Michael A. Crystal

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his application for damages arising from his exclusion from WeChat groups related to his occupation as a real estate agent.

He also sought a declaration that the WeChat groups belonged to the respondent Homelife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that an application was not the appropriate proceeding for advancing a damages claim of this type, and that there was no proper evidentiary foundation for either an intentional interference with economic relations claim, a civil conspiracy claim, or the declaration sought.

The appellants appealed an order from the motion judge dismissing a certification motion for class proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's order was clear and unequivocal in dismissing only the certification motion, not the underlying claims.

Under section 30 of the Class Proceedings Act, an appeal from an order refusing to certify a proceeding lies to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants proceeding with the appeal in the Divisional Court.

Ricci Abram, convicted of first-degree murder in 2005, applied for a "faint hope" hearing under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code to reduce his parole ineligibility period.

The application required judicial screening for merit.

The court, applying the "reasonable prospect of success" standard due to Charter considerations (R. v. Dell), found that the applicant had demonstrated dramatic rehabilitative efforts, strong institutional support, and a deep connection to indigenous traditions.

Despite the brutal nature of the original offence and victim impact, the court balanced these factors with the applicant's significant personal growth and the relevance of Gladue principles.

The application for a jury hearing was granted.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the "faint hope" clause (s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code).

The screening judge applied the less stringent "reasonable prospect of success" test from the 1997 amendments, as the murder occurred in 2003.

Despite some positive institutional conduct, the applicant's abysmal overall conduct, lack of genuine remorse and accountability, and persistent moderate risk for violent recidivism led the court to conclude he failed to meet the test.

The application was dismissed, but a further application was permitted after six years.

The appellants were convicted of three counts of possessing narcotics for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a warrantless search of their apartment and a subsequent search pursuant to a warrant.

The trial judge found the warrantless search unconstitutional but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 24(2) analysis by failing to consider the searching officer's misleading testimony and by improperly emphasizing objective grounds while diminishing the lack of subjective grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge committed material errors in his Charter analysis, excluded the evidence, and substituted verdicts of acquittal on all charges.

The appellant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling but convicted of two counts of manslaughter by criminal negligence arising from an incident where he transported three Indian nationals on a Sea-Doo across the St. Lawrence River without life jackets, resulting in the capsizing of the vessel and the deaths of two passengers.

The Federal Crown appealed the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's statement and the surviving passenger's hearsay statements.

The accused appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misstated the mens rea test and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant was acquitted of conspiracy to commit human smuggling but convicted of two counts of manslaughter by criminal negligence arising from an incident where he transported three Indian nationals on a Sea-Doo across the St. Lawrence River without life jackets, resulting in the capsizing of the vessel and the deaths of two passengers.

The Federal Crown appealed the acquittal on the conspiracy charge, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding the accused's statement and the surviving passenger's hearsay statements.

The accused appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge misstated the mens rea test and failed to consider all relevant circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions on grounds of Charter delay under s. 11(b), arguing the trial judge erred in applying the law of reasonable doubt, and contending his conviction for drug possession was inconsistent with his acquittal on firearm possession charges.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the delay was reasonable in the transitional post-Jordan context, the convictions were supported by evidence, and the sentence, though lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's secondary role in the drug enterprise and rehabilitative efforts.

The applicant, Gary Eunick, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under section 745.61 of the Criminal Code, having been convicted of first-degree murder and attempt murder in 2004.

The Crown opposed the application.

Applying the pre-2011 Criminal Code amendments test, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the parole ineligibility.

While the applicant's conduct in prison had improved, his persistent denial of guilt and lack of remorse were significant negative factors.

Considering the brutal nature of the offences and the profound, ongoing impact on the victims' family, the court found no reasonable prospect of a unanimous jury reducing the parole ineligibility period.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and hydromorphone found in a safe in the basement room he had rented.

The trial judge found that the appellant had knowledge of and control over the drugs based on circumstantial evidence, including that the appellant was the last and only person to occupy the area where the drugs were found, the landlord's credible testimony that no one else had entered the home during the relevant period, and the discovery of a key to the safe on the appellant's person.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not err in his approach to circumstantial evidence and that his conclusion was logically based on the evidence and free of error.

The appellant, Brian White, appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's finding that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care and control by lacking intention to exercise it, and the trial judge's finding that the vehicle was operable.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's conclusions on both the appellant's intention to set the vehicle in motion and the vehicle's operability were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The accused, D.O., was charged with sexual offences under ss. 151 and 271 of the Criminal Code involving a 12-year-old complainant.

D.O. raised a mistake of age defence, claiming he believed the complainant was 15 and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, relying on her Facebook profile.

The Crown argued D.O. knew her true age or failed to take reasonable steps.

The court found the accused met his evidentiary burden for the defence.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.O. did not subjectively believe the complainant was 15, or that he failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, considering the information on her Facebook profile and the absence of strong "red flags" requiring further inquiry.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

In a criminal appeal from acquittals on assault and sexual assault charges, the Court addressed trial errors involving prior sexual activity cross-examination and exclusion of rebuttal evidence on alleged recent fabrication.

The intermediate appellate court was divided on remedy despite finding error.

The Court allowed the appeal and adopted the dissenting remedial approach from below.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The accused, James Norton, was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault.

The complainant, MP, alleged two physical assaults and one instance of non-consensual anal intercourse.

The defence denied the assaults and claimed the anal intercourse was consensual.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of MP's testimony, noting inconsistencies, disingenuous statements, and the influence of her sister-in-law, K, who fabricated evidence of injuries.

The court also considered the accused's character as a "Lothario" and his deceptive conduct in relationships.

Ultimately, the court found significant reservations regarding the veracity of MP's allegations and acquitted Mr. Norton of all charges, concluding that the evidence as a whole left reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed convictions for touching a person under the age of 16 years for a sexual purpose and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the credible evidence of two young complainants who testified about being touched inappropriately while sleeping in the appellant's trailer.

The appellant denied the allegations and argued the complainants' evidence contained discrepancies and inconsistencies suggesting collusion or fabrication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, addressed the collusion arguments, and provided adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's denial in light of the complainants' credible testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while disqualified, arguing that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the police officer's identification evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge reviewed the trial judge's reasons, noting that the trial judge had properly considered the weaknesses in the Crown's case and the principles of identification evidence.

Finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the 'faint hope' clause.

The court conducted an initial judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would grant the application.

Considering the applicant's positive institutional record, successful completion of rehabilitative programs, expressions of remorse, and family support, the court found that the applicant met the threshold.

The application was allowed to proceed, and a jury was ordered to be empanelled.

The applicant sought release pending trial on a charge of second degree murder under s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered detention under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds in s. 515(10) following a reverse-onus bail application under s. 522.

Evidence included the applicant’s extensive criminal record for breaches, her presence at the homicide scene, forensic evidence linking her footwear and clothing to the victim’s blood, and her conduct before and after the alleged offence.

The proposed release plan involved residence at a supervised disability facility with her brother acting as surety.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to discharge her onus on all three grounds, finding a significant risk of non-attendance, public safety concerns, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offence and strength of the evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery of a bank, attempted extortion of the same branch, laundering proceeds of crime, and fraud.

The offences were committed while the accused was employed at the bank and involved planning with co-accused, threats of violence, and misuse of his position of trust.

During the robbery, co‑accused used knives and restrained employees with duct tape, causing significant fear and emotional harm.

The court considered mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior criminal record, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation, but found numerous aggravating factors including breach of trust, planning, recruitment of accomplices, and continued criminal conduct over several months.

A penitentiary sentence was required to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.

The Crown appealed from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's convictions for incest and sexual assault and ordering a new trial.

The accused had sought to adduce fresh affidavit evidence on appeal alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that defence counsel's conduct did not result in omissions and decisions which, taken together, undermined the reliability of the convictions such that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The convictions were restored and the Sex Offender Information Registration order was modified from 10 to 25 years.