Paul Tait

The applicant sought a review of a judicial interim release order that required a surety following a Crown onus bail hearing.

The Crown consented to varying the release to an own recognizance with less onerous conditions.

The Superior Court issued reasons addressing procedural and legal errors in the initial hearing, emphasizing the Supreme Court's direction in Antic regarding the ladder principle and the overuse of sureties in Ontario.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

The trial judge had calculated the net delay at 13.5 months, which fell below the presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in calculating the delay, which should have been approximately 11.5 months.

Furthermore, the defence failed to demonstrate that it took meaningful, sustained steps to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than reasonably required.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused applied for disclosure of third-party records held by a shelter and Children's Aid Services.

The court addressed two main issues: (1) disclosure of Children's Aid records, which was resolved by consent of all parties; and (2) disclosure of counselling records from the Yellow Brick House shelter.

The court applied the O'Connor test and considered solicitor-client privilege.

The court rejected the defence argument that the "innocence at stake" exception to solicitor-client privilege applied, finding that speculation about potential contradictory statements was insufficient to overcome the stringent test.

The court ordered partial disclosure of specific portions of the shelter records relating to the mother while protecting the child's privacy and privileged communications.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after driving with a blood alcohol level more than double the legal limit, resulting in a vehicle rollover that caused serious injury to his passenger.

The Crown sought 12 to 18 months imprisonment with a 3-year driving prohibition, while the defence sought 90 days intermittent with a 4-year prohibition.

The court imposed 8 months imprisonment followed by 2 years probation and a 3-year driving prohibition, emphasizing the principles of general deterrence and denunciation while considering the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and rehabilitative efforts.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of impaired driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm after running a stop sign at excessive speed with a blood alcohol concentration nearly three times the legal limit.

The collision killed three young children and their grandfather, and injured two other family members.

The court weighed the offender's early guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and good character against the extreme gravity of the offence and high moral blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and a 12-year driving prohibition.

The five applicants were jointly charged with offences relating to a fraudulent enterprise involving staged automobile accidents.

They applied for severance under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Four of the co-accused intended to run a defence of lack of knowledge, arguing they were duped by the alleged ringleader, Bajwa, and intended to adduce bad character evidence against him.

The court found that the existence of antagonistic defences and the general prejudice to the co-accused outweighed the desire to avoid multiple proceedings.

The court ordered that Bajwa be tried separately from the other four co-accused, who would be tried jointly.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of driving over 80.

At trial, the accused raised a 'bolus drinking' defence, testifying she rapidly consumed a large beer shortly before driving.

The Crown requested an adjournment to call a toxicologist in reply to calculate the impact of this consumption on her blood alcohol concentration.

The trial judge denied the adjournment, treating the request as an attempt to reopen the Crown's case.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by confusing reply evidence with reopening a case.

The Crown was entitled to call reply evidence to respond to a new matter put in play by the defence.

A new trial was ordered.

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

On August 18, 2012, the offender accelerated his pickup truck while exiting a parking lot to show off its power to a passenger, lost control, and struck a 16-year-old girl standing on the grass in front of a house, killing her.

The offender fled the scene without stopping to render assistance.

The court imposed an 18-month sentence for dangerous driving causing death and a 9-month consecutive sentence for failing to remain at the scene, with credit for 13 months of stringent bail conditions, resulting in a global sentence of two years less a day.

A five-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of the vehicle were also imposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He used his position as an investment advisor at a bank to steal approximately $9 million from the bank's clients over a six-year period.

He was sentenced to four years imprisonment.

The court issued a ruling on restitution, determining the appropriate amount to be ordered as part of the overall sentence.

The Crown sought restitution of $5,255,850, while the defence argued for a reduced amount of $4,695,871.39, accounting for recovered funds and the civil judgment against the accused.

The court ordered restitution in the amount of $4,695,871.39.

The accused sought review of a bail decision denying release on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code following charges arising from an alleged armed home invasion and assault.

The reviewing judge considered whether the justice of the peace erred in law and whether continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Although the prosecution's case appeared strong and the offences were serious, the court held that the required “something more” justifying detention on the tertiary ground was absent.

Balancing the circumstances, including the accused’s lack of criminal record and a strengthened surety package, the court concluded that a properly informed member of the public would not view continued detention as necessary.

Bail was granted subject to strict house-arrest conditions and supervision by sureties.