Mark Anthony Veneziano

Following a successful medical negligence trial, the plaintiffs sought costs after achieving complete success on liability and damages of $190,000.

The plaintiffs had made a Rule 49 offer of $150,000 inclusive of prejudgment interest prior to trial and argued that the judgment exceeded the offer by 31%, entitling them to substantial indemnity costs from the offer date.

The defendant argued the claimed costs were disproportionate to the damages and that agreeing to damages prior to trial prevented a determination that the offer had been beaten.

The court found the plaintiffs had repeatedly attempted settlement and that the defendant displayed intransigence in proceeding to trial despite the standing offer.

Applying the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court awarded the plaintiffs their full claimed costs and disbursements.

A physician plaintiff sued another physician and related institutions for negligence and false imprisonment after being involuntarily detained for psychiatric assessment under a Form 1 pursuant to the Mental Health Act.

The court held that the defendant physician breached the standard of care by failing to conduct a proper personal examination and by relying on unreliable third‑party information before completing the Form 1.

The improper completion of the Form 1 meant the resulting detention was unauthorized and constituted false imprisonment.

The plaintiff established compensable psychiatric injury and economic loss caused by the negligent and unlawful detention.

The court awarded general damages and reduced income loss but denied punitive damages and prevented double recovery between the negligence and false imprisonment claims.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement reflected in minutes of settlement.

They argued that a term requiring execution of a release satisfactory to all parties made the settlement conditional, ambiguous, and unenforceable.

The court rejected those submissions, holding that the motion judge found the parties had agreed to the form of release and that finding was not challenged.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondents.

The moving parties, two of several defendants, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction restraining them from using confidential information and competing with the plaintiff.

The motions judge had found a strong prima facie case that the former president breached his fiduciary duty and that the moving parties were impressed with the same duty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision and no conflicting decision that would warrant granting leave.

Following reasons granting an interlocutory injunction in a dispute involving alleged breach of fiduciary duties and misuse of confidential information, the court addressed disagreements over the form of the order and costs.

The plaintiff sought additional wording expanding the scope of entities and confidential technology referenced in the injunction, which the court refused because the relief had not been sought in the motion record or oral submissions.

The court required that the original wording of the injunction regarding preservation of confidential information be maintained.

A stay of the data‑imaging paragraph was granted for two defendants pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

Costs of the interlocutory injunction motion were ordered to be in the cause.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against former key employees and contractors who started a competing business.

The plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence.

The court found that the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and duties of confidence by using the plaintiff's confidential information and business opportunities.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction for six months, finding that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding spray foam insulation services.

The appellant argued that its defence of equitable set-off required the entire matter to proceed to trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's factual distinction between the types of services provided, noting that the attic insulation and related set-off claims would still proceed to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

Insurers disputed responsibility for satisfying a tort judgment arising from a fatal apartment fire.

One insurer had paid the balance of the judgment after the other insurer exhausted its primary policy limits and refused to contribute further pending resolution of a priority dispute.

The court held that liability of the building owner and property manager—treated as a single defendant in the underlying tort action—should be apportioned equally between them for indemnity purposes.

Applying principles analogous to Aetna Insurance Co. v. Canadian Surety Co. and restitutionary doctrines, the court concluded the paying insurer had overpaid and was entitled to reimbursement.

Judgment was granted requiring the responding insurer to reimburse the excess amount.

The respondents brought a motion to transfer a Commercial List application from Toronto to Kitchener.

The underlying dispute involved two shareholders disagreeing over the implementation of a Transition Agreement and the proposed removal of one shareholder as a director.

The court applied a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the applicant resided and worked in Toronto, and that the Commercial List could accommodate the scheduling, the court concluded the respondents failed to demonstrate that Kitchener was a more desirable venue.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the applicants.

The City of Toronto sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion to quash a summons to examine a city councillor.

The underlying applications challenged a municipal by-law removing a licensing exemption for airport taxis, alleging bad faith.

The City argued that the intention of a legislative body cannot be established through the examination of a single councillor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision that the councillor's statements had an institutional quality that might reflect the intention of City Council.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a Master's decision ordering them to answer certain discovery questions.

The plaintiff, a former CEO of Symcor, claimed a 10% equity interest based on his employment agreement.

The defendants argued the agreement was unenforceable.

During discovery, the defendants refused to answer questions regarding the drafting of a subsequent shareholders' agreement, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The Master ordered the questions answered, finding no privilege or that privilege was waived.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal for Symcor regarding certain questions, finding good reason to doubt the Master's decision on privilege, but denied leave for the Banks and other questions.

The appellant company sought payment of a $5 million key-man life insurance policy following the death of its principal from colon cancer.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the deceased materially misrepresented his medical history at the time of application and failed to disclose a change in insurability before the policy was delivered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the failure to disclose relevant medical information rendered the policy voidable by the insurer under section 183 of the Insurance Act.

The appellant mortgagee appealed an order staying its action against one corporate respondent after a foreclosure action had been converted to one for judicial sale.

The court held that the consent order arising from the negotiations was clear and unequivocal, and did not result from mistaken intentions or a failure to reflect the parties' agreement.

The appellant knew it had to choose which defendant would be the subject of judgment and that consequences flowed from that choice.

By signing judgment against another defendant, the appellant's right to recover against the respondent corporation was terminated by s. 20(3) of the Mortgages Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.