Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Court File No.: London – FC-21-1039
Date: 2025-06-24
Family Court

Re: Roger Lacroix, Applicant
And: Cynthia Meek, Respondent

Before: S. Campbell
Counsel:

• A. Osmani, counsel for the Applicant
• Respondent, unrepresented

Heard: May 21, 2025

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] The respondent (moving party on this motion but referred to as the respondent in this decision for the purpose of clarity), Cynthia Meek, seeks declaratory relief relating to her request to audio record court appearances in this matter including her upcoming trial. Specifically, she seeks a declaration that:

a. Pursuant to s. 136(2)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43 (“the CJA”) a self-represented litigant may make an audio recording of a court hearing for personal use subject only to approval of the method.

b. The requirement for leave to audio record, that the moving party states is set out in the Superior Court of Justice Practice Direction of February 6, 2025, is inconsistent with s. 136(2)(b) of the CJA in that it imposes a requirement which conflicts with the wording of the CJA and, as a result, the Practice Direction is of no force and effect.

c. The Practice Direction violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and specifically section 2(b) (freedom of expression), section 7 (life, liberty and security of the person), and section 15(1) (equality before and under the law) and is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires leave and not merely approval of the method.

d. The Practice Direction must be interpreted or amended to provide an approved, unobtrusive method of recording to enable a litigant to exercise their “statutory rights” under s. 136(2)(b) shall be allowed without requiring leave of the court.

[2] On May 13, 2025, the respondent served the applicant with a motion returnable May 21, 2025 seeking the above-noted relief. The motion record included an affidavit sworn by the respondent and a factum prepared by her.

[3] On May 6, 2025, the respondent served the Attorney General of Ontario and the Attorney General of Canada with a Notice of Constitutional Question. That notice is in Form 4F and is dated May 6, 2025. The constitutional questions stated to be raised by the notice are essentially those as stated in her notice of motion.

[4] On the return of the motion, counsel for the applicant, Roger Lacroix, indicated that they took no position with respect to the relief claimed by the respondent. Neither the Attorney General of Ontario nor the Attorney General of Canada attended. The Attorney General of Ontario forwarded to the parties a letter which was characterized as a non-intervention letter. The letter simply stated that the Attorney General of Ontario would not be intervening at this stage of the proceeding. They did request to be advised of the outcome of the constitutional issue. The Attorney General of Canada did not provide a similar, or any, response.

Factual Background

[5] This proceeding was commenced by application on October 8, 2022 to deal with issues arising out of the parties’ separation. The matter has proceeded through the usual steps of litigation including motions and conferences. There is a trial management conference scheduled in this matter for August 18, 2025 and a trial readiness conference scheduled for September 2, 2025. The matter is on the list to be heard in the sittings commencing September 8, 2025.

[6] It would appear to me that the issues involved appear to be largely financial in nature, including issues of equalization of net family property, child support and spousal support. I reach that conclusion after reviewing the endorsements and orders in the court file.

[7] The responding party deposes that she has previously raised the issue of being allowed to record court appearances. It appears she submitted a 14B motion, without notice, requesting approval to record the proceedings scheduled for February 5, 2025. On January 31, 2025, Mitrow J. concluded that the respondent’s 14B motion should not be brought without notice, was premature, and ought to be dealt with by the presiding judge on February 5, 2025. It would appear that motion was never argued.

[8] On March 21, 2025 the parties were before Hassan J. to argue a motion dealing with issues of the disclosure of financial records. The respondent deposes in her affidavit sworn May 13, 2025 that she made a request to audio record the proceedings that day. The respondent further states in her affidavit that she explained to Hassan J. that she was suffering from a neck injury that made it difficult to move her head or hold her body in a position to write or type.

[9] The respondent states that Hassan J. declined her request. That caused her stress and confusion. She asserts she is concerned she is missing critical information and was unable to capture or review what was said during the motion. This compromises her ability to participate in and have an understanding of the court proceedings. The motion on that date was adjourned to April 15, 2025.

[10] The endorsement of Hassan J. from April 15, 2025 refers to a motion filed by the respondent seeking an order that she be permitted to audio record any further appearances in the matter pursuant to s. 136 of the CJA. That endorsement indicates that Hassan J. declined to hear the motion because it was not properly before her and because the respondent had not requested leave to bring any motion returnable that day. Hassan J. stated, “given the nature of the motion, it should be returnable in open court on a motions day.” Hassan J. also noted that the respondent had not sought an accommodation to be permitted to record and that any form of accommodation needed to be addressed with the court office.

[11] Hassan J. also concluded that the original motion would not be proceeding that day because the anticipated evidence had not been filed. She noted that she did not see the necessity to waive the prohibition against recording a court hearing. The original motion was adjourned to a date to be set through the trial coordinator’s office to await the respondent’s accommodation request.

[12] I would note that I was not provided with a transcript of the proceedings on March 21, 2025 or April 15, 2025. It appears, from the SharePoint file, that a transcript only of Hassan J.’s decision and reasons given orally on March 21, 2025 was prepared. Regardless, the salient fact is that the respondent seeks to audio record court appearances because of her physical limitations and because she is a self-represented litigant not experienced with the conduct of court hearings. She asserts that she requires a recording of each step to help her better understand the proceeding and to prepare for and conduct any step in the proceeding, including the trial.

Issues

[13] The respondent has set out in her factum and motion the issues she seeks to have the court determine. I have summarized those issues at the beginning of these reasons and there is no need to repeat them here.

Position of the Respondent

[14] The respondent fully outlines her position in the factum filed by her. Only a brief outline of that position is necessary given the thoroughness of her factum.

[15] The respondent submits that the Practice Direction is not consistent with the CJA. She argues that the CJA presumptively allows for the recording of a proceeding for the purpose of note taking. That is, the only issue for the presiding judicial officer to determine is the methodology. The Practice Direction, however, requires leave of the court for the recording itself, not merely the methodology.

[16] The respondent referred the court to Fragomeni v. Greater Sudbury (Police Service), 2014 ONSC 5452. In that case, Kane J. allowed a self-represented party to record a motion for summary judgment for the purpose of supplementing their handwritten notes. The respondent also referred to Blanks v. Roberts, 2018 ONSC 7699, where the court granted permission for audio recording as an accommodation. However, the respondent emphasized that she is not seeking an accommodation and is not required to prove the need for such accommodation.

[17] The main thrust of the respondent’s argument on this issue is that there is an absolute right to record. She argues that this conclusion is supported by modern statutory interpretation.

[18] The respondent also argues that, in requiring leave to record, the Practice Direction violates ss. 2(b), 7 and 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Namely, requiring leave for recording imposes a barrier for self-represented litigants to exercise the fundamental freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression set out in s. 2(b). Further, restricting the ability of self-represented litigants to participate meaningfully in proceedings that affect their core personal interests is contrary to s. 7 in that it interferes with the principles of fundamental justice. Finally, requiring leave to audio record disproportionately impacts self-represented litigants as compared to lawyers – who can, without leave of the court, be routinely accompanied by their client and legal assistants to assist with note-taking – and therefore violates s. 15(1)’s protection for equal benefit of the law.

[19] The respondent does not seek a declaration that s. 136 of the CJA violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Rather, she seeks a declaration that the Practice Direction violates the Charter and must be interpreted or amended to allow self-represented litigants to meaningfully exercise their statutory right under the CJA.

Courts of Justice Act

[20] Section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act provides:

136.(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), no person shall,

(a) take or attempt to take a photograph, motion picture, audio recording or other record capable of producing visual or aural representations by electronic means or otherwise,

(i) at a court hearing,

(ii) of any person entering or leaving the room in which a court hearing is to be or has been convened, or

(iii) of any person in the building in which a court hearing is to be or has been convened where there is reasonable ground for believing that the person is there for the purpose of attending or leaving the hearing;

(b) publish, broadcast, reproduce or otherwise disseminate a photograph, motion picture, audio recording or record taken in contravention of clause (a); or

(c) broadcast or reproduce an audio recording made as described in clause (2)(b). R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 136(1).

[21] The CJA provides for an exception to the general prohibition of recording. Specifically, section 136(2) of the CJA states,

(2) Nothing in subsection (1),

(a) prohibits a person from unobtrusively making handwritten notes or sketches at a court hearing; or

(b) prohibits a lawyer, a party acting in person or a journalist from unobtrusively making an audio recording at a court hearing, in the manner that has been approved by the judge, for the sole purpose of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes.

[22] The meaning and purpose of s. 136 of the CJA was discussed by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Dunstan, 2017 ONCA 432, para 53:

[53] Section 136 is the descendant of s. 67 of the Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, which introduced a prohibition against televising or photographing court proceedings or persons entering or leaving a courtroom. Its objectives were the maintenance of order and decorum in the courtroom and courthouse and the protection of unimpeded access to and from the courtroom by participants in court proceedings: R. v. Squires, 11 O.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, [1993] S.C.C.A. No. 57, at p. 393. Section 136 has been expanded to prohibit unauthorized audio recordings of court proceedings, but the meaning and scope of the section is not otherwise changed: see Garry D. Watson & Michael McGowan, Ontario Civil Practice 2017 (Toronto: Carswell, 2016), at p. 244. Subsection 136(3) provides for the authorized exceptions to the prohibition.

Practice Direction

[23] The issuance of practice directions is authorized by rule 1.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. That rule provides that a practice direction for proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice throughout Ontario shall be signed by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice, and that a practice direction for a region shall be signed by the Regional Senior Judge of the region and countersigned by the Chief Justice. Practice directions aim to promote the better administration of the court and do not affect the rights and obligations of the parties: re Cessald Corp. v. Fort Norman Expirations Inc., 25 O.R. 69 (HC).

[24] In her notice of motion, the respondent simply referred to ‘the Practice Direction’. I conclude that what the respondent is referring to is the Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction for Family Proceedings at the Superior Court of Justice.

[25] In the current Superior Court Practice Direction, in section ‘G. Electronic Devices in the Courtroom’, under the heading, “3. Use of Electronic Devices in the Courtroom”, it is provided that:

Unless the presiding judge orders otherwise, the use of electronic devices used in silent mode and in a discrete and unobtrusive manner is permitted in the courtroom for the purpose of the court proceeding, by:

a) Counsel,

b) Paralegals or licenced by the Law Society,

c) Law student and the law clerks assisting counsel during the proceeding,

d) Parties; and

e) Media or journalists.

[26] However, where the use of electronics is permitted there are restrictions. The relevant restriction for this matter is found at item (e) in the same section and provides,

Counsel, parties, the media and journalists must seek leave of the Court for permission to audio record a proceeding. Any audio recording that has been approved by the court is for the sole purposes of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes.

What is a Court Hearing?

[27] The CJA prohibits the recording of a court hearing. The Practice Direction refers to use of electronic devices in a courtroom. Neither the CJA nor the Practice Direction define the terms ‘court hearing’ or ‘courtroom’. The respondent deposes that Hassan J. indicated that a recording would not be allowed to be made of a motion because motion courts are not courts of record – however, I have no way of knowing if that is what was said by Hassan J. More importantly, this is not an appeal of her decision and it is unnecessary and improper for me to comment on any reasons she may or may not have given. I have already set out above a summary of Hassan J.’s endorsement on the issue.

[28] There can be no argument made that a trial is not a court hearing and that it takes place in a courtroom. I find the more challenging issue to be whether a motion court falls within the same category.

[29] In Michail v. Ontario English Catholic Teachers Association, 2019 ONCA 319, the Court of Appeal was considering a motion in that court to obtain and disseminate audio recordings of the proceeding pursuant to s. 136(3) of the CJA. In that matter, Ms. Michail brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking orders relating to her request. She argued that s. 136(3) authorized an exception to the general rule prohibiting recording and the dissemination of recordings. That motion was heard by Brown J.A. who ultimately denied the request.

[30] Ms. Michail then brought a motion to review Brown J.A.’s decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed Ms. Michail’s request for review. In their decision the Court of Appeal referred to Restoule v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 114. In Restoule, the court allowed the livestreaming of the broadcast given the nature of the proceeding, the parties involved, and the public interest in the matter.

[31] The reviewing court in Michail, when dismissing the application, noted that it was not a court of record. The court further observed that the Court of Appeal makes digital recordings of its proceedings for internal use pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction. Those recordings are not governed by s. 136 of the CJA. Additionally, the court explained that s. 17 of its practice direction governed requests for copies of recordings to be provided.

[32] It is of note that in both Michail and Restoule the moving parties were seeking to record and disseminate the proceeding. That is a significant factual distinction from the matter before me. Nonetheless, the court’s comments with respect to recording are helpful in considering what events may be recorded.

[33] In Michail, the Court of Appeal did not refer to the expressions “court hearing,” “courtroom” or “proceeding”. What I take from the court’s decision as well as the decision in Restoule is that the exceptions to the prohibition are not a matter of right. Rather, the court, in considering the exception, needs to consider the purpose of the request and not whether the matter sought to be recorded was a motion or some other type of proceeding.

[34] In Restoule the issue before the court was of significant public interest. In Michail the court was left to wonder not only what record the applicant was seeking to record and disseminate, but rather the need for such a recording and dissemination.

[35] The issue of recording of motions has been considered in Superior Court decisions. In Blanks v. Roberts, 2018 ONSC 7699, Lamay J. granted permission to a self-represented litigant to record a motion hearing on a personal device. Lamay J.’s decision, however, did not make reference to s. 136 of the CJA; rather, he granted the permission under the umbrella of an accommodation.

[36] In Fragomeni, Kane J. treated an announcement by a self-represented respondent that he was going to record as a request pursuant to s. 136(2)(b) of the CJA. At para. 4 of his decision, Kane J. stated that he granted the self-represented litigant permission pursuant to s. 136(2)(b) of the CJA to make audio recordings of the motions for summary judgment. The recordings were to be for the sole purpose of supplementing the litigant’s handwritten notes during argument of various motions. The litigant was prohibited from reproducing, broadcasting, posting or communicating the contents of the recording.

[37] The courts in Blanks and Fragomeni allowed the recording of motions, albeit for different reasons. The Court of Appeal in Michail did not allow the recording. In Michail permission was being sought to record and disseminate for what I would describe as the ‘public good’. I have noted, the distinction as to what was being sought by the moving party in Michail and by the litigants in Blanks and Fragomeni is of significance.

[38] In considering s. 136(2) of the CJA, the court has to consider whether it is appropriate to allow an exception to the general prohibition of recording so that a lawyer, a party acting in person or a journalist can unobtrusively make an audio recording at a court hearing for the sole purpose of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes. Obviously, the court must be made aware of a request for the exception and take into account the purpose for which the exception is sought. If the court finds the recording is appropriate for the purpose of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes, it must then determine the methodology and ensure it is consistent with the purpose.

[39] I conclude that s. 136(2) of the CJA and the Practice Direction apply to motions courts and trials equally. In my view, the reference to a court hearing in the CJA, and the use of the words “courtroom” and “proceeding” in the Practice Direction, include a motion and a trial.

[40] A court has to first consider whether the request to record an event is for an expected purpose, and then determine the methodology. In determining the methodology, the court may weigh the advantage of physically recording. This would include deciding whether a cell phone or some device that cannot be connected directly to the internet should be used.

[41] The court may consider utilization of the court’s Digital Recording Devices (DRDs). The Practice Direction provides for the release of digital court recordings in section ‘F. Release of Digital Court Recordings’, under item 3(b). That provision deals with digital recordings of matters heard in open court and states that a litigant may obtain digital recordings upon completion of the “undertaking to the court for access to digital recordings” and payment of the prescribed fee.

[42] The court may consider other options. For example, a self-represented litigant could enlist the aid of a “McKenzie Friend”: McKenzie v. McKenzie, (1970) 3 W.L.R. 472. All of this is to be considered in the context of the purpose of the recording and management of the particular proceeding.

[43] In this matter, the respondent states she needs the recording to assist her in understanding the court’s process and to help prepare herself for litigation. A court will need to consider the respondent’s request to record to supplement her handwritten notes at each step of the proceeding and, if applicable, the mode of recording.

[44] I would add that I take a different view of a conference or a pre-trial. Conferences and pre-trials are matters that are not in court, they are “in chambers”; the public is generally excluded; recordings are made for the court’s internal use as in Michail; and there are issues of confidentiality and in some instances there is a statutory prohibition from using statements or admissions made at the conference in other stages of the proceeding. Although unnecessary for me to determine in deciding this motion, I would distinguish a conference from a motion or a trial.

Are the Courts of Justice Act and the Practice Direction in Conflict?

[45] The respondent argues that the self-represented litigant has, as of right, the authority to record a court hearing without prior authorization or leave of the court. The judicial officer presiding only has authority or discretion as to the mode or method of recording.

[46] Respectfully, I disagree. I conclude it is inherent in the provisions of the CJA that the presiding judge has to consider if the request for exemption from the recording prohibition is for the purpose of “supplementing or replacing handwritten notes”. In some instances, the court or a judge may conclude it is not. When the respondent appeared before me she asked if I would allow her to record the motion. By the time that request was made, I was aware that neither the applicant nor the Attorney General of Ontario nor the Attorney General of Canada was going to be making submissions. Therefore, all the respondent was going to be able to record were her own submissions. I concluded that recording was not necessary and I did not grant permission for the recording.

[47] Nonetheless, at the conclusion of the respondent’s submissions, I engaged her by asking questions. I enquired about the methods she was going to use to record, suggested using a device other than a phone, and discussed with her the use of the court prepared DRD recordings. For that portion of the motion, I allowed her to record the proceeding. In my view such a recording may be helpful to the respondent on an ongoing basis.

[48] The Practice Direction requires leave to record in certain circumstances. One of those circumstances is for media and journalists as well as self-represented litigants to record for the purpose of supplementing or replacing handwritten notes. Again, that requires the presiding judge to determine whether or not such a recording is necessary. To paraphrase the Court of Appeal in Michail, the court needs to determine what record is being captured. In my view, that is no different than what is required in the CJA. Similarly, the court has to engage the person seeking authorization to record on the issue of the purpose and methodology of recording, both under the CJA and the Practice Direction.

[49] The respondent in her submissions referred the court to R. v. Schertzer, 2012 ONSC 227. The wording of the practice direction in place at the time of Schertzer specifically stated that the request to record to supplement or replace handwritten notes may be considered as approved without an oral or written application to the presiding judge. The comments of Pardu J., as she then was, in para. 6 are a reflection of the wording of the practice direction at the time.

[50] The practice direction with respect to the use of electronic devices in the courtroom has evolved over time. The practice direction referred to in Schertzer appears to have been replaced by one that came into effect on July 1, 2014. The 2014 practice direction provided, at item 100, that “Unless the presiding judge orders otherwise, the use of electronic devices in silent mode and in a discrete and unobtrusive matter is permitted in the courtroom” by specific classes of individuals. It was, however, subject to restrictions including, “VI. Only counsel, self-represented parties, the media and journalists are permitted to use electronic devices to make an audio recording of the proceeding and only for the purpose of note-taking. However, such audio recordings cannot be sent from the electronic device.”

[51] The prevailing approach to statutory interpretation requires enactments to always be interpreted purposefully and in context. As set out by the Supreme Court in Rizzo v. Rizzo Shoes Ltd., para 21: “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.” Although a practice direction is not an Act, this modern approach to statutory interpretation suggests that it should be interpreted, as much as possible, as consistent with the governing legislation that it aims to supplement.

[52] I have set out earlier in this endorsement the wording of the current Practice Direction. Clearly, it is different than the direction from 2014. In my view, the issues both directions seek to address is the same. As one might expect, the Practice Direction provides the mechanism for the implementation of the CJA.

[53] The Practice Direction must be interpreted having regard to the provisions of the CJA. I find that while the wording of the CJA and the Practice Direction are different, the impact and import of both provisions are the same. Both require the court to consider the request and then the methodology if the request is granted.

[54] I would further observe that it is reasonable to presume that the drafters of the Practice Direction were aware of the provisions of the CJA. Indeed, the wording of the Practice Direction supports that notion. The CJA is the lens through which the provisions of the Practice Direction must be viewed, interpreted and implemented.

[55] After determining that granting the exception to the rule is appropriate, the court then turns to consider the methodology. That methodology must be the least intrusive and most effective means of recording. Determining the most effective means has to be done from both the perspective of the court and the litigant. These are issues to trial or courtroom management required to be undertaken by the presiding judge.

Is Declaratory Relief Warranted?

[56] Section 97 of the CJA provides that the Court of Appeal and Superior Court of Justice have the jurisdiction to make binding declarations of right, “whether or not consequential relief is or could be claimed”.

[57] In Daniels v. Canada, 2016 SCC 12, para 11, the Supreme Court stated: “the parties seeking relief must establish that the court has jurisdiction to hear the issue, that the question is real and not theoretical, and that the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution. A declaration can only be granted if it will have practical utility, that is, if it will settle ‘a live controversy’ between the parties”.

[58] In the subsequent decision of Ewert v. Canada, 2018 SCC 30, para 81, the court stated: “the declaration is a narrow remedy but one that is available without a cause of action and whether or not any consequential relief is available”.

[59] The court in Ewert referenced previous decisions of the court, as well as The Law of Declaratory Judgements (4th ed., 2016) and stated at para. 11: “A court may, in its discretion, grant a declaration where it has jurisdiction to hear the issue, where the dispute before the court is real and not theoretical, where the party raising the issue has a genuine interest in its resolution, and where the respondent has in interest in opposing the declaration sought”.

[60] In Savary v. Tarion Warranty Corp., 2021 ONSC 2409, para 21, Bale J., in the context of a Rule 21.01 and Rule 25.11 motion, considered the appropriateness of the plaintiff’s declaration for declaratory relief. In his decision, Bale J. referred to the law of declaratory judgments. At para. 21 he quoted the treatise and stated, “an application for a declaration will be rejected if it seeks confirmation of a breach of statute, since it would serve no useful purpose and the application itself constitutes an abuse of process.”

[61] In this matter, the respondent seeks a finding that will not resolve an issue between the parties. She seeks a finding of a declaration of right and that the failure by any court to grant her request to record is a breach of the CJA.

[62] In my view, this is not a circumstance in which declaratory relief is appropriate. The statute, and collaterally, the Practice Direction, provide a process by which certain classes of individuals may seek exception from a provision of the CJA. The application of the statute and Practice Direction involves the exercise of judicial discretion. Exercising that discretion may require inquiry into the specific circumstances of the matter. The respondent’s request relates to process not substance. It will not resolve an issue between the parties.

[63] Stated more simply, the CJA and Practice Direction speak for themselves. I cannot make a declaration binding on other judicial officers dealing with further motions in this matter or a trial. In my view, this conclusion answers the relief claimed in paras. (a), (b) and (d) of the respondent’s motion. The remaining question is whether the Practice Direction violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Breach of Charter

[64] I have concluded that s. 136 of the CJA and the Practice Direction are not in conflict; that is, when read as a whole, they both require a court to determine if certain individuals require recording to supplement their handwritten notes and how such a recording should be done. I have commented that if there is any conflict between the two, the CJA prevails.

[65] The issue of whether s. 136 of the CJA interferes with self-represented litigants’ rights under the Charter was considered in Michail. In my view, the court in that case provided a succinct answer to the question. There, the applicant argued that the open courts principle required that video recordings, streaming and archiving be permitted. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found at para. 11 that: “the open courts principle is one constitutional principle among many and is not automatically dispositive. Judicial discretion in this instance, like all exercises of judicial discretion, must be exercised in a manner that conforms to the requirements of the rule of law.”

[66] In my view, the same conclusion should be reached in considering the respondent’s argument with respect to her position that the Practice Direction violates the Charter. The engagement of s. 2(b) of the Charter was specifically dealt with in the context of the CJA by the Court of Appeal. The same reasoning and conclusion can be applied to the provisions of the Practice Direction.

[67] With respect to s. 7 and 15(1), I find that the exceptions included in s. 136 of the CJA and the provisions of the Practice Direction ensure compliance with the Charter. There is not a blanket prohibition nor is there a blanket authorization. I would describe the CJA as permitting recording when it is necessary and when it can be done without otherwise interfering with the functioning of the court. This would include ensuring justice is delivered in a timely manner and in a manner that is fair to all the litigants involved. It likely will require the exercise of judicial discretion. That exercise can be undertaken without infringement of the respondent’s rights.

Conclusion

[68] I conclude:

a. Declaratory relief is not appropriate because there is a governing statutory provision and a practice direction for the implementation of the statute.

b. The Practice Direction and CJA are not in conflict and therefore are not contrary to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and ought not to be struck down.

Therefore, the respondent’s motion is dismissed. In my view, this is not a matter which should attract an order of costs. However, if any party is of the view that there should be an order with respect to costs, they may make submissions within 30 days.

Justice S. Campbell
Date: June 24, 2025