Bradley W. Miller

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The respondent sought specific performance of an asset purchase agreement for its restaurant.

At the hearing, the application judge denied specific performance but awarded restitution for unjust enrichment, despite the claim not being pleaded in the Notice of Application.

The application judge had also indicated during the hearing that he would not entertain the unpleaded restitution claim, leading the appellant to make no submissions on the issue.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment, finding that the application judge's conduct denied the appellant procedural fairness and the right to know the case it had to meet.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay an equalization payment of $353,752.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to exclude his 50% interest in a corporation from his net family property as a gift and inheritance from his late father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the husband failed to meet his evidentiary burden under section 4(3) of the Family Law Act to prove the shares were actually paid for by his father and thus capable of being gifted.

The appellant law firm appealed a motion judge's decision reducing its contingency fee from approximately $4.1 million to $3.25 million following a $14 million medical malpractice settlement.

The motion judge found the 2018 contingency fee agreement was neither fair nor reasonable under the Solicitors Act, noting the client's vulnerability and the agreement's non-compliance with regulatory requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's conclusion that the agreement was not fair at the time it was entered into, given the potential for fees to exceed the client's recovery and the failure to adequately explain the need for court approval.

The appellants, private practice oral surgeons, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of a hospital board's decision to cancel their operating room access and hospital privileges.

The board made the decision without a hearing, relying on s. 44 of the Public Hospitals Act, which allows a hospital to revoke privileges when ceasing to provide a service.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the board's interpretation of s. 44 was reasonable, that the termination of the specific operating room access constituted ceasing a 'service', and that the board was not required to hold a hearing or consider the appellants' affidavits.

The appellant, who suffered from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for attempted murder after a vicious, unprovoked attack on his neighbour.

The trial judge subsequently designated the appellant a high-risk accused (HRA) under ss. 672.64(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied the wrong legal standards and that the findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinct risk thresholds under the two subsections and finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of grave harm.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

Appeal from dismissal of breach of contract claim for attendant care services.

The appellant alleged an oral agreement modifying a fixed-rate compensation arrangement, claiming a balance owing of over $576,000.

The trial judge found no documentary evidence of the oral agreement, ruled certain evidence inadmissible, and found invoices and timesheets to be exaggerated or fabricated.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

Following the release of the Court's decision on the appeal, submissions were received regarding the apportionment of costs.

The Court fixed costs of the appeal payable to the Receiver, the respondent 100 Ontario Inc., and the respondent Issam A. Saad, each in the amount of $15,000.

The appellant, a 58-year-old family friend, was convicted of sexually assaulting the 17-year-old daughter of his close friend and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, applying the W.(D.) principles, and finding a lack of consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year term was not demonstrably unfit given the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the adolescent victim, and the severe impact of the offences.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order requiring them to pay $285,000 in damages to the respondents for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The parties had entered into an agreement for the respondents to purchase a parcel of land, conditional on the appellants obtaining municipal approval for a condominium conversion within two years.

When approval was not obtained, the respondents sued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in concluding the appellants breached their duty of good faith.

The Court also held the motion judge erred in applying unjust enrichment where a contract governed the relationship, and failed to provide sufficient reasons for dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

A new trial was ordered.

The moving parties sought to quash the responding party's appeal of an order validating service of an application record.

The responding party, a foreign state, argued the order was final because it determined substantive rights regarding state sovereignty and the Hague Convention.

The Court of Appeal held that the order validating service was procedural and interlocutory, as it did not finally dispose of the dispute or deprive the responding party of substantive defences.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant was acquitted of possession of proceeds of crime after over $1.2 million in cash was excluded from his criminal trial under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown subsequently applied for forfeiture of the cash under s. 490(9) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, admitted the evidence, and ordered forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant argued that his acquittal created an issue estoppel preventing the trial judge from finding his possession was unlawful or conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the acquittal did not logically necessitate a finding of lawful possession, and that a s. 24(2) analysis in a forfeiture proceeding involves different considerations than in a criminal trial.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought leave to appeal a $50,000 costs award.

The appellant had made threats to communicate damaging information to the respondent's clients and the Ministry of Transportation if unpaid wage claims were not satisfied.

The motion judge found that the appellant's communications were fundamentally about his employment dispute rather than matters of public interest, and that the respondent would easily prove the statements were false and harmful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis under s. 137.1(3) or s. 137.1(4)(b), and affirmed the costs award.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 76 months for sexual exploitation, making child pornography, and voyeurism involving a 17-year-old complainant and multiple other victims secretly recorded in his home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by imposing a consecutive sentence for child pornography, treating elements of the offences as aggravating factors, and providing insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the overall sentence fit under the totality principle and noting the trial judge's discretionary decisions were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global sentence of eight years for sexual offences against three adolescent women.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of each complainant as similar fact evidence across counts, specifically regarding the finding that accidental tainting had not occurred.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis, noting that the core allegations differed meaningfully and could not be the product of accidental tainting.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year global sentence was fit given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the victims.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal of a stay order granted under section 9 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, arguing that the stay order was temporary and therefore interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that a stay order under section 9 of the ICAA is generally final in nature for purposes of determining the proper appeal route, as it effectively ends the action before the court.

The court rejected arguments that the stay was temporary merely because the arbitral tribunal might decline jurisdiction, and clarified that statements in cost submissions and the motion judge's characterization of the order do not alter its legal nature for appeal purposes.