Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed a conviction for dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm arising from a collision with an electric scooter rider on a residential street.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence concerning his emotional state, improperly relied on demeanour evidence, and erred in rejecting his position that the incident reflected only a momentary lapse of attention.

The court held that the characterization of the appellant's emotional condition was supported by the record, that any demeanour-based inference was invited by defence counsel, and that the trial judge committed no reversible error in treating the conduct as a marked departure from the reasonable standard of care.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

A payment processing company appealed sanctions imposed after it was found in civil contempt for repeatedly obstructing a court-ordered audit obtained by mandatory injunction under a commercial services agreement.

The appellant argued the penalties were disproportionate, challenged the direction to pay audit costs into court, and sought leave to appeal the contempt-motion costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding the arguments depended on unappealed factual findings that the appellant intentionally obstructed the audit and that no basis existed to interfere with the sanctions or the costs order.

The court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that r. 60.11(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is not confined to cases where the officer or director has already been found personally in contempt, and remitted the issue of joint and several liability of the sole officer and director for redetermination.

Following a successful appeal in which the appellants were awarded a 50% interest in a residential property, the court addressed trial costs.

The appellants sought approximately $155,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the result beat their offer to settle.

The court declined, finding the result did not beat the offer because the appellants were awarded 50% ownership rather than 50% of the equity, with the equity value remaining to be determined on a subsequent accounting.

Trial costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $70,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his action against the respondents on the basis that he was an undischarged bankrupt at the relevant time and thus lacked capacity to commence it.

The appellant argued the trustee in bankruptcy had implicitly assigned him authority to commence the action by permitting him to manage the property under s. 30(1)(l) of the BIA.

The Court of Appeal held the motion judge committed no palpable and overriding error in finding that no express assignment had been made, as the trustee was unaware of both the fire damage and the action.

The court further held the appellant's claim for general damages for loss of enjoyment and use of the property was proprietary rather than personal in nature, and therefore vested in the trustee.

Appeal dismissed with no costs order given the respondents' non-participation.

Following the dismissal of the appeal (2026 ONCA 3), the court addressed costs.

Having considered the written submissions and costs outlines of both parties, the court fixed all-inclusive costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondents in the amount of $37,000.

The moving party sought panel review under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of two single-judge decisions: a refusal to extend time to perfect an appeal of a judgment rejecting allegations of undue influence in an estate matter, and a full indemnity costs award of $16,492.35.

The panel found no error in the refusal to extend time, noting the long unexplained delay, prejudice to the estate, and lack of merit in the proposed appeal.

However, the panel found the motion judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs, as there was no evidence of especially egregious misconduct warranting enhanced costs on appeal, and substituted partial indemnity costs of $9,400.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that dismissed its copyright claim under s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act over competing software secretly developed by a former employee.

The trial judge found the software was not created "in the course of employment" because the employee's actual responsibilities were limited to developing the employer's existing software, he was not directed to create new products, and the employer did not expend resources on the competing software's development.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the proper test under s. 13(3) focuses on the employee's actual assigned responsibilities, not the class of work the employer could have directed, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering repayment of funds advanced by the respondent and dismissing the appellants' counterclaim for defamation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's grant of summary judgment on the loan claim, his rejection of the non est factum defence, or his dismissal of the defamation counterclaim.

However, the court found that the issue of reverse corporate veil piercing to impose liability on the corporate appellants was not properly before the motion judge and may not have been fairly argued.

The appeal was allowed in part: the judgment against the corporate appellants was set aside and remitted for redetermination, but dismissed in all other respects.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's order requiring her to post $50,000 in security for costs of her appeal.

The panel found no error in principle, unreasonable result, legal error, or misapprehension of material evidence in the motion judge's decision.

The motion judge had considered 11 outstanding costs orders totalling over $146,000, the moving party's lack of diligence in perfecting her appeal, and the prejudice to the estate beneficiaries.

The panel declined to consider new affidavit evidence filed after the motion judge's decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs of $10,000 payable to the responding party.

The appellant sought to set aside a default judgment entered seven years earlier after her pleadings were struck for non-compliance with a costs order imposed as a condition of an adjournment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not brought promptly or pursued diligently and disbelieving the explanation offered.

On appeal, the court found no error in the motion judge's application of the test under Rule 19.08 for setting aside a default judgment, including findings of prejudice and tarnishing of the administration of justice.

In a conviction appeal, the appellant sought production of a post-Hason Crown communication, plus a list of cases reviewed by the prosecution service concerning a forensic psychiatric expert and reasons for selection.

The court applied the two-step appellate production framework requiring a reasonable possibility the materials could assist a fresh-evidence motion and a reasonable possibility of eventual admissibility as fresh evidence.

It held the request was speculative, case-specific concerns from prior proceedings did not establish relevance in this record, and the requested internal review rationale was privileged.

The court further held that any standalone direction, divorced from justification, would not satisfy the relevance threshold.

The production motion was dismissed.

The appeal arose from a dispute over whether a substantial contribution to a home purchase created a beneficial ownership interest under resulting trust principles.

The majority held the trial judge made a legal error by disregarding key third-party evidence probative of the transferor’s objective intention and allowed the appeal.

The court declared the appellants entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in the property, set aside the judgment and costs below, and remitted related sale and accounting remedies for case management.

A dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible legal or factual error and concluding the transfer was supported by consideration.

The appellant challenged an annual Review Board disposition that maintained a conditional discharge based on a finding of significant threat to public safety.

On appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the court admitted post-hearing psychiatric evidence showing medication discontinuation without decompensation, a revised diagnosis, and a materially lower structured risk assessment.

Applying the interests of justice framework for fresh evidence in NCRMD appeals, the court held the new record required allowing the appeal.

The court found remittal unnecessary because an absolute discharge was the only reasonable disposition on the updated evidence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted robbery arising from a carjacking spree and was sentenced to 2.5 years' incarceration.

He appealed on two grounds: that the sentencing judge erred in treating denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for a youthful first-time offender, and that the sentencing judge failed to account for collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found that despite a misstatement of the law, the sentencing judge did not overemphasize denunciation and deterrence, as evidenced by a below-range sentence.

The court also held that immigration consequences could not be avoided without imposing an unfit sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought review of a motion judge's order dismissing her request for an extension of time to cross-appeal a Divisional Court decision that had upheld the Law Society of Ontario's invalidation of her barrister examination result as procedurally fair and reasonable.

The moving party had been among candidates whose exam results were voided following an investigation into widespread cheating.

The panel held that the motion judge made no error in finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the procedural protections sought were ancillary to a right to a hearing that this court had previously held was not required, and candidates receiving a lesser sanction could not be accorded greater procedural fairness than those who faced more serious sanctions.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The garnishee appealed an order requiring it to pay $154,257.05 to the respondent creditor pursuant to r. 60.08(17) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge found that a registered mortgage between the garnishee and the judgment debtor constituted evidence of a legitimate debt and rejected the garnishee's sole director's testimony that the mortgage was a sham, on credibility grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's credibility findings or factual conclusions and held that the equitable and discretionary nature of garnishment does not constitute an independent basis to find a debt where none exists.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, break and enter, and two counts of threatening to use a weapon, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed trial counsel usurped his right to elect the mode of trial and his right to testify.

The Court of Appeal rejected the election claim, finding the appellant had not established the factual foundation and had not shown a reasonable probability he would have elected differently.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the right-to-testify ground, finding trial counsel failed to make clear that the decision to testify was the appellant's to make, failed to obtain written instructions, and that the police interview was not a functional equivalent of in-court testimony.

A new trial by judge and jury was ordered.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of a Superior Court order confirming an assessment officer's certificate.

The assessment officer had reduced the responding parties' legal accounts, resulting in a further payment of $25,546.14 required from the moving parties.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal route for a solicitor and client costs assessment is determined by the amount of the single payment ordered by the Superior Court judge.

Because the single payment ordered was less than $50,000, the appeal lay to the Divisional Court.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that a 2006 Transfer/Deed and Direction did not have testamentary effect, and sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant acknowledged the documents did not comply with the requirements of a valid will under the Succession Law Reform Act and could not identify a legal basis for their validity.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied as no reviewable error was identified in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.