judgment was therefore dismissed except for the protection finding, the application was adjourned, the existing order continued, and no costs were awarded.

In a child protection trial involving three young children, the court found the children in need of protection on grounds of actual and risk of physical harm and emotional harm arising from neglect, chronic household clutter, poor hygiene, rigid and conflictual parenting, and the caregiver’s inability to meet the children’s emotional needs.

The court accepted expert psycho-legal evidence that the children had significant attachment-related difficulties and that the caregiver’s personality structure and parenting style made meaningful change unlikely within the children’s timelines.

The court held that Crown wardship with a view to adoption was the least intrusive disposition consistent with the children’s best interests.

No access order was made, although sibling contact was expected to continue where possible.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application seeking to terminate its supervision order over a young child.

Both parents agreed to the termination but disputed the subsequent custody and access arrangement under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought primary care or joint custody with primary residence, while the father sought sole or joint custody with primary residence.

The court considered the child's best interests, noting the parents' high conflict, the father's pending deportation proceedings, and the child's positive development under the existing shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered joint legal custody with primary residence to the mother, maintaining the child's attendance at an Ontario school, and granted the mother a restraining order against the father.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat to cause death.

The offences arose from a violent attack in a restaurant washroom where the accused struck the complainant, banged her head against a wall, and threatened to kill her.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the victim, the gratuitous violence, and the offender’s significant criminal record, including prior robbery convictions, while recognizing mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth and difficult upbringing.

Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718–718.2 of the Criminal Code, the court imposed a custodial sentence of two years for assault causing bodily harm and three months concurrent for the uttering threats offence, followed by probation.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and time spent in a residential facility, and ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition were imposed.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit preliminary inquiry testimony of an independent witness who had moved to Nicaragua and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.

The defence argued the Crown failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the witness’s testimony through technological means such as videoconference under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that while efforts to obtain live testimony are a relevant factor, failure to pursue electronic testimony is not fatal to an application under s. 715.

Applying the principles in Potvin and Saleh, the judge concluded the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry and that the evidence was reliable and corroborated.

The prior testimony was therefore admitted to be read into the trial record.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

Child protection motion seeking an interim order placing three children in the care and custody of a children’s aid society under the Child and Family Services Act.

The society alleged neglect, poor hygiene, inconsistent routines, unsafe living conditions, and the use of abusive disciplinary measures.

Evidence showed the children frequently arrived late to school and that multiple support services previously offered to the mother had not been followed through.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm and that a supervision order would be insufficient.

An interim care order and a psychological or parenting assessment of the mother and children were granted.

During a criminal jury trial, defence counsel sought leave to comment in closing submissions on the Crown’s failure to call a police witness who had relevant observations regarding the complainant’s impairment.

The court held that an adverse inference against the Crown was unavailable because the officer was ultimately called as a defence witness and testified.

The proposed defence submission criticizing the Crown’s decision not to call the officer was found improper because it focused on Crown counsel personally rather than the evidence.

However, the court permitted a separate submission highlighting evidence that the officer was described as thorough and capable, as it related directly to the evidentiary record.

The ruling emphasized that counsel have broad discretion in choosing which witnesses to call and discouraged personal commentary about opposing counsel’s litigation decisions.

The Crown sought to introduce a video recording of a complainant’s participation in a photographic lineup following a robbery.

During the lineup, the complainant initially selected the wrong photograph but verbally described identifying characteristics of the robber while reviewing the sequence.

The defence objected on the basis that the video constituted inadmissible hearsay, lacked probative value due to the erroneous identification, and risked impermissible prior consistent statements.

The court held that evidence of out-of-court identification and the identification process may be admitted as original evidence, particularly where the identifying witness testifies and is subject to cross‑examination.

The video evidence was admissible because it provided the jury with the full narrative of the identification process and assisted in assessing the reliability of the witness’s observations.

A Gardiner hearing was conducted following the accused’s guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 14 to determine disputed aggravating facts relevant to sentencing.

The Crown alleged that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted the complainant over an extended period, while the accused admitted only a single incident initiated by the complainant.

Applying the principles in W(D.), the court rejected the accused’s account as implausible and unreliable.

After considering the complainant’s inconsistent prior statements and the surrounding evidence, the court accepted the essential substance of the complainant’s testimony.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted and sexually touched the complainant over many months and that he occupied a parental role toward the child.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to make a four-year-old child a permanent ward of the Crown.

The child's mother and father did not oppose the motion or present viable plans of care.

The paternal grandmother opposed the motion and presented a plan of care.

The court found that the grandmother had a long history of child protection involvement, lacked a relationship with the child, and failed to demonstrate an ability to meet the child's needs.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered that the child be made a permanent Crown ward.

Sentencing decision following conviction of two accused for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm against a young child with sickle cell anemia.

The accused inflicted repeated physical abuse including whipping with a belt, resulting in significant scarring.

The court imposed custodial sentences of 9 months for the mother and 5 months for the co-accused, finding that non-custodial sentences would be inadequate given the severity of abuse, the vulnerability of the victim, the positions of trust held by the accused, and the complete absence of remorse or insight demonstrated by either accused.