Bradley W. Miller

The appellants, majority shareholders of Golden Ocean Investment Corporation, appealed the dismissal of their challenge to the validity and enforceability of two mortgages on property owned by the corporation.

The mortgages were authorized by the minority shareholder and sole director, Mr. Huang.

The appellants alleged the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances and that they had been defrauded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the mortgagees were bona fide purchasers for value with no notice of fraud, that Mr. Huang had both ostensible and actual authority to enter into the mortgages, and that there was consideration for the third mortgage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the second mortgagee respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant suffered a catastrophic spinal cord injury in a cycling accident on a dirt path adjacent to Stone Church Road in Hamilton.

The City brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal under s. 44(8) of the Municipal Act, 2001, which exempts municipalities from liability for damages caused by construction, obstruction, or erection on untravelled portions of highways.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the accident occurred on an untravelled portion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the wrong legal test.

The correct test requires determining whether the portion of highway was commonly and habitually used by the public for travel, not whether such use was reasonably foreseeable.

The court found the dirt path was commonly and regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists and therefore constituted a travelled portion of the highway, placing it outside the statutory exemption.

An appeal from a trial judge's order setting aside a separation agreement under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act and section 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The trial judge had set aside the agreement in its entirety and recalculated spousal support.

The appellate court found that while the trial judge erred in setting aside the entire agreement under section 56(4), the spousal support terms did not comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act under the Miglin analysis.

The court allowed the appeal in part, maintaining the separation agreement but modifying the spousal support provisions to remove the cohabitation clause and make support indefinite, while preserving the original quantum of $28,800 annually.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with an extensive history of child sexual offences, appealed his sentence of 20 months imposed for breaching a long-term supervision order and prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The breach occurred when he attended a religious service in a church in the presence of numerous children, merely 30 days after being released to a community correctional centre.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) entitlement to sentence credit for the period between suspension of his long-term supervision order and the laying of charges; (2) the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit at a ratio of 1:1.3 instead of 1:1.5 and the denial of a Duncan credit; and (3) that the sentence was imposed to ensure federal detention for treatment purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence fit and imposed without error.

Binance Holdings Limited appealed orders from the Divisional Court and Ontario Securities Commission regarding an investigation into Binance's operations in Ontario.

The Commission had issued a summons demanding production of documents and communications relating to alleged violations of the Securities Act.

Binance challenged the summons as unconstitutionally overbroad under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the Divisional Court erred in declining to judicially review the Charter arguments and that the summons was an unreasonable seizure because it lacked a reasonable foundation to believe the demanded documents were relevant to the investigation.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellant appealed his guilty pleas to operation of a vehicle while disqualified and obstruction of an officer, as well as his sentence of 18 months in custody.

The appellant sought to strike his plea on the basis that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for allowing the conviction appeal, noting that the appellant acknowledged understanding the Crown's position and the consequences during the plea inquiry, and provided no fresh evidence to support his claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, given the appellant's twenty prior similar convictions.

The conviction appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal the sentence was allowed but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale with a court-appointed receiver to purchase real estate.

The receiver brought a motion for approval and vesting.

However, late-breaking offers emerged, including one 37% higher than the appellant's offer.

The motion judge declined to approve the sale and instead ordered a six-day extension of the bidding process.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge misapplied the principles from Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly exercised discretion in reopening the auction process given the magnitude of the late offer and the receiver's alternative recommendation.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by the Attorney General of Canada from a certification order of a class action brought by immigration detainees.

Between May 2016 and July 2023, the Canada Border Services Agency placed approximately 8,360 immigration detainees in provincial and territorial prisons instead of Immigration Holding Centers.

The respondents challenged this practice as violating sections 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and as constituting negligence.

The motion judge certified the class action, finding that the Charter and negligence claims disclosed reasonable causes of action and that common issues existed.

The appellate court upheld the certification, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motion judge's analysis.

The appellants commenced an action against the respondent, a personal injury lawyer, for damages arising from the non-payment of referral fees allegedly owed under an oral contract spanning 1984 to 2018.

The appellants claimed entitlement to 10% of gross settlements or awards on over 130 referred lawsuits.

The respondent denied the existence of any contract and brought a summary judgment motion relying on denial of contract, alleged illegality, and limitation defences.

The motion judge found genuine issues requiring trial regarding contract existence and legality but granted partial summary judgment on limitation grounds, dismissing claims for lawsuits settling before December 10, 2017.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in characterizing the contract and in failing to recognize that the cause of action did not arise until the relationship ended in 2018.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly determined that the cause of action accrued when each referred lawsuit settled and payment was not made, regardless of whether the full extent of damages was known.

The appellant was convicted of one count of sexual assault, three counts of assault, and one count of uttering threats against his common law spouse.

He was acquitted of one count of assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred by artificially compartmentalizing the complainant's testimony and by relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to bolster her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to assessing credibility and the weight of evidence.

The Crown appealed acquittals on firearms charges following a Charter breach finding.

Police executed a general warrant to seize a cellular device associated with a specific phone number during a murder investigation.

The respondent was a victim/witness to the murder.

During execution, police seized three phones and discovered firearms in a hidden door compartment.

The application judge found the search exceeded the warrant's scope, violating s. 8 of the Charter, and excluded the firearms under s. 24(2).

The majority (Miller and Wilson JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding no s. 8 violation and that the firearms should be admitted.

Pomerance J.A. dissented, agreeing with the application judge that the police exceeded the warrant's terms and that exclusion was appropriate.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their contempt motion against the respondents for breach of a 2012 judgment.

The 2012 judgment had found that the respondents interfered with water drainage from the appellants' property by damaging a drainage pipe, changing the slope of their driveway, and installing a rubber dam.

The respondents were ordered to restore the flow of water within three months.

The motion judge dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the respondents had complied by replacing the damaged pipe.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge misinterpreted the 2012 judgment, misapprehended the expert evidence, and misapplied the test for civil contempt.

The court ordered the respondents to implement the necessary steps to restore water flow as recommended by the appellants' expert, including installation of two 250mm diameter pipes and removal of the rubber dam.

The applicant corporation sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal of a trial judgment dated June 27, 2025.

The non-lawyer representative sought leave to represent the corporation pursuant to Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge refused leave to represent the corporation, finding that the representative had repeatedly filed factums containing fabricated legal citations, non-existent cases, miscited authorities, false statutory provisions, and fabricated quotations.

The court held that while access to justice is a relevant consideration, the integrity of the justice system and the undue burden imposed on opposing counsel and the court outweighed such considerations.

The motion for extension of time was adjourned, and the corporation was directed to appoint a lawyer within 30 days or face dismissal of both the motion and the appeal.

Appeal from a trial decision addressing all issues arising from the separation of the parties, including parenting arrangements, imputation of income, child support (including section 7 expenses and retroactivity), spousal support, the validity of a marriage contract, and equalization.

The appellant father challenged nearly every aspect of the trial judgment, alleging 42 errors.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's findings on parenting arrangements, income imputation, section 7 expenses, spousal support, and the validity of the marriage contract, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The motion for fresh evidence was dismissed, as was the appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a bar manager, was convicted of sexual assault and voyeurism after sexually assaulting a female employee in the bar basement while intentionally having the incident recorded by a security camera.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the trial judge over-relied on the complainant's demeanor when assessing credibility; (2) the trial judge misapplied the adopted admissions rule by relying on text messages between the appellant and his co-accused; and (3) the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for repayment of money transferred to the respondents over a period of years.

The appellants alleged the transfers were loans and investments, including a $100,000 investment in real estate that appreciated significantly.

The respondents contended the transfers were payments for room and board and other expenses for the appellants' daughter.

The trial judge dismissed all claims and ordered costs against the appellants.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's treatment of evidence, her dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, or her application of the Limitations Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in the death of his former girlfriend and the 18-year parole ineligibility period imposed at his second trial.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on hearsay regarding statements by the appellant's deceased mother and that the trial judge erred in imposing the 18-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions and determining that the 18-year period was a fit sentence given the horrific nature of the crime, the appellant's high moral culpability, and the absence of remorse.

This is the third appeal brought by the respondent in a family law proceeding concerning equalization payments and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The appellant sought to appeal an order of eviction from the matrimonial home and a power of sale granted by the trial judge due to the appellant's intransigence in the sale process.

The appellant also appealed a costs award of $36,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the eviction and power of sale order as an abuse of process, noting it was an attempt to circumvent two previous appeals that had been dismissed for delay.

The appeal was also found to be moot as the matrimonial home had already been sold.

The costs appeal was dismissed as the trial judge committed no reviewable error in awarding substantial indemnity costs based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct.

An appeal concerning the correct appellate jurisdiction and the discretionary transfer of an appeal.

The parties had a divorce order made in Texas that included parenting terms.

The Ontario Court of Justice found jurisdiction to address parenting issues.

The mother appealed to the Superior Court of Justice, which dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding that the appeal properly lay to the Court of Appeal for Ontario under section 73(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The mother requested a transfer to the Court of Appeal late in oral submissions, which the Superior Court judge declined.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Superior Court judge's characterization of the order and her discretionary decision not to transfer.