Dallas Mack

During a jury trial for multiple convenience store robberies where the perpetrators wore masks, the Crown sought to admit a 2009 police booking photograph of the accused showing him wearing a jacket with three stripes.

The Crown argued the photograph was admissible as a police business record under s. 30(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and constituted circumstantial evidence linking the accused to robbery surveillance footage depicting a similarly striped jacket.

The defence objected on the basis that the evidence carried significant prejudicial risk and minimal probative value.

The court held that while the photograph could qualify as a business record, admissibility still required a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

Given the common nature of the clothing, the two‑year time gap, and the risk the jury would infer prior police involvement, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial motion seeking admission of similar fact evidence relating to several convenience store robberies to prove identity of the perpetrators in a multi-count indictment involving robberies committed by one or more offenders.

The court applied the framework governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Perrier, R. v. Handy, and R. v. Arp, including the additional requirements where group criminal activity involves rotating participation.

The court found sufficient distinctive similarities among three robberies committed by a single offender to admit evidence of a prior conviction as similar fact evidence against one accused on the issue of identity.

However, the Crown failed to establish the necessary distinctive modus operandi among the group robberies because numerous material differences undermined the alleged common signature.

As a result, most of the requested similar act evidence was excluded.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

The Crown and the Ontario Provincial Police applied for certiorari to quash a provincial court disclosure order requiring production of records related to an Intoxylizer 8000C breath testing device in impaired driving prosecutions.

The lower court had ordered disclosure of calibration, maintenance, usage logs, prior subject test records, and samples of the alcohol standard solution used in breath testing.

The applicants argued the police should have been treated as a third party and given notice and an opportunity to be heard, and that the disclosure order conflicted with expert evidence about the relevance of the records.

The court held that the police possessed a direct interest in the records and should have been afforded an opportunity to make submissions on whether the materials constituted third party records.

The order was quashed and the matter remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice for reconsideration of the disclosure regime with participation from the police.

The accused brought a motion to sever one robbery count from a fourteen-count indictment alleging multiple robberies and attempted robberies of convenience stores over several months.

The defence argued that the later robbery count lacked a sufficient legal and factual nexus to the earlier incidents and that trying all counts together would cause unfair prejudice.

The Crown opposed severance, asserting substantial similarities between the incidents and indicating an intention to rely on similar fact evidence across the counts.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court held that the Crown had a viable similar fact argument and that the similarities among the robberies established a sufficient nexus.

The court concluded that any risk of prejudice could be mitigated through appropriate jury instructions and dismissed the severance application.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following his conviction for kidnapping and sexually assaulting a third victim while threatening to use a knife.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive history of violence, non-compliance with court orders, and diagnoses of sexual sadism and antisocial personality disorder.

Despite the offender's recent use of anti-androgen medication (chemical castration), the court found no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community, given his history of deceit and the need for lifelong treatment.

The offender was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate term in penitentiary.

A Gardiner hearing was conducted following the accused’s guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 14 to determine disputed aggravating facts relevant to sentencing.

The Crown alleged that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted the complainant over an extended period, while the accused admitted only a single incident initiated by the complainant.

Applying the principles in W(D.), the court rejected the accused’s account as implausible and unreliable.

After considering the complainant’s inconsistent prior statements and the surrounding evidence, the court accepted the essential substance of the complainant’s testimony.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted and sexually touched the complainant over many months and that he occupied a parental role toward the child.

The applicant sought clarification of a prior court order relating to disclosure materials held by defence counsel.

The earlier order required the return of all disclosure and imposed conditions including mentoring and removal of disclosure materials from internet sources.

The issue on the motion was whether the earlier order implicitly required the Crown to provide future disclosure only in hard copy to defence counsel.

The court held that the original order did not address future disclosure and that the court could not compel the Crown regarding disclosure practices not covered by the application that produced the earlier order.

The matter was remanded to be spoken to at a later date.

The offender was sentenced following a jury conviction on two counts of assault causing bodily harm arising from an unprovoked bar-related attack on two victims.

One victim was rendered unconscious by a single punch and later died, although the offender was convicted only of assault causing bodily harm for the loss of consciousness.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the premeditated nature of the assaults, the vulnerability of the intoxicated victim, and the offender’s lack of remorse.

While youth and the absence of a criminal record at the time of the offence were mitigating factors, the seriousness and moral blameworthiness of the conduct required incarceration.

A custodial sentence of 24 months less a day followed by probation was imposed.

The Crown brought an application for certiorari and mandamus to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondents on charges of first degree murder and commit them on second degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences, usurping the role of the trier of fact, and failing to consider the whole of the evidence regarding planning and deliberation and unlawful confinement.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the test for committal and did not commit any jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to return a verdict of first degree murder.

During a jury trial for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and failing to stop, the defence brought a motion requesting that the jury be permitted to conduct a view of the scene depicted in surveillance footage.

Both parties agreed that the wide-angle lens used in the video distorted distances and perspectives, potentially affecting the jury’s understanding of the evidence.

The court considered the authority under s. 652 of the Criminal Code and determined that a view may be ordered where it assists the jury in understanding the evidence, though it is not itself evidence.

The judge concluded that a view of the gas bar where the incident occurred would assist the jury and ordered it with detailed logistical and non‑communication safeguards.

A request to include a nearby gas station related to a different offence was denied.

During a manslaughter jury trial arising from a fatal assault outside a bar, the court ruled on several evidentiary and procedural applications.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of a witness on the basis that police and Crown interviews improperly pressured the witness and constituted abuse of process.

The court held that informing a witness that authorities did not believe him, raising the possibility of perjury, and confronting him with conflicting evidence did not amount to oppressive or abusive conduct.

The court also permitted the Crown to cross‑examine a witness on a prior inconsistent statement under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, finding the statement voluntary and sufficiently reliable despite the witness’s illness and reluctance.

However, the court excluded proposed circumstantial “association evidence” linking the accused to others at the bar, finding the inferential chain speculative and irrelevant to identification.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction.

The central issue was whether the trial judge's finding that the complainant was in fear was reasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal court correctly determined the finding was not unreasonable and that the reasons were adequate.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.