ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 07-16570
DATE: 2012/09/06

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent – and – AARON ORLIK Appellant

Julien Lalande, for the Crown

Diane Condo, for the Appellant

HEARD: August 18, 2012

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL DECISION

Annis J.

Introduction

[ 1 ] This is an appeal from the conviction and sentence of the appellant by Madam Justice Dorval dated June 11, 2009. The appellant was convicted of one count of criminal harassment contrary to s. 264(2) (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada , R.S.C. c. C-46. He was sentenced to 60 days incarceration and probation and is currently on judicial interim release pending the disposition of this appeal.

[ 2 ] On appeal, the appellant raised a number of grounds. I indicated at the opening of the hearing that I was particularly concerned by the decision of the trial judge to refuse to reopen the evidence prior to rendering her decision.

[ 3 ] Specifically, the defence sought permission to call the complainant’s daughter who was living with the complainant at all relevant times. The appellant deposed that the daughter would contradict the evidence of the complainant on the issue of whether his conduct had caused her to fear for her safety, one of the constituent elements of criminal harassment.

[ 4 ] Argument was limited to this issue. Having read the materials and heard counsel, I am satisfied that the appeal should be allowed on this ground and a new trial ordered.

[ 5 ] I allow the appeal while recognizing that trial judges possess a very broad discretion in deciding to reopen the evidence. As described in R. v. Scott , 1990 27 (SCC) , [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979 at para. 51 , this discretion should not be interfered with unless it is concluded that the discretion was not exercised judicially.

[ 6 ] I conclude that the trial judge erred in her ruling that the daughter’s proposed testimony was not relevant to the issue whether the appellant’s conduct caused the complainant to fear for her safety.

[ 7 ] This error arose due to the trial judge’s failure to fully consider important evidence described by the complainant. Specifically, the evidence concerns her daughter’s implication in the incidents comprising the criminal charge of harassment.

[ 8 ] I also find that the trial judge erred in requiring the appellant to demonstrate due diligence as a factor of the test used to govern the court’s exercise of discretion.

[ 9 ] Ultimately, I conclude that the trial judge’s choice in not having reopened the evidence to permit the proposed evidence of the complainant’s daughter, created the potential of a serious miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial.

Factual background

[ 10 ] The parties agreed on the following basic summary of facts:

(a) The appellant and the complainant started dating in 2004. They moved in together in 2005 and lived together until approximately the spring of 2007.

(b) The complainant testified that she started noticing that small household items were missing from the residence such as sheets, towels, cutlery, canned food, etc., but did not know who took them.

(c) The first incident reported was when the appellant attended at the residence to retrieve part of his personal property and he put a snowblower in the back of the pickup truck. The complainant told the appellant to take the snowblower out of his truck and to return it. The appellant complied with this request.

(d) The complainant reported other incidents. They included:

• finding dead rabbits at her residence;

• getting a ticket for parking her car on the street because of a phoned-in complaint;

• noting that the remote control for the garage went missing from her car;

• having the air let out of her tires;

• having her car tires slashed;

• having her home’s floodlights smashed;

• getting her fence locks cut; and

• having a ladder placed against the fence.

(e) The complainant testified that she saw the appellant parked near her house.

(f) The complainant testified that every Thursday she found garbage on her lawn. In addition, she saw the appellant pick through her garbage on at least one occasion and take a bookcase from the garbage on another occasion.

(g) The complainant and neighbours testified that the appellant would often drive by the complainant’s residence. On occasion he would stop at the end of the laneway, rev up his motorcycle and leave.

[ 11 ] In 2007, the complainant was found guilty of assaulting the appellant. She was given an absolute discharge, after which the appellant was asked to leave the matrimonial home.

[ 12 ] The complainant’s daughter lived with the complainant and the appellant at all material times. She was not called as a witness by the Crown.

[ 13 ] The appellant did not testify at trial, although other witnesses were called by the defence.

[ 14 ] The trial judge relied upon the testimony of the complainant’s married neighbours, Ms. Foran (née Donnafriend) and Mr. Foran. They corroborated the complainant’s evidence in many respects including that the appellant was besetting and watching the complainant and that she appeared fearful when discussing these incidents with them.

[ 15 ] The proposed evidence of the daughter related primarily to the issue of the fear caused by the appellant’s conduct. In ruling on whether or not the complainant was harassed, the trial judge described the complainant’s fear caused by the appellant in her oral reasons as follows:

... Mr. Foran stated that the complainant came over, called distraught on a number of occasions. Constable McConnachie testified that she was upset, hands shaking, when he attended [at] her residence, and the complainant’s own evidence was to the effect that she felt she was a prisoner in her home. She became very afraid, and I do find that that does constitute being tormented, worried continually.

[ 16 ] With reference to the reasonableness of the appellant causing the complainant to fear for her safety, the complainant led evidence about a threat to her safety concerning civil litigation she was engaged in with the appellant’s brother. At pp. 15-16, she stated:

During this period, she indicated she was in civil litigation with the defendant’s brother, Joel Orlik; that the defendant called her and said she should drop that civil litigation case now, as he had copied correspondence between the complainant and her counsel, and he, during the same telephone conversation, mentioned associations with Hells Angels. The complainant testified that she was aware of one association with Hells Angels, and an association between Bruce Orlik and the Outlaws. She testified that she was told to be very careful.

She became aware, also, during this time-frame that the defendant had attended her civil lawyer’s office, and that she became afraid. Her evidence was, “It scared the heck out of me”, and that this threat in reference to the organized crime associations made her a prisoner in her own home;

[ 17 ] The appellant pointed out that these threats were unrelated to the relevant charge, specifically any besetting or watching of the residence.

[ 18 ] The trial judge summed up her conclusions on the appellant’s conduct which caused her fear as follows at pp. 24-25:

But, it is the combination of these events, within a short period of time, at the same location, following a threat to be careful, that I must assess separately these incidents, or of limited usefulness, but, together, the Crown argues that they lead to the inference that the accused perpetrated these acts. I note that Joel also had animus with respect to the complainant, however, I find that it is unnecessary for me to make findings with respect to all of these specific incidents brought together, given the wording of the particular charge in this context. The context of the threats that the complainant, I find, did receive, and the defendant’s presence on her street, at her laneway, as described by Mr. Foran, and related to her, and as she, herself, observed, I do find that that is cause to fear.

[ 19 ] The complainant’s testimony regarding her daughter’s involvement in these matters may be paraphrased as follows:

(a) the daughter was present with the complainant and her common-law partner when the appellant was watching the house nearby. The mother, common‑law spouse and daughter panicked. The daughter observed the complainant become hysterical. The daughter started to cry. All three persons were upset because “everybody had just had enough” [of the appellant’s conduct] (see Information No. 07-16570, R. v. Orlik , Proceedings at Trial Transcript Volume III, May 4, 2009, Evidence of Kim McLenachan, p. 37);

(b) the daughter was with the complainant when both of them saw the appellant drive beside them near the complainant’s house;

(c) the daughter was concerned and upset by the appellant attending at the residence in the complainant’s absence and told him that he should not have been there and he left;

(d) the appellant followed the daughter;

(e) the daughter threw a dead rabbit found at the complainant’s residence over the backyard fence.

Application to Reopen the Evidence

[ 20 ] The appellant filed an affidavit dated May 19, 2009, the relevant paragraphs of which are as follows:

3. Ms. McLenachan is my former common-law spouse. I resided with Ms. McLenachan and her daughter Michaela McCormick (“Michaela”) at 45 Aintree Place, Kanata, Ontario, at all material times.

4. When I met with my lawyers with respect to this charge, I had no reason to believe that Mikaela could be a witness that could assist in my defence as it was her mother who was the complainant in this matter.

5. I did not attempt to contact Mikaela prior to trial, as I did not want to have it perceived as further acts of harassment or intimidation.

6. On May 6, 2009, at approximately 6 pm, I attended at Montana’s restaurant in Kanata. While sitting at a table, Mikaela approached me and said hi. She appeared very happy to see me and asked how I was doing.

7. During that conversation, I advised Mikaela that I was in the middle of my trial with respect to her mother. Mikaela advised me that she was not aware of that.

8. Michaela is 19 or 20 years old at this time and advised me that she is no longer residing with her mother.

9. As a result of my conversation with Mikaela, it is clear that Mikaela has relevant evidence with respect to the following matters:

(a) that she did not fear me now or in the past;

(b) that Ms. McLenachan did not fear me now or in the past;

(c) that Ms. McLenachan does go out of her house for different types of social activities;

(d) that she can attest to the background of the relationship between Ms. McLenachan and I (sic), as she resided with us at the relevant times.

11. Prior to my meeting with Mikaela on May 6, 2009, I was not aware that she would provide the evidence enumerated at paragraph 10 herein.

Analysis

[ 21 ] The parties agree that the appropriate test to determine whether the defence’s case should be reopened prior to a conviction is described in R. v. Hayward (1993), 1993 14679 (ON CA) , 67 O.A.C. 379, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at paras 17-19 [ Hayward ].

[ 22 ] Hayward describes the following factors to guide the judge’s exercise of discretion to reopen evidence:

(a) whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue in the case;

(b) the potential prejudice to the other party, if reopening is permitted; and

(c) the effect of permitting reopening on the orderly and expeditious conduct of the trial.

[ 23 ] The trial judge found that there was no prejudice. Rather, she rejected the application on the basis that the evidence was not relevant, except for attesting to the background relationship of the complainant and the appellant. At p. 10, she described the relationship issue as “generic.”

[ 24 ] She also concluded that the appellant was aware of relevant evidence from the daughter, yet made no effort to contact her after being charged. In all the circumstances she concluded that the effect on the expeditious conduct of the trial did not merit reopening the evidence to hear evidence of little relevance.

1. The Relevance of the Proposed Evidence

[ 25 ] The trial judge commented on the four “matters” on which the daughter could provide evidence. At p. 8 she wrote:

1. Mikaela would testify that she did not fear him at the present time, or in the past.

I agree with the Crown’s position on this proposed evidence, that it is totally irrelevant to the issue before me. Mikaela’s state of fear of the accused is not an element of the offence, nor is it relevant to my considerations on the credibility of the complainant, as the complainant’s perception of what was happening is what was at issue at trial.

[ 26 ] I would respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the daughter’s state of fear is irrelevant to the issues in this matter. I conclude that in the circumstances of this case, it is highly relevant.

[ 27 ] As described above, the complainant testified that the daughter was a target of the appellant’s conduct, and in particular, shared the experience of the appellant’s harassment with the mother and common-law spouse.

[ 28 ] According to the complainant, on that occasion all three persons panicked as described above at para. 19 (a); the mother became hysterical and the daughter cried. The complainant testified: “ everybody had just had enough” in reference to the appellant’s conduct [emphasis added].

[ 29 ] In my view, in the face of the mother’s evidence of her shared fear of the accused with the daughter, the proposed evidence of the daughter that she did not fear the accused would have been seen to be relevant to the conjoined issue of the mother and daughter’s fear caused by the accused’s conduct.

[ 30 ] It is also my view that a contradiction of the mother’s evidence both as to the daughter’s recollection of the incident and her own fear of the accused during the shared panic incident would be significant. If the incident did not happen as the mother described, a court could consider the discrepancy as a form of a “linch-pin” credibility concern, bringing about a reconsideration of the complainant’s credibility on whether the appellant’s actions caused the mother to fear for her safety.

[ 31 ] I would add that it does not appear that the trial judge considered the mother’s evidence of shared panic with her daughter in her decision. When addressing whether the court should draw an adverse inference from the fact that the Crown had not called the daughter, the trial judge stated as follows, at p. 20:

I agree with counsel for the defendant that the evidence of Pamela, the girlfriend of the complainant, and the evidence of the employer at the spa, as well as the evidence from the daughter, would have facilitated this Court’s consideration of the evidence. I disagree, however, with the suggestion that the Court should draw an adverse inference from the fact that they did not testify.

In the case of Pamela, and of the daughter, their evidence would have been related to an incident which is not directly attributable to the defendant, and would have been of limited use. [Emphasis added]

[ 32 ] As I understand it, the evidence “not directly attributable to the defendant” refers solely to the daughter disposing of the dead rabbit. The mother testified on a number of incidents where the daughter was directly involved as described above.

[ 33 ] From the foregoing statement, I conclude that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence in limiting the scope of the daughter’s possible relevant evidence, had she been called, to that surrounding the dead rabbit.

[ 34 ] The trial judge made a similar observation appearing to indicate that the daughter’s evidence related only to the dead rabbit incident when commenting on the fact that the appellant did not exercise due diligence in contacting the daughter before trial. At pp. 9-10 she wrote:

I must look at whether, or not, in any aspect of this case, this proposed witness’ evidence would have been foreseeable as being relevant. Her existence in the house was disclosed. In fact, the complainant stated that she was involved in her allegation, that a dead rabbit had been found on her doorstep and that, indeed, this very person had removed the dead rabbit from the doorstep . [Emphasis added]

[ 35 ] At p. 8 of her reasons, the trial judge stated:

2. Ms. McLenachan did not fear the accused now, or in the past.

This is not something that Mikaela could testify to, in fact. Were the Crown [to] object to this type of evidence, the objection would be sustained. One could not testify of the state of mind of another person. One can only testify as to incidents, and none are outlined in this affidavit as proposed evidence.

[ 36 ] I consider the relevance of the daughter’s testimony - that she did not fear the accused - as being directly related to the issue of the mother’s fear of the accused, as they both experienced the shared panic incident.

[ 37 ] Once the relevance of the daughter’s potential evidence of her lack of fear of the accused in this incident is acknowledged as being relevant, it is difficult to imagine how the daughter’s observations on the truthfulness of the mother’s fear of the accused, i.e. panicking and being hysterical, would not be similarly admissible as being relevant.

[ 38 ] This is a shared experience where according to the mother “everybody had just had enough” making the evidence concerning the mother’s lack of fear of the accused something on which the daughter should have been allowed to provide evidence.

[ 39 ] Standing on its own however, I consider the trial judge to have too narrowly construed the nature of the daughter’s proposed evidence in suggesting that the daughter would be testifying as a fact that she knows whether the mother feared the accused.

[ 40 ] I think the appropriate characterization of the, admittedly inadequately drafted sentence, is that the appellant is saying that the daughter would express a conclusory opinion or inference that the mother did not fear the accused based on her association with, and observations of, her.

[ 41 ] Under the modern opinion of lay opinion, it is an error to attempt to distinguish between fact and opinion; see R. v. Graat , 1982 33 (SCC) , [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819 at 835. Admissibility is based on helpfulness which is in turn based on the witness having the experiential capacity to make conclusions being in a better position than the trier of fact to form the opinion; and the opinion is a compendious mode of speaking and the witness could not as accurately, adequately and with reasonable facility describe the facts she or he is testifying about. See: David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence , 5th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), at 185-87.

[ 42 ] A lay witness is entitled to express an opinion on the state of mind of another person, such as shock, fear or happiness. See generally Watt’s Manual of Criminal Evidence (2012 ed), Toronto: Carswell: 2012, at p. 462 and R. v. Falkenberg (1995), 1995 ABCA 27 () , 95 C.C.C. (3d) 307, 165 A.R. 16 (Alta. C.A.) at para 7 .

[ 43 ] I am also in agreement with the common sense statement enunciated in civil cases that a lay opinion should be given considerable weight if formed from an opportunity to observe the person in close association and over a long period of time; see Re: Price v. Spence , 1945 339 (ON CA) , [1946] O.W.N. 80 at para. 17 .

[ 44 ] I also understand the trial judge’s reasons rejecting the admissibility of the daughter’s evidence to be on the grounds that the appellant failed to provide any particulars to support the daughter’s opinion that her mother did not fear the accused.

[ 45 ] The Hayward test only speaks to the “relevance” of the evidence, not its admissibility. The appellant’s affidavit was clearly not drafted to demonstrate admissibility of any of the daughter’s evidence. The affidavit states only that the daughter “has relevant evidence with respect to the following matters”.

[ 46 ] No attempt is made to describe the evidence. I do not believe that it is necessary to do so. As long as it is for the purpose of establishing a relevant fact, i.e. that the mother did not fear the accused on account of his conduct, it would be relevant.

[ 47 ] In my view, it would add another dimension to the Hayward test if the appellant, particularly as a defendant, was required to provide a detailed outline of the evidence he proposes to tender to establish its admissibility.

[ 48 ] The Court of Appeal in Hayward stated at para. 17 that it was sufficient for counsel to provide a summary of the anticipated evidence, implying a certain degree of flexibility on the court’s part. I find that this emphasizes that the court’s focus should be on the relevance of what the witness’ evidence intends to demonstrate, not its admissibility.

[ 49 ] See also R. v. Cunsolo , 2009 CarswellOnt 2598 , at para. 29 :

Procedural rules must have sufficient flexibility to permit departure from normal procedure where necessary to do justice in the circumstances of each case . A trial judge sitting without a jury may permit the reopening of the evidence at any time before sentence is passed: Hayward , at 197. [ Emphasis added ]

[ 50 ] If not satisfied with t he sufficiency of the statement in the affidavit, which was notably not sought to be clarified during cross-examination by the Crown, there is a further issue as to whether the court was required to inquire as to how the daughter was going to substantiate her opinion. This assumes that the judge considered the description of the daughter’s statement to be an o pinion and not a statement of fact.

[ 51 ] I am of the opinion that the trial judge was obliged to make further inquiries because of the potential miscarriage of justice were the daughter not to testify. By living with the appellant and the mother when they lived together, and thereafter with the mother during the time when the incidents of harassment occurred, there would be a presumption that the daughter was in a privileged position by her long and close association to observe the mother and to form reliable opinions on her mental state caused by these events.

[ 52 ] I would think that there would be an inference that she could provide the “best evidence” of any of the witnesses, i.e. of greatest weight on whether the appellant’s conduct caused the mother to fear for her safety. Her evidence could well raise a reasonable doubt or even be preferred to that of the neighbours with whom the mother chose to speak about these incidents from time to time, which evidence the court relied upon to corroborate the mother’s statement that she was fearful.

[ 53 ] At p. 9 of her reasons, the trial judge stated:

4. The proposed witness could attest to the background of the relationship between the complainant and the accused, given that she lived with him at the time.

No particulars are given as to what she could testify to. I suppose that from the perspective of someone, the daughter of the complainant who is living in the residence at the time, that she would be able to give some background of the relationship between her mother and the accused. It may be relevant to the issues before the Court.

[ 54 ] Later, the trial judge stated at p. 10, “I find that to permit to reopen a case on such an issue, as generic as it is noted on the application as simply the background of the relationship, in the circumstances that I have outlined...”

[ 55 ] I note that no particulars were provided on this aspect of the daughter’s testimony. However, I take no issue with the trial judge’s conclusion that reopening the evidence could not be justified if only general background evidence on the relationship was to be introduced.

[ 56 ] As expressed above, I find that the error creating a significant miscarriage of justice arises from the failure to reopen the evidence to permit the daughter to testify as to her own lack of fear of the accused and that of the mother.

[ 57 ] Obviously had the appellant’s application been allowed, she would have been permitted to provide the evidence on the background relationship between the complainant and the appellant which may contain some relevant insight into the issue of the complainant’s fear of the appellant.

[ 58 ] One does not normally assault a person who is feared. Consideration of the background relationship of the parties provides an opportunity to explore the possible existence of a retaliatory mindset arising from the appellant’s assault charges against the complainant.

2. Effect on the Orderly and Expeditious Conduct of the Trial

[ 59 ] Under this heading, the trial judge noted at p. 10 that:

where there has been no attempt to communicate with her [the daughter] in the past , in the circumstances where it would open the very real possibility of a further examination of the complainant, in my view, it would be, simply inappropriate to permit re-opening under these circumstances, and indeed, would affect the orderly conduct of this trial.... [Emphasis added]

[ 60 ] In treating the appellant’s failure to communicate with the daughter, the trial judge noted at pp. 9-10 as follows:

And I do note that there has been no attempt made to speak to Michaela since the accused was charged with this offence... I must look at whether or not, in any aspect of this case, this proposed witness’ evidence would have been foreseeable as being relevant . Her existence in the house was disclosed. In fact, the complainant stated that she was involved in her allegation, that a dead rabbit had been found on her doorstep and that, indeed, this very person had removed the dead rabbit from the doorstep. Therefore, it is quite relevant that this was a potential witness that was simply chosen not to be explored at any point, given that the only material evidence that is proposed that she would give is [on] the background of a relationship. [Emphasis added]

[ 61 ] I agree with the appellant’s submission that by concluding that the appellant ought to have attempted to communicate with the daughter given that her evidence would have been foreseeable as relevant, the trial judge misapplied the test enunciated in Hayward .

[ 62 ] The Court of Appeal in R. v. Kowall (1996), 1996 411 (ON CA) , 92 O.A.C. 82, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at para. 31 [ Kowall ], indicated that the test to reopen is more rigourous post-conviction, than prior to a finding of guilt. The court in Kowall held that:

The test for re-opening the defence case when the application is made prior to conviction has been laid down by the court in R. v. Hayward (1993), 1993 14679 (ON CA) , 86 C.C.C. (3d) 193. However, once the trial judge has convicted the accused a more rigorous test is required to protect the integrity of the process, including the enhanced interest in finality.

[ 63 ] In describing the more rigorous test to be applied to reopening cases after conviction, Kowall , the Court adopted the same test for reopening as the test for admitting fresh evidence on appeal. These criteria were previously established in R. v. Palmer , 1979 8 (SCC) , [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, [ Palmer ]. The first criterion, in Palmer , at para. 22 , and subsequently adopted in Kowall , at para. 31 , holds that “[t]he evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly in a criminal case as in civil cases…”

[ 64 ] The Hayward decision makes no reference to a due diligence requirement in its three-pronged test. I find that none is required, with the exception perhaps, of situations where a party seeks to reopen in order to recall a witness who has already testified; see R. v. Arabia , 2008 ONCA 565 , 235 C.C.C. (3d) 354.

[ 65 ] I conclude that the trial judge erred in imposing a due diligence requirement by finding that the appellant should have attempted to speak to the daughter after being charged because her evidence would have been foreseeable as being relevant.

[ 66 ] Moreover, it is arguable that the trial judge erred in applying too “strictly” the more rigorous diligence test were it to apply in the circumstances. Given the mother’s testimony I would have thought that the court would have been justifiably surprised to hear that the daughter would contradict what her mother had testified to.

[ 67 ] It is difficult therefore, not to sympathize with the appellant’s deposition that he “had no reason to believe that Mikaela would be a witness that could assist the defence as it was her mother who was the complainant in this matter.”

[ 68 ] For the same reason, I also am of the opinion that the trial judge was overly strict in dismissing the appellant’s evidence that he believed that it was implied from his interim release that he could not have contact with the daughter because his conclusion was “inaccurate”.

[ 69 ] In my view, the trial judge was required to consider whether the appellant could have had an honest belief that the prohibition on communication was implied from the terms of the release.

[ 70 ] The interim release was not introduced into evidence during the trial. Nor was the appellant cross-examined on its conditions, which apparently were discussed during submissions when the document was brought out from the file.

[ 71 ] It is noted that the prohibition prevented the appellant from being within “500 meters of the residence, school or place of work of Kim McLenachan”. I find the inclusion of the term “school” to be confusing in that it would appear to have more relevance to the daughter, who was 16 years of age at the time, than the complainant. The term “school” was not included on the recognizance issued after conviction. The mother also testified that the daughter told the appellant that he should not be at the residence when the mother was away, which he apparently complied with.

[ 72 ] In any event, in applying the test for reopening as a whole and, even were due diligence a requirement of the test, in all the circumstances described above, I conclude that the highly relevant nature of the daughter’s potential evidence would outweigh any concerns about the effect of reopening on the orderly and expeditious conduct of the trial.

Order

[ 73 ] In my opinion, the refusal to allow the defence to reopen its case to call the daughter was an error in law. The Crown cannot establish that but for that error the verdict would necessarily have been the same given that the proposed evidence relates to an element of the charge.

[ 74 ] I would allow the appeal, quash the conviction and order a new trial.

[ 75 ] In light of this conclusion, I also order that the mother, or anyone on behalf of the mother, apart from the Crown, is prohibited from discussing with the daughter matters relating to her potential evidence at the new trial.

Annis J.

Released: September 6, 2012