Ann-Marie Calsavara

The court delivered reasons for sentence for three co-accused, David Kawal, Tyrel Nicholson, and Devonte Rowe, involved in a botched robbery and kidnapping scheme.

Kawal was convicted of attempted murder of a police officer, robbery with a firearm, and kidnapping with a firearm.

Nicholson pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, kidnapping with a firearm, and breach of recognizance.

Rowe was convicted of robbery and kidnapping simpliciter.

The judge emphasized the gravity of handgun violence and offences against police officers, applying principles of general deterrence and denunciation.

Kawal received a life sentence with normal parole eligibility.

Nicholson was sentenced to 10 years (63 months actual after pre-trial credit).

Rowe received a 4-year sentence (time served) based on a joint submission.

The court declined to delay parole for Kawal, citing the parole board's superior position to assess rehabilitation.

The accused, charged with kidnapping, robbery, and attempted murder, applied under s. 7 and s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude statements he made to undercover police officers placed in his cell after his arrest.

The accused had previously exercised his right to silence.

The court applied the Hebert framework and found that the undercover officers did not actively elicit the statements or engage in the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

The accused spoke voluntarily and freely to his cellmates.

The application to exclude the statements was dismissed.

In a prosecution for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application seeking admission of several out-of-court statements made by the deceased to friends and associates describing a deteriorating relationship with the accused and expressing fear that the accused and his family intended to kill him.

The court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the statements under the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement expressing fear that the accused would kill the deceased with his own guns was admissible under the traditional state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The remaining statements describing prior disputes, business dealings, and a recent altercation between the deceased and the accused were admitted under the principled exception because necessity was established and sufficient indicia of reliability existed through corroborating evidence and contextual circumstances.

The probative value of the evidence relating to animus and motive outweighed any prejudicial effect, including concerns about prior discreditable conduct.

The accused, a Black man charged with the murder of an Asian man, brought a motion to allow multiple-choice questions to be put to prospective jurors during the challenge for cause process, arguing the standard Parks question is insufficient to uncover subconscious racial bias.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the standard question.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the proposed multiple-choice format would be an improvement over the standard Parks question, but directed that jurors be instructed they may provide detailed answers rather than just 'yes' or 'no'.

The Crown sought a ruling that an accused’s inculpatory statement made to a police officer while awaiting medical treatment was voluntary and admissible.

The statement was made after the accused had earlier invoked the right to silence during a recorded interview and after consulting counsel.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, emphasizing gaps in the officer’s notes and inconsistencies in recollection.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness analysis and concluded that uncertainties about the unrecorded portions of the conversation and the officer’s unreliable recollection raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible and the Charter exclusion argument became moot.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter arising from a planned robbery of a banquet hall poker tournament that resulted in the fatal shooting of a bystander.

At sentencing, the court made factual findings consistent with the jury’s verdict and concluded the accused was a principal organizer of the robbery and knew or ought to have known that firearms would be used.

Aggravating factors included extensive planning, the presence of over 100 patrons, the use of firearms, significant prior criminal record, and the death of a Good Samaritan attempting to intervene.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as dominant sentencing principles in armed robbery-related manslaughter.

The offender’s difficult background and limited mitigating factors did not outweigh the seriousness of the offence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make the demand.

The court found that the officer held both subjective and objective reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances, including the motor vehicle collision, the accused's bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils, agitated demeanor, apparent confusion, and the officer's experience.

The court upheld the approved screening device demand as lawful and admitted the breath test results into evidence.