Dallas Mack

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his conviction for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a third victim while threatening to use a knife.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of violence, non-compliance with court orders, and diagnoses of sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder.

Despite the offender's recent use of anti-androgen medication (chemical castration), the court found no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community, given his history of deceit and the need for lifelong treatment.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term in penitentiary.

A Gardiner hearing was conducted following the accused’s guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 14 to determine disputed aggravating facts relevant to sentencing.

The Crown alleged that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted the complainant over an extended period, while the accused admitted only a single incident initiated by the complainant.

Applying the principles in W(D.), the court rejected the accused’s account as implausible and unreliable.

After considering the complainant’s inconsistent prior statements and the surrounding evidence, the court accepted the essential substance of the complainant’s testimony.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted and sexually touched the complainant over many months and that he occupied a parental role toward the child.

The applicant sought clarification of a prior court order relating to disclosure materials held by defence counsel.

The earlier order required the return of all disclosure and imposed conditions including mentoring and removal of disclosure materials from internet sources.

The issue on the motion was whether the earlier order implicitly required the Crown to provide future disclosure only in hard copy to defence counsel.

The court held that the original order did not address future disclosure and that the court could not compel the Crown regarding disclosure practices not covered by the application that produced the earlier order.

The matter was remanded to be spoken to at a later date.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction on two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from an unprovoked bar-related attack on two victims.

One victim was rendered unconscious by a single punch and later died, although the offender was convicted only of assault causing bodily harm for the loss of consciousness.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the premeditated nature of the assaults, the vulnerability of the intoxicated victim, and the offender’s lack of remorse.

While youth and the absence of a criminal record at the time of the offence were mitigating factors, the seriousness and moral blameworthiness of the conduct required incarceration.

A custodial sentence of 24 months less a day followed by probation was imposed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.

During a jury trial for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to stop, the defence brought a motion requesting that the jury be permitted to conduct a view of the scene depicted in surveillance footage.

Both parties agreed that the wide-angle lens used in the video distorted distances and perspectives, potentially affecting the jury’s understanding of the evidence.

The court considered the authority under s. 652 of the Criminal Code and determined that a view may be ordered where it assists the jury in understanding the evidence, though it is not itself evidence.

The judge concluded that a view of the gas bar where the incident occurred would assist the jury and ordered it with detailed logistical and non‑communication safeguards.

A request to include a nearby gas station related to a different offence was denied.

During a manslaughter jury trial arising from a fatal assault outside a bar, the court ruled on several evidentiary and procedural applications.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of a witness on the basis that police and Crown interviews improperly pressured the witness and constituted abuse of process.

The court held that informing a witness that authorities did not believe him, raising the possibility of perjury, and confronting him with conflicting evidence did not amount to oppressive or abusive conduct.

The court also permitted the Crown to cross‑examine a witness on a prior inconsistent statement under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, finding the statement voluntary and sufficiently reliable despite the witness’s illness and reluctance.

However, the court excluded proposed circumstantial “association evidence” linking the accused to others at the bar, finding the inferential chain speculative and irrelevant to identification.