Cedric Yaacov Laurent Nahum

The court ruled on the admissibility of two purported prescriptions during a criminal trial.

The documents, introduced by defence counsel during cross-examination of a doctor's secretary, were questioned for authenticity by co-accused's counsel.

The court found that the witness's testimony, which appeared to accept the documents' representation, coupled with the difficulty of assessing her evidence without the documents, warranted their admission as numbered exhibits for a limited purpose, rejecting defence arguments for non-admission or identification-only marking.

The Crown applied under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for an order remanding the offender, R.M.P., for a dangerous offender/long-term offender assessment following his conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The court found that R.M.P. had been convicted of a serious personal injury offence.

The primary issues were whether there were reasonable grounds to believe R.M.P. might be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender, and if so, who should perform the assessment.

The court reviewed R.M.P.'s extensive criminal record, including multiple convictions for sexual assault, assault, assault with a weapon, robbery, uttering threats, and breaches of court orders, noting a pattern of escalating violent and aggressive behaviour and failure to control sexual impulses.

The court concluded there were reasonable grounds for the assessment.

The defence objected to the Crown's proposed assessor, Dr. Jonathan Gray, but the court found no cogent reason to reject him, noting his qualifications and availability.

The application was granted, and R.M.P. was remanded for a psychiatric assessment by Dr. Gray.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking extended society care for the child D.M. without access for purposes of adoption.

The motion also sought to strike the father's Answer and Plan of Care.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the caution required in child protection cases, but granted summary judgment.

The child was found in need of protection due to a history of parental substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of engagement, and was placed in extended society care without access for adoption.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of pharmacy records as business records under section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The documents in question included fax copies of prescriptions and computer-generated "prescription hard copies," some with handwritten notes.

The court found that these documents met the five prerequisite conditions for admissibility as business records: they were original entries, made contemporaneously, in the course of normal business routine, by persons under a duty to record, and without a motive to misrepresent.

The court also addressed the notice requirement under subsection 30(7), finding that sufficient notice was given or, alternatively, dispensing with the formal notice requirement.

The records were admitted into evidence.

R.M.P. was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault.

During the sentencing phase, specifically concerning a Crown application under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code for a dangerous or long-term offender assessment, defence counsel raised concerns about R.M.P.'s fitness to continue participating.

A fitness hearing was held, considering psychiatric reports and testimony.

The court applied the "limited cognitive capacity" test, which requires a rudimentary understanding of the judicial process, its consequences, and the ability to communicate with counsel.

Despite R.M.P. suffering from schizophrenia and exhibiting delusions, the court found that he met the fitness criteria, being able to follow proceedings, understand roles, and be redirected.

The defence failed to establish unfitness on a balance of probabilities, and their request for a finding of unfitness and a treatment order was dismissed.

The applicant, M.R.M., pleaded guilty to sexual contact and incest.

He sought a conditional stay of proceedings for the sexual contact charge based on the Kienapple principle and challenged the constitutionality of the five-year minimum sentence for incest under s. 155(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court granted the stay for the sexual contact charge, finding a legal nexus with the incest charge.

However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the minimum sentence for incest, determining it was not grossly disproportionate, even when considering hypothetical less severe cases.

The final sentence imposed was five years imprisonment for incest.

The accused, an Indigenous person, was found guilty after trial of driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and breaching a bail condition prohibiting him from driving.

The Crown sought six months consecutive on both counts.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of six months less one day followed by three years of probation, applying Gladue principles.

The court found that despite the accused's significant criminal record, he was at a unique point in his life with a supportive partner, a newborn daughter, and engagement with Indigenous community resources, presenting a genuine opportunity for rehabilitation through a restorative approach rather than incarceration.

The accused pleaded guilty to ten offences committed between January and April 2016, including four counts of driving while prohibited, three counts of breach of recognizance, possession of stolen property, obstruction of a peace officer, and possession of marijuana.

The accused had an extensive criminal history with prior convictions for driving while disqualified, flight from police, dangerous driving, and numerous breaches of probation.

A Gladue report was prepared and a sentencing circle was held.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with strict conditions including home confinement for the first 12 months, recognizing the accused's Aboriginal background, systemic disadvantages, and demonstrated prospect of rehabilitation through his relationship and commitment to a rehabilitation plan.

The accused was charged with two counts of breach of recognizance: failing to abide by a curfew imposed between 7:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m., and possessing and using a computer or device with access to the internet or digital network.

The Crown called one witness, the accused's neighbour, who testified she saw the accused away from his residence during curfew hours on October 6, 2017, and identified concerning Facebook posts made from the accused's account.

The defence called three witnesses, including the accused's spouse and sister, who claimed the accused had written permission to be away during curfew and that the Facebook posts were made by the spouse and sister, not the accused.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, rejecting the defence evidence as implausible and finding the accused had accessed his Facebook account in breach of his recognizance.

The Children's Aid Society initially sought summary judgment for extended care of three children but withdrew it.

The respondent mother then brought a motion for a temporary or final order placing the children in her care.

The court considered the children's best interests under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and the mother's progress since her incarceration and criminal charges.

Despite some concerns regarding contact with the father and transparency, the court found that a temporary order returning the children to the mother's care, subject to detailed conditions, was in their best interests.

The court emphasized the mother's significant improvements and the children's desire to live with her.

A bail application by a young person charged with possession of a firearm while prohibited under section 51 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and three counts of breach of a youth sentence imposed two days prior.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary ground, arguing substantial likelihood of committing a serious offence (drug trafficking).

The court found the Crown's case on the firearm charge weak, lacking direct evidence and relying on a poor-quality photograph.

The court rejected detention, finding it would improperly substitute for child protection and mental health measures, contrary to the YCJA's preference for release and its rehabilitative principles.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for a temporary order placing the child, S.M., in the temporary care and custody of the Mother, C.L., subject to supervision.

The Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer consented, while the Father, M.M., opposed.

The court found ample evidence that the Father's verbal outbursts, aggressive behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society or exercise supervised access had caused the child emotional harm.

The Father's arguments regarding the invalidity of a prior "without prejudice" order and his non-cooperation were rejected.

The motion was granted, placing the child with the Mother under Society supervision, with specific conditions for both parents, including the Father's participation in programs and a psychiatric assessment.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought release from custody pending trial.

The court assessed the proposed release plan, which included a surety (the accused's mother) and electronic monitoring, against the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under the Criminal Code.

The court found the surety to be unreliable due to past inability to control the accused and a lack of understanding regarding previous bail conditions.

The electronic monitoring was deemed insufficient given the weak surety.

The court concluded that the accused failed to demonstrate that his detention was not necessary for public protection or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the serious and violent nature of the alleged offence and the apparent strength of the prosecution's case.

Bail was denied.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa-Carleton brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child, A.J.M., was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship for adoption.

The child's mother, N.J.-L., opposed the motion, while the father, B.M., did not participate.

The court applied principles from the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure, including Hryniak v. Mauldin, in the child protection context.

The court found that A.J.M. was in need of protection due to the parents' history of instability, substance abuse, domestic violence, and inconsistent engagement with the Society and access visits.

The mother's efforts to improve her parenting skills and stabilize her life were deemed insufficient and too late.

The father demonstrated no capacity to parent.

The court granted Crown wardship for adoption, terminating both parents' access, emphasizing the child's best interests and the need for timely, permanent planning.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship of the child, V.T., without access, for the purpose of adoption.

The mother, C.A.T., sought the child's return to her care.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the mother's inability to prioritize the child's needs, lack of insight into parenting deficits, and inappropriate conduct during supervised access, including delusional thoughts and threats related to the mafia.

Despite the mother's community integration and efforts to improve her lifestyle, the court determined that the risks of returning the child were real and that a supervision order would be unworkable due to the mother's lack of cooperation with the Society.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding it to be in the child's best interests for permanent placement through adoption.

The court determined the burden of proof regarding consent in a sexual interference prosecution under section 151 of the Criminal Code where section 150.1(2.1) applies.

The accused, a 16-year-old, was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The defence argued that the Crown bears the burden of disproving consent beyond a reasonable doubt, despite section 150.1 referring to consent as a "defence." The court held that section 150.1(2-2.2) operates to add consent as an element the Crown must prove, rather than imposing a burden on the accused to prove consent.

Therefore, the Crown must prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal jury trial, defence counsel sought leave to comment in closing submissions on the Crown’s failure to call a police witness who had relevant observations regarding the complainant’s impairment.

The court held that an adverse inference against the Crown was unavailable because the officer was ultimately called as a defence witness and testified.

The proposed defence submission criticizing the Crown’s decision not to call the officer was found improper because it focused on Crown counsel personally rather than the evidence.

However, the court permitted a separate submission highlighting evidence that the officer was described as thorough and capable, as it related directly to the evidentiary record.

The ruling emphasized that counsel have broad discretion in choosing which witnesses to call and discouraged personal commentary about opposing counsel’s litigation decisions.

The Crown sought to introduce a video recording of a complainant’s participation in a photographic lineup following a robbery.

During the lineup, the complainant initially selected the wrong photograph but verbally described identifying characteristics of the robber while reviewing the sequence.

The defence objected on the basis that the video constituted inadmissible hearsay, lacked probative value due to the erroneous identification, and risked impermissible prior consistent statements.

The court held that evidence of out-of-court identification and the identification process may be admitted as original evidence, particularly where the identifying witness testifies and is subject to cross‑examination.

The video evidence was admissible because it provided the jury with the full narrative of the identification process and assisted in assessing the reliability of the witness’s observations.

Sentencing decision following conviction of two accused for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm against a young child with sickle cell anemia.

The accused inflicted repeated physical abuse including whipping with a belt, resulting in significant scarring.

The court imposed custodial sentences of 9 months for the mother and 5 months for the co-accused, finding that non-custodial sentences would be inadequate given the severity of abuse, the vulnerability of the victim, the positions of trust held by the accused, and the complete absence of remorse or insight demonstrated by either accused.