Dallas Mack

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender/long-term offender assessment under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code and sought to designate Dr. Philip Klassen as the assessor.

Defence counsel opposed this designation, proposing alternative psychiatrists.

The court held that while the accused has a role in the expert designation, the court should defer to the Crown's choice absent cogent and compelling reasons indicating the Crown's choice is inappropriate, such as lack of qualifications, bias, or unavailability.

The court found no such reasons to reject Dr. Klassen and rejected the defence's proposals due to potential bias (treating psychiatrist) and unavailability.

Dr. Klassen was designated.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 48 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the case was not particularly complex and that the Crown's reliance on the previous state of the law was unreasonable, particularly given the accused's continuous pre-trial custody and the Crown's failure to mitigate delay caused by its own unavailability.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to bar the Crown from calling witnesses to testify about matters that the defence had already admitted or offered to admit.

The defence argued that calling such evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant given the admissions.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the Crown has broad prosecutorial discretion to determine how to present its case, including the right to reject defence-framed admissions and to call evidence to prove elements such as planning and deliberation, negate third-party suspect theories, and provide confirmatory evidence for unsavoury witnesses.

The Crown sought to admit two statements made by the accused to police during a missing person investigation that later became a first-degree murder case.

The court found the first statement inadmissible because the police officer's notes were inadequate to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The second statement, which was video-recorded, was ruled admissible because the accused attended the police station voluntarily, the interaction was conversational, and the police did not yet have reasonable grounds to suspect the accused of a crime, meaning no caution was required.

During a trial, the Crown sought to introduce intercepted telephone conversations to show the state of mind of the witnesses, rather than for the truth of their contents.

The defence objected, arguing the Crown must first attempt to refresh the witnesses' memories or establish past recollection recorded.

The court ruled that the intercepted communications were admissible as real evidence without a preliminary voir dire or the need to exhaust the witnesses' memories, allowing the Crown to play the recordings and ask the witnesses to comment.

The Crown sought to admit certain text messages for the truth of their contents in a criminal trial.

The Defence objected, citing concerns about necessity and reliability under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court ruled that two of the four contested text messages were admissible for the truth of their contents under the present intentions and co-conspirators’ exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that they met the necessity and reliability requirements despite the declarant's availability.

The other two messages were deemed to lack probative value for their truth.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by two accomplices who refused to testify at the accused's trial for second degree murder.

The accomplices had previously given statements to police and one had testified at his own trial.

Applying the principled approach to hearsay, the court found that the police statements met the test for threshold reliability due to corroborating evidence and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.

However, the court excluded the prior trial testimony of one accomplice, finding that the leading cross-examination by the Crown at that trial undermined its reliability and admission would negatively impact trial fairness.

Sam Tsega was charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to admit evidence of Tsega's marijuana use and dealing to establish opportunity, motive, context, and witness credibility.

The defense argued inadmissibility due to lack of support for inferences and prejudicial effect outweighing probative value.

The court applied the Handy/L.B. framework, finding the evidence relevant and material to central issues, and while discreditable, its probative value significantly outweighed any minimal prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The evidence was deemed admissible.

The offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a horrific, drug-fueled home invasion.

The court accepted a joint submission for a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 18 years for the murder, along with concurrent sentences of 14 years for attempted murder and 6 years for aggravated assault.

The court weighed the extreme violence and premeditation against the offender's early guilty pleas, deep remorse, and lack of prior criminal record.

The applicants sought to vary a sealing order under s. 487.3(4) of the Criminal Code to obtain access to the Information to Obtain search warrants executed at two residences.

They argued that, as non‑accused persons affected by the search, they had a presumptive right to access the materials in order to assess potential Charter s. 8 violations.

The Crown opposed, arguing that a non‑accused must first present some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully before a court will review sealed materials.

The court adopted the approach from Michaud v. Quebec (Attorney General) and R. v. Schmidt, requiring a preliminary evidentiary basis before varying a sealing order.

Because the applicants filed no evidence suggesting unlawful authorization of the warrants, the application was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that declared the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 737(1) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The accused, who pleaded guilty to multiple offences and was indigent with mental health and addiction issues, argued that the mandatory surcharge imposed a crushing financial burden.

The Superior Court agreed that the surcharge constitutes punishment for Charter purposes but held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to establish that the surcharge was grossly disproportionate.

The court emphasized the high threshold for s. 12 violations and the availability of statutory mechanisms such as extensions of time to pay.

The appeal was allowed and the surcharge was ordered imposed.

The accused applied for an order requiring that his murder trial be scheduled earlier than the agreed trial date because he would have been in custody for nearly four years by the time of trial.

Granting the request would effectively require the reassignment of one of the Crown prosecutors who was unavailable on earlier court dates.

The court held that the assignment of Crown counsel is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion belonging to the Attorney General and is reviewable only for abuse of process.

As no abuse of process or improper motive was alleged or established, the court declined to interfere with prosecutorial discretion.

The application for an earlier trial date was therefore dismissed.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.

A 26-year-old Inuit street person with severe alcohol and drug addiction was convicted of nine offences including assault, mischief, and breaching court orders.

He faced a mandatory victim surcharge of $900 ($100 per offence) under section 737 of the Criminal Code.

Living on social assistance with a monthly income of $250, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the victim surcharge provision, arguing it violated section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment and that imposing it on an indigent offender in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate, both as applied to the accused and in reasonable hypothetical cases.

The court declared section 737 of no force or effect.

During a jury trial for multiple robberies and a conspiracy charge, the Crown brought a similar fact application seeking permission for the jury to use evidence from several robbery counts as proof of identity across those counts.

The court analyzed similarities between four convenience store robberies occurring within a short time frame in the Ottawa area, including the method of operation, division of labour among perpetrators, use of masks and firearms, handling of store clerks, and the repeated presence of a distinctive heavy-set participant.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence in identity cases, the court held that the cumulative similarities were sufficiently significant to render coincidence objectively improbable.

The probative value of the evidence outweighed potential prejudice, particularly because each event was already charged in the indictment.

The court therefore permitted the jury to consider the four group robbery counts as similar act evidence for identity and allowed evidence of robberies or attempted robberies to be considered on the issue of intent regarding the conspiracy charge.

During a jury trial for multiple convenience store robberies where the perpetrators wore masks, the Crown sought to admit a 2009 police booking photograph of the accused showing him wearing a jacket with three stripes.

The Crown argued the photograph was admissible as a police business record under s. 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and constituted circumstantial evidence linking the accused to robbery surveillance footage depicting a similarly striped jacket.

The defence objected on the basis that the evidence carried significant prejudicial risk and minimal probative value.

The court held that while the photograph could qualify as a business record, admissibility still required a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Given the common nature of the clothing, the two‑year time gap, and the risk the jury would infer prior police involvement, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking admission of similar fact evidence relating to several convenience store robberies to prove identity of the perpetrators in a multi-count indictment involving robberies committed by one or more offenders.

The court applied the framework governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Perrier, R. v. Handy, and R. v. Arp, including the additional requirements where group criminal activity involves rotating participation.

The court found sufficient distinctive similarities among three robberies committed by a single offender to admit evidence of a prior conviction as similar fact evidence against one accused on the issue of identity.

However, the Crown failed to establish the necessary distinctive modus operandi among the group robberies because numerous material differences undermined the alleged common signature.

As a result, most of the requested similar act evidence was excluded.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

The Crown and the Ontario Provincial Police applied for certiorari to quash a provincial court disclosure order requiring production of records related to an Intoxylizer 8000C breath testing device in impaired driving prosecutions.

The lower court had ordered disclosure of calibration, maintenance, usage logs, prior subject test records, and samples of the alcohol standard solution used in breath testing.

The applicants argued the police should have been treated as a third party and given notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that the disclosure order conflicted with expert evidence about the relevance of the records.

The court held that the police possessed a direct interest in the records and should have been afforded an opportunity to make submissions on whether the materials constituted third party records.

The order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for reconsideration of the disclosure regime with participation from the police.

The accused brought a motion to sever one robbery count from a fourteen-count indictment alleging multiple robberies and attempted robberies of convenience stores over several months.

The defence argued that the later robbery count lacked a sufficient legal and factual nexus to the earlier incidents and that trying all counts together would cause unfair prejudice.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting substantial similarities between the incidents and indicating an intention to rely on similar fact evidence across the counts.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court held that the Crown had a viable similar fact argument and that the similarities among the robberies established a sufficient nexus.

The court concluded that any risk of prejudice could be mitigated through appropriate jury instructions and dismissed the severance application.