Darilynn Sue Allison

The Attorney General for Ontario applied ex parte for certiorari with mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's refusal to issue a production order against textPlus, Inc., a US-based company with a virtual presence in Canada.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace committed jurisdictional errors and errors of law by concluding that the order could not be enforced and by failing to follow binding horizontal precedent regarding virtual presence.

The Court granted the application, quashed the refusal, and compelled the Ontario Court of Justice to issue the production order.

In a first-degree murder trial, the court ruled on the admissibility of three wiretap excerpts, balancing their probative value against their prejudicial effect.

Two excerpts were excluded: one lacked sufficient link to the killing and carried significant prejudice by associating the accused with incarcerated individuals, and the other lacked probative value regarding a potential getaway vehicle or the shooting itself.

The third excerpt, which involved the accused discussing a homicide and police inquiries with his girlfriend, was admitted as highly probative of post-incident conduct related to his involvement in the shooting.

The Crown brought a motion to admit "recognition" evidence from the accused's former girlfriend, Dejaunte Blake, to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the relationship was not significant enough and the video quality was poor.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Leaney, found the witness was in a better position than the jury to identify the accused due to her intimate and regular contact with him.

The court admitted the evidence, ruling that concerns about video quality and prior inconsistent statements went to weight, not admissibility.

The Crown sought to admit "recognition evidence" from a hotel customer service representative to identify the accused in surveillance video related to a first-degree murder charge.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness lacked sufficient exposure to the accused.

The court dismissed the Crown's motion, finding that the witness's limited prior interactions with the accused, reliance on a short, obscured video clip, and identification based on clothing and gait (rather than facial features or consistent observation of gait on stairs) did not place her in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the accused.

During a first-degree murder trial where identification was the sole issue, the defence sought to allow the jury a closer physical view of the accused's eyes.

The only eyewitness had described the shooter as having "colourful eyes" and the defence argued the current courtroom configuration prevented the jury from properly assessing this evidence.

The Crown opposed, contending the request was a formal "view" under s. 652 of the Criminal Code or amounted to calling new evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, clarifying that a jury's observation of an accused's physical appearance constitutes "real evidence" and is distinct from a formal "view." The court ruled that the jury should be permitted a closer view of the accused's eyes to ensure a fair trial and proper assessment of the evidence, noting that the accused's right to a fair trial should not be contingent on courtroom layout.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter and challenge the voluntariness of a statement.

The accused argued that a brief interaction with police in a stairwell months before the murder constituted an arbitrary detention, and that obtaining his phone number from Ontario Works violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the stairwell encounter was a brief, consensual interaction that did not amount to a detention, and the statement was voluntary.

The court also held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone number obtained from Ontario Works.

The applications were dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused, charged with homicide, brought an application to adduce evidence that a third party was the true perpetrator.

The defence argued the alternate suspect had opportunity, motive, propensity, and was identified as the shooter.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient connection between the alternate suspect and the crime, as the evidence for opportunity, motive, propensity, and identification was seriously lacking or completely absent.

The offender was convicted of sexual assault for forcing the victim to perform oral sex in an apartment building stairwell.

The Crown sought a sentence of 20-26 months, while the defence sought time served (12 months).

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day, exceeding the Crown's recommendation due to the gravity of the offence, the violent nature of the assault, the offender's prior sexual assault conviction, and the need for denunciation and specific deterrence.

The court rejected the distinction between oral and vaginal penetration as a determinative sentencing factor.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contract regarding liability.

The Court also agreed that cross-examination was not necessary on the issue of mitigation of damages, as the evidence was not solely available to the plaintiff.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.