Michael A. Crystal

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian at an intersection in Ottawa.

The accused claimed he fled in self-defence because the pedestrian was acting erratically and touching his car.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as fabricated and found his rapid acceleration and fishtailing through a busy intersection constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found the accused knew he had struck the pedestrian and fled to evade liability.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian who had been acting erratically in front of his vehicle.

The trial judge held a hearing to determine whether there was an "air of reality" to the accused's claims of self-defence and defence of property under the amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The court found no evidence that the accused reasonably believed force was being used or threatened against him, nor that his actions in rapidly accelerating his vehicle were reasonable in the circumstances.

Consequently, the court ruled that neither defence had an air of reality and could not be put to the trier of fact.

The moving parties (plaintiffs in a proposed class proceeding for privacy breach) brought a motion to quash the defendant hospital's appeal to the Court of Appeal.

They argued the motion judge's order refusing to strike their claim for lack of jurisdiction under the Personal Health Information Protection Act was interlocutory, meaning the appeal should go to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a final order, as it precludes the defendant from continuing to dispute jurisdiction.

Therefore, the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.

The applicant sought leave under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code to proceed to a jury hearing for potential reduction of the 25‑year parole ineligibility period imposed for first degree murder.

The court applied the amended threshold under s. 745.61 requiring proof on a balance of probabilities that there is a substantial likelihood the application would succeed before a jury.

While the applicant demonstrated positive institutional conduct and program participation during incarceration, risk assessments continued to rate him as a moderate risk for violent recidivism and a high risk for sexual reoffending.

Considering the nature of the offence, the applicant’s criminal history, and continuing public safety concerns, the court concluded the statutory threshold was not met.

The accused appealed his convictions for violent offences against a former friend, while the Crown appealed the refusal to designate him a dangerous offender.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge made no reviewable errors in applying the credibility framework, assessing the forensic evidence, or giving reasons.

On the sentence appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by importing intractability into s. 753(1), by treating spontaneity and absence of 'serial' offending as defeating pattern, and by misapprehending the availability of long-term offender style community control for a non-sexual violent offender.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and the disposition was varied to five years' imprisonment followed by a ten-year supervision order.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance based on a police officer's observation of an alleged hand-to-hand transaction with a third party.

The third party testified that he acquired the drugs from another source prior to the encounter.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's explanation but failed to address the third party's exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure required a new trial, as the reasons did not indicate whether the evidence was rejected or considered.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery of a bank, attempted extortion of the same branch, laundering proceeds of crime, and fraud.

The offences were committed while the accused was employed at the bank and involved planning with co-accused, threats of violence, and misuse of his position of trust.

During the robbery, co‑accused used knives and restrained employees with duct tape, causing significant fear and emotional harm.

The court considered mitigating factors including youth, lack of prior criminal record, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation, but found numerous aggravating factors including breach of trust, planning, recruitment of accomplices, and continued criminal conduct over several months.

A penitentiary sentence was required to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

At trial, the defence called a psychiatrist who testified that the appellant's schizophrenia may have affected his appreciation of the risk of his driving.

On cross-examination, the Crown elicited hearsay evidence from the appellant's medical records regarding prior violent incidents to suggest the appellant had anger management issues.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the limited permissible use of this bad character evidence and its hearsay nature.

The Crown also invited the jury to engage in prohibited propensity reasoning during closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal found these non-directions fatal to the verdicts, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a non-citizen, pleaded guilty to obstruction of a peace officer after repeatedly lying to police about her involvement in a fatal hit-and-run committed by her boyfriend.

She received a suspended sentence.

Upon learning that the conviction rendered her inadmissible to Canada, she appealed her sentence, seeking a conditional discharge to avoid deportation.

The summary conviction appeal judge conducted a de novo hearing but dismissed the appeal, finding a discharge contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge properly applied the Supreme Court's framework in Pham regarding collateral immigration consequences and correctly concluded that a discharge would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offence.

The Crown appealed from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's convictions for incest and sexual assault and ordering a new trial.

The accused had sought to adduce fresh affidavit evidence on appeal alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that defence counsel's conduct did not result in omissions and decisions which, taken together, undermined the reliability of the convictions such that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The convictions were restored and the Sex Offender Information Registration order was modified from 10 to 25 years.

The Crown appealed from the Court of Appeal for Newfoundland and Labrador's decision setting aside a jury conviction for sexual assault and entering an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal had concluded the verdict was unreasonable, applying a test of whether an experienced trial judge could have provided adequate reasons for conviction.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal applied the wrong legal test and failed to give sufficient deference to the jury's assessment of witness credibility.

The proper test requires asking whether the verdict is supportable on any reasonable view of the evidence, not whether an imaginary trial judge could articulate reasons for conviction.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in declining to impose a conditional sentence and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of his rehabilitative efforts while on bail.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge adequately considered the appellant's family circumstances and the nature of his crimes.

The fresh evidence was deemed an extension of what was expected at sentencing and did not change the outcome.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on the sole ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel incompetently refused to allow him to testify, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to call a witness regarding an alleged prior false complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his claims or demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his counsel's conduct.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and disguise with intent after a convenience store was robbed by a man wearing a balaclava.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence, including DNA from a balaclava found near the scene that did not match the appellant, and discrepancies in the robber's height.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to address this exculpatory evidence.

The Court also noted serious flaws in the voice identification procedure used by police.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

During a jury trial for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to stop, the defence brought a motion requesting that the jury be permitted to conduct a view of the scene depicted in surveillance footage.

Both parties agreed that the wide-angle lens used in the video distorted distances and perspectives, potentially affecting the jury’s understanding of the evidence.

The court considered the authority under s. 652 of the Criminal Code and determined that a view may be ordered where it assists the jury in understanding the evidence, though it is not itself evidence.

The judge concluded that a view of the gas bar where the incident occurred would assist the jury and ordered it with detailed logistical and non‑communication safeguards.

A request to include a nearby gas station related to a different offence was denied.

The standardbred licensee appealed a Director's order of immediate suspension and a Notice of Proposed Order to revoke and suspend his licence for five years.

At the hearing, the Administration advised that it would call no evidence and consented to the ruling.

The Commission Panel ordered that the immediate suspension and Notice of Proposed Order be set aside, and directed that the licensee is eligible to apply to be re-licensed in accordance with section 17 of the Racing Commission Act, 2000.

The appellant police officer pled guilty to discreditable conduct after being convicted criminally for shoplifting and uttering threats while off duty.

The Hearing Officer ordered his dismissal.

On appeal, the Commission found the Hearing Officer committed a manifest error in principle by accepting the diagnosis of work-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) but failing to consider it as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase.

The uncontradicted medical evidence showed the appellant had recovered and his risk of reoffending was extremely low.

The penalty was varied from dismissal to a one-year demotion to third-class constable with mandatory psychological monitoring.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was in a conflict of interest and provided ineffective assistance by failing to cross-examine the complainant on a breach of recognizance incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no conflict of interest and concluding that trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine was a reasonable judgment call.

Furthermore, the court found no prejudice to the appellant, as the trial judge disbelieved him based on his own testimony.