Julie A. Zamprogna Balles

Appeal under s. 80 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a health practitioner's finding that the appellant was incapable with respect to proposed treatment in the classes of antipsychotic medications, mood stabilizers, and anxiolytics.

The appellant argued the Board erred by accepting a seven-day gap between the psychiatrist's last capacity assessment and the hearing, misapprehending a social worker's note as a clinical assessment, and failing to carefully weigh hearsay.

The court found the Board applied the correct legal test from Starson, acknowledged the presumption of capacity and onus on the health practitioner, and reasonably concluded that incapacity persisted as of the hearing date based on enduring lack of insight and corroborative clinical entries.

Appeal dismissed and Board's decision confirmed.

The appellant challenged an annual Review Board disposition that maintained a conditional discharge based on a finding of significant threat to public safety.

On appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the court admitted post-hearing psychiatric evidence showing medication discontinuation without decompensation, a revised diagnosis, and a materially lower structured risk assessment.

Applying the interests of justice framework for fresh evidence in NCRMD appeals, the court held the new record required allowing the appeal.

The court found remittal unnecessary because an absolute discharge was the only reasonable disposition on the updated evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission, community treatment order, and incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not assessing incapacity in the context of informed consent and by making a blanket finding of incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable.

The court held that the appellant's delusions rendered him unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision, and that the finding of incapacity was properly related to a specific treatment and time.