Alex Hardiejowski

The 72-year-old offender was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The defence sought a suspended or conditional sentence, citing the offender's age, health issues, the risk of contracting COVID-19 in prison, and the likelihood of deportation to England.

The court found that the gravity of commercial cocaine trafficking required a sentence emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The court held that a non-custodial sentence would be disproportionate and sentenced the offender to 2 years plus 1 day in a federal penitentiary.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The charge, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, remained outstanding for approximately 905 days from arrest to the hearing of the application.

The court applied the Morin framework and found extensive delay attributable to the Crown, particularly relating to late and incomplete disclosure and failures to attend scheduling courts.

Institutional delays also contributed, while only limited time was waived by the accused.

The court concluded the Morin guidelines were exceeded and the delay was unreasonable, warranting a stay of proceedings.

The applicant sought to quash a general warrant authorizing surreptitious entry into a commercial room used to store suspected narcotics and to exclude resulting evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed whether the issuing justice had reasonable grounds to authorize the warrant under s. 487.01(1) of the Criminal Code based on an Information to Obtain supported by confidential informants and police surveillance.

Applying the deferential standard of warrant review, the court held that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence that could reasonably support issuance of the warrant.

The informant information was corroborated by surveillance and other investigative steps linking the applicant and his associate to the location.

The court found no Charter breach and declined to exclude the evidence.

The applicant sought to quash a general warrant authorizing covert police entry into a commercial storage room and to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of s. 8.

The court first addressed whether the applicant had standing to challenge the search by demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.

Although the lease for the room was in the name of a business partner, the applicant had keys, used the space for joint business storage, and exercised practical access and control.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held that the applicant had a sufficient expectation of privacy.

The applicant therefore had standing to challenge the warrant and proceed to the second stage of the application.

The self-represented accused brought pretrial applications seeking a stay of proceedings for alleged violations of his s. 11(b) and s. 8 Charter rights.

He argued that the 39-month delay from his arrest to the application date was unreasonable and that the search warrant for his home was based on insufficient information from confidential informants.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the accused's own actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and that the Information to Obtain the search warrant provided sufficient grounds for the issuing justice to authorize the search.

The self-represented accused brought pretrial applications seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging violations of his rights under s. 11(b) and s. 8 of the Charter.

The accused argued that the 39-month delay from his arrest to the application date was unreasonable and that the search warrant for his home was unlawfully obtained based on insufficient information from confidential informants.

The court dismissed the s. 11(b) application, finding that much of the delay was attributable to the accused's own actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and that he failed to prove any prejudice.

The court also dismissed the s. 8 application, concluding that the Information to Obtain (ITO) provided sufficient reliable information for the issuing justice to authorize the search warrant.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the defence relied on the defence of necessity, asserting that the accused drove to assist his wife at the hospital.

The appellate court reviewed the governing principles for summary conviction appeals and the legal test for necessity established in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The court held that the trial judge correctly stated the law and reasonably found that the elements of necessity—imminent peril, lack of reasonable alternatives, and proportionality—were not established.

Finding no error of law, palpable and overriding error of fact, or miscarriage of justice, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and a sentence of 60 days’ intermittent incarceration.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.) and provided insufficient reasons for rejecting defence evidence.

The court held that the trial judge considered the whole of the evidence and did not shift the burden of proof, and the conviction appeal was dismissed.

However, the sentencing judge failed to conduct a Gladue analysis despite the offender being Indigenous, contrary to s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was therefore set aside and the matter remitted for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed a conviction for committing an indecent act under s. 173(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after being found to have exposed his buttocks toward occupants of a passing vehicle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s explanation that his pants had accidentally slipped and accepted the testimony of the complainant witnesses.

On appeal, the court applied the reasonableness standard for reviewing verdicts and considered the credibility analysis conducted at trial using the principles from W.(D.).

The appellate judge held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reasonably concluded that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction and the suspended sentence with probation were upheld.