Julianne Parfett

The respondent brought a motion to determine which intermediate school the parties' eldest child should attend.

The parties shared custody and lived in different catchment areas.

The respondent preferred a public school closer to her home, while the applicant preferred a Catholic school closer to his home.

The court applied the best interests of the child test, considering factors such as the child's moderate preference for the Catholic school, the schools' resources for the child's dyslexia, and the logistical challenges of the commute.

The court ordered the child to attend the Catholic school, placing weight on the child's consistent preference and the applicant's willingness to assist with transportation.

The defendants were successful in setting aside an ex-parte Mareva injunction after their marital situation changed, eliminating the risk of them fleeing the jurisdiction.

The defendants sought costs as the successful party, while the plaintiff argued that no costs should be awarded due to the defendants' conduct complicating the litigation.

The court applied Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the defendants unnecessarily complicated the matter by litigating the sale of the matrimonial home.

Furthermore, the injunction was set aside due to changed circumstances, not any failure by the plaintiff.

The court ordered that no costs be awarded to either party.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge failed to recognize that video evidence of the incident had been modified.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the video's reliability and appropriately relied on the victim's testimony while rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The court concluded that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

During a criminal trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the court ruled on whether the partial defence of provocation should be put to the jury and whether directed verdicts of acquittal should be entered for the accessory charges.

The court found an air of reality to the provocation defence, noting evidence that the deceased may have fired first.

The court dismissed the application for a directed verdict on accessory after the fact to a firearms offence, but granted a directed verdict of acquittal for accessory after the fact to murder, as the victim was not yet dead when the assistance was provided.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for defamation, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and that the statements were protected by qualified privilege.

The plaintiff, a construction superintendent, alleged that a vendor performance management report detailing problems with his work was defamatory and had been posted on the MERX database.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that because the report may have been published on MERX to an unknown number of subscribers, it was not possible at this stage to determine if the defence of qualified privilege applied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg%.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the breathalyzer technician had formed his own reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer demand, and that he was arbitrarily detained between his arrest and the breathalyzer demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence regarding the technician's grounds and concluding that the detention was lawful under s. 497(1.1) of the Criminal Code to secure evidence.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Hells Angels and Red Devils, in a trial where the accused allegedly attempted to forcibly remove a victim's gang-related tattoo.

The defence opposed the qualification, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, unreliable, and the officer lacked proper qualifications.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and found the officer was properly qualified based on her extensive experience.

The court ruled her evidence on gang structure and culture was necessary, but excluded her proposed testimony interpreting text messages and her evidence on tattoo removal practices that relied on inherently suspect hearsay.

The appellant, a driving instructor, appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a guilty plea, arguing the plea was not voluntary or unequivocal because he did not understand the charges due to language difficulties.

The court heard fresh evidence from the appellant, his friend who acted as an interpreter, and his former trial counsel.

The court rejected the appellant's evidence, finding that he understood the allegations and the consequences of his plea, and that his plea was both voluntary and unequivocal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff issued an ultimatum regarding her husband's pay and subsequently participated in organizing a work stoppage, demanding changes to her employment duties.

The court found that while the plaintiff did not clearly resign, her actions constituted a repudiation of her employment contract, justifying the end of her employment.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The defendant's counterclaim for wrongful resignation was also dismissed, as the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff's departure caused the alleged financial losses.

The applicant hotel sought a declaration from the Superior Court of Justice that it was eligible for electricity rebates under the Ontario Rebate for Electricity Consumers Act 2016 and the Ontario Fair Hydro Plan Act.

The respondent local electricity distribution company brought a motion to stay the proceedings, arguing the matter fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board.

The court granted the motion and stayed the application, finding that the substance of the dispute involved enforceable provisions under the Ontario Energy Board Act, granting the Board exclusive jurisdiction.

The accused, an animal rights activist, was charged with breaking and entering a mink farm with intent to commit mischief.

He admitted to trespassing and surreptitiously videotaping the animals to publicize their living conditions, but denied intending to commit mischief.

The Crown argued that the videotaping and subsequent publication of the farmer's personal information constituted mischief.

The court found that the surreptitious videotaping of a commercial property did not interfere with the lawful use of the property and caused no harm to the animals.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the intent to commit mischief.

The applicant mother brought a motion to determine whether the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over custody and access of the parties' child, who had been living in India with his paternal grandparents since 2018.

The court found that because the parties were pursuing a divorce and both resided in Ontario, the Divorce Act superseded the Children's Law Reform Act, granting the court jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the court found that under the CLRA, the child's last habitual residence was with his parents in Ontario, also giving the court jurisdiction.

The moving party mother sought to vary a temporary consent order to allow for increased, unsupervised access to her child, as well as a restraining order against the responding party father.

The mother had previously consented to supervised access due to severe substance abuse issues but had since demonstrated significant efforts towards sobriety and rehabilitation.

The court found a material change in circumstances and determined it was in the child's best interests to gradually increase the mother's access and remove the supervision requirement, subject to strict conditions including random drug testing and COVID-19 protocols.

The court also granted the restraining order but declined to order counselling for the child.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the two children were in need of protection and an order for extended society care.

The mother consented to statutory findings but opposed the protection and disposition orders.

The court granted summary judgment on the protection issue, finding the children in need of protection due to the mother's paranoid personality disorder, frequent moves, and use of physical discipline.

However, the court found a genuine issue for trial regarding the final disposition, as the mother had recently made significant efforts to improve her parenting and engage in counselling.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault, applied for state-funded counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist with his appeal.

The court found that while the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel, he failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal regarding alleged misapprehension of evidence and trial judge bias.

The application was dismissed as the applicant was also deemed capable of representing himself.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of s. 10(b) of the Charter and in excluding breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2).

The trial judge had found breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) due to a four-minute delay in making an ASD demand and a six-minute delay in reading rights to counsel.

The Superior Court upheld the s. 10(b) breach finding but concluded the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) analysis by failing to assess the specific impact of the ss. 8 and 9 breaches on the respondent's Charter-protected interests, instead relying solely on the cumulative effect of multiple breaches.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a limited trial on the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Crown brought an ex parte motion for certiorari and mandamus to compel a reviewing justice to consider a search warrant application on its merits.

The reviewing justice had rejected the warrant on its face because it listed a police locker as the place to be searched and electronic devices as the things to be seized, stating a warrant was not required to search a police locker.

The Superior Court held that characterizing an electronic device as an item to be seized and searched, rather than as a place to be searched, does not invalidate the warrant.

The court found the reviewing justice made an error in law and issued the order for certiorari and mandamus.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife during their marriage.

The Crown's case relied on a single incident from 2002.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, finding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also noted significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and a strong motive to fabricate arising from a bitter family court dispute over child custody and access.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order postponing an upcoming trial or requiring security for costs due to the respondent's failure to pay outstanding costs awards and child support arrears.

The respondent sought leave to bring a motion to vary child support.

The court found that the respondent's efforts to pay child support arrears were inadequate to justify granting leave for his motion to vary.

However, given the respondent's apparent impecuniosity, the court declined to order security for costs or stay the proceedings, directing that the trial proceed as expeditiously as possible.