Bradley W. Miller

The corporate appellant defaulted on a Canada Small Business Financing Loan and the individual appellant was found liable as guarantor on a summary judgment motion.

On appeal, the appellants argued the action was statute-barred, improperly served, procedurally unfair, and that the bank breached obligations by not disbursing the full loan amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors by the motion judge in concluding the loan was in default, the guarantee was enforceable, and the bank owed no duty of care to disburse the full amount.

The appellant challenged a jury conviction for sexual interference on the basis that the trial judge wrongly admitted a young child's hearsay statement under the principled exception and permitted the jury to use it as similar fact evidence across counts.

The court held that the trial judge failed to identify and analyze key hearsay dangers, including the risk of maternal misinterpretation of non-verbal gestures and the risk that the statement was shaped by leading and suggestive questioning.

Applying the threshold reliability framework, the court concluded contemporaneous cross-examination could have materially assisted the truth-seeking process and that reliability was not sufficiently established.

Because the impugned statement may have influenced the conviction on the surviving count, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

She argued the Board failed to adequately consider her proposal for a conditional discharge that included a 'Young clause' and treatment compliance conditions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board must meaningfully consider whether the proposed conditions could practically and effectively address the risk to the public, and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant property developer sued the respondent municipal councillor for defamation after she made a police complaint about him following an altercation.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action lacked substantial merit as the mere making of a police complaint that is closed without charges does not constitute defamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and making and distributing child sexual abuse and exploitation material involving a 14-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions and his four-and-a-half-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying a stay of proceedings for egregious Crown misconduct, finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach, instructing the jury on prior inconsistent statements, and not leaving the private use exemption defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the global sentence was fit and the 18-month reduction for the s. 7 Charter breach was an appropriate remedy.

The parties separated in 2015, and the appellant commenced an application seeking an equalization payment.

After nine years and multiple court orders, the appellant failed to provide complete financial disclosure regarding his bank accounts and alleged business interests.

The motion judge found the non-compliance egregious and struck the appellant's application under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge failed to consider the relevance of the undisclosed documents, the disclosure already made, and alternative remedies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly applied the framework for assessing non-disclosure and reasonably concluded that the appellant's failure to disclose made it fundamentally unfair to expect the respondent to defend the equalization claim.

The appellant tenant appealed the dismissal of its application to restrain the respondent landlord from terminating its commercial lease.

The landlord relied on a 30-day termination clause from a 1998 amending agreement.

The tenant argued that subsequent amending agreements, which included a six-month termination clause conditional on redevelopment, indicated the 30-day clause was confined to the 1998 extension term.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by failing to address this key argument regarding contractual interpretation.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment holding it jointly liable with a related corporation for wrongful dismissal under the common employer doctrine.

The court held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, made findings available on the record, and committed no palpable and overriding error in concluding that both corporations jointly ran the hotel and intended to create an employment relationship with the deceased employee.

The court also upheld the conclusion that res judicata and abuse of process did not bar the estate's subsequent claim against the appellant, because the appellant was not a defendant in the initial action and the corporate relationship was not easily discernable.

The appeal was dismissed with partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The appellant challenged an indeterminate sentence imposed after a dangerous offender designation, arguing that his risk could be managed in the community through a fixed custodial term followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge made no error in finding that the appellant’s violent risk was driven by multiple factors, including personality pathology not meaningfully amenable to medication.

The psychiatric evidence established high risk, chronic non-compliance with treatment and supervision, and an absence of insight or motivation to change.

The court concluded that the conditions necessary to control the risk could only be achieved in custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged a conditional discharge from bankruptcy requiring him to satisfy several conditions, including payment of approximately $13.6 million into the bankruptcy estate.

He argued that the monetary condition was improper because there was no evidence he could fulfill it and also challenged the remaining terms of discharge.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge made no error in principle, that the monetary condition fell within the court's discretionary authority under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and that the conditions were justified on the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the trustee.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge's exchanges with defence counsel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the established bias test and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden required to rebut it.

Although the trial judge's comments to defence counsel were found to be inappropriate and short-tempered, they arose in the context of counsel's repeated improper questioning, including myth-based reasoning and impermissible use of prior sexual history evidence.

Viewed realistically and practically, the exchanges did not demonstrate that the trial judge was predisposed to one side.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence in an estate action.

The motion judge struck the pleading after finding the appellants deliberately breached a court order requiring them to produce passwords for business email accounts and prohibiting the deletion of emails.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Falcon Lumber test and concluding that striking the defence was an appropriate sanction for the appellants' repeated and continuous failure to provide transparent disclosure of estate business documents.

The Township of Clearview brought a motion for a stay pending appeal of an order requiring it to immediately issue a fill permit to the respondents.

The respondents had sought to build a noise and privacy berm on their property adjacent to an unregulated aerodrome.

The application judge had found the Township's requirement to verify obstacle limitation surfaces was ultra vires.

On the motion for a stay, the Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding that the appeal raised a serious question, the Township would suffer irreparable harm as the appeal would become moot if the permit issued, and the balance of convenience favoured the Township.

The motion for a stay was granted and the appeal expedited.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and in applying delayed reporting principles to physical assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent after an initial refusal, and made no error in assessing the complainant's credibility regarding her delayed reporting.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm, driving, and drug trafficking offences, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of a key witness who had a motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not explicitly address the witness's motive to lie, the reasons demonstrated an awareness of the evidence's frailties.

Furthermore, the witness's testimony was corroborated by significant independent evidence, including the complainant's testimony, video surveillance, and text messages.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition.

The charges arose from an altercation outside a bar where a handgun fell to the ground, which the trial judge concluded had fallen from the appellant's satchel based on circumstantial and video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed the restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders imposed following his conviction for five counts of fraud over $5,000.

He argued the orders were unfair and based on a misinterpretation of the fraud amount.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant did not contest the restitution order at sentencing and the preconditions for the fine in lieu of forfeiture were met.

The three-year sentence in default of payment was the statutory minimum.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to four years in custody.

On sentence appeal, he argued that the sentencing judge improperly treated his lack of remorse as an aggravating factor related to his decision to appeal rather than plead guilty, incorrectly relied on a case involving a younger victim, and unfairly considered his failure to participate in programs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error.

The sentencing judge expressly stated he did not treat the absence of a guilty plea as aggravating; lack of remorse was properly considered with respect to future rehabilitative prospects.

The four-year sentence falls squarely within the established three-to-five-year range for penetrative sexual assaults and appropriately reflects the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the serious aggravating factors, including a decades-long criminal record involving violence against women.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.