William W. N. Fawcett

The appellants appealed the application judge's finding of a prescriptive easement over portions of their property in favour of the respondents' neighbouring property.

The appellants argued that the application judge misapprehended evidence regarding whether the gravel driveway remained unchanged over the relevant period and reversed the onus of proof.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the application judge's reliance on aerial photographs and witness testimony was open to her and that she did not reverse the burden of proof on the prescriptive easement claim.

Appeal dismissed with costs of $10,000 to the respondents.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that dismissed its copyright claim under s. 13(3) of the Copyright Act over competing software secretly developed by a former employee.

The trial judge found the software was not created "in the course of employment" because the employee's actual responsibilities were limited to developing the employer's existing software, he was not directed to create new products, and the employer did not expend resources on the competing software's development.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the proper test under s. 13(3) focuses on the employee's actual assigned responsibilities, not the class of work the employer could have directed, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

This is a costs decision following an application for property rights over portions of the respondents' property.

The applicants sought either ownership by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over a driveway area and a gravel parking and lawn area.

The applicants were substantially successful, obtaining an easement of vehicular ingress and egress over the driveway area and an order requiring the respondents to remove obstructing items.

However, the applicants' claim for adverse possession of the parking and lawn area was dismissed.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicants in the amount of $36,000.00, all inclusive, finding that while the respondents' conduct was un-neighbourly and antagonistic, it did not rise to the level of reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous behaviour warranting substantial indemnity costs.

This property dispute concerned whether the applicants had gained rights over parts of their neighbours’ land used for a shared driveway and a parking and lawn area.

The court rejected the claim for adverse possession of both the driveway strip and the parking and lawn area because the evidence did not show actual possession, an intention to exclude the true owner, or effective exclusion for the required period.

However, the court found that the applicants and their predecessors had openly, continuously, and without permission used the encroaching portion of the driveway since at least 1977, establishing a prescriptive easement for vehicular access.

The court declared the easement, ordered the respondents not to obstruct it, and required removal of items interfering with its use.

This decision addresses whether software developed by an employee (Vladimir Krougly) while employed at Nexus Solutions Inc. was created in the course of employment, such that Nexus would own the copyright in the software (Limedas) later commercialized by Limesoft Inc. The court finds that although Krougly was the author of the software, it was not created in the course of his employment with Nexus, and thus Nexus is not entitled to a proprietary remedy under copyright law.

The court reviews the factual background, credibility of witnesses, expert evidence, and the legal framework for copyright ownership in the employment context.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay and to extend the time to perfect his appeal.

The original action had been dismissed by summary judgment due to the expiry of a limitation period.

The Court of Appeal, applying the four-factor test for extending time, found the appellant's delay lengthy and inadequately explained, and critically, determined that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion judge's finding on the limitation period was deemed a finding of mixed fact and law, reviewable only for palpable and overriding error, which was not present.

Consequently, the motion was denied.

The applicant maternal grandmother moved to amend a previous costs order of $85,000 against the respondent father, seeking to apportion 50 percent of the costs to child support.

The father had declared bankruptcy, and costs attributed to child support survive bankruptcy.

The court found it had jurisdiction to apportion costs retroactively.

However, because child support was resolved by consent before trial and was not a contested issue, the court declined to apportion 50 percent as requested.

Instead, considering the time spent and complexity, the court apportioned 10 percent of the costs to child support.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment regarding three commercial loans to the defendants.

The defendants argued that the loan restructuring agreement was unauthorized, signed under duress, and that potential insurance coverage precluded judgment.

The court rejected these defences, finding that the corporate defendant's director had ostensible authority, there was no illegitimate pressure amounting to duress, and no evidence of relevant insurance existed.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the full amount of the debts.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Desotti J. dated July 30, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As agreed by the parties, costs were awarded to the responding party in the amount of $2,200.