Court File and Parties
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
STEPHANIE ALVARADO Defendant
Counsel: Karen Jokinen, for the Crown Steven Hinkson, for the Defendant
HEARD: November 28, 2025
NOTE: The written version of these Reasons released this day is to be considered the official version and takes precedence over the oral Reasons read into the record. If there are any discrepancies between the oral version and the written version, it is the written version that is the official record to be relied upon.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
CASULLO, J.
Introduction
1On July 28, 2025, following trial by jury, Ms. Stephanie Alvarado was found guilty of the following offences: possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, both contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, and unlawful possession of cannabis for the purpose of selling, contrary to s. 10(2) of the Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c. 16.
2Ms. Alvarado is before me today for sentencing.
Circumstance of the Offences
3At trial, the evidence established that when Ms. Alvarado was pulled over by police, officers found a vacuum-sealed bag containing 1,065 g of cocaine in a backpack that also held Ms. Alvarado’s identification. Ms. Alvarado also advised police that they would find drugs “hooped” inside of her. Indeed, at the station Ms. Alvarado extricated a plastic bag from her vagina, in which were two separate plastic bags, one containing 32.5 g of cocaine, and one containing 15.7 g of fentanyl.
4Ms. Alvarado testified that she was under duress and was not in possession of the drugs voluntarily. The defence rested on an assessment of Ms. Alvarado’s credibility. The jury clearly did not find that the defence of duress, upon which it was charged, applied to Ms. Alvarado.
5The value of the drugs found exceeded $100,000 which, as PC Chiaramida testified, bore the marking of organized crime-level drugs.
Circumstances of the Offender
6Ms. Alvarado is presently 35 years old. She has a 13-year-old son who is in grade eight, over whom she is the primary caregiver.
7Prior to being arrested, Ms. Alvarado worked at a property management office. When the company learned about her legal challenges, they allowed her to resign. Recently Ms. Alvarado has launched a residential and commercial cleaning business.
8Ms. Alvarado has no criminal record and no prior involvement with the law. There is no evidence that Ms. Alvarado is addicted to cocaine or fentanyl.
9Ms. Alvarado has a close relationship with her parents, although this was not always the case. Her parents separated when she was about four years old. She lived with her mother primarily, but maintained a consistent relationship with her father.
10The pre-sentence report described the challenges Ms. Alvarado faced as a young mother, then a mother with sole custody of a young child. The author of the report described Ms. Alvarado as cooperative, respectful, and emotionally invested in making positive life changes.
11The letters of support written on her behalf (referenced in the pre-sentence report, though not provided to the court), describe Ms. Alvarado similarly, as kind, loyal, and supportive of others. They noted Ms. Alvarado’s unstable upbringing, and her resilience in always trying to improve her life. They find the current charges to be very out of character for Ms. Alvarado.
Positions of the Parties
12The Crown argues that a fit and proper sentence for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purposes of trafficking, and possession of cannabis for the purpose of selling, is eight years. The Crown is also requesting a ten-year weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Criminal Code”), and an order for DNA under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code.
13The defence submits that in light of Ms. Alvarado’s circumstances, a sentence of three to five years is a more appropriate range. No issue was taken with the ancillary orders sought by the Crown.
Principles of Sentencing
14As summarized by Watt J.A. in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 28, 153 O.R. (3d) 623, at para. 5, in determining a fit sentence, the sentencing judge must consider a complexity of factors including the nature of the offence and the personal characteristics of the offender. As well, the sentencing judge must weigh the normative principles Parliament has enshrined in the Criminal Code; the sentencing objectives in s. 718, the fundamental principle of proportionality in s. 718.1, the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as the principles of totality and restraint in s. 718.2.
15Section 718 of the Criminal Code outlines the principles of sentencing. That section states:
The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
16Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that a sentence is to be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the offender.
17Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code provides additional sentencing principles, including that a sentence may be increased or decreased depending upon aggravating or mitigating factors, and that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.
18In cases involving drug trafficking, the primary sentencing principles are denunciation and deterrence. The offences Ms. Alvarado has been convicted of are serious ones. Possession for the purpose of trafficking in a Schedule I substance carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
19In this case, the Crown and defence agree that sentences of five to eight years reflect the proper sentencing range for someone without a record who has been convicted of possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking: R. v. Bryan, 2011 ONCA 273, at para. 1.
Aggravating Factors
20The amount and nature of the drugs involved is a significant aggravating factor. The harms visited by cocaine have long been documented. See R. v. Currant, 2018 ONSC 7094, at para. 36:
There is no doubt that the distribution and sale of cocaine is a scourge on society. It leads to untold misery for so many. It is the genesis of so many other crimes such as gang turf wars, guns and gangs, property offences to get the means to purchase cocaine, collection of drug debts. The list goes on.
21Ms. Alvarado was also found to be in possession of fentanyl. Fentanyl is a potent opioid that continues to ravage lives and communities. The tremendous harm it causes is repeated time and again by our courts. As held by Fairburn, A.C.J.O. in R. v. El-Azrak, 2023 ONCA 440, 167 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 151, “even the smallest amount of fentanyl can kill. And it does, over and over and over again.”
22Ms. Alvarado can only be described as part of a distribution chain. By her own account, she developed a messaging app by which customers could retain her services. Their messages disappeared thereafter.
23There is no evidence that the cocaine or fentanyl were being used to support a habit. The Crown submits that this is a case of greed, as Ms. Alvarado was involved solely for financial gain.
24Ms. Alvarado put her son in harm’s way in choosing to become involved in the drug subculture. The night of her arrest, she was so fearful of retaliation that she and her son moved out of their apartment, and her son lived with his father for a period of time.
Mitigating Factors
25Ms. Alvarado has no criminal record. This is a significant mitigating factor. She has been a productive member of society. It is clear she has transferrable skills that she can put to good use in the future. I find her potential for rehabilitation to be high.
26Ms. Alvarado is the primary caregiver to her 13-year-old son. He will be without her guidance for most, if not all, of his high school years.
27This crime was out of character for Ms. Alvarado. She said she was remorseful in the pre-sentence report. She equally expressed remorse in her statement to the court.
28Her time on bail has been without incident. The defence acknowledges that Ms. Alvarado has not been subject to onerous restrictions, and as such, is not seeking a Downes credit.
29I am sentencing Ms. Alvarado after a trial, so there is no mitigation for a guilty plea. That being said, I want to emphasize that the absence of a guilty plea does not equate to an aggravating factor.
Conclusion
30The sentence of three years proposed by the defence does not take into account the aggravating factors of this case, particularly the amount and type of drugs that Ms. Alvarado possessed. I strongly disagree with defence counsel’s submission that Ms. Alvarado comes to court “with clean hands.”
31Similarly, the Crown’s proposed sentence of eight years does not consider Ms. Alvarado’s non-existent criminal record, her remorse, and the fact that she is facing a custodial sentence in a penitentiary for the first time, at almost forty years of age. It also does not allow for a consideration of “preserving the family as much as possible.” See R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at para. 44, and R. v. D.B., 2025 ONCA 577, at para. 19.
32Taking all of these factors into consideration, I sentence Ms. Alvarado to a total term of incarceration of five years, broken down as follows:
Count One – Five years
Count Two – Five years concurrent
Count Three – Two years concurrent
33I believe, as Ms. Alvarado stated in her allocution, that her perspective has been changed in a profound way, and she is committed to changing her life’s path upon release.
34Ms. Alvarado will be subject to the following ancillary orders:
a. a DNA order, under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code; and
b. a weapons prohibition for ten years, under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.
CASULLO J.
Released: January 23, 2026