ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty the Queen
– and –
John Anstie
Accused
Counsel:
Julien Lalande, for the Crown
Michael Crystal, for the Accused
HEARD: Oral Reasons for Judgment given August 7, 2019, Written Reasons released September 03, 2019, Oral Reasons for Sentence given September 10, 2020
Reasons for sentence
A.E. London-Weinstein J.
1Mr. Anstie was found guilty after a trial before a judge alone of the deaths of Joan and Doug Foster. He was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs, which caused the deaths of Joan and Doug Foster, and of criminal negligence causing death in relation to the Fosters. Two counts of dangerous driving causing death based on the same facts were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.
The Offence:
2Doug and Joan Foster died after Mr. Anstie collided with their vehicle on March Road near the Highway 417 exit, in front of the Carp Depot, just outside of Almonte. Mr. Anstie had spent the day with a friend. The road was dark and it was shortly before 9 p.m. It was a clear night and snow would not start falling until the early morning hours, when first responders were working at the scene after the catastrophic collision.
3Mr. Anstie drove along March Road in the northbound lane. Joan Foster was driving southbound on March Road. Doug Foster was in the front passenger seat. As Mrs. Foster approached the Carp Depot building on March Road, a video camera posted on that building captured Mr. Anstie’s vehicle cross the center line without braking and slam into the Foster’s Honda. Mr. Anstie’s Nissan was travelling at a speed of 116 to 117 km per hour in the last five seconds before impact. The Honda was travelling at about 14 km per hour at the point of impact. Mrs. Foster braked so hard prior to the collision that the front of the Honda can be seen to dip down when viewed on the recovered Carp Depot video.
4A Nissan Event Data Recorder, or Crash Data Recorder, noted Mr. Anstie’s speed, which was nearly twice the posted speed limit. Mr. Anstie did not attempt to brake, nor did he attempt to steer away from the Honda in the last five seconds of driving activity recorded by the Crash Data Recorder. The Anstie Nissan smashed into the Honda and the Honda flipped into the ditch.
5The Fosters died as a result of the injuries they sustained in the crash. Mr. Anstie suffered severe injuries and was rushed to hospital. A test of Mr. Anstie’s blood by the Centre for Forensic Science revealed the presence of Fentanyl, Xanax and Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).
6Mr. Anstie had an ongoing opioid addiction. He was addicted to Fentanyl and his methadone dosage had been increased prior to the collision. He admitted to use of Fentanyl two weeks prior to the collision. For a full recitation of the facts in this case, reference can be made to my reasons for judgment in this case.
The Position of the Parties:
7The defence argues for a reformatory sentence of just less than two years. The Crown seeks a sentence in the range of eight years or longer.
Relevant Sentencing Principles:
8The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, directs judges to craft sentences that achieve these goals by imposing just sanctions which have one or more of six objectives. Those objectives include the denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims, or to the community that is caused by the unlawful conduct; to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; to separate offenders from society where necessary; to assist in rehabilitating offenders; to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to the victims or to the community.
9Whatever sanction is imposed “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (see Criminal Code, s. 718.1). This proportionality principle is the overarching consideration for every judge in imposing sentence. In determining the sanction required in the particular circumstances of a case, a judge must take into consideration any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.
10Further, a judge must bear in mind that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances, that an offender should not be deprived of liberty if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances, and that all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders (see Criminal Code, ss. 718, 718.1 and 718.2).
11The objectives of sentencing often pull in different directions. It is often difficult to reconcile the different principles at issue. In this case for example, two lives have been taken by the actions of Mr. Anstie. The gravity of the offence mandates that the sentence imposed denounce Mr. Anstie’s actions that night, and that it serve as deterrence to others. However, Mr. Anstie is a young man who has no criminal record. He has a history of trauma and resultant addiction which he has addressed and will continue to address for the rest of his life. He has excellent prospects for rehabilitation. He has employment. He has a strong supportive family. The principles of deterrence, both general and specific, and denunciation are the primary sentencing principles engaged by this case. However, rehabilitation and restraint must also be weighed in the balancing which I am required to conduct.
12In R. v. Hamilton (2004), 2004 CanLII 5549 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.), Doherty J.A. stated at para. 90:
The “gravity of the offence” refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence. The “degree of responsibility of the offender” refers to the offender’s culpability as reflected in the essential substantive elements of the offence—especially the fault component, and any specific aspects of the offender’s conduct or background that tend to increase or decrease the offender’s personal responsibility for the crime.
13Mr. Crystal asks me to consider a sentence of two years less a day. Mr. Crystal argues passionately and thoroughly that the interconnectedness of Mr. Anstie’s addiction to opioids, arising from trauma, and his criminal conduct mandate a therapeutic approach in fashioning a fit sentence. Mr. Crystal argues that the sentence proposed by the defence is sufficiently proportional to the gravity of the offence, the culpability of the offender and meets the needs of general deterrence. Mr. Crystal argues that the emphasis on rehabilitation in the therapeutic approach means that society is better protected as the offender receives the ongoing therapy and treatment required to avoid re-offence. Re-offence is directly tied to further drug use.
14The Crown asks me to consider a sentence of eight years or above. The lives of two beloved people, who had worked hard all of their lives and raised a wonderful family, were taken by the reckless actions of Mr. Anstie. Mr. Anstie had both Fentanyl and Xanax in his system at the time of the crash. His speed was excessive. He did not brake. He had a driving record which was not extensive, as in some other cases, but which is an aggravating factor on sentence. Mr. Lalande, through his cross-examination, drew out the fact that, prior to the collision, Mr. Anstie was not as co-operative with his initial therapy provider as he could have been. Mr. Lalande points out that if he had been more forthcoming, this tragedy may have been avoided all together. In addition, he relapsed into drug use after the collision. I will explain why, at a further point in these reasons, I have concluded that relapse cannot be fairly treated as an aggravating factor on sentence, given Mr. Anstie’s status as a recovering drug addict. I also decline to treat his failure to be forthcoming with his therapist before the accident as an aggravating factor on sentence.
15I agree with Mr. Lalande that the sentence imposed must give paramountcy to deterrence and denunciation. However, I must also insure that the sentence I impose does not crush Mr. Anstie, nor ignore his prospects for rehabilitation. In my view, nether a sentence of eight years, nor a sentence of two years less a day strikes the appropriate balance in this case, given the various factors to be considered.
16I considered every argument and all of the materials presented by both the defence and the Crown. The victim impact evidence revealed, to the extent possible in mere words, the depth of the loss to the Foster family and their friends. Joan and Doug Foster were the kind of people we would all like to count as our friends and neighbours. They were kind, hardworking, decent people who represented the heart of the Foster family. They had worked for many years and were at the point in life when they could begin to slow down and enjoy the fruit of many years of hard labour. I want the Foster family to know that it was made clear to me from their victim impact statements, how much Joan and Doug Foster were loved. There is nothing I can say to the family which will take away the pain, or the loss they have experienced. The adult children have been left with the feeling that they are adrift from what was once the centre of the family.
17The evidence presented on behalf of Mr. Anstie demonstrated a young man who suffers from a terrible addiction to opioids. During the sentencing hearing, it was revealed that Mr. Anstie developed his addiction to opioids after being the victim of childhood sexual abuse by an adult family friend.
18Mr. Anstie had relapsed and made the terrible and irrevocable decision to drive his vehicle after ingesting Fentanyl and Xanax. I was cognizant of the fact that trauma fuelled Mr. Anstie’s pain and his addiction. He has done a lot of hard work in therapy and through the various counselling programs which were described before me, to overcome his addiction. This material all augers in favour of his potential for rehabilitation. However, Mr. Anstie is not being punished today for succumbing to his addiction to opioids. Rather, he is being sentenced for the catastrophic results of his decision to drive after using drugs, resulting in the loss of two innocent lives.
19I turn to a discussion of the various principles of sentencing expressed in the case law, the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the particular circumstances relating to this offence and to Mr. Anstie, which I felt were the most relevant considerations.
Parity of Sentence:
20The sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation are applicable to impaired driving offences, which often are committed by persons like Mr. Anstie, who have no criminal antecedents: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para. 13; R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 261 at paras. 74-75.
21An offender’s level of moral blameworthiness for impaired driving causing death will vary significantly depending on the aggravating and mitigating factors in any given case. As a result, and based on the number of different circumstances involved in the commission of this offence, the range of imposed sentences is quite broad—from low penitentiary sentences of two to three years to more substantial sentences of eight years.
22In Lacasse, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeal for Ontario has refused to define a sentencing range for the crime of impaired driving causing death, noting that the crime can be committed in an infinite variety of circumstances: R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39, 103 O.R. (3d) 641.
23Three years was the starting point of the range of sentence appropriate for this offence 35 years ago. Since that time, sentences have risen in response to the perceived need for general deterrence in relation to drunk driving. The maximum sentence for a conviction for criminal negligence causing death is life imprisonment. In R. v. McVeigh (1985), 1985 CanLII 115 (ON CA), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 145 (Ont. C.A.), the court held that the 21-month sentence imposed by the trial judge could not stand. The court instead imposed a sentence of three years.
24In McVeigh, the driver of a motor vehicle was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after driving drunk and striking and killing a 14-year-old-boy. A sentence of 21 months did not give sufficient weight to the requirement of general deterrence. The blood alcohol readings were extremely high, in the 185 mg range. Mr. McVeigh was 31 at the time of sentencing. He was married with two children and was employed as an industrial accountant.
25Mr. McVeigh, like Mr. Anstie, had no criminal record at the time of sentencing. He also had an addiction issue and had taken steps before sentencing to deal with the addiction. The court in McVeigh noted at para. 9, in regard to evidence of rehabilitation, that “the evidence of his attempts at rehabilitation would have been much more impressive if he had taken steps to cure his addiction before April 1, 1983.”
26I appreciate that the court may have found that in the case of Mr. McVeigh, his cure came too late to be of any assistance to the victim. This case was decided in 1985. Much more is known about the disease of addiction in 2020 than was known in 1985. The evidence before me on this hearing was consistent with the current view of recovery and addiction, which is that recovery is an ongoing lifelong process to avoid relapse, rather than being regarded as a cure.
27At the time of this incident, Mr. Anstie had made previous attempts to remain sober and had a methadone prescription. However, he had experienced a relapse.
28The court in McVeigh noted that no one takes to the road after becoming impaired with the thought that someone may be killed. The court noted that sentences should be such as to make it much less attractive for the drinker to get behind the wheel after drinking. The court wrote at para. 12: “The public should not have to wait until members of the public are killed before the courts’ repudiation of the conduct that lead to the killing is clear. It is trite to say that every drinking driver is a potential killer.”
29In the case of Mr. Anstie, I do not believe that he thought about the consequences of his decision to drive at the time it was made. He was in a state of relapse, in the grip of a very acute addiction. As a result of his relapse, he made a terrible error in judgment which cost two people their lives. It is for that error in judgment, by choosing to drive when impaired by drugs, that he is being sentenced.
30The case law in this area consistently speaks to the importance of general deterrence due to the gravity of the offence. Two lives were taken as a direct result of the actions of Mr. Anstie.
31In my view, after reviewing all of the evidence put before me, I do not believe that Mr. Anstie needs to be specifically deterred from using drugs and driving in the future. I do not believe that Mr. Anstie would ever drive a vehicle while impaired by drugs again, given his expressed remorse, the psychological and physical suffering he has also endured himself and the pain his actions have caused his family, who have supported him throughout these proceedings. However, I am required to fashion a sentence which expresses the appropriate level of denunciation so that others who may be similarly tempted will be deterred from driving while impaired by drugs.
32Unfortunately, the decision to drive a vehicle while impaired usually occurs in circumstances when the individual’s ability to make good decisions is also impaired. I am certain that Mr. Anstie never expected that his decision to drive would have such catastrophic consequences. It follows that he was not thinking about the length of sentence which he would face for a collision that he never contemplated.
33However, the authority of binding law requires that I fashion a sentence which will denounce what Mr. Anstie has done with enough force to generally deter others.
34I was provided with a number of authorities by both Mr. Crystal and Mr. Lalande. I reviewed all of them. Of course, each case turns, to some degree, on its particular facts and relevant considerations.
35In R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 261, the Court of Appeal for Ontario upheld the trial judge’s decision to impose a four-year sentence.
36Ramage exemplified some of the features that are common in these types of tragic cases. Mr. Ramage’s motor vehicle crossed four lanes of traffic on a busy four-lane road and struck two oncoming vehicles. The passenger in Mr. Ramage’s vehicle was killed. The driver of one of the vehicles struck by the appellant’s vehicle suffered significant debilitating injuries. Mr. Ramage was convicted of impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death; impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm; and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol exceeding .08.
37Counsel for Mr. Ramage argued that having regard to the appellant’s truly exemplary background and the heartfelt plea for mercy made by members of the deceased’s family, a four-year penitentiary term was harsh and grossly disproportionate.
38Mr. Ramage had been attending the funeral of a friend and former colleague prior to the collision.
39While Mr. Ramage did not appear intoxicated to those who observed him that evening, he failed to apply the brakes and took no evasive action prior to the collision. He crossed four lanes of traffic prior to the collision.
40Mr. Anstie also did not apply the brakes nor steer to avoid a collision in the last five seconds before the collision. His speed was excessive. Mr. Ramage’s blood alcohol readings were estimated to be between .212 and .282 at the time of the accident.
41The sentencing judge in Ramage identified general deterrence as the predominant concern. In doing so, he applied the Court of Appeal’ s judgment in McVeigh. In that judgment, the court made it clear that drinking and driving related offences were serious crimes and must be treated as such by the courts: R. v. Ramage, 2010 ONCA 488, 257 C.C.C. (3d) 261 at para. 74.
42In Ramage, the Court of Appeal observed that many persons who commit serious crimes while impaired are otherwise good citizens who have never been involved with the criminal law. General deterrence is of primary importance. The court described the impaired driver as creating peril akin to the danger created by a drunken man who walks down a busy street firing a handgun at random. The community, quite properly, demands that the courts denounce and deter such reckless and dangerous conduct. Significant incarceration is the remedy that most emphatically achieves those goals: at para. 76.
43In Ramage, the court noted the remorse of the appellant. In this case, Mr. Anstie has expressed his heartfelt remorse and I accept that he is remorseful. In Ramage, the family of the deceased asked the trial judge not to incarcerate the appellant. The family had forgiven him. The trial judge canvassed the “moving and rare” position taken by the victim’s family and properly considered their request as one of the many factors that were relevant to his determination of an appropriate sentence: at para. 77. In this case, certain members of the Foster family have also forgiven Mr. Anstie. I have considered that factor.
44In Ramage, a four-year sentence was upheld. Mr. Ramage had killed one person, and severely injured another. Justice Doherty, in obiter, wrote at para. 80:
Initially, I was inclined to the view that the sentence appeal should be allowed on the basis that the appellant’s exemplary life, other than this event, entitled him to the lowest possible period of incarceration that would adequately reflect the need for general deterrence and denunciation. I thought that a penitentiary sentence of less than four years would achieve that purpose. Further consideration has, however, led me to conclude that were I to take that approach, I would not be giving the trial judge’s decision the deference it is due. There is no error in principle here. Nor, can it be said, in light of McVeigh and the relevant jurisprudence, that a four-year sentence is manifestly unreasonable.
45In R. v. Junkert, 2010 ONCA 549, 103 O.R. (3d) 284, a five-year sentence was upheld where Mr. Junkert was driving at a high speed in a residential neighbourhood when he struck a pedestrian. His blood alcohol readings were 130 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. The court cautioned against thinking formulaically about sentence ranges in drinking and driving cases involving death. O’Connor A.C.J.O., wrote at para. 40: “I begin by noting that courts should be cautious in rigidly applying ‘a range’ of sentences in cases such as this, involving impaired driving causing death.”
46In R. v. L. (J.) (2000), 2000 CanLII 15854 (ON CA), 147 C.C.C. (3d) 299 (Ont. C.A.) the court also recognized at para. 2 that cases involving drinking and driving did not demonstrate a particular range of sentencing but rather that the sentences were driven by the almost “infinite variety of circumstances in which this offence can be committed.”
47In R. v. Regier, 2011 ONCA 557, the appellant unsuccessfully appealed his sentence of six years imprisonment imposed by Ray J. on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The Court of Appeal did not accept that the range for such cases is restricted to two to five years. The court pointed out at para. 2 that in R. v. Boukchev (2003), 2003 CanLII 26654 (ON CA), 177 O.A.C. 119 at para 6 “sentences have tended to increase in severity for these types of offences because of the heightened recognition of the need for general deterrence and protection of the public.”
48In Regier, two young people were killed, and the driver of another vehicle seriously injured. The trial judge found that the appellant’s driving was aggressive and that his manoeuvring was “grossly unsafe.” The appellant had a lengthy driving record involving 25 Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 convictions over a period of 28 years. He had been charged with careless driving in another incident near the place of the accident on the same highway within two years following the accident.
49In R. v. Kummer, 2011 ONCA 39, 103 O.R. (3d) 641, the appellant was driving at a high rate of speed when he collided with another vehicle in an intersection after going through a stop sign without stopping. His blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit. He had no prior criminal record.
50The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts each of dangerous driving causing death and impaired driving causing death, and two counts each of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and impaired driving causing bodily harm. He drove at an extreme rate of speed with a blood alcohol concentration more than twice the legal limit. He collided with a vehicle that was lawfully in the intersection. Both cars burst into flames. The father of one of the two 12-year-old boys in the car hit by the appellant had to be repeatedly restrained from rushing back to his car where his son and his young friend were still trapped inside. The car became completely engulfed in flames.
51The father also suffered serious physical injuries in the crash, as well as significant psychological consequences still evident a year after the crash. One of the accused’s two passengers was also killed. The trial judge imposed an eight-year concurrent sentence for each of the dangerous and impaired driving causing death offences and four-year concurrent sentences for each of the dangerous and impaired driving offences, along with a 12-year driving prohibition. The Court of Appeal held that the four to five-year range on prior decisions did not cap the sentences available for these types of offences. Three young lives were lost. The prior careless driving conviction should have been a wake-up call, which was a significant aggravating feature of the case. The driver failed to heed a warning to slow down moments before the crash. The eight-year sentence was found not to be unfit. The court found that there was good reason, in that case, to move beyond the sentences imposed and affirmed in Ramage and Junkert. The results of the appellant’s actions were particularly catastrophic. The appellants in both Ramage and Junkert each killed one person. The court noted that in Kummer, three lives were lost, and the impact of the tragedy on three families had to be recognized by imposition of a sentence significant enough to hold the appellant accountable for his actions. A sentence of 8 years was held to be appropriate.
52In R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, 56 C.R. (7th) 83, the appellant was heavily intoxicated and driving when he ran a red light and collided with another vehicle. Two passengers in the rear seat of the other vehicle were killed in the collision. The driver suffered severe injuries, as did another passenger. The appellant had a blood alcohol concentration of 175 mg in 100 ml of blood. A sentence of 10 years was reduced to 7. The appellant had pled guilty. Gladue principles were part of the hearing.
53In R. v. Muzzo, 2016 ONSC 2068, 353 C.C.C. (3d) 411, a ten-year sentence was imposed. Mr. Muzzo was 29, with no criminal record. He sped through a stop sign, collided with a minivan and killed four people, seriously injuring two others. The evidence showed that at the time of the collision, his blood alcohol concentration was between 190 and 245 mg per 100 ml blood. He had a lengthy prior record for driving infractions, including ten convictions for speeding, “which to the sentencing judge “indicated an irresponsible attitude toward the privilege of driving”: at para. 71.
54In R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, 56 C.R. (7th) 83, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed a number of decisions and concluded that sentences for impaired driving causing death typically fall in the four to six year range, unless the offender has a prior criminal record, or a prior driving record. Where he or she does, lengthier sentences have been imposed, ranging from seven and one half to twelve years. The court noted that in Lacasse, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of six-and-one-half years for impaired driving causing the death of two passengers, even though the offender had been convicted three times for speeding: R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, 56 C.R. (7th) 83 at para. 70; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089 at para. 80.
55The court also noted that “while these have been the lengths of sentences imposed in practice by Ontario courts over the past decade, it remains the case that this court has not defined a formal range for such sentences in light of the infinite variety of circumstances in which the offence can be committed”: at para. 72.
56In Altiman, the court found that a 10-year custodial sentence was a substantial and marked departure from the sentences customarily imposed in Ontario for similar offenders committing similar crimes. That was found to be the case even taking into account both the fact that Mr. Altiman killed two people and seriously injured two others, as well as the primary role played by the principles of denunciation and deterrence in cases of impaired driving causing death. The sentence was found to be demonstrably unfit and a seven-year sentence was substituted: at para. 108.
Moral culpability of Mr. Anstie
57Mr. Crystal on behalf of Mr. Anstie has argued that a two-year sentence is an appropriate reflection of the moral culpability of Mr. Anstie.
58A two-year sentence is far outside of the sentences imposed for an impaired (in this case by drug) case where two people died as a result. In R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 1089, the Supreme Court made clear that imposing a sentence outside of the usual range is not a self-standing sentencing error provided that the sentence is justified on the facts of the case. Mr. Crystal points me to case law which demonstrates that a sentencing judge can impose a sentence outside of what would in other circumstances be considered appropriate where the decision can be justified on the individual facts of the case. Sentencing is an inherently contextual exercise. I note however, that the gravity of the case before me is much more serious than the examples provided in the case law by Mr. Crystal. In my view, a sentence of two years less a day does not adequately reflect the gravity of Mr. Anstie’s offence.
59In R. v. Basha, 2019 ONCA 236, the Crown appealed a two year less a day sentence which Kane J. imposed for one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, one count of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, one count of processing proceeds of crime, and another of breach of probation. Mr. Basha also pleaded guilty to a count of simple possession of cocaine found on his person when he was subsequently arrested.
60The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, although it was outside of the range. The trial judge was not found to have committed any errors of principle that affected that sentence. The court noted at para. 21:
In the unusual circumstances of this case, we do not find the sentence to be demonstrably unfit. The trial judge, having had the benefit of the full evidence in the case, including many hours of surveillance tapes, concluded that Mr. Basha was not a principal in the drug trafficking enterprise. He was an addict who, despite his work in carrying, distributing and selling drugs belonging to others, remained of modest financial means. A refugee traumatized by the horrors of a war-torn Kosovo, he began his life in Canada as a young teenager, isolated and troubled. He turned to drugs, and his addiction led him to become involved in drug trafficking.
61The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s acceptance of the fact that in the three years prior to trial, Mr. Basha made significant rehabilitative gains, supported by family and health care professionals. At the time of sentencing, his addiction was under control, he was gainfully employed, he was leading a pro-social life, and his common-law partner was expecting a child: at para. 22.
62In that decision, the sentence was outside of the range due to the reduced moral culpability of the offender due to his diminished role in the drug trafficking operation. It was also a mitigating factor that he had made significant rehabilitative gains, supported by family and health care professionals.
63In the case before me, Mr. Anstie is a victim of highly traumatic sexual abuse as a young person which resulted in the development of a serious drug addiction. He has made significant strides in his recovery with the help of professionals and has engaged in relapse prevention therapy. In my view his rehabilitative efforts deserve serious weight as mitigation and they also point to his strong prospects for ongoing rehabilitation. However, I believe the gravity of the offence makes a sentence in the range of two years less a day an inappropriate reflection of the harm caused by his actions.
64In R. v. Hillier, 2018 ONCJ 397, West J. found that a suspended sentence and probation was a proportionate sentence for one offender, and a sentence of two years less a day plus three years of probation was proportionate for another offender where both offenders pleaded guilty to one count of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking. This case was provided to me by the defence to support the argument that a sentence well outside the range is possible where the background circumstances of the offender are highly compelling and support what Mr. Crystal describes as the therapeutic approach to sentencing.
65Hillier is not binding on me, but West J. is a highly experienced criminal law jurist and I agreed with his reasoning in that case.
66Justice West found that Ms. Blain had a lesser role in the offence than Mr. Hillier and also noted that Ms. Blain put her children in danger when she had Fentanyl in the car as Fentanyl is easily absorbed through the children’s skin. Her children were also placed in danger given the very nature of the trafficking in activity which Mr. Hillier was engaged. This fact was in contrast to the very positive letter which was provided by the Children’s Aid Society, which described Ms. Blain as an attentive and caring mother. Justice West wrote at para. 164: “It is my view this speaks to the intensity of Ms. Blain’s opiate addiction and the impairment it caused to her judgment.” In Hillier, Justice West fashioned a sentence which met the need for specific deterrence in relation to Ms. Blain. Justice West resolved the vexing problem of how to meet the demand for general deterrence by pointing to the fact that, while he spared Ms. Blain jailtime, given her lesser role in the trafficking, Mr. Hillier served a jail sentence, as he played the principal role in trafficking the Fentanyl and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking: at para. 166.
67Justice West went on to say that the gravity of possessing Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, within the proportionality assessment, if that were the only consideration, would strongly indicate the appropriate sentence should be a custodial one: at para. 168. The fundamental principle of sentencing proportionality also requires consideration of the degree of responsibility of the offender. However, he was of the view that Ms. Blain’s personal constellation of mitigation factors amount to a totality of such exceptional rigour as to not only justify a departure from the conventional range of imprisonment for offences such as hers, but from any imprisonment at all: at para. 158.
68In the case before me, Mr. Anstie of course does not have a secondary role in terms of the offence. The requirement for denunciation vested in the concept of general deterrence must be borne by him alone, although the need for general deterrence must be balanced to accommodate other relevant sentencing factors, including his strong prospects for rehabilitation.
69Finally, in R. v. Briscoe, 2019 ONSC 2471, Barnes J. imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine. Mr. Briscoe was a drug addict and, while he had periods of success and sobriety, he inevitably would succumb to his drug addiction. The offences for which he was convicted occurred just a few days after he finished the Teen Challenge Program.
70In Briscoe, the court noted that the offender’s background and the circumstances of the offence show how criminal law and drug treatment intersect. The court noted that s. 718 of the Criminal Code includes deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation, reparation to victim and community, accountability and responsibility as sentencing objectives.
71Justice Barnes wrote a thoughtful and detailed decision tracing the link between addiction and offence, and the need for rehabilitation to be given paramountcy in sentencing where addiction is the causal link to the offence. He noted that drug addiction and drug treatment are also mitigating factors in sentencing: R. v. Barkhouse, 2017 ONCA 29 at para. 3; R. v. McDonald, 2015 ABCA 108, 323 C.C.C. (3d) 3.
72A sentencing judge must balance the objectives of sentencing as warranted by the circumstances of the case and the offender: R. v. Nasoguluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206 at para. 43.
73In cases where criminal law and treatment intersect, rehabilitation (treatment) must be a paramount sentencing objective because treatment and improvement of the individual are intricately linked to the probability of recurrence of criminal behaviour. Hence the betterment of the individual is directly linked to the betterment of society: R. v. Briscoe, 2019 ONSC 2471 at para. 24.
74Justice Barnes goes on to point out, at para. 16:
When criminal law and treatment meet, the question is not whether treatment of the underlying cause of criminal law should occur, it must. The question is where and how such treatment should take place? The importance of other sentencing objectives will determine the venue of treatment. So for example, minor offences may attract treatment interventions outside a custodial setting and more serious offences may attract treatment interventions within a custodial setting.
75I agree with Mr. Crystal’s submission that Mr. Anstie’s criminal offence is linked inexorably to his addiction. Society will be better protected by Mr. Anstie continuing the treatment he has been so diligent in pursuing. I also agree with everything which Barnes J. wrote in regard to the need for rehabilitation to be given paramountcy where a criminal offence is linked to addiction, as it was in the case of Mr. Anstie. However, given the gravity of the offence, treatment in this case will have to, as Barnes J. pointed out, take place initially within a custodial facility. The gravity of the offence, despite the importance of fostering rehabilitation through the therapeutic approach, mandates that a significant term of imprisonment be imposed, in my view.
76I appreciate that Mr. Anstie is currently employed and will lose his employment if sentenced to a period of time exceeding two years. Employment is a pro-social activity and is also helpful in ensuring that Mr. Anstie not relapse.
77There were a number of witnesses who testified to Mr. Anstie’s progress. Mr. Peter Kunst, the executive director of Newgate 180 Addiction Solutions testified in the sentencing portion of this trial. Newgate 180 is a treatment facility for addicts.
78Mr. Kunst testified that his program specifically deals with the underlying pain which is at the root of addiction. He cited the work of Dr. Gabor Mate, who advocates for substantial lifestyle change in order to avoid a reversion to pain avoidance mechanisms rooted in substance abuse.
79Mr. Anstie had a team of therapeutic workers, including his therapist, Ms. Suzanne Duc, and Dale Campbell, a relapse prevention worker.
80Ms. Duc began seeing Mr. Anstie in October of 2016. He was referred to her by Dr. Mark Ujjainwalla, who was his treating physician for methadone recovery. After three years of treatment, Ms. Duc concluded that Mr. Anstie has made significant progress in overcoming his addiction, in maintaining his sobriety and in trying to become a better person.
81Ms. Duc indicated that despite a pro-social and loving home life, Mr. Anstie was sexually assaulted, at the age of 14, by an individual who took a group of his friends camping and fishing. This person provided them with drugs and alcohol and molested the boys and sexually assaulted them. Mr. Anstie also witnessed one of his friends being abused. Mr. Anstie did not disclose these incidents until after the collision. Ms. Duc said that Mr. Anstie suffered significant trauma by his own abuse, and by witnessing his friend being abused. This trauma lead to his drug addiction. Ms. Duc described Mr. Anstie as being someone who has a conscience and is a thoughtful person. She also referenced the fact that Mr. Anstie has a sponsor who is older than Mr. Anstie, and has 27 years of sobriety, as being a positive factor in terms of his long term prospects for remaining sober. She described him as being in an “ocean of pain” at one point, and her lasting concern that he will be unable to metabolize the pain and his trauma, in reference to Mr. Anstie’s attempt at suicide after the accident while recovering in a convalescent home. Mr. Anstie expressed a willingness to atone to the Foster family and that he feels tremendous remorse for the pain he has caused them.
82Prior to the collision, Ms. Duc admitted that an initial assessment came to a halt because Mr. Anstie would not co-operate. Further, she confirmed that he had relapsed since the collision in December of 2016.
83Mr. Anstie completed a 30-day intensive residential treatment program and an 11-month follow-up outpatient support program.
84Mr. Anstie was observed to have gained both strength and insight as it related to his addiction over the course of the treatment period.
85Jane Rockandel, Mr. Anstie’s paternal aunt also testified. Ms. Rockandel is a retired lawyer. She gave evidence regarding the close-knit nature of the Anstie family. It is clear from her evidence, which I accept, that Mr. Anstie will have a strong family to support him in his continued rehabilitation going forward.
86Anne Collis, who is a neighbour of the Anstie family, testified that Mr. Anstie was her son’s best friend growing up. She is very close to Mr. Anstie. She entrusts him to care for her home when she is absent and has a great deal of trust generally, in him. Ms. Collis noted an increase in Mr. Anstie’s insightfulness.
87Sarah Anstie, Mr. Anstie’s sister, also testified during the sentencing hearing. She indicated her family is close, loving and supportive. She testified that her parents were forced to ask her brother to leave their home due to his drug use. For a period, he was living on the street. Ms. Anstie noted that her brother is accepting help, is becoming more of himself again and is demonstrating a commitment to himself by taking his medication. She also testified that he has maintained his job with the City of Ottawa in the Parks Department.
88Jennifer Heath, Mr. Anstie’s physiotherapist, wrote a letter on behalf of Mr. Anstie. She has been a physiotherapist for 24 years and has treated many persons who have survived motor vehicle accidents, such as Mr. Anstie. Ms. Heath was Mr. Anstie’s physiotherapist from December 2016 to March 2019. She described Mr. Anstie as well-read, educated, respectful and peaceful. She described his nature to be quiet and respectful. She asked me to take his nature into consideration when sentencing Mr. Anstie.
89It also was brought to my attention that Mr. Anstie would be able to retain his employment with the City of Ottawa if he were given a two-year sentence. Mr. Luc Cleroux, of Mr. Anstie’s union, requested that he be given 18 months of absence without pay. This was confirmed in a letter provided to the court by the defence.
90However, I still must balance the mitigation of all that he has done to enable his recovery, and the fact that he is a survivor of a highly traumatic sexual assault, with the need for general deterrence due to the consequences of his decision to drive when impaired by Fentanyl and Xanax.
Pre-Sentence Report:
91Mr. Anstie, age 27, has an older sister Sarah, who testified on his behalf at this sentencing hearing. Sarah asked me to remember that my decision would not only affect her brother, but would have a ripple effect upon the entire family. The pre-sentence report confirmed that the extended Anstie family contains a loving and supportive group of aunts and uncles who support Mr. Anstie.
92Mr. Anstie disclosed to the author of the pre-sentence report that despite an idyllic home life, he was permitted, when he was 14, to attend camping trips with an older man, whom a friend represented as being his uncle. Mr. Anstie and his group of friends went camping and fishing with this older man. This “uncle” provided the boys with drugs and alcohol, and then molested and sexually abused them.
93Ms. Duc, who is Mr. Anstie’s psychotherapist, advised the author of the pre-sentence report that, in one session, he remembered that, as he was regaining consciousness in the cabin, he witnessed an older man performing fellatio on one of the young boys in the group. Ms. Duc opined that, while Mr. Anstie’s mind won’t remember the trauma of the sexual assault, his body will indeed remember the suffering. Mr. Anstie suspected that most of the assaults on him occurred while he was unconscious.
94After high school, his addiction precluded him from engaging in meaningful employment. For a period of time he lived on the streets and was supported by Ontario Works. However, with the support of his parents he was able to obtain a trucking license and worked with the City of Ottawa in this capacity for some time. He had some “issues” during this course of employment that were managed in part by a union representative.
95Mr. Anstie has been working in the Parks Department with the City of Ottawa for 12 to 18 months at the time of the issuance of the pre-sentence report.
96While he has had some slip ups, Ms. Duc advised the author of the pre-sentence report that she estimated Mr. Anstie was in sobriety 97 per cent of the time. His Narcotics Anonymous sponsor confirmed that Mr. Anstie attends NA meetings minimally twice weekly. He believes Mr. Anstie to be committed to NA.
97Ms. Duc and Mr. Anstie’s NA sponsor both agree that relapse prevention is a large part of sobriety and Mr. Anstie must be in a place where he is able to continue with clinical and social supports to keep him focused. Ms. Duc believes that, should Mr. Anstie be left without his circle of care and support, he is at serious risk of relapse, as it is in using that he has found escape.
98In the assessment portion of the pre-sentence report, the author inserted opinions which, in my view, exceeded the acceptable parameters of a report by a probation officer filed in compliance with s. 722 of the Criminal Code.
99The purpose of a pre-sentence report is to supply a picture of the offender as a person in society. The report is intended to be an accurate, independent, and balanced assessment of an offender, his background and prospects for the future. Probation officers must be thorough and fair and should canvass the relevant information before commenting on an issue: R. v. Junkert, 2010 ONCA 549, 103 O.R. (3d) 284 at para. 59-60.
100At the second paragraph of page 9 of the report, the author opined that:
…for all intents and purposes the subject superimposed his own trauma on the lives of others. The subject falling into a pattern of addiction by means to escape trauma is theoretically and completely understandable. What is beyond comprehension is the cumulative actions of the subject that resulted in the matter currently before this Court.
There is no doubt in this writer’s mind that the subject deeply and truly regrets his actions on December 4, 2016, the impacts on the lives of all involved including the subject’s own family have been profound. But what cannot be ignored is that in this particular case, regardless of regret and remorse, the lives of the victims and their families were impacted so fully and completely, there are unavoidable consequences. Consequences that in no way shape or form can undo tragedy but may provide a starting point for healing for all involved.
101The purpose of the pre-sentence report is to provide information about the offender in a balanced manner. These remarks go beyond the purpose of a pre-sentence report. I gave no weight to these two paragraphs of the report, nor should the Parole Board.
Letters in Support of Mr. Anstie:
102In addition to the letters already referenced, I was provided with over 15 letters in support of Mr. Anstie. Where there was repetition, I did not make specific reference to each letter. The letters overwhelmingly speak of Mr. Anstie’s kind and sensitive character, his sincere remorse at what he has done and the steps he has taken to rehabilitate himself and become a productive person in our society. The first was heart rending. It was from Mr. Anstie’s father Bill. The letter begins with extended condolences to the family of Joan and Doug Foster. Bill Anstie is an IT consultant and worked outside of Ottawa to support his family, largely on contracts. He was a resident of a Territory of the Canadian Arctic between 2005 and 2016. He worries in retrospect that this time away may have compounded his son’s struggles in high school. He moved his son to Iqaluit to be with him and Sarah, but John could not find work. John returned to Kanata and ended up leaving home. He attended the Ottawa Addiction Clinic in Vanier, where he was placed on daily methadone.
103Mr. Anstie confirmed his son’s employment, and the fact that John attends NA meetings regularly and is dedicated to getting off of methadone and continuing in his recovery. After the collision, John attempted suicide while living in a convalescent home.
104Mrs. Anstie described her son as funny, sensitive and easy going before he developed a drug problem which put his parents through “hell and heartbreak” trying to get him to get help.
105John became better after seeing a specialized doctor, although he had a few set backs. On December 4, 2016 the police arrived at their house and said that Joan and Doug Foster had died, and John was still alive but had serious injuries.
106Mrs. Anstie pointed out that her son has been on house arrest except for work and medical appointments. He is following all of the house rules and has thought about becoming a drug counsellor. His mother notes he is working and is an asset to society. She notes his remorse.
107Sarah Anstie noted that her brother now has a desire to gain control over his drug addiction, he is investing his energy into creative outlets, he is an animal lover, he is maintaining his job and desires to have responsibilities. He has a desire to continue living and has expressed deep remorse after the collision. Sarah also wrote that her brother has demonstrated a desire to seek support and successfully completed his rehabilitation program. He has also demonstrated a commitment toward self-improvement and a desire to be a contributing family member and a contributing member of society.
108Mr. Anstie’s aunt Donna Palov has known him all of his life and has spent time with the family since the collision. She describes him as a kind, caring and gentle person.
109Paul Anstie related an incident where John helped him restore his home so that it could be sold when he was recovering from a bout of cancer. John did an excellent job and would not accept any payment. He wrote: “John’s effort towards recovery from addiction, his attachment to his family, and his continued steady employment, are all positive signs. John’s sociable, non-violent nature, his practical and artistic skills offer hope for his future contribution to society.”
110Ms. Anya Brookner described the Anstie family as tight-knit and loving. She has known John and his family for many years and describes him as a kind-hearted and creative young man.
111Mr. Peter Lamothe, Mr. Anstie’s sponsor at NA, is of the view that Mr. Anstie has been a faithful member of his Home Group called “Faith in Life.” He has immersed himself in the 12 Step program. Mr. Lamothe has been a sponsor to many young men over his 27 years. He is a retired Catholic High School teacher. He is of the view that John’s dedication and hard work to improve himself resembles the long-term success he has seen in other sponsees.
Mr. Anstie’s expression of remorse:
112I fully accept that Mr. Anstie is deeply remorseful for taking the lives of Joan and Doug Foster. The reality of what happened, he said, rarely escapes his thoughts and fills him with great remorse. Mr. Anstie also knows that he must go to prison for what he has done. Mr. Anstie appreciates that the loss of Joan and Doug was the loss of the epicentre of that family. Mr. Anstie indicated that every day he works in his recovery program in honour of the Fosters.
Community Impact Statements:
113Mrs. Joan Foster’s sister, Dorothy Gordon provided a victim impact statement. Ms. Gordon’s life has been turned upside down since losing her older sister Joan and her husband Doug. Three days before Joan died, she and her sister Dorothy had made plans to have lunch together in Renfrew. Joan gave Dorothy a beautiful plate. Ms. Gordon misses sharing life with her older sister, and she misses Joan’s sense of adventure. She recalled a summer before Joan passed where she took her kayak out and enjoyed lunch on the river. Ms. Gordon recalled the sound of her sister’s soft singing voice as they recalled some of the hymns they learned as children. Ms. Gordon recalled how caring Joan was when Dorothy’s infant grandchild died. She also found it heartbreaking that, after years of working at her hairdressing business and Doug as a prominent builder, they built the house of their dreams, but only got to enjoy it for a short two years. Mrs. Gordon ended her victim impact statement by writing:
One thing I know for sure…. the many memories I have of Joan and Doug over the years will never be taken away. They were so special to our family and their passing has left a profound emptiness in our lives. We miss them, but we will one day see them again in Heaven. That is our comfort.
114Ms. Ruth Anne Adams was also Joan Foster’s sister. Her articulate words described the unfairness of the deaths of the couple, just at a point in time when they were going to be able to retire and enjoy the golden years with extended family and grandchildren.
As a result of his choices, I lost a loving sister, brother in-law, my hairstylist of 20 years and rest of the now unfulfilled lives we could have shared together, creating wonderful new memories with our continually growing family. The loss is truly immeasurable. As a Christian, I extend my forgiveness to Mr. Anstie. As a victim of his actions, I hope his sentence will speak for the depth of hurt and fracture he caused in so many lives, and reflect the loss of the two lives he ended.
115Ms. Sharon McBride is also Joan Foster’s sister. She was so impacted by her sister’s death that she had to received bereavement counselling. Ms. McBride pointed out how beloved Doug and Joan Foster were in the community. There were over a thousand sympathetic acquaintances who offered their condolences and the church was overflowing for the funeral. Ms. McBride is an eloquent writer. Some of her thoughts regarding losing her sister reflect an intense and personal pain, which is clearly communicated and which I understood. Of her sister, she wrote:
Joan was a formidable woman who lived up to the saying “a mother is the heart of the family”. She was the heart of our large Robertson family as the eldest sister. Since that fateful night when they were taken away from us, we as a family no longer have the direction or presence that we once had.
116Mr. Ron Robertson, Joan’s brother, spoke of the profound effect of the loss on the entire family. Joan was the glue who kept the family together and Doug was Mr. Robertson’s mentor. The loss has impacted the entire family.
117Skyler Foster was living in Berlin, Germany when his parents died. Mr. Skyler Foster wrote in his victim impact statement in a manner which spoke directly to Mr. Anstie. He wrote:
Now, nearly three years have passed and you’re about to receive your sentence. There was a time I felt so angry I longed for this day, but something has changed. Without the pain of my grief so fresh, I can see you better. I don’t know you at all, but what I do know is that you have a mother and father who love you, just like my mother and father loved me. I know this because they came with you to court and sat by your side and every single day of the trial. I know that if you go to prison for a long time, it will break their hearts, just as you broke mine when you took away my parents.
118Joel Foster wrote that he is in agony any time he thinks of his parents’ final moments. He is tormented knowing that they saw Mr. Anstie driving straight toward them, and tried to avoid the collision. Mr. Foster wrote that he can imagine the fear, the panic and confusion they must have felt in their final moments.
119Mr. Joel Foster had to remove his parents’ personal belongings from the vehicle. “I can never un-see those things; the blood-soaked airbags, the steering column compressed toward the driver’s seat, with scarcely enough room for a human being between the steering wheel and the seat.” Mr. Foster is haunted by those images.
120The extended family used to get together for a meal at every Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas and for a summer barbeque. This does not happen since Mr. Foster’s parents died.
121Being together highlights their absence. Holidays are difficult. Mr. Joel Foster has a number of regrets that he will never be able to remedy. His work in addiction medicine has become complicated for him. Some days he has to compartmentalize his thoughts in order to continue functioning at a minimal level. Mr. Foster lost time from work to attend the trial, verdict and sentencing hearing.
122Mr. Joel Foster no longer trusts that drivers will follow the rules of the road. He feels uncomfortable as a pedestrian when cars approach. He sold his car and is not comfortable even as a passenger in a car.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:
123It is aggravating that Mr. Anstie has a prior HTA driving record, although his driving record is not as serious as the drivers in Altiman, or Reigert. Mr. Anstie had both Xanax and Fentanyl in his blood stream. Mr. Anstie was speeding at the time of collision. He left his own lane completely and struck the Foster vehicle without swerving away, or braking in the last five seconds before impact. He killed two people. The immediate and extended Foster family have been completely devastated by the loss of Joan and Doug Foster.
124It is mitigating that Mr. Anstie is a drug addict who has worked diligently at his rehabilitation. He attended a month-long inpatient program, and 11 months of follow up treatment. He has immersed himself in a 12-step program and has a good and experienced sponsor. He has retained employment and has a job open to him if he receives a sentence of two years. He is well loved by a large and supportive extended family. He has been on strict conditions of release. He has expressed contrition and remorse. I do not regard it as aggravating that he has had slip ups in the period of time since he began to seriously address the issue of sobriety. In my view, relapses are part of the struggle to remain sober. They are not anomalous in recovery, but are relatively common. To punish Mr. Anstie for relapse would be to punish him for being an addict. The important, and mitigating factor, in my view, is that he picked himself up after the relapse, and continued in the work of his recovery. His prospects for long term rehabilitation, according to his very experienced sponsor, are strong.
125Mr. Anstie is also a first-time offender. He was 24 years old at the time of the collision and is 27 now. While not a youth at the time of the incident, he is still what I would consider a young adult. He was a victim of sexual abuse as a youth, which largely contributed to him becoming an opioid addict. He expressed heartfelt remorse. His pre-sentence report was quite positive. His letters of support from family all describe him in positive terms.
126I have struggled in this case to reconcile the individual factors in Mr. Anstie’s case which favour rehabilitation, with the gravity of the offence which mandates emphasis on general deterrence.
127In my view, having considered all of the relevant sentencing principles at play in this case, a period of incarceration of 5 years is a just and appropriate sentence which is consistent with the sentencing objectives of the Criminal Code.
128I appreciate that due to the number of ways this offence can be committed, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Kummer, has declined to set sentencing ranges for this offence. The sentence I have imposed is below the six or seven years imposed in other cases which are somewhat similar on the facts, for example where there were multiple deaths and a driving record. However, the mitigating factors of addiction, work on recovery, remorse, no criminal record, the fact that Mr. Anstie is a relatively youthful adult, employment, time on strict bail conditions and that he has family support with his addiction issues, persuaded me that a sentence of five years strikes the appropriate balance in this case between the need for general deterrence and denunciation, and the need to exercise the principle of restraint for a first time offender who had done everything in his power to rehabilitate himself in the face of a very formidable addiction.
129His driver’s license is to be suspended for 10 years, less the three years it has been suspended while he was on judicial interim release. The remaining period of suspension will begin to run at the end of his period of incarceration. Mr. Anstie is to report to the Ottawa Police Service at 474 Elgin Street within 24 hours of the delivery of this judgment in order to begin serving his sentence.
A.E. London-Weinstein J.
Released: September 14, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: 17-9001
DATE: 2020/09/14
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Her Majesty The Queen
– and –
John Anstie
Accused
Reasons for sentence
A.E. London-Weinstein J.
Released: September 14, 2020