COURT FILE NO.: CR-20-88 DATE: 2024/10/31 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING – and – J.H. Defendant
COUNSEL: M. Crystal, for the Crown D. Baker, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 18, 2024
PUBLICATION RESTRICTION NOTICE By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, no information that might identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant shall be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any manner.
ELLIES J.
REASONS FOR DECISION ON APPLICATION FOR A STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
OVERVIEW
[1] J.H. is accused of three sexual offences in which the complainant is his daughter. He applies under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of the proceedings due to delay.
[2] The Information charging the accused was sworn on February 28, 2019. The charges were scheduled for trial before a judge sitting without a jury beginning on April 22, 2024. However, shortly before the trial was set to begin, the accused sought an adjournment for the purpose of bringing this application.
[3] The central issue in the application is the characterization of a period of about 13 months of delay associated with a similar fact application (“SFA”) brought by the Crown. The accused submits that the delay is entirely the fault of the Crown and is the reason the case “stopped moving forward”: see R. v. Schardt, 2021 ONSC 3143, at para. 70.
[4] I am unable to agree. As I will explain, the delay associated with the SFA was caused, in part, by the fact that counsel for the accused at the time served his responding materials only shortly before the SFA was first heard and took the position in his materials that the records regime in s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, applied to certain records upon which the defence wished to rely. The Crown agreed. Ultimately, however, both parties later agreed that the records regime did not apply. Therefore, both sides were responsible for the delay relating to the records issue.
[5] Nonetheless, as I will explain, even when the delay associated with the records issue is apportioned between the parties and this delay is combined with the other defence delay and the exceptional circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay is still above the presumptive ceiling of 30 months for trials in the Superior Court of Justice, established by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 46.
[6] The application must, therefore, be allowed and the charges stayed.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[7] This area of the law is well-settled. The following summary of the Jordan framework employs the terminology used by Gillese J.A. in R. v. Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704, 133 O.R. (3d) 433, at paras. 34-50:
- The first step is to calculate the total delay from the date the information was sworn until the date the trial is expected to end: Jordan, at para 47.
- Defence delay is then deducted from the total delay, resulting in the “net delay”: Jordan, at para. 66.
- Defence delay is either: (1) delay that results from a defence waiver of s. 11(b), or (2) delay caused solely or directly by the conduct of the defence: Jordan, at paras. 61 and 63.
- If the net delay exceeds the ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. The Crown may rebut the presumption by establishing the presence of exceptional circumstances: Jordan, at para. 47.
- In general, exceptional circumstances are either (1) discrete events, or (2) particularly complex cases: Jordan, at para. 71. They lie outside the Crown's control because they are reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable and the delay they cause cannot reasonably be remedied: Jordan, at para. 69.
- The delay caused by discrete events must be deducted from net delay to arrive at the “remaining delay”: Jordan, at para. 75.
- If the remaining delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the court must consider whether the case was particularly complex such that the time it has taken is justified and the delay is reasonable: Jordan, at para. 80.
- If the remaining delay falls below the ceiling (which I will call “sub-ceiling delay”), the onus is on the defence to show that it is unreasonable: Jordan, at para. 48. It may do this by demonstrating both: (1) that it took meaningful, sustained steps to expedite the proceedings, and (2) that the time the case has taken markedly exceeds the reasonable time requirements of the case: Jordan, at paras. 82 and 87.
[8] With this framework in place, I move to an analysis of the periods of time at issue in this application.
ANALYSIS
Total Delay
[9] The accused has expressly waived any delay arising after the date the trial was scheduled to take place, on April 22, 2024, which was adjourned to allow him to bring this application. In addition, he takes the position that any delay after January 14, 2024, is defence delay caused by the fact that he changed counsel and that new counsel, Mr. Baker, was not available when a trial date of January 15, 2024, was offered by the court after he went on record.
[10] On behalf of the accused, Mr. Baker submits that the overall period of delay from the date the Information was sworn until January 14, 2024, is 1781 days, or 58.5 months. The Crown submits that the total delay is 1782 days. The difference is small. The Crown's position reflects the fact, correctly in my view, that the period of total delay includes a leap year (2020).
[11] I would adjust the end date from January 15, 2024, the date the trial would have begun if Mr. Baker had been available, to January 18, 2024, the date the trial would have finished. This is the date that the court is required to use: Jordan, at paras. 47 and 48. The total delay, therefore, is 1786 days.
[12] However, as I will explain when I deal with the issue of defence delay, the total delay would have been considerably less had Mr. Baker been available when earlier trial dates were offered, beginning with the date of September 18, 2023.
Defence Delay
[13] The Crown has the onus of bringing an accused to trial; an accused has no such duty: R. v. Beason (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 65, at para. 63. Any delay in getting to trial, therefore, weighs against the Crown under s. 11(b), except for defence delay and delay caused by exceptional circumstances.
[14] In the analysis that follows, therefore, I will refer only to periods of delay that may be characterized as defence delay.
July 9, 2019, to August 6, 2019 (28 days):
[15] A judicial pre-trial conference (“JPT”) was held in the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”) on June 17, 2019, and the case was adjourned at the conclusion of the JPT to June 25, 2019.
[16] On June 25, an agent appeared on behalf of then counsel for the accused. He told the court that he had been instructed to ask for an adjournment to August 6, 2019, “for a file review”. The presiding OCJ judge asked the agent why counsel had not pre-set a preliminary hearing date, given that the matter was only estimated to require one day. He commented that a one-week adjournment should have been sufficient. However, as the agent was unable to answer the judge's questions, the judge relented and granted the requested adjournment.
[17] Based on the OCJ judge's comment that an adjournment of one week should have been sufficient in the circumstances of this case, I would characterize the delay from one week after June 25, namely from July 9, 2019, to the August 6 date as defence delay.
August 6, 2019, to August 27, 2019 (21 days):
[18] When the matter was addressed next on August 6, 2019, counsel for the accused had still not pre-set a preliminary hearing date. Instead, he requested a further adjournment of three weeks to do so.
[19] Present counsel for the accused submits that this should be characterized as defence delay. I agree.
August 27, 2019, to September 17, 2019 (21 days):
[20] On August 27, 2019, defence counsel again requested an adjournment, apparently for the purpose of reviewing and summarizing video-recorded interviews. This time, however, he expressly waived the delay on behalf of his client.
September 17, 2019, to October 1, 2019 (14 days):
[21] On September 17, 2019, counsel had an agent appear on his behalf. The presiding OCJ judge, the same judge who had presided on June 25, wanted “to set a date for something”. However, the agent requested yet another adjournment, this time for two weeks, again for the purpose of preparation. When the Crown mentioned that defence counsel had waived his client's s. 11(b) rights on the last appearance, the agent advised that he was doing so again.
[22] Although apparently reluctantly, the judge granted the adjournment request.
October 1, 2019, to October 29, 2019:
[23] Finally, by October 1, 2019, counsel had pre-set a date for a preliminary hearing, being January 20, 2020. An agent appeared for defence counsel on October 1, no doubt expecting only to have to confirm the January date. However, it appears from the transcript and my discussions with counsel that, by the time this case was addressed, the January 20 date had been given away by the court. The agent had been provided with one other date upon which defence counsel was available, namely January 3, 2020. However, the Crown advised that its witnesses were not available on that date. The presiding judge then stated:
So the record will reflect that there were three other full available days through the remainder of the fall. I’m going to suggest that the matter go to the end of October, it's obviously going to require the release of additional dates by the trial coordinator to secure future dates …
[24] The matter was, therefore, adjourned to October 29, 2019.
[25] Based on the presiding judge's comments, I gather that there were other, earlier, dates available for the preliminary hearing. The law is clear that, where both the court and the Crown are available for a proposed hearing date, but the defence is not, the resulting delay is defence delay: Jordan, at para. 64. Thus, it is possible that the defence was responsible for delay relating to the scheduling of the preliminary hearing because defence counsel was not available on the earlier dates offered or because the agent had not been provided with defence counsel's availability so as to be able to canvas those dates on October 1, 2019. However, I have no evidence that the Crown was in a position to proceed on any of the earlier dates.
[26] Consequently, I would not characterize the delay in setting the date for the preliminary hearing as defence delay. However, as I will explain, this is only true up to October 29, 2019.
October 29, 2019, to November 19, 2019 (21 days):
[27] It is reasonable to assume from the judge's comments on October 1 that four weeks was enough time for the trial coordinator to release additional, later dates and for another date for the preliminary inquiry to be pre-set. And yet, that had not been done by October 29, 2019. On that date, defence counsel asked for a further adjournment to November 19, 2019, for that purpose. Understandably, he waived his client's rights regarding delay resulting from the adjournment.
[28] On November 19, 2019, the date of March 20, 2020, was confirmed for the preliminary hearing. As I will explain when dealing with the issue of exceptional circumstances, below, it could not proceed on that date and was eventually held on September 24, 2020.
November 19, 2019, to March 20, 2020:
[29] The Crown contends that the entire period of time between November 19, 2019, and March 20, 2020, should be characterized as defence delay. This submission appears to be based on the comments of the judge presiding on October 1, 2019. However, as I have explained, I have no evidence that the Crown was available to proceed on any of the earlier dates that were apparently available.
[30] This submission also ignores the fact that, had the pre-set date of January 20, 2020, not been given away by the court, the preliminary hearing would have been held then, or on January 3, 2020, had the Crown witnesses been available on that date.
[31] For these reasons, I would not attribute this period of delay to the defence. In my view, as indicated above, the only delay for which the defence is responsible is the delay involved in setting a new date, not the delay involved in getting to that new date.
December 2, 2020, to January 4, 2021 (33 days):
[32] Following the preliminary hearing on September 24, 2020, the accused was committed to stand trial and the case was adjourned directly by the presiding OCJ judge to the Superior Court of Justice (“SCJ”) assignment court on November 12, 2020. On that date, the court offered dates for a JPT, beginning with December 2, 2020. Defence counsel advised that he was not available on any of the earliest dates offered and commented that “the record would reflect that”, which it does. A date of January 4, 2021, was eventually set.
[33] As counsel apparently recognized at the time, this is defence delay.
February 8, 2021, to February 26, 2021 (14 days):
[34] Prior to the January 4, 2021, date set for the JPT, the matter was returned by the court to the assignment court on December 4, 2020. On that date, counsel were advised that it was necessary to reschedule the JPT from January 4, 2021, to another date. New dates were offered, beginning with February 8, 2021. Defence counsel advised that all of the dates offered were “the same” to him, but that his client had a new matter down south, that the new matter would impact this one, and that his client would need to retain counsel on the new matter. Therefore, he chose the latest date, being February 26, 2021.
[35] Again, this is defence delay.
October 14, 2021, to November 16, 2022 (398 days ÷ 2):
[36] The Report to Trial Judge completed by the JPT judge on February 26, 2021, indicated that the Crown was contemplating bringing an SFA and that the defence was awaiting that application before deciding whether to re-elect trial by judge alone.
[37] Following the JPT, the case was addressed again at the assignment court on May 14, 2021. By then, the defence had filed a Notice of Re-election, with the consent of the Crown. The Crown indicated that it was drafting the SFA, but that it was awaiting transcripts that it had just ordered. The matter went over to the June 4, 2021, assignment court to await the transcripts.
[38] On behalf of the accused, Mr. Baker argues that the Crown is responsible for the delay associated with bringing the SFA because the Crown knew as early as February 12, 2021, that an SFA might be necessary. I do not need to decide whether the Crown was dilatory in ordering transcripts. The clock runs against the Crown unless it can prove defence delay or exceptional circumstances: R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, at p. 1228: Jordan, at para. 47. The Crown does not seek to do this regarding the majority of the transcripts.
[39] This case was addressed again at the June 4, 2021, assignment court. By then, the Crown had received three of the transcripts it had ordered, but was still awaiting a fourth. As a result, the matter was adjourned again to July 2, 2021.
[40] The Crown argues that the delay in awaiting delivery of this last transcript was a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, an argument that I will deal with when I address the issue of exceptional circumstances, below.
[41] The Crown completed its SFA materials on June 30, 2021.
[42] By July 2, 2021, counsel had pre-set a date of October 14, 2021, for the hearing of the SFA and the matter was, therefore, adjourned to that date.
[43] Notwithstanding the fact that the Crown's materials had been served on or about June 30, 2021, the defence did not file a response before October 6, 2021. In its responding materials, the defence took the position that records that had been in its possession since at least November 2, 2020, were relevant to the SFA and were subject to the records regime set out in s. 278.92 of Criminal Code. That section requires that an accused bring an application before being able to use certain records in his defence, which had not been done. In its factum filed on the SFA, the defence wrote, at para. 6:
The respondent acknowledges that certain evidence referred to herein [texts allegedly from the complainant to a witness] is subject to applications under sections 278.93 and 278.94 not yet brought.
[44] At the outset of the hearing on October 14, defence counsel reversed himself and took the position that the records regime did not apply. However, counsel for the Crown took the position that it did. For oral reasons delivered on that date, I agreed with the Crown. However, in the hope that we could prevent further delay, I suggested that we proceed with the portion of the SFA relating only to the probative value of the proffered evidence, without addressing the possibility of collusion. As counsel and I agreed at the time, if I found that the evidence was not sufficiently probative, the issue of collusion would not arise, and the records would not be needed as evidence.
[45] In an endorsement released on October 25, 2021, I indicated that, for reasons that I would deliver later, I found that at least some of the proposed evidence was sufficiently probative so as to require that the court deal with the records issue raised by the defence and the matter was adjourned to the November 12, 2021, assignment court to canvas dates for the continuation of the hearing.
[46] Although I released my endorsement on October 25, 2021, on November 12, 2021, this case had to be adjourned again because counsel had still not pre-set a date for the continuation of the hearing relating to the records issue which, as defence counsel stated that day, had to take place before the SFA could continue. Therefore, the matter was adjourned again to December 10, 2021, for that purpose.
[47] On December 10, 2021, a pre-set date of April 7, 2022, was confirmed for the application under s. 278.93 of the Code.
[48] The defence filed a s. 278.92 application dated March 8, 2022, which I assume was served at or about the same time.
[49] On the date set for the hearing under s. 287.93 (April 7, 2022), the Crown reversed itself and took the position that the particular records in question were not captured by s. 278.92 of the Code. The defence agreed. Therefore, the matter was put over to the assignment court on May 13, 2021, to set a date for the continuation of the SFA.
[50] On May 13, 2022, the SFA was finally scheduled to conclude on November 25, 2022, a date that had been pre-set. However, on October 14, 2022, at the direction of the court, the hearing was re-scheduled due to a scheduling conflict and was moved to the slightly earlier date of November 16, 2022.
[51] All told, the SFA was delayed by 398 days because of the issue relating to the records the defence sought to use during the hearing. In my view, both the Crown and the defence are responsible for this delay.
[52] The defence is to blame for the fact that the records issue was raised at the last minute. Notwithstanding the fact that the Crown had its SFA materials ready at the end of June 2021, the defence did not file a response until October 6, 2021, just days before the hearing. Had the issue been raised earlier, it might have been dealt with more efficiently. While the defence materials refer to certain disclosure that the defence required before it could complete its response to the SFA, it appears from the affidavit that the defence had the records in question on November 2, 2020. Further, as it turned out, the defence was mistaken and no such disclosure existed.
[53] In R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659, at para. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada stressed the point it had made earlier in Jordan that “every actor in the justice system has a responsibility to ensure that criminal proceedings are carried out in a manner that is consistent with an accused person's right to a trial within a reasonable time.” At para. 32, the court wrote:
As well, inaction may amount to defence conduct that is not legitimate (Jordan, at paras. 113 and 121). Illegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts … Accused persons must bear in mind that a corollary of the s. 11(b) right “to be tried within a reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay. Defence counsel are therefore expected to “actively advanc[e] their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborat[e] with Crown counsel when appropriate and ... us[e] court time efficiently” (Jordan, at para. 138).
[54] In my view, the defence did not fulfill its responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay when it failed to raise the records issue until the last minute and when it failed to file its application materials until shortly before the records application.
[55] At the same time, the Crown is to blame for first adopting the position that the records regime applied to the records in question and then reversing its position at the last minute, just before the records hearing was set to begin on November 16, 2022.
[56] Where delay can be attributed to both the Crown and the defence, such delay may be apportioned between the parties. In R. v. K.J.M., 2019 SCC 55, [2019] S.C.R. 39, at paras. 93-97, the Supreme Court of Canada apportioned delay that had resulted both from the Crown changing its position regarding a statement made by the accused and by the accused failing to show up on time for his trial. In R. v. Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2, at paras. 9-10, the Supreme Court apportioned the delay that resulted from a change in the Crown's strategy, defence counsel's unavailability, and the court's “lack of initiative” in finding earlier dates in an amount that it held that it was “fair and reasonable” in the particular circumstances of the case.
[57] In this case, my view is that it is fair and reasonable to apportion the delay equally between the parties, resulting in further defence delay in the amount of 199 days.
December 16, 2022, to January 13, 2023 (28 days):
[58] The SFA hearing finally proceeded on November 16, 2022, as planned, and my decision was reserved. The case was adjourned to the November 25, 2022, assignment court pending the release of the decision.
[59] The case was adjourned again on November 25, 2022, to the December 16, 2022, assignment court, as the decision on the SFA had not yet been released. It was released only a few days later, on November 30, 2022: R. v. J.H., 2022 ONSC 6759.
[60] As early as November 12, 2021, then defence counsel advised the court that it might one day be necessary for him to seek to be removed as counsel. It became clear later that there was an issue regarding counsel's fees when counsel mentioned in April 2022 that he might have to bring a Rowbotham application on behalf of his client. However, as present counsel for the accused quite rightly submits, his predecessor acted in the highest traditions of his profession by remaining on the file throughout the SFA, notwithstanding the fees issue.
[61] By December 16, 2022, defence counsel had brought an application to be removed. The accused indicated during the assignment court on that date that he did not oppose the application and that he was working with Legal Aid to retain new counsel. Accordingly, an order was made removing defence counsel from the record and the case was adjourned to the January 13, 2023, assignment court to permit the accused to retain new counsel.
[62] The accused agrees that the delay between December 16, 2022, and January 13, 2023, is defence delay.
January 13, 2023, to February 10, 2023 (28 days):
[63] It appears from the transcripts that the accused managed to obtain the assistance of Legal Aid and Mr. Baker first appeared in the assignment court on January 13, 2023. At his request, the case was again adjourned to allow him to be properly retained.
[64] Mr. Baker agrees that this delay is also defence delay.
February 10, 2023, to March 3, 2023 (21 days):
[65] Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate a transcript of the February 10, 2023, assignment court appearance. However, Mr. Baker again characterizes the delay between that date and the next assignment court date of March 3, 2023, as defence delay and I have no reason to doubt that.
September 21, 2023, to January 18, 2024 (119 days):
[66] Between February 10 and March 3, 2023, counsel had pre-set a trial date of April 22, 2024, through the office of the trial coordinator. During the assignment court on March 3, 2023, the Crown attempted to set an earlier date by using trial time in June 2023 that had apparently been freed up after the April 2024 date was agreed upon between counsel. I was seized with this matter and, unfortunately, I was not available in June for all of the trial days required. Therefore, the original pre-set trial date of April 22, 2024, was chosen and the matter was adjourned to that date.
[67] However, on August 11, 2023, the Crown wrote to the trial coordinator, again seeking to set an earlier trial date. Aware that two-to-three weeks of trial time had freed up, the Crown asked via email if it was possible to schedule this matter in late September or early October. The trial coordinator responded within an hour by offering the dates of September 18-21 and October 3-6, 2023. The Crown advised later that same day that it was available on all of the proposed dates. Mr. Baker's response on August 14, 2023, was brief. Although he apologized, he wrote that “none of those blocks of dates actually work for me.”
[68] As I stated earlier, when the court and the Crown are available to proceed on a certain date, but the accused or his counsel are not, the resulting delay is defence delay. Had Mr. Baker been available for trial on the earliest of the dates offered, being September 18, 2023, the trial would have finished on September 21, 2023, assuming it went no longer than projected. Therefore, the delay between that date and January 18, 2024, the date the trial would otherwise have ended had Mr. Baker been available to begin on January 15, 2024, is defence delay.
Net Delay
[69] Under the Jordan framework, defence delay must be subtracted from total delay to determine the net delay. The total defence delay in this case is 547 days. Deducting the defence delay from the total delay leaves net delay of 1,239 days, or roughly 40.7 months. [1] This exceeds the presumptive ceiling by approximately 10.7 months. Therefore, I must consider the issue of exceptional circumstances.
Exceptional Circumstances
Discrete Events
[70] Discrete events operate similarly to defence delay, except that the delay caused by discrete events is subtracted from the net delay, rather than the total delay: Jordan, at para. 75.
[71] To qualify as an exceptional circumstance, the Crown must demonstrate that the circumstances causing the delay were both: (1) unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) could not reasonably be remedied: Jordan, at para. 69.
[72] The only discrete event involved in this case is the COVID-19 pandemic.
March 20, 2020, to June 2, 2020 (74 days):
[73] It will be recalled that, on November 19, 2019, the date of March 20, 2020, was set for the preliminary hearing in this matter in the OCJ. However, the COVID-19 pandemic intervened just before the preliminary inquiry could be held. Therefore, on March 20, 2020, the case was presumptively adjourned to June 2, 2020, to set a new date, while the justice system struggled to re-configure itself.
[74] The parties agree that this adjournment was required to accommodate the discrete exceptional circumstance of the COVID-19 pandemic.
June 2, 2020, to August 11, 2020 (70 days):
[75] On June 2, 2020, this case was again presumptively adjourned, this time to August 11, 2020.
[76] Again, the parties agree that this adjournment was the result of an exceptional discrete event.
August 11, 2020, to September 24, 2020 (44 days):
[77] On August 11, 2020, this case was again adjourned due to the pandemic. It was originally adjourned to October 20, 2020. However, although it is not clear from the transcripts exactly how the matter was moved forward, it is clear that the preliminary inquiry took place earlier, on September 24, 2020, following which the accused began to appear in the SCJ.
[78] Again, the characterization of this period of delay as being due to an exceptional circumstance is not at issue in the application.
June 4, 2021, to July 2, 2021:
[79] It will also be recalled that this case was adjourned on June 4, 2021, to July 2, 2021, to await the last of four transcripts the Crown required to finalize its SFA materials. The Crown contends that the delay in obtaining this last transcript was caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
[80] I am not persuaded on the evidence that this delay should be attributed to the pandemic. That is not borne out by what was put on the record on June 4, nor by the fact that the preparation of the other three transcripts was apparently unaffected by the pandemic. During the June 4 appearance, the Crown indicated that the problem with the fourth transcript related to a disc, not the pandemic. Without more evidence as to the nature of the problem with the disc, I am not prepared to find that the problem with the disc should be characterized as a discrete exceptional circumstance, either pandemic-related or otherwise.
Complexity
[81] As an exceptional circumstance, the complexity of a case can operate to increase the permissible net delay, as opposed to reducing it the way that discrete events do: Jordan, at para. 80.
[82] Neither side argues that the presumptive ceiling should be raised because of the complexity of this case.
Remaining Delay
[83] The delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic amounts to 188 days. Deducting this delay from the net delay of 1,239 days leaves 1,051 days, or roughly 34.5 months, of remaining delay.
CONCLUSION
[84] Because the remaining delay of 34.5 months remains above the presumptive ceiling of 30 months, the application must be allowed, and the charges must be stayed under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter.
M.G. Ellies J.
Released: October 31, 2024
Footnotes
[1] The overall time frame at issue in this case includes a leap year (2020), in which there is an extra day. Therefore, in order to convert days to months, I have taken the total number of days in four years, including one leap year (1,461), and divided that number by 48 months. In this way, I have arrived at a divisor of 30.44. The difference, if any, in using this number as opposed to the divisor for periods not including a leap year (30.42) is very small.