Michael A. Crystal

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions on grounds of Charter delay under s. 11(b), arguing the trial judge erred in applying the law of reasonable doubt, and contending his conviction for drug possession was inconsistent with his acquittal on firearm possession charges.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the delay was reasonable in the transitional post-Jordan context, the convictions were supported by evidence, and the sentence, though lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's secondary role in the drug enterprise and rehabilitative efforts.

A police officer was acquitted by jury of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, which provides that no consent is obtained where an accused, by abusing a position of trust, power, or authority, induces a complainant to engage in sexual activity.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an instruction under s. 273.1(2)(c) was warranted on the facts, as it was open to the jury to conclude the accused used his position of trust and the complainant's intoxicated and vulnerable state to secure her apparent consent to sexual activity.

The accused was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision while driving a rental car.

Police seized the vehicle and conducted a warrantless search, locating drug paraphernalia in a knapsack and downloading the vehicle's Crash Data Recovery (CDR) data.

Police subsequently obtained a search warrant for the accused's blood and medical records.

The accused brought a motion to quash the warrant and exclude evidence under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice held that while the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information regarding the knapsack search, the warrant could still have issued on the remaining evidence.

The court further held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the CDR data of the rental vehicle.

However, the court found that the warrantless search of the accused's knapsack for the vehicle's keys violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

Arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) were deferred.

The applicant, Gary Eunick, sought a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under section 745.61 of the Criminal Code, having been convicted of first-degree murder and attempt murder in 2004.

The Crown opposed the application.

Applying the pre-2011 Criminal Code amendments test, the court assessed whether there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the parole ineligibility.

While the applicant's conduct in prison had improved, his persistent denial of guilt and lack of remorse were significant negative factors.

Considering the brutal nature of the offences and the profound, ongoing impact on the victims' family, the court found no reasonable prospect of a unanimous jury reducing the parole ineligibility period.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a fresh application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter after the Court of Appeal previously overturned a stay and ordered a new trial.

The court conducted a preliminary assessment under Rule 34.02 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

Finding that the delay since the appellate decision was entirely attributable to the applicant's own requests for time to prepare and seek leave to appeal, the court concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success and summarily dismissed it.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine and hydromorphone found in a safe in the basement room he had rented.

The trial judge found that the appellant had knowledge of and control over the drugs based on circumstantial evidence, including that the appellant was the last and only person to occupy the area where the drugs were found, the landlord's credible testimony that no one else had entered the home during the relevant period, and the discovery of a key to the safe on the appellant's person.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge did not err in his approach to circumstantial evidence and that his conclusion was logically based on the evidence and free of error.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The appellant, Brian White, appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's finding that the appellant had not rebutted the presumption of care and control by lacking intention to exercise it, and the trial judge's finding that the vehicle was operable.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's conclusions on both the appellant's intention to set the vehicle in motion and the vehicle's operability were supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The accused, D.O., was charged with sexual offences under ss. 151 and 271 of the Criminal Code involving a 12-year-old complainant.

D.O. raised a mistake of age defence, claiming he believed the complainant was 15 and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, relying on her Facebook profile.

The Crown argued D.O. knew her true age or failed to take reasonable steps.

The court found the accused met his evidentiary burden for the defence.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.O. did not subjectively believe the complainant was 15, or that he failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, considering the information on her Facebook profile and the absence of strong "red flags" requiring further inquiry.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

In a criminal appeal from acquittals on assault and sexual assault charges, the Court addressed trial errors involving prior sexual activity cross-examination and exclusion of rebuttal evidence on alleged recent fabrication.

The intermediate appellate court was divided on remedy despite finding error.

The Court allowed the appeal and adopted the dissenting remedial approach from below.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The accused, James Norton, was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault.

The complainant, MP, alleged two physical assaults and one instance of non-consensual anal intercourse.

The defence denied the assaults and claimed the anal intercourse was consensual.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of MP's testimony, noting inconsistencies, disingenuous statements, and the influence of her sister-in-law, K, who fabricated evidence of injuries.

The court also considered the accused's character as a "Lothario" and his deceptive conduct in relationships.

Ultimately, the court found significant reservations regarding the veracity of MP's allegations and acquitted Mr. Norton of all charges, concluding that the evidence as a whole left reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed convictions for touching a person under the age of 16 years for a sexual purpose and sexual assault.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the credible evidence of two young complainants who testified about being touched inappropriately while sleeping in the appellant's trailer.

The appellant denied the allegations and argued the complainants' evidence contained discrepancies and inconsistencies suggesting collusion or fabrication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, addressed the collusion arguments, and provided adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant's denial in light of the complainants' credible testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while disqualified, arguing that the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the police officer's identification evidence.

The summary conviction appeal judge reviewed the trial judge's reasons, noting that the trial judge had properly considered the weaknesses in the Crown's case and the principles of identification evidence.

Finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence and not unreasonable, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under the 'faint hope' clause.

The court conducted an initial judicial screening to determine if there was a substantial likelihood that a jury would grant the application.

Considering the applicant's positive institutional record, successful completion of rehabilitative programs, expressions of remorse, and family support, the court found that the applicant met the threshold.

The application was allowed to proceed, and a jury was ordered to be empanelled.

The applicant sought release pending trial on a charge of second degree murder under s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered detention under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds in s. 515(10) following a reverse-onus bail application under s. 522.

Evidence included the applicant’s extensive criminal record for breaches, her presence at the homicide scene, forensic evidence linking her footwear and clothing to the victim’s blood, and her conduct before and after the alleged offence.

The proposed release plan involved residence at a supervised disability facility with her brother acting as surety.

The court concluded that the applicant failed to discharge her onus on all three grounds, finding a significant risk of non-attendance, public safety concerns, and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity of the offence and strength of the evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic cocaine after purchasing significant quantities over multiple transactions during a drug investigation.

Although the parties jointly proposed an eighteen-month sentence, the accused sought a conditional sentence based on alleged police misconduct in the execution of the search warrant and arrest, relying on Charter principles and the sentencing analysis in Nasogaluak.

The court found that denunciation and deterrence remained the dominant sentencing objectives for cocaine trafficking and that a conditional sentence would not satisfy proportionality.

Applying Cornell and Nasogaluak, the court rejected the allegation of unreasonable search, excessive force, or vandalism, and held that no state misconduct mitigated sentence.

An eighteen-month custodial sentence, followed by two years' probation and ancillary forfeiture and weapons orders, was imposed.

On a written judicial screening application under the former faint hope regime, the applicant sought leave to proceed to a jury for a reduction in parole ineligibility following a first degree murder conviction.

The court applied s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code and considered the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, the nature of the offence, victim information, and other relevant circumstances.

Despite the highly aggravating facts of a calculated murder-for-insurance plot and the applicant’s initial denial and flight from Canada, the court found the applicant’s institutional record exemplary, his programming and insight substantial, and his current risk to public safety low.

The court held that the application had a substantial likelihood of success and directed that a jury be empanelled.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action for the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion after hospital staff improperly accessed patient records.

The defendants moved to strike the claim, arguing that the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) constitutes an exhaustive code that ousts the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that PHIPA does not create an exhaustive code.

The Act's language, its highly discretionary review procedure tailored for systemic issues, and its explicit contemplation of other proceedings indicate that the legislature did not intend to preclude common law claims for breach of privacy.

Sentencing decision involving an Aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to participating as the final courier in a human smuggling operation involving a family of five, together with related Customs Act and Criminal Code offences arising from a dangerous flight from police.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as central given the offender's callous treatment of vulnerable migrants, the profit motive, and the risk created to adults and children, but also gave substantial weight to rehabilitation, recovery from OxyContin addiction, Gladue principles, and the availability of strict community supervision.

Applying the Gladue and Proulx frameworks, the court held that a sentence of less than two years was fit, community safety would not be endangered, and a conditional sentence could satisfy punitive and restorative objectives.

A consecutive sentence totalling 24 months less one day was imposed to be served in the community, followed by two years' probation and ancillary orders.

The applicant sought a stay of a sexual assault charge on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter following a military investigation, court martial process, and eventual transfer to civilian authorities.

The court found excessive delay caused by prosecutorial inaction, administrative neglect, and failures of communication within the military justice system, including delay in referral and service.

The applicant established actual prejudice, including employment, social, and mental health consequences, and the court also recognized increasing inferred prejudice over time.

Balancing the relevant delay factors, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay under s. 24(1).