Leonardo Russomanno

The two accused were charged with multiple firearms and driving offences following a drive-by shooting and subsequent high-speed police chase.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, as the accused were arrested in the suspect vehicle shortly after the shooting, and gunshot residue was found on their hands.

The driver testified that two unknown passengers committed the shooting and fled the vehicle before the police stopped them.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, applying the W.(D.) and Villaroman frameworks, and found both accused guilty of the firearms offences and the driver guilty of the driving offences, but acquitted the driver of resisting arrest due to inconsistent police testimony.

The Crown and the accused brought six pre-trial motions relating to a joint trial for murder and accessory after the fact.

During the hearing, the accused Osman failed to appear, and the court found he had absconded under s. 475 of the Criminal Code, allowing the motions to proceed in his absence.

The court granted a consent order protecting the identities of three victim witnesses.

The court ruled that evidence of the accused's after-the-fact conduct, including flight and a subsequent meeting, was admissible for limited purposes.

Osman's s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay was dismissed, as the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was reasonably mitigated by the Crown.

Khiar's s. 8 Charter application to exclude video surveillance obtained from his condominium's property manager without a warrant was dismissed, as he had a low expectation of privacy in the common areas.

Finally, the court admitted the expert opinion evidence of a forensic video analyst, subject to limitations on tracking and comparing clothing characteristics.

The accused Osman, charged as an accessory after the fact to murder, brought a pre-trial motion for severance from his co-accused, who was charged with second-degree murder.

Osman argued that severance was necessary to preserve his right to be tried within a reasonable time, as he was ready for a judge-alone trial while his co-accused insisted on a jury trial, which was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the motion premature, noting that the Crown had not yet sought consent for a judge-alone trial and further case management was required.

The motion was adjourned with specific case management orders made to expedite the proceedings.

The applicants brought a motion to reconsider a previous decision denying production of CSIS source documents and sought leave to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on a Garofoli voir dire.

The court found that newly disclosed information revealed an apparent contradiction in the CSIS affidavit regarding whether a target was actively seeking a gun.

This contradiction met the threshold to show the affiant may have failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court ordered the CSIS source documents to be produced for judicial review to determine their relevance to the Garofoli application.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of CSIS search warrants that formed the basis for subsequent RCMP wiretap warrants in a terrorism investigation.

The applicant alleged breaches of s. 8 of the Charter and argued the information to obtain the warrants failed to establish both a threat to the security of Canada and investigative necessity under s. 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that the affidavit contained sufficiently reliable information, including detailed statements from a human source relaying incriminating admissions from a target of the investigation, and that the issuing judge could reasonably conclude the statutory requirements were met.

The court further held that the investigative necessity requirement under the CSIS Act differs from the investigative necessity standard applicable to Criminal Code wiretaps.

The application to set aside the warrants was dismissed.

In a terrorism prosecution, the applicants sought further disclosure from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service relating to payments made to a human source relied upon in a CSIS affidavit supporting investigative warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that records detailing remuneration and reimbursements paid to the source were likely relevant to a pending Garofoli voir dire because financial incentives may affect credibility and the affiant’s assessment of reliability.

Production of records relating to payments to the source was therefore ordered.

However, the request for disclosure of any CSIS reliability assessments concerning a target of the investigation was refused, as the target was not a traditional informant whose reliability required evaluation.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing explosive materials for the purpose of endangering life or causing serious property damage in a terrorism context.

The court emphasized the gravity of terrorism-related offences under the Criminal Code and the serious threat posed to public safety.

After considering the joint submission of counsel and the circumstances of the offence, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence of 24 years with credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 to 1, totaling six years of credit.

The court ordered that the accused serve a further 18 years and imposed a delayed parole eligibility period pursuant to s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code.

Additional ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

During a jury trial for multiple robberies and a conspiracy charge, the Crown brought a similar fact application seeking permission for the jury to use evidence from several robbery counts as proof of identity across those counts.

The court analyzed similarities between four convenience store robberies occurring within a short time frame in the Ottawa area, including the method of operation, division of labour among perpetrators, use of masks and firearms, handling of store clerks, and the repeated presence of a distinctive heavy-set participant.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence in identity cases, the court held that the cumulative similarities were sufficiently significant to render coincidence objectively improbable.

The probative value of the evidence outweighed potential prejudice, particularly because each event was already charged in the indictment.

The court therefore permitted the jury to consider the four group robbery counts as similar act evidence for identity and allowed evidence of robberies or attempted robberies to be considered on the issue of intent regarding the conspiracy charge.

The applicants sought leave to cross‑examine a CSIS affiant in a Garofoli‑type challenge relating to warrants issued under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act in a terrorism prosecution.

They alleged material non‑disclosure and mischaracterization in the affidavit supporting the warrants, including contradictions in source material regarding an alleged attempt to acquire a firearm, the remuneration structure of a confidential source, the source’s alleged status as an agent, and the possibility of direct meetings between the source and one applicant.

Applying the threshold in R. v. Garofoli and R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, the court held that cross‑examination is permitted only where it could undermine a statutory precondition for authorization.

The court found a sufficient factual foundation regarding a contradiction about attempts to obtain a gun, which could relate to the existence of reasonable grounds and the duty of full, fair, and frank disclosure.

Leave was granted on that issue but denied for the remaining proposed lines of questioning.

During a jury trial for multiple convenience store robberies where the perpetrators wore masks, the Crown sought to admit a 2009 police booking photograph of the accused showing him wearing a jacket with three stripes.

The Crown argued the photograph was admissible as a police business record under s. 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and constituted circumstantial evidence linking the accused to robbery surveillance footage depicting a similarly striped jacket.

The defence objected on the basis that the evidence carried significant prejudicial risk and minimal probative value.

The court held that while the photograph could qualify as a business record, admissibility still required a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Given the common nature of the clothing, the two‑year time gap, and the risk the jury would infer prior police involvement, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking admission of similar fact evidence relating to several convenience store robberies to prove identity of the perpetrators in a multi-count indictment involving robberies committed by one or more offenders.

The court applied the framework governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Perrier, R. v. Handy, and R. v. Arp, including the additional requirements where group criminal activity involves rotating participation.

The court found sufficient distinctive similarities among three robberies committed by a single offender to admit evidence of a prior conviction as similar fact evidence against one accused on the issue of identity.

However, the Crown failed to establish the necessary distinctive modus operandi among the group robberies because numerous material differences undermined the alleged common signature.

As a result, most of the requested similar act evidence was excluded.

The appellant appealed convictions for obstructing a police officer and two counts of failing to comply with an undertaking.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in determining when the appellant was detained by police, thereby triggering Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The appellant argued detention occurred from the outset of the police interaction in a park during proactive policing.

Applying the framework from R. v. Grant, the court held the initial interaction constituted general questioning and did not amount to detention until the appellant provided false identifying information confirmed by another officer.

The court concluded there was no Charter breach and no error of law by the trial judge.

The applicant, facing serious and complex drug and criminal organization charges, brought a Rowbotham application seeking a stay of proceedings until state-funded counsel was provided.

He had been refused legal aid due to incomplete financial documentation regarding the disposition of several properties.

The court found that the applicant required counsel for a fair trial and that he was indigent, having exhausted his financial resources and being unable to provide further documentation to Legal Aid.

The court granted a conditional stay of proceedings until funding for counsel was provided.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's request to appoint specific counsel at a specific hourly rate, noting that the court lacks jurisdiction to set fees or dictate how Legal Aid retains counsel.

The Court held that under s. 16(3) of the Canada Evidence Act, an adult witness with mental disabilities is competent if they can communicate evidence and promise to tell the truth.

Requiring abstract understanding of truth-telling obligations was rejected.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.